Opinion of the Court employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO "pattern . . . of activity," § 1962(c), uses that corporation as a "vehicle" whether he is, or is not, its sole owner. Conversely, the appellate court's critical legal distinction— between employees acting within the scope of corporate authority and those acting outside that authority-is inconsistent with a basic statutory purpose. Cf. Reves, supra, at 184 (stating that an enterprise is "operated,'" within § 1962(c)'s meaning, "not just by upper management but also by lower rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management" (emphasis added)). It would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims―e. g., high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the purposes of that enterprise, act within the scope of their authority. Cf. Turkette, supra, at 581 (Congress "did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal"). Finally, we have found nothing in the statute's history that significantly favors an alternative interpretation. That history not only refers frequently to the importance of undermining organized crime's influence upon legitimate businesses but also refers to the need to protect the public from those who would run "organization[s] in a manner detrimental to the public interest." S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 82. This latter purpose, as we have said, invites the legal principle we endorse, namely, that in present circumstances the statute requires no more than the formal legal distinction between "person" and "enterprise" (namely, incorporation) that is present here. In reply, King argues that the lower court's rule is consistent with (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents, 1 Fletcher, supra, §30, (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable Opinion of the Court for the criminal acts of its employees where Congress so intends, Brief for Respondents 20-21, and (3) the Sherman Act principle limiting liability under 15 U. S. C. §1 by excluding "from unlawful combinations or conspiracies the activities of a single firm," Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 769-770, n. 15 (1984). The alternative that we endorse, however, is no less consistent with these principles. It does not deny that a corporation acts through its employees; it says only that the corporation and its employees are not legally identical. It does not assert that ordinary respondeat superior principles make a corporation legally liable under RICO for the criminal acts of its employees; that is a matter of congressional intent not before us. See, e. g., Gasoline Sales, Inc., 39 F. 3d, at 73 (holding that corporation cannot be "vicariously liable" for § 1962(c) violations committed by its vice president). Neither is it inconsistent with antitrust law's intracorporate conspiracy doctrine; that doctrine turns on specific antitrust objectives. See Copperweld Corp., supra, at 770-771. Rather, we hold simply that the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision before us applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner-whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Syllabus DUNCAN, SUPERINTENDENT, GREAT MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. WALKER CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 00-121. Argued March 26, 2001-Decided June 18, 2001 The time during which an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" is pending tolls the limitation period for filing federal habeas petitions. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). Before the April 24, 1996, effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), respondent's state robbery conviction became final. He filed, inter alia, a federal habeas petition under §2254. The District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice because it was not apparent that respondent had exhausted available state remedies. On May 20, 1997, without having returned to state court, respondent filed another federal habeas petition. The District Court dismissed that petition because respondent had not filed within a reasonable time from AEDPA's effective date. In reversing, the Second Circuit found that respondent's first federal habeas petition was an application for "other collateral review" that tolled the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely. Held: A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State postconviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). As a result, § 2244(d)(2) did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of respondent's first federal habeas petition. The Court begins with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 431. Petitioner's contention that "State" applies to the entire phrase "post-conviction or other collateral review" is correct. To begin with, Congress placed "State" before that phrase without specifically naming any kind of "Federal" review. The fact that other AEDPA provisions denominate expressly both "State" and "Federal" proceedings, see, e. g., §2254(i), supplies strong evidence that Congress would have mentioned "Federal" review expressly had Congress intended to include federal review. See Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23, 29-30. Respondent's contrary construction would render the word "State" insignificant, if not wholly superfluous. This Court's duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute, United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539, makes the Court reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage. This is especially so when the Syllabus term occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme as the word "State" in the federal habeas statute. But under respondent's rendition, "State" has no operative effect on the scope of § 2244(d)(2). The clause would have precisely the same content were it to read "postconviction or other collateral review." Contrary to the Second Circuit's characterization, petitioner's interpretation does not yield the linguistic oddity "State other collateral review," but more naturally yields the understanding "other State collateral review." Further, that court's reasoning that the phrase "other collateral review" would be rendered meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions depends on the incorrect premise that the only state "collateral" review is "post-conviction" review. "[O]ther collateral review" could include, e. g., a state court civil commitment or civil contempt order. Congress also may have used "post-conviction or other collateral" in recognition of the diverse terminology that different States employ to represent the different forms of collateral review that are available after a conviction. Examination of the AEDPA provision establishing the limitation period for filing §2254 petitions in state capital cases, §2263(b)(2), shows that Congress used the disjunctive clause "post-conviction review or other collateral relief" where the latter term could not possibly include anything federal within its ambit. Petitioner's construction is also far more consistent than respondent's with AEDPA's purpose to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. Respondent contends that petitioner's interpretation creates the potential for unfairness to litigants who file timely federal petitions that are dismissed without prejudice after the limitation period has expired. But the Court's sole task here is one of statutory construction. And in light of the facts that respondent never cured the defects that led to the dismissal of his first federal petition during the remaining nine months of the limitation period, and that his 1996 and 1997 petitions contained different claims, this Court has no occasion to address alternative scenarios. Pp. 172-182. 208 F.3d 357, reversed and remanded. O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 182. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SouTER, J., joined, post, p. 182. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined, post, p. 185. Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Eliot Opinion of the Court Spitzer, Attorney General, Daniel Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, and David Axinn, Robert H. Easton, Robin Forshaw, and Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Solicitors General. Deborah Wolikow Loewenberg, by appointment of the Court, 531 U. S. 1066, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were John H. Blume and Keir M. Weyble.* JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: "The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." This case presents the question whether a federal habeas corpus petition is an "application for State postconviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of this provision. I In 1992, several judgments of conviction for robbery were entered against respondent Sherman Walker in the *A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Catherine E. Sullivan and William J. Meade, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Earl Anzai of Hawaii, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Darrel V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia. Leon Friedman and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. |