Opinion of the Court State's rehabilitation programs. By contrast, returning the prisoner prior to trial-in violation of Article IV(e)—would permit the prisoner to participate in the sending State's program for some of those days. But to call such a violation "technical," because it means fewer days spent away from the sending State, is to call virtually every conceivable antishuttling violation "technical"-a circumstance which, like the 13th chime of the clock, shows that Alabama's conception of the provision's purpose is seriously flawed. Article IV(e) may seek to remove obstructions to prisoner rehabilitation in a different way. The Agreement not only prevents "return," but it also requires the receiving State to pay for the prisoner's incarceration in that State during the period prior to trial. Art. V(h) (“From the time that a party State receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending State, the [receiving] State . . . shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner"). That requirement may provide the receiving State with an incentive to shorten the pretrial period-to proceed to trial faster than 120 days or not to seek extensions-thus disposing of detainers, and the attendant "uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation," in the most "expeditious" manner. Art. I. See also Cuyler, 449 U. S., at 449 (discussing negative effects of detainers on prisoners). But if that is Article IV(e)'s purpose, the transfer here was inconsistent with it. By returning Bozeman to federal prison, the county saved itself the cost of housing him—and for a nontrivial several week period, which may have allowed it to delay resolving the detainer. Alternatively, the Agreement's drafters may have thought that the "shuttling" itself, i. e., the movement back and forth among prisons, adds to the "uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation." Art. I Opinion of the Court (emphasis added). And they may have sought to minimize the number of "shuttles" for that reason alone. Viewing the Agreement in terms of either purpose, we cannot say that the one-day violation here is de mimimis, technical, or harmless. Neither do the briefs (or, to our knowledge, any lower court opinion) point to any other plausible rehabilitation-related purpose of Article IV(e) specifically, in terms of which the violation here might count as trivial. But we need not decide precisely what led Congress and the many other legislatures to agree to Article IV(e)'s antishuttling remedy. Given the Agreement's absolute language, it is enough to explain why Alabama's view of the Agreement's purpose is not plausible and to point to other purposes more easily squared with Article IV(e)'s text and operation. C Alabama and amici make additional claims, basically elaborating on the trial court's view that return to the sending State after a brief journey to the receiving State for pretrial purposes is helpful, not harmful, to the prisoner. But given Article IV's text, which indicates a contrary view, the parties would more appropriately address these policy arguments to legislatures. The Solicitor General also points to a federal statutory provision that says expressly that an "order of a court dismissing any indictment, information, or complaint may be with or without prejudice," depending on the "seriousness of the offense," the "facts and circumstances of the case," and the "impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the agreement" and "on the administration of justice." 18 U. S. C. App. §9(1), p. 695. This statutory provision, however, governs only when "the United States is a receiving State." §9. And here the United States is not the receiving State. We fail to see how this provision helps, rather than hurts, Alabama's cause. Although we reject Alabama's interpretation of the Agreement, our decision does not bar a Opinion of the Court receiving State from returning a prisoner when it would be mutually advantageous and the prisoner accordingly waives his rights under Article IV(e). Cf. Hill, 528 U. S., at 114115 (holding that defendant may waive his rights under Art. III of the Agreement) For these reasons, the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Syllabus CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. KING ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 00-549. Argued April 18, 2001-Decided June 11, 2001 Petitioner, a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise... to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity," 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c). The District Court, citing Circuit precedent, dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Second Circuit expressed its view that §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. In this instance, the court noted, it was undisputed that King was an employee of his corporation and also acting within the scope of his authority. Under the court's analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs." Held: In the circumstances of this case, § 1962(c) requires no more than the formal legal distinction between "person" and "enterprise" (namely, incorporation); hence, the provision applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner-whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority. This Court does not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a "person"; and (2) an "enterprise" that is not simply the same "person" referred to by a different name. Nonetheless, the Court disagrees with the appellate court's application of that "distinctness" principle to the present circumstances, in which a corporate employee, acting within the scope of his authority, allegedly conducts the corporation's affairs in a RICOforbidden way. The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status. The Court can find nothing in RICO that requires more "separateness" than that. Syllabus Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts his corporation's affairs through illegal acts comes within § 1962(c)'s terms forbidding any "person" unlawfully to conduct an "enterprise," particularly when RICO explicitly defines "person" to include "any individual... capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property," and defines "enterprise" to include a "corporation," §§ 1961(3), (4). And, linguistically speaking, the employee and the corporation are different "persons," even where the employee is the corporation's sole owner. Incorporation's basic purpose is to create a legal entity distinct from those natural individuals who created the corporation, who own it, or whom it employs. See, e. g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 61-62. The precedent on which the Second Circuit relied involved significantly different circumstances from those here at issue. Further, to apply RICO in these circumstances is consistent with the statute's basic purposes of protecting both a legitimate "enterprise" from those who would use unlawful acts to victimize it, United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 591, and the public from those who would unlawfully use an "enterprise" (whether legitimate or illegitimate) as a "vehicle" through which unlawful activity is committed, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 259. Conversely, the appellate court's critical legal distinction-between employees acting within and without the scope of corporate authority-would immunize from RICO liability many of those at whom this Court has said RICO directly aims, e. g., high-ranking individuals in an illegitimate criminal enterprise, who, seeking to further the enterprise's purposes, act within the scope of their authority, cf. Turkette, supra, at 581. Finally, nothing in the statute's history significantly favors an alternative interpretation. This Court's rule is no less consistent than is the lower court's rule with the following principles cited by King: (1) the principle that a corporation acts only through its directors, officers, and agents; (2) the principle that a corporation should not be liable for its employees' criminal acts where Congress so intends; and (3) antitrust law's intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Pp. 161-166. 219 F.3d 115, reversed and remanded. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard A. Edlin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Ronald D. Lefton. Austin C. Schlick argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assist |