• Both reafon and analogy seem to draw our views towards a ftate of things fo noble and grand. There feems a proneness in nature to perish, if we admit not the supposition. But the greatness of fuch an univerfal fyftem only opens upon us by degrees. We are led onwards to, conceptions of ftill more furpaffing grandeur. If the mediation of fecond caufes fo far obtain, what an inconceivable difplay of creation is fuggefted, when we turn our thoughts towards that place which the motions of fo many revolving fyftems is made to respect! Here may be, fo to speak, an hitherto unthought-of univerfe of itself, an example of material creation, which must individually far exceed all the other parts, although added into one amount, and whofe remoteness, next to infinite, may be conformable to fome more exalted nature which it poffeffes. Sober reason will not be disposed to revolt at fo glorious, an extenfion of the works of God, how much foever it be fuited to overpower our weak conceptions. It may be again repeated, that reason and analogy lead towards the thoughts of such a scheme of things, and doth not this very analogy acquire an additional weight and authority from the transcendent nature of the material univerfe at which it points?

• But laft of all, an appeal may be made to arguments still more direct. For, agreeable to all that hath been said, certain proper motions of the ftars begin actually to be discovered by the nicety of modern obfervations. Sirius, Caftor, Procyon, Regulus, Alpha Aquila, Pollux, Arcturus, and many others, are found to be all moving through abfolute space with incredible velocity, and the whole ftars in the firmament are suspected to do so, by the first astronomers of this age. What an astonishing thing, this when confidered in its proper and full extent! It seems the voice of nature reaching from the uttermoft heavens, and inviting us to enlarge and elevate our views.

Let pofterity, therefore, determine, how far the obferved laws of these celeftial motions, shall favour these hints of one grand universal system.'

This pamphlet bears evident marks of a very masterly pen; the thoughts being expreffed in that liberal and open manner fo peculiar to enlarged, philofophical minds, replete with true and folid literature, and accustomed to that closeness and ftrength of reafoning so constantly imbibed from mathematical and philofophical ftudies.

The

A Treatise on Man, bis Intellectual Faculties, and bis Education. A Pofthumous Work of M. Helvetius. Tranflated from the French, with additional Notes. By W. Hooper, M. D. In 2 vols. 80.

THE point, which this learned writer endeavours to establifh, is, that education, neceffarily different in different men, is the cause of that inequality of understanding, hitherto attributed to the unequal fenfibility of their organs.

For this purpose he enquires at what age the education of man begins, and who are his inftructors. He obferves, that man is the pupil of every object which furrounds him, of all the pofitions in which chance has placed him, and, in short, of every incident that happens to him; that these objects, pofitions, and incidents, are not exactly the fame with respect to any two perfons; and, confequently, no two receive the fame inftructions; that if it were poffible for two men to have the fame objects before their eyes, these objects, not ftriking them at the precise moment, when their minds are in the fame fituation, would not, in confequence, excite in them the fame ideas. Therefore, he fays, the pretended uniformity of inftruction, received either in the fchools, or in the parent's houfe, is one of those fuppofitions, the impoffibility of which is proved by facts, and by the influence, that chance, independent on inftructors, has, and always will have, on the education of childhood and youth,'

These points being determined, the author confiders the extreme extent of the power of chance, and examines, whether illuftrious men do not frequently owe to it their tafte for a particular fort of study, and confequently their talents, and their fuccefs in that study; whether the fcience of education can be perfected, without reftraining the bounds of the empire of chance; whether the contradictions, at prefent, perceived among all the precepts of education, do not extend the empire of chance, &c.

In the second section he examines, whether all men, commonly well organized, have not an equal aptitude to underftanding ??

The object of the third fection is an enquiry concerning the causes, to which the inequality of understanding is to be attributed. The caufes are reducible to two: the one is the unequal defire that men have to knowledge; the other, the diversity of positions, in which chance places them, a diversity from which results that of their inftruction and their ideas. To fhew that it is to these two causes only we ought to refer the VOL. XLIV. Nov. 1777. difference

difference and inequality of understandings, he proves, that most of our difcoveries are the gifts of chance; that these gifts are not granted to all; that, however, chance is lefs neglectful of us, than we are of chance; that, in fact, all men commonly well organized, have an equal power of understanding, but that power is dead in them, when not put in action by fome paffion, as the love of efteem, or glory; and that men owe to fuch paffions only the attention proper to fecundate the ideas offered to them by chance.

He then endeavours to demonflrate, that men commonly well organized are fufceptible of the fame degree of paffion; that its unequal force is always the effect of the difference of fituations, in which chance has placed them; that the original character of each man, as Pafcal obferves, is nothing more than the produce of his firft habits; that a man is born without ideas, without paffions; and without other wants than thofe of hunger and thirst, and confequently without character; that he often changes it, without any change in his organization; that those changes, independent of the greater or lefs fineness of his fenfes, operate according to the changes, that happen in his fituation and ideas; that the diverfity of characters depends folely on the different manners, in which the fentiment of-felf-love is modified in men; that this fentiment, the neceffary effect of corporeal fenfibility is common to all, and produces in all the love of power; and that this defire produces envy, the love of wealth, of glory, importance, justice, virtue, intolerance; in fhort, all the factitious paffions, whofe feveral names mean nothing more than the different applications of the love of power.

As no

In the next place, the author points out the errors and contradictions of thofe, who adopt on this question principles different from his own, and refer the inequality of understanding to the unequal perfection in the organs of the fenfes. one has written better on this fubject than Mr. Rouffeau (See Eleifa, vol. iii. &c.) he cites him for an example; and fhews, that he is always contradicting himself, fometinies regarding understanding and character, as effects of the diverfity of temperaments, and fometimes adopting the contrary opinion.

In the remaining fections he confiders the feveral evils produced by ignorance; the good and bad effects of riches; the little influence that religions have on the virtue and felicity of nations; what conftitutes the happiness of individuals, and the happiness of a nation; the poffibility of tracing out a good plan of legiflation; the power of education, and the means of giving it the utmoft degree of perfection with other interefting fubjects.

As

As our author's hypothefis is liable to be controverted, he, points out the analogy of his principles with thofe of Mr. Locke.

The understanding, he fays, is nothing more than the affemblage of our ideas. Our ideas, fays Locke, come to us by the fenfes; and from this principle, as from mine, it may be concluded, that the understanding is nothing more in us than an acquifition.

To regard it as a mere gift of nature, or the effect of a particular organisation, without being able to name the organ by which it is produced, is to bring back to philofophy the Occult qualities; it is to believe without proof, and judge at a venture,

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History and experience equally inform us that the under-" ftanding is independent of the greater or lefs fineness of the fenfes, that men of different conftitutions are fufceptible of the fame pallions and the fame bideas.

The principles of Locke, far from contradi&ting this opinion, confirm it; they prove that education makes us what we are; and that men more refemble each other as their inftructions are more fimilar; and confequently that a German re fembles a Frenchman more than an Afiatic; and another German more than a Frenchman; and, in fhort, if the underftandings of men be very different, it is because none of them have the fame education..

Such are the facts on which I have compofed this work; I offer it with the more confidence to the public, as the analogy of my principles with thofe of Locke affureme of their truth.

If I were defirous ofcourting the protection of the theologians, I would add, that thefe principles are the moft conformable to the ideas a Christian ought to form of the juftice of God.

In fact, if the underftanding, the characters, and paffions of men depend on the unequal perfection of their organs, and each individual were a different machine, how could the justice of heaven, or even that of earth, require the fame effects from difimilar machines? Would God have given the fame law to all, without granting them all the fame means of fulfilling it ? If a refined and delicate probity be that of precept, and if that kind of precept frequently fuppofes great intelligence, it follows, that all men commonly well organifed, must be endowed by the divinity with an equal aptitude to understanding.

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Let it not be imagined however that I would maintain the truth of my principles by theological arguments; I do not accufe to the fanatics, thofe whofe opinions on this fubject are different from mine: to oppose them with other arms than those

of reafon, would be to wound the enemy behind, whom I dared not look in the face.

• Experience and reafon are the only judges of my principles: were their truth demonftrated, I should not conclude that these principles ought to be immediately and univerfally adopted. The truth is always propagated flowly. The Hungarians believed in vampires a long time after their non-existence had been demonstrated. The antiquity of an error renders it for a long time refpectable. I therefore do not flatter myself with feeing the common race of men abandon, for my opinions, thofe in which they have been educated, and which they refpect."

Allowing that education has infinite power in improving the human mind, it may, at the fame time, be very confiftently afferted, that the capacities, the acutenefs, the penetration, the intellectual endowments of men may be very different. 'One man, fays an ingenious writer, feems to inherit, from propitious nature, a more fubtle and exquifite texture of mind, more delicate fenfibilities, more acute difcernment, a more elegant tafte and genius, a finer understanding, a more tenacious memory, a stronger founder judgment, and far more alert and vigorous powers, than what we fee another born heir to.' On the other hand, in this and every other country on the face of the earth, there are innumerable dunces, who feem to be qualified for no higher purpose than to handle a spade, a cleaver, an oar, or a gun, or to deal in old cloaths and rabbit-fkins. No happy combination of chance, no poffible application, no inftruction that could be obtained, would have placed them upon a level with Milton, Newton, or Locke, fo that ex quovis ligno non fit Mercurius,' feems to be a maxim founded in the conftitution of nature.

It seems to be extremely proper, in a state of fociety, that there fhould be mechanics and labourers, and that the lowest occupations should be filled with men of proportionable abi lities; but it is by no means neceffary, in point of justice, that the Creator fhould beftow the fame capacity on every indivi dual of the human fpecies, as it would be a useless and unprofitable gift.

An inequality of genius feems likewife to be agreeable to the analogy of nature. We fee a plain gradation from the hell-fish to the Hottentot, and from the Hottentot to the sublime poet and philofopher.

M. Helvetius feems alarmed at the idea of bringing occult qualities into philofophy. Here he carries his apprehenfions too far. Philofophy must confefs her ignorance in many things.

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