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absurdly accounted for. In the latter class of explanations may be included the notion that the people of the South were exasperated by the interference of Congress, that body, as already mentioned, not having convened till after the passage of the obnoxious laws. On the other hand, it was not generally known, even in Mississippi, that the President in the work of reorganization had resolved to ignore the coordinate political branch of Government; he had, indeed, fairly signified to Governor Sharkey the position that he intended to assume, but his communication to that official, which was never designed for publication, was not immediately circulated through the State; the knowledge, therefore, that the Executive had concluded to oppose the policy of Congress could not have been a factor in disturbing the brief repose of the seceding States, and we must seek elsewhere for the cause. In many of the insurgent commonwealths rebellion had involved almost every citizen in the guilt of treason, almost every estate in the liability to confiscation. The President and his advisers hoped by a generous distribution of pardons to win the esteem and confidence of this numerous and influential class, and to leave to "Radical" members of Congress the ungrateful office of punishment. This policy contributed to awaken the undaunted spirit of the South, and was, no doubt, an element in unsettling the conditions that prevailed after the surrender. Northern magnanimity, which was content to regard the defeat of secession as sufficient discipline for the rebellious States, and the attitude of the Democratic party were also important influences in misleading the South. More responsible for the reaction, however, than any of these was the unsatisfactory administration of the Freedmen's Bureau. The testimony of General Grant can be cited to prove that, while accomplishing much that was desirable, this institution was retarding somewhat the progress of reconstruction. In a hurried tour of the late Confederate States

he had observed that it was not conducted with good judgment or economy, and remarked in his report to the President that "the belief widely spread among the freedmen of the Southern States, that the lands of their former owners will, at least in part, be divided among them, has come from the agents of this bureau. This belief is seriously interfering with the willingness of the freedmen to make contracts for the coming year. Many, perhaps the majority, of the agents of the Freedmen's Bureau advise the freedmen that by their own industry they must expect to live. To this end they endeavor to secure employment for them, and to see that both contracting parties comply with their engagements. In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief in division of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and cities.” 1

Though its management was open to criticism, the necessity for the existence of the bureau, to afford at least temporary protection to the newly enfranchised, was perceived and acknowledged by the General. It probably accorded well with the political aspirations of bureau agents to create in the minds of freedmen a belief that the Government would give to each of them "forty acres of land and a mule "; for this expectation would be a pledge of allegiance to the Federal representative, without the approval of whom no negro could seriously hope to secure so enviable a start in his career of freedom.

That confusion would follow the violent overthrow of a long-established industrial system was to be expected, and it was not unnatural for the South to ascribe to the influence of bureau agents much of the mischief inseparable from immediate emancipation. While the complaints of the late in1 Ann. Cycl., 1866, p. 132.

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surgents were commonly considered with deference, it was scarcely to be expected that they would not sometimes be despised, and it would be easy to impute to their discontent every outrage reported to the officers of the bureau or the commanders of the posts. Though Federal representatives as a rule labored faithfully to restore and preserve order, it would be singular if some of them, assuming the arrogant manner of conquerors, did not occasionally depart from that system of conciliation which the generous nature of Mr. Lincoln had adopted.

These were among the causes of the Southern reaction. It is no justification of these severe and even cruel enactments to show, as Mr. Herbert has done, that similar laws disgraced the statute books of many Northern States. In the settlement then in progress the Southern people conceded nothing of importance that was not won in the war, and if they were as sincere in their desire for reunion as some writers contend, they should not have feared the paradox of improving by their example the ancient legislation of the free States, or have been alarmed at the innovation of reducing to practice the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

It is not to be denied that there was considerable ground for complaint because of the influence of many employees of the bureau in demoralizing the Southern system of labor, but the further punishment of a race that had been trodden down by oppressive generations does not commend itself as either a humane or an enlightened remedy; besides, the South was greatly indebted to the fidelity of the negro, who during the war possessed, without abusing, the opportunity as well as the capacity for mischief. On the other hand, there was some obligation to Northern men for their magnanimity, and under wiser counsels their wishes, and even their prejudices, would have been respected. In the victorious section public opinion, then in the formative stage, was watching anxiously the

progress and the proceedings of the new governments. Except a few extremists, the voters of the loyal States did not dream at that time, as was persistently asserted at the South, of forcing negro suffrage on the rebellious States. They did, however, desire to see embodied in the new State constitutions such provisions as would establish before the law the equality of all classes.

While the policy of President Johnson did not altogether escape criticism at the South, so general and so prompt was the acquiescence in his plan, that when Congress convened nearly all the States recently in rebellion had remodeled their governments and elected members of Congress who were at the national capital waiting to be admitted to seats. Without separately considering the new establishments, they may be described concisely and with sufficient accuracy as governments differing but little from those extinguished by the fall of the Confederacy. The members of the former, it is true, had taken an oath of allegiance, and the influence of that act upon their conduct will presently be noticed. Though it certainly was not the original intention, and appears never to have become the fixed purpose of Mr. Johnson to entrust to enemies of the Government the work of restoring the insurgent States, the result of his endeavors was that reconstruction was left almost exclusively in the hands of those who had attempted to destroy the Union. It was precisely such a contingency that Mr. Lincoln had in mind when he declared in his message of December 8, 1863, that, "An attempt to guarantee and protect a revived State government, constructed in whole or in preponderating part from the very element against whose hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply absurd." 1

This deliberate statement, as well as the subsequent administrative acts of Mr. Lincoln, sufficiently disposes of the noAnn. Cycl., 1863, pp. 780-781.

tion that he favored a rather loose system of reconstruction. Without attempting to distinguish between theories really identical, there was still a considerable difference in the reorganization effected under the two Executives. The conditions which confronted the President and Congress in December, 1865, could have arisen only from disregarding the principle laid down by Mr. Lincoln. From his solemn and reiterated declarations there can be little doubt that he would have rejected without hesitation any system of which the first fruits were little more than a nullification of his decree of emancipation.

Notwithstanding his tireless threats of severity, we can easily perceive in the reorganization directed by Mr. Johnson, a noticeable falling back from the Executive plan of December, 1863, as announced and enforced by his predecessor. Nor did this retrogression proceed from the greater humanity, but rather from the greater weakness of the new President. Even in the matter of fealty there was a difference; for while the conflict was still doubtful, the taking of an oath of allegiance to the General Government was a serious step for the Southern Unionist, because the record thereafter singled him out, if not for destruction, at least for annoyance, or for punishment by the friends of secession, and, perhaps, the oath then effected some such object as it was designed to accomplish. When war had ceased, however, there was no longer a choice of sides, and thenceforth universal swearing as an instrument of government became practically worthless. It was not regarded, at all events, as an efficient security for the future. Mr. Johnson probably continued to exact oaths of allegiance because they were formerly of value in distinguishing the friends from the enemies of the Government. Though professing the same general opinion on the subject of amnesty, the principles on which the two Presidents granted pardons were sufficiently distinct.

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