per.142 A carrier of passengers stands in the same position with respect to baggage 143 intrusted to his possession,1** but if the passenger retains control the carrier will be liable only if negligence is shown.145

The measure of care with respect to passengers has been variously stated,146 e. g., as "extraordinary care," 147 "the highest practicable degree of care," 148 "the highest degree

ligence, see Clarke v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. Dec. 205, note; McGraw v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 18 W. Va. 361, 41 Am. Rep. 696.

142 Loveland v. Burke, 120 Mass. 139, 21 Am. Rep. 507; Bradley v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 145 App. Div. 312, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1045; American Lead Pencil Co. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 124 Tenn. 57, 134 S. W. 613, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 323. Whether the act of the shipper by which the injury was caused amounted to negligence is immaterial. Hart v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 69 Iowa, 485, 29 N. W. 597.

143 Baggage includes "whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or to the ultimate purpose of the journey.” Macrow v. Great Western Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612, 622, per Cockburn, C. J. In accord, Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Whitten, 90 Ark. 462, 119 S. W. 835, 21 Ann. Cas. 726; Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. v. Morrison, 34 Kan. 502, 9 Pac. 225, 55 Am. Rep. 252; Hasbrouck v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 202 N. Y. 363, 95 N. E. 808, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 537, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1150; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 25 L. Ed. 531.

144 Haaga v. Austro-Americana Line, 173 Ill. App. 35; Wolf v. Grand Rapids Holland & Chicago Ry., 149 Mich. 75, 112 N. W. 732; Hubbard v. Mobile & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 Mo. App. 459, 87 S. W. 52; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 594; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Beasley, 104 Va. 788, 52 S. E. 566, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183.

145 Repp v. Indianapolis C. & S. T. Co. (Ind. App. 1905) 109 N. E. 441; Kinsley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 125 Mass. 54, 28 Am. Rep. 200, note; Knieriem v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 109 App. Div. 709, 96 N. Y. Supp. 602; American Steamship Co. v. Bryan, 83 Pa. 446. Cf. Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 151 N. Y. 163, 45 N. E. 369, 34 L. R. A. 682, 56 Am. St. Rep. 616, where a steamboat was treated as a "floating inn."

146 See Moore on Carriers (2d Ed.) vol. 2, p. 1210 et seq.

147 Raymond v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 152, 154, 21 N. W. 495; Sales v. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 547, 549.

148 Washington, A. & Mt. V. Ry. Co. v. Vaughan, 111 Va. 785, 794, 69 S. E. 1035.

"149 "the highest "150 "the highest

of care that a reasonable man would use,' degree of care of a very prudent person,' degree of care and caution, consistent with the practical operation of the road," 151 "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful prudent men," 152 or "the utmost care and diligence which human foresight can use." 153

No useful purpose would be served by attempting here to analyze these statements of a principle which in effect is that the degree of care for the safety of passengers "is much higher than the ordinary care required of men who sustain to each other nothing more than the common relations of life which one citizen, merely as such, sustains to another." 15 This does not apply, however, where the person of the passenger is not in the carrier's control. the approaches to the cars, such as platforms, halls, stairways, and the like, a less degree of care is required. * The rule in such cases is that the carrier is bound simply to exercise ordinary care in view of the dangers to be apprehended." 155 "With respect of these it is to be

*

"In

149 Kebbe v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 641, 643, 84 Atl. 329, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 167. Cf. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Burke, 147 Ky. 694, 696, 145 S. W. 370, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 208 ("highest degree of care which ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the operation of railroad trains exercise for the safety of passengers").

150 O'Connell v. St. Louis Cable & W. Ry. Co., 106 Mo. 482, 484, 17 S. W. 494. Cf. Beattie v. Detroit United Ry., 158 Mich. 243, 246, 122 N. W. 557.

151 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Kromshinsky, 185 Ill. 92, 56 N. E. 1110.

152 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 456, 26 L. Ed. 141. Cf. Brady v. Springfield Traction Co., 140 Mo. App. 421, 425, 124 S. W. 1070 ("utmost care * * that would be used by very cautious persons under the same circumstances").

153 Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 102 Md. 110, 113, 62 Atl. 245; Cf. Palmer v. President, etc., of Delaware & H. Canal Co., 120 N. Y. 170, 174, 24 N. E. 302, 17 Am. St. Rep. 629; Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R. Co., 157 Pa. 103, 27 Atl. 689, 22 L. R. A. 306; Ozanne v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (C. C.) 151 Fed. 900.

154 Michie on Carriers, vol. 2, p. 1714.

155 Kelly v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 112 N. Y. 443, 450, 20 N. E. 383, 3 L. R. A. 74. In accord, Falls v. San Francisco & N. P. R. Co., 97 Cal. 114, 31 Pac. 901; Bacon v. Casco Bay Steamboat Co., 90 Me. 46, 37 Atl. 328..

held to that reasonable degree of care for the safety and protection of its patrons, having regard to the nature of its business, as is demanded of individuals upon whose premises others come by invitation or inducement for the transaction of business." 156

DETERMINING STANDARD OF CARE-RES
IPSA LOQUITUR

111. What the conduct of the man of ordinary prudence would have been under the circumstances, and whether plaintiff or defendant lived up to this standard, are questions which ordinarily must be answered by the jury, unless the facts are undis puted, and fair-minded men could draw but one conclusion from them.157

But there are cases where a definite rule of law has been framed to meet given conditions. For example, it may be said generally, the courts not being altogether in accord in formulating the rule, that a traveler who goes upon a railway track must first "make a vigilant use of his eyes and ears to ascertain the presence of a train." 158 He must look and listen, and a failure to do so will constitute negligence,159 though his omission to look will not necessarily

156 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 104 Ind. 239, 243, 3 N. E. 874, per Mitchell, J. In accord, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Allen, 75 Kan. 190, 88 Pac. 966, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 576. Cf. Bennett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 102 U. S. 577, 26 L. Ed. 235.

157 Mann v. Belt Railroad & Stock-Yard Co., 128 Ind. 138, 26 N. E. 819; Lasky v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 83 Me. 461, 22 Atl. 367; Cumberland & P. R. Co. v. State to Use of Fazenbaker, 37 Md. 156; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485.

158 Judson v. Central Vt. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 597, 605, 53 N. E. 514; Davis v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 400.

159 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Richards, 100 Ala. 365, 13 South. 944; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Cooper v. North Carolina R. Co., 140 N. C. 209, 52 S. E. 932, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391, 6 Ann. Cas. 71; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Wilson, 90 Va. 263, 18 S. E. 35; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 542;

make him negligent, where to look would be useless.100 By the weight of authority there is no rule of law that requires him to stop, though his failure to do so may be a fact to be considered by the jury.101 There is also, as many courts have held, a legal duty to look before crossing a city street.162 But, although the traveler must use his eyes, yet Hart v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 196 Fed. 180, 116 C. C. A. 12. In Illinois, however, it has been held that "no invariable rule can be predicated upon the mere act of failing to look or listen." Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Ill. 540, 553, 22 N. E. 20. The authorities are collected in 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 135, note.

160 Vance v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 9 Cal. App. 20, 98 Pac. 41 (view obstructed by box car); Smedis v. Brooklyn & R. B. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 13 (engine without lights on dark night; could not have been heard); Pruey v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 41 App. Div. 158, 58 N. Y. Supp. 797, affirmed 166 N. Y. 616, 59 N. E. 1129 (engine backing without light or signal on dark, foggy morning); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Burge, 84 Va. 63, 4 S. E. 21 (view of track obstructed by fence and buildings). Cf. Hendrickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 340, 54 N. W. 189; Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 631, 15 Am. Rep. 633. Contra, if the obstruction is but temporary (e. g., smoke from a passing engine), Debbins v. Old Colony R. Co., 154 Mass. 402, 28 N. E. 274; West Jersey R. Co. v. Ewan, 55 N. J. Law, 574, 27 Atl. 1064; Heaney v. Long Island R. Co., 112 N. Y. 122, 19 N. E. 422.

161 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mizell, 100 Ky. 235, 38 S. W. 5; Van Auken v. Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 96 Mich. 307, 55 N. W. 971, 22 L. R. A. 33; Jenkins v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 124 Minn. 368, 145 N. W. 40; Danskin v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 83 N. J. Law, 522, 83 Atl. 1006; Judson v. Central Vt. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 597, 53 N. E. 514. But in Pennsylvania it has been held that the traveler must stop, and, if he cannot see the track, he must alight from his vehicle and advance to a point from which an observation may be made. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504, 13 Am. Rep. 753; Mankewicz v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 214 Pa. 386, 63 Atl. 604; Bistider v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 224 Pa. 615, 73 Atl. 940. Cf. Ellis v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 138 Pa. 506, 21 Atl. 140, 21 Am. St. Rep. 914. The duty of an automobile driver to stop where there is restricted vision has been held a positive duty. Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 179 Fed. 577, 103 C. C. A. 135, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Maidment, 168 Fed. 21, 93 C. C. A. 413, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 794.

162 Davis v. John Breuner Co., 167 Cal. 683, 140 Pac. 586; Zoltovski v. Gzella, 159 Mich. 620, 124 N. W. 527, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435, 134 Am. St. Rep. 752; Lorah v. Rinehart, 243 Pa. 231, 89 Atl. 967 (look and listen); Dimuria v. Seattle Transfer Co., 50 Wash. 633, 97

as the New York Court of Appeals has said in a recent case: "The law does not say how often he must look, or precisely how far, or when, or from where. If, for example, he looks as he starts to cross, and the way seems clear, he is not bound as a matter of law to look again. The law does not even say that, because he sees a wagon approaching, he must stop till it has passed. He may go forward unless it is close upon him; and whether he is negligent in going forward will be a question for the jury. If he has used his eyes, and has miscalculated the danger, he may still be free from fault. But it is a very different thing to say that he is not bound to look at all." 163

It has been seen that a cause of action may arise out of the breach of a statutory duty.16 This is not to be confounded with cases based upon negligence. In the former, the failure to observe the statute creates a liability per se. In the latter, the violation of a statute or an ordinance having some connection with the injury is, as some courts have held, merely evidence more or less cogent to be considered by the jury. Thus, in New York, where this doctrine prevails, it was held that the violation of a statute prohibiting the employment of a child under fourteen in any factory was to be given mere evidential effect in an action brought by one injured thereby.160 A similar conclusion was reached where a team was left unattended in the street,167 and where a public way was obstructed,108 in disregard of an ordinance.16 The

Pac. 657, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 471. Contra, Barbour v. Shebor (1912) 177 Ala. 304, 58 South. 276. See Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 79 (cf. Crimmins v. Armstrong Transfer Exp. Co., 217 Mass. 155, 104 N. E. 457).

163 Knapp v. Barrett, 216 N. Y. 226, 230, 110 N. E. 428, per Cardozo, J. Cf. Higgins v. Public Service Ry. Co. (1910) 79 N. J. Law, 471, 76 Atl. 1028.

164 See supra, p. 32 et seq.

165 Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N. Y. 531, 108 N. E. 830, L. R. A. 1915E, 519.

166 Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530, 66 N. E. 572, 61 L. R. A. 811. 167 Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488.

168 Fluker v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N. Y. 40, 93 N. E. 1112, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 793.

160 In accord, Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190, 45 Atl.