DAMAGES

80. Upon the commission of a trespass, plaintiff is entitled at least to nominal damages, since there has been

an invasion of a legal right. Beyond this, the amount depends upon circumstances.

Upon proof that a trespass has been committed, plaintiff becomes entitled to some damages, though where he has suffered no actual, loss the amount may be but nominal.106 Beyond this, except where smart money may be awarded,107 his recovery will be limited to compensation for such damages as he may establish,108 and which proximately result from the wrongful act.100 The trespasser, it has been said, cannot be permitted to urge, even in mitigation, that he has really benefited the plaintiff by his wrongful acts, since one may not thrust benefits upon another, and then set them up in reduction of the damage he has caused.110 While generally this is true, it is unfair so to hold in cases where improvements have in good faith been added to the land, which plaintiff would not other

106 Realty, Brown v. Perkins, 1 Allen (Mass.) 89; Brame v. Clark, 148 N. C. 364, 62 S. E. 418, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 73. Personalty, Champion v. Vincent, 20 Tex. 812.

107 Stevens v. Stevens, 96 Ga. 374, 23 S. E. 312; Druse v. Wheeler, 22 Mich. 439; Trainer v. Wolff, 58 N. J. Law, 381, 33 Atl. 1051; Brame v. Clark, 148 N. C. 364, 62 S. E. 418, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 73.

108 Engle v. Jones, 51 Mo. 316. Proof of the extent of loss is essential, in order that there may be a recovery for more than nominal damages. Batson v. Higginbothem, 7 Ga. App. 835, 68 S. E. 455; Caruth v. Allen, 2 McCord (S. C.) 226; Murray v. Pannaci, 130 Fed. 529, 65 C. C. A. 153. Cf. Fortescue v. Kings County Lighting Co., 128 App. Div. 826, 112 N. Y. Supp. 1010.

109 Cf. Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318, 65 Am. Dec. 401; Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 284; Longfellow v. Quimby, 29 Me. 196, 48 Am. Dec. 525; Fore v. Western N. C. R. Co., 101 N. C. 526, 8 S. E. 335; McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. 156.

110 Bird v. Womack, 69 Ala. 390; Pinney v. Borough of Winsted, 83 Conn. 411, 76 Atl. 994, 20 Ann. Cas. 923; Williams v. Hathaway, 21 R. I. 566, 45 Atl. 578. Cf. Hanmer v. Wilsey, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 91.

wise have had, and which become his property, for here his damage is less by the value thus added.111 But proof that the trespasser has not in fact benefited cannot be considered.112

It is manifestly impossible within the compass of this work to discuss adequately the principles governing the quantum of damages. 113 Where there has been a permanent injury to real property, the damages are generally measured by the difference in values before and after the trespass.114 But it is permissible to prove the cost of restoring the property to its former condition, "for the very obvious reason that, if the land could be restored for less, the landowner ought to restore it, and not attempt to hold the tort-feasor for the full diminution in value." 115 To

111 Jewett v. Whitney, 43 Me. 242; Mayo v. City of Springfield, 138 Mass. 70; Murphy v. City of Fond du Lac, 23 Wis. 365, 99 Am. Dec. 181. Applied in trespass for mesne profits. Morrison v. Robinson, 31 Pa. 456. See Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 390. Cf. Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. § 1531.

112 Thus one who trespassed upon a mining claim is not entitled to a verdict merely because the value of the ore extracted equaled or was less than the cost of extracting it. Empire Gold Min. Co. v. Bonanza Gold Min. Co., 67 Cal. 406, 7 Pac. 810.

113 For illustrative cases, see Wrightsville & T. R. Co. v. Holmes, 85 Ga. 668, 11 S. E. 658; Huftalin v. Misner, 70 Ill. 55; Johnson v. Farwell, 7 Me. (7 Greenl.) 370, 22 Am. Dec. 203; Thiel v. Bull's Ferry Land Co., 58 N. J. Law, 212, 33 Atl. 281. Deprivation of use and loss of profits, White v. Moseley, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 356; Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J. Law, 707; Schile v. Brokhahus, 80 N. Y. 614; Capel v. Lyons, 3 Misc. Rep. 73, 22 N. Y. Supp. 378, 51 N. Y. St. Rep. 601; mental anguish, Moyer v. Gordon, 113 Ind. 282, 14 N. E. 476; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759; Lesch v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 97 Minn. 503, 106 N. W. 955, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 93; Bonelli v. Bowen, 70 Miss. 142, 11 South. 791.

114 Southern Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 169 Ala. 22, 53 South. 767; Barnett v. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co., 33 Minn. 265, 22 N. W. 535; Argotsinger v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Pedelty v. Wisconsin Zinc Co., 148 Wis. 245, 134 N. W. 356. Cf. Freeman v. Sayre, 48 N. J. Law, 37, 2 Atl. 650; Disbrow v. Westchester Hardwood Co., 164 N. Y. 415, 58 N. E. 519.

115 Manda v. City of Orange, 77 N. J. Law, 285, 286, 72 Atl. 42, per Swayze, J. To the same effect, Graessle v. Carpenter, 70 Iowa, 166. 30 N. W. 392; Cavanagh v. Durgin, 156 Mass. 466, 31 N. E. 643; Walters v. Chamberlin, 65 Mich. 333, 32 N. W. 440.

" 117

"On

this may be added compensation for loss of use.116 the other hand, when the cost of restoring is more than such diminution, the latter is generally the true measure of damages." If defendant's acts do not work any permanent injury to plaintiff's property, the diminution in rental value is the standard.118 Varying rules have been adopted with respect to the cutting of trees. A distinction is usually recognized between those available for timber or fuel and fruit or ornamental trees. The former have a substantial value in themselves, which may serve as a basis for compensation. The value of the latter when severed is but slight; hence their loss is an injury to the realty itself. It would be unsafe, however, to attempt the statement of a general doctrine.119 Where minerals have been mined, their value is usually fixed as in situ.120

If a chattel has been destroyed, or taken and retained, its market value at the time of the taking or destruction, with interest, is awarded.121 If the deprivation has been not total, but partial, as where the owner has regained 122 or retained possession,123 he is entitled to the value of the

116 Graessle v. Carpenter, supra; Cavanagh v. Durgin, supra. 117 Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 135 N. Y. 116, 31 N. E. 997, 17 L. R. A. 426, per O'Brien, J. To the same effect, Nelson v. Village of West Duluth, 55 Minn. 497, 57 N. W. 149; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23, 30 S. W. 314; Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. 302, 100 Am. Dec. 642.

118 Carli v. Union Depot, S. R. & T. Co., 32 Minn. 101, 20 N. W. 89; Gillett v. Trustees of Village of Kinderhook, 77 Hun, 604, 28 N. Y. Supp. 1044; Honsee v. Hammond, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 89; Irwin v. Nolde, 176 Pa. 594, 35 Atl. 217, 35 L. R. A. 415; Carl v. Sheboygan & F. Du L. R. Co., 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295. Cf. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Md. 32, 10 Atl. 315, 1 Am. St. Rep. 362; Adams v. Durham & N. R. Co., 110 N. C. 325, 14 S. E. 857.

119 See Sedgwick on Damages, vol. 3, § 933, and 38 Cyc. p. 1130, where the cases are collected.

120 See Sedgwick on Damages, vol. 3, § 935.

121 Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108; Gardner v. Field, 1 Gray (Mass.) 151; Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N. H. 219, 90 Am. Dec. 569; King v. Orser, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 431; Conard v. Pacific Ins. Co., 6 Pet. (U. S.) 262, 8 L. Ed. 392.

122 Fields v. Williams, 91 Ala. 502, 8 South. 808; Smith v. Miller, 145 Ill. App. 606; Hart v. Blake, 31 Mich. 278. Cf. Hammond v. Sullivan, 112 App. Div. 788, 99 N. Y. Supp. 472.

123 Streett v. Laumier, 34 Mo. 469. See Graves v. Baltimore & N.

chattel's use while deprived thereof, with the necessary and reasonable expense of repairs, and an amount which will represent the difference, if any, between the value before the injury and after the repairs.124

In many states, by statute, double or treble damages are given in certain cases of willful trespass.125

Where an injury has been done to the property itself, there would seem no reason why the possessor of a chattel should not be permitted to recover full damages from a stranger. Trespass was maintainable only for an injury to the thing itself, not for an injury to a right.126 It has been said that, if "the suit is brought by a bailee or special property man against the general owner, then the plaintiff can recover the value of his special property only; but if the writ is against a stranger, then he recovers the value of the property and interest according to the general rule, and holds the balance beyond his own interest in trust for the general owner." 127 The same rule would apY. R. Co., 76 N. J. Law, 362, 69 Atl. 971; Stearns v. McGinty, 55 Hun, 101, 8 N. Y. Supp. 216; Johnson v. Parker, 7 Misc. Rep. 685, 28 N. Y. Supp. 146, 58 N. Y. St. Rep. 332; Baker v. Mims, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 413, 37 S. W. 190.

124 Necessary and reasonable expense incurred in regaining possession should be allowed. See Fields v. Williams, supra.

125 Real property, forcible entry or detainer, see Howell's Ann. St. Mich. (2d Ed.) 1912, § 13319; Rev. Codes Mont. 1907, § 6869; Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. § 1669; Fults v. Munro, 202 N. Y. 34, 95 N. E. 23, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 600, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 870; cutting trees, see Code Iowa, § 4306; Werner v. Flies, 91 Iowa, 146, 59 N. W. 18; Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, c. 185, § 7; Palmer v. Davidson, 211 Mass. 556, 98 N. E. 623; Howell's St. Mich. (2d Ed.) 1912, § 13317; Bockes v. A. McAfee & Son Co., 165 Mich, 7, 130 N. W. 313; Rev. Codes Mont. 1907, § 6867; 4 Comp. St. N. J. 1910, p. 5396, § 1, ($8 per tree); Lott v. Leventhal, 80 N. J. Law, 216, 76 Atl. 328; Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. §§ 1667, 1668; McCruden v. Rochester Ry. Co., 5 Misc. Rep. 59, 25 N. Y. Supp. 114, affirmed 151 N. Y. 623, 45 N. E. 1133. Personal property, see Rev. St. Mo. 1909, § 5455; Herman v. Owen, 42 Mo. App. 387.

128 See "The Disseizin of Chattels," by Prof. James Barr Ames, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 313, 337.

127 White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305, per Hinman, J., quoted in Becker v. Bailies, 44 Conn. 167, 174. To the same effect, Luse v. Jones, 39 N. J. Law, 707; Criner v. Pike, 2 Head (Tenn.) 398; Wooley v. Edson, 35 Vt. 214. But see Sterrett's Ex'r v. Kaster, 37 Ala. 366;

pear applicable to real property,128 but by many courts. the quantum of his recovery has been fixed by the extent of. his interest.129 The principle that the owner of the title, out of possession, may sue in case and likewise obtain the amount of damages to his interest,130 will not, however, be allowed to work a disadvantage to the defendant by forcing him to pay twice. The doctrine of full liability to the possessor must be subject to an exception permitting the trespasser to prove in mitigation facts showing that the owner himself had no cause of action,' e. g., that he has received the property or its proceeds,182 the effect of which may be to reduce the possessor's damages to the value of his interest.

131

Gwaltney v. Scottish Carolina Timber & Land Co., 115 N. C. 579, 20 S. E. 465.

128 See Elvins v. Delaware & A. Telegraph & Telephone Co., 63 N. J. Law, 243, 43 Atl. 903, 76 Am. St. Rep. 217; Perry v. Jefferies, 61 S. C. 292, 39 S. E. 515; Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559, 25 Atl. 436. Cf. Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661, L. R. A. 1916A, 787.

129 "In the case of a tenant, whether for life or for years, he may sue and recover for the injury to his possession and right of enjoyment, and the reversioner or remainderman may sue and recover for any injury sustained to the estate in reversion or remainder. And where there are several entitled in succession as tenants for life, in tail, or in fee, they can recover only damages commensurate to the injury done to their respective estates. The damages there

*

fore must be assessed with reference to the extent of the several interests affected." Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357, 362, per Alvey, J. See Frisbee v. Town of Marshall, 122 N. C. 760, 30 S. E. 21; Sedgwick on Damages (9th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 109 et seq.; Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.) vol. IV, p. 2960 et seq.

130 Chattels, Forbes v. Parker, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 462; Goulet v. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225. See New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. New Jersey Elec. Ry. Co., 60 N. J. Law, 338, 38 Atl. 828. Real property, Randall v. Cleaveland, 6 Conn. 328; Indianapolis, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin, 77 Ill. 275; Walden v. Conn, 84 Ky. 312, 1 S. W. 537, 4 Am. St. Rep. 201; Van Deusen v. Young, 29 N. Y. 9 (trespass under statute); Dutro v. Wilson, 4 Ohio St. 101. Cf. Cotes & Patchin v. City of Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227.

131 Anthony v. Gilbert, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 348.

132 Sheldon v. Southern Express Co., 48 Ga. 625; Squire v. Hollenback, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 551, 20 Am. Dec. 506; Huning v. Chavez, 7 N. M. 128, 34 Pac. 44. See Elvins v. Delaware & A. Telegraph & Telephone Co., 63 N. J. Law, 243, 43 Atl. 903, 76 Am. St. Rep. 217.

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