the estate of his testator. Where done without fraud or collusion, he may assign or release such debts, and may exercise general acts of ownership over them in regard to their security or collection, subject only to his liability on his bond for any loss which may occur by reason of his mismanagement of such debts. 2 Williams on Ex. 932; 39 Ind. 241; 57 Ind. 198. The power of an executor to extend the time of payment of a debt appears to be plainly inferable from his other powers. The evidence does not sustain th verdict. Judgment reversed. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-Underwood v. Semple. - A LEASE - ASSIGNMENT OF TERM-MERGER. leased certain premises to B for a term of five years, at a stipulated rental of $500 a year. Subsequently B sold and assigned the leasehold, when there were still a number of years to run, to C, at a rental of $37.50 per month, to be paid monthly. C soon afterwards became the owner of the premises in fee simple by conveyance from A. Held, that when C became the owner of the premises in fee simple, the unexpired term of the leasehold estate was merged and extinguished in his estate in fee; and C, having become both landlord and tenant in one and the same estate, the tenancy ceased, and the rent reserved also ceased and was determined, and C could not maintain an action against B for said rent. Affirmed. Opinion by HOWK, J.-Liebschuetz v. Moore. PROMISSORY NOTE- EFFECT OF ANTEDATINGJURISDICTION OF JUSTICES-FRAUD.-1. The maker of a note has the right to antedate it, and having done so, and it being payable one day after date, the note becomes due one day after the date it bears, without regard to the date of its execution. 2. Notes not payable in bank in this State are not negotiable as inland bills of exchange, and three days' grace will not be allowed thereon. 1 R. S. 636, sec. 14; Benson v. Adams, decided May 14, 1880. 3. When a party holds a number of notes executed by the same maker and bearing the same date, he has the right to bring a separate suit on each, on the same day, before a justice of the peace; and each of the notes thus sued on being within his jurisdiction, the justice has a right to render separate judgment on each of them on the same day, without reference to the aggregate amount of the notes. 4. Fraud is never presumed, but must be proven; and in a case where a restraining order is sought to prevent the sale of property on execution, on the ground that the notes on which the judgments were rendered, upon which the executions issued, were given with a fraudulent intent and for a fraudulent purpose, the question of fraud is one of fact for the jury to determine. 36 Ind. 7; 44 Ind. 209; 57 Ind. 274. In the case at bar, the jury determined the question of fraud adversely to appellants, and their verdict was sustained by the evidence. Opinion by Howк, J.-Luce v. Shoff. SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. June, 1880. Affirmed. TRADE-MARKS-INJUNCTION.-1. S had been for many years engaged in the manufacture of wagons at Eldora. The business, for a time, was prosecuted by copartnership, composed of S and the defendants, his brothers, and another person. Upon the dissolution of this copartnership, S continued the business and acquired all the property of the firm. For several years S conducted the business on his own account, and sometime before his brothers commenced business for themselves they had been employed by S. In 1874, S adopted as a trade-mark the words "Shaver Wagon, Eldora," which was, at first, with some variation in form, painted conspicuously on all wagons manufactured and sold by him. He adhered to a general style of work and painting, and his trademark for the last few years had been painted upon his wagons in substantially the same form and manner. The defendants, more than two years after they ceased to be copartners of S, commenced the manufacture of wagons, and painted thereon the identical words used as a trade-mark by S. They changed somewhat the form of inscribing the words, and painted their own initials near to the trade-mark. The wagons, in general style and painting, resembled those manufactured by S, and were not inferior thereto. They did but little of the business before this suit was commenced, constructing and selling but one or two wagons. On a bill filed by S to enjoin the use of the trade-mark: Held, that the injunction must be granted. 2. The court below excluded the following testimony offered by defendants, viz.: That the scroll work" upon which plaintiff caused his trade-mark to be painted was generally used in painting wagons; that plaintiff had never called the words "Shaver Wagon, Eldora," his trade-mark, and had not instructed his painter to put it on; that the wagons sold by defendants were disposed of without regard to the trade-mark; that the painting of defendants' wagons is readily distinguishable from that of plaintiff, and that they are different in size; that defendants' wagons were not sold because of any notoriety on account of the trade-mark, and that defendants had not sought to increase their sales by means of the trademark. Held, no error. Affirmed. Opinion by BECK. J.-Shaver v. Shaver. EVIDENCE-BASTARDY-EXHIBITION OF CHILD TO JURY TO SHOW RESEMBLANCE TO ALLEGED FATHER. In a prosecution for bastardy on a complaint made by one Reka Helm, the court permitted the State to exhibit the child to the jury for the purpose of showing a resemblance between the child and defendant; also in his speech to the jury the counsel for the State made use of this language: "I only wish to call the attention of the jury to what any one can see plainly with half an eye, that the eyes of this exhibit (the child) are hooked, and that also the eyes of the defendant are hooked, and that the eyes of Reka Helm are not." This statement was objected to by defendant, but the objection was overruled. The child was two years and a month old. Held, no error. "The defendant claims that any resemblance, if it should be thought to exist between such a child and a man alleged to be its father, is too unreliable to constitute legal evidence of the alleged paternity. It is a well-known fact that resemblances often exists between persons who are not related, and are wanting between persons who are. Still, what is called family resemblance is sometimes so marked as scarcely to admit of a mistake. We are of the opinion, therefore, that a child of the proper age may be exhibited to a jury as evidence of alleged paternity. Precisely what should be deemed the proper age we need not determine. It was held in State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa, 43, that it was error to allow a child three months old to be exhibited. That case is relied upon by the defendant in this. But a child which is only three months old has that peculiar immaturity of features which characterizes an infant during the time it is called a babe. A child two years old or more has, to a large extent, put off that immaturity. In allowing a child of that age to be exhibited we think the court did not err, "'expressly as it instructed the jury that if they did not clearly see such resemblance they should disregard all claims of resemblance on the part of the State. Affirmed. Opinion by ADAMS, C. J.-State v. Smith. NEGLIGENCE- FELLOW SERVANTS-IOWA STATUTE GIVING ACTION AGAINST MASTER-CONSTRUCTION. -1. A detective in the employ of a railroad company, and an engineer operating an engine on said road, are fellow-servants, or co-employees. 2. Section 1807 of the Code, provides as follows: "Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employees of such corporation, in consequence of any neglect of agents, or by any mismanagement of engineers or other employees of the corporation; and in consequence of the wilful wrongs, whether of commission or omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employees, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of any railway on or about which they shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding. Held, that the statute does not embrace those only who are engaged in the actual operation of a railroad in running the trains. Trackmen, switchmen, and others. whose duty requires them to be upon the track, are more or less exposed to the hazards of the business of railroading, and such employees, when injured by the use or operation of the road, and by the negligence of co-employees, are as plainly within the provisions of the statute as those whose duty requires them to assist in the running of trains. The proper test in determining the question is, does the duty of the employee require him to perform service which exposes him to hazard peculiar to the business of using and operating a railroad? If it does, and if, while in the line of his duy, he, by the negligence of a co-employee, receives an injury from a passing train, or from other appliances used in the use and operation of the road, he may recover. 3. The plaintiff, a detective employed by the defendant to apprehend certain parties, averred in his petition that he was acting under the immediate direction and instruction of the defendant, by its agent, Wood; that he was directed to walk along on the track of the road to a house by the road side; that as he was walking along on said track, in obedience to his instructions, he was, from sun-stroke or some other cause, prostrated upon the track in an insensible condition; and that, while in that condition, he was injured by the engineer of a passing train negligently running the train upon him. Held, that the plaintiff was within the section of the Code just cited. The allegations of the petition must be accepted as true, however incredible they may appear. It is not for the defendant to say that the plaintiff's duty aid not require him to walk upon the track, because it is averred that the defendant, by its agent, directed him to walk there. If this was an absurd or foolish order, or if it was attended with seemingly unnecessary danger, it was not in itself negligence in the plaintiff to obey the directions given to him. If a track-walker, whose duty it is to patrol a track in the night, should be prostrated by apoplexy or the like, and the engineer of a passing train should negligently run upon and injure him, there can be no doubt he would have a right of action. The case at bar presents the same state of facts, with the exception that probably a track-walker could not properly perform his duty without walking between the rails. The plaintiff might have performed his duty as a detective without walking upon the track, but the averment is that the defendant required him to do so, and we must accept that averment as the truth, for the purposes of this appeal. Reversed. Opinion by ROTHROCK, J.—Pyne v. Chicago etc. R. Co. SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. May, 1880. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS BEAR SHOW IN STREET-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE of Officers. -The fact that a license is granted by the city officers for a bear show will not make the city liable for damages resulting from the negligence of its police officers in not preventing the show being held in the street. Action for injuries caused by the frightening of a horse by a bear show in the streets of the city. The Judge below instructed the jury that the city was liable if its officers were negligent in not preventing the show in the street. Held, error. The distinction seems obvious between a case where the officers of the city authorize and license a show in the highwaythat is, become themselves active agents in the commission of the wrong-and where they are merely negligent in preventing such show or improper use of the street. Doubtless the city officers were in duty bound to be diligent to prevent the show in the street where it might cause injury to persons traveling thereon. But if they failed to perform that duty, and an injury resulted from this omission, we do not understand that the law renders the city liable for such neglect. It was further suggested that the liability of the city arose from the fact that it granted a license for the exhibition, for which a fee was received which went into the city treasury. But this fee was not exacted merely for revenue. The granting of licenses for shows was a police regulation, and the fee demanded was not intended to be for revenue, strictly speaking. It appears in this case that the license was a general one "to give a bear show' on the day named. It was not necessary to state in the license that the exhibition was to be at a proper place, away from the public street. This would be implied. As a matter of fact, it appears that Carr was told by several of the officers of the city that he must not exhibit the bears on the street, but go off on to some private lot. Still, we must assume that the jury found, under the charge of the court, that the officers were negligent in not taking effectual means to prevent the exhibition on the street before the accident happened; that is to say, they were guilty of a nonfeasance, or an omission of duty as public officers. But for such negligence no action will lie against the city. Schultz v. City of Milwaukee, supra. Even the granting of a license did not, under the circumstances, impose upon the city the responsibility of seeing that the exhibition was had in a suitable place, and conducted in a proper manner. All this would be implied; the licensee would attend to himself. Nor should the receipt of a license fee be considered as affording a consideration for an implied undertaking on the part of the city to be answerable for the neglect of its police officers to perform their official duty and prevent the exhibition in an improper place. The show licensed was not necessarily dangerous to travelers on the streets, or to any one, if it had been held on a private lot, as the city officers doubtless expected it would be. Reversed. Opinion by COLE, J.-Little v. City of Madison. ADULTERY - MEANING OF THE TERM - MARRIED MAN AND UNMARRIED WOMAN.-A married man who has illicit intercourse with an unmarried woman is guilty of the crime of adultery. There are, undoubtedly, many authorities which hold that adultery can not be committed with a single woman; that even where her paramour is a married man it is only fornication. But our statute, on the subject of divorce, says nothing about fornication, and it has been the common understanding that illicit intercourse by the husband, with an unmarried female, amounted to a sufficient cause At for nullifying the marriage contract under that statute. The same idea as to what constituted adultery seems to have been in the mind of the legislature when prescribing punishment for the offense, perhaps derived from the early decision above referred to. all events, we should be unwilling to hold, after the practical construction which the divorce law has received since the organization of the State government, that the offense in the information amounted only to fornication, and not adultery. The difference of professional opinion in this country, as to what constiutes adultery, has arisen from the different codes under which the subject has been considered. Mr. Wharton alludes to this matter in his work on Criminal Law, where he says: "Adultery, by the Roman law, was confined to illicit sexual intercourse with a married woman, the woman and her paramour being principals in the offense. A married man, who had illicit intercourse with an unmarried woman, was not guilty of this specific crime." 2 Crim. Law, § 2644. The same learned author adds: "But Christianity, speaking through the canon law, materially modified this feature of Roman jurisprudence. Hence, the offense was committed by a sexual violation of the marriage vow, be the offender male or fe male. The married man having sexual intercourse with a woman other than his wife was as guilty of adultery as a married woman having sexual intercourse with other than her husband." Sec. 2645. We have no doubt that the word 'adultery," as used in sec. 4676, was intended to include the illicit sexual intercourse of a married man with an unmarried female, and we must so hold. It would subserve no useful purpose to go over the authorities for and against this conclusion. Opinion by COLE, J.-State v. Fellows. CONTRACTS FOR DELIVERY OF GRAIN - WHEN VOID.-Contracts in writing for the sale and delivery of grain at a future day, at a price certain, made with a bona fide intention to deliver the grain and pay the price, are valid in law; but when such contracts are made as a cover for gambling, without intention to deliver and receive the grain, but merely to pay and receive the difference between the price agreed upon and the market price at some such future day, they come within the statute of gaming, and are void in law. To uphold such a contract, it must affirmatively and satisfactorily appear that it was made with an actual view to the delivery and receipt of the grain, and not as an evasion of the statute of gaming, or as a cover for a gambling transaction. Reversed. Opinion PER CURIAM,-Barnard v. Backhous. QUERIES AND ANSWERS. [*** The attention of subscribers is directed to this department, as a means of mutual benefit. Answers to queries will be thankfully received, and due credit given whenever requested. The queries must be brief; long statements of facts of particular cases must, for want of space, be invariably rejected. Anonymous communications are not requested.] QUERIES. 10. In 1876 H sold hotel furniture to D. D and C executed their joint and several promissory note payable to H to secure the payment of the purchase price. D failed to pay for the goods. C paid H, and H delivered the note to O. C sued D for the amount of the note and interest, got judgment and had execution issued. Are those goods in the hands of D exempt from sale under said execution, they being all the property owned by D. D is the head of a family, a resident of this State, and 11. Fifteen years ago the town of Z was organized. At or about the organization the company dug a ditch, which turned the water from its natural course and let it upon the land of one N. Subsequent to this time, N sold the property to M. In the spring of 1880, the water came down the said ravine, and through the said ditch, and overflowed the lands of the said M, and destroyed his crops. Has he a remedy against the town company Louisville, Mo. Q. 12. In the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the State of Missouri under the Constitution of 1875, art. 2, sec. 21, can damages to the owner of the land to be taken, be set-off by benefits accruing to the owner on account of the proposed improvement? Is not the Constitution absolute, and sec. 6938 of Rev. Stat. of 1879, permitting such damages to be set-off by benefits, unconstitutional? Must not the actual value of the land taken be paid for in money? Must not the jury provided for in sec. 21 of art. 2 be composed of twelve men? Does not the phase "of not less than three freeholders," qualify "board of commissioners," and not the word "Jury?" Is not sec. 6938, above referred to unconstitutional, because it provides for a jury of three men instead of twelve? Mexico, Mo. P. Q. 13. In Ohio, if application be made to the Probate Court for letters of administration upon the estate of a person who is proved to have left his friends, gone to parts unknown, and to have been absent and unheard of for a period of more than ten years; and upon such application and proof, if the probate judge refuses to grant letters for the sole reason that he is not satisfied of said person's death, what remedy, if any, have the heirs of said person, and how, if at all, can they obtain possession of personal property and money, left by said absent person. Statute of Ohio reads, "Upon the decease of any person, etc., letters of administration shall be granted by the Probate Court, etc." P. Mansfield, O. 14. A widow purchased real estate, giving her own notes for the payment of the purchase price, and taking the conveyance in the names of her children. She having since died insolvent, the question is, whether the land is subject to the vendor's lien. ANSWERS. 6. [11 Cent. L. J. 37.] The record of the conveyance from A to B, is not notice to D. Corbin v. Sullivan, 47 Ind. 356. C. CAMBERN. Rushville, Ind. 6. [11 Cent. L. J. 37.] The rule is that a purchaser of real estate occupies the position of an innocent purchaser, and will be protected, unless he has actual or constructive notice of a prior conveyance, or, in case of an unrecorded deed, he is in possession of facts that would put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, when such inquiry would discover such deed or conveyance. In the case stated by "T SR" D had no actual notice of the conveyance from A to B, nor from B to C; nor was he in possession of facts that would, upon inquiry, have discovered such conveyances. Then if he was chargeable with notice at all it would be constructive notice of the conveyance from B to C. But he would not be chargeable with constructive notice thereof, because B was a stranger to the title, his deed would not be in the regular chain of title. Manley v. Pettee, 28 Ill. 128; Wade on Notice, § 214; Irish v. Sharp, 89 Ill. 261; Faircloth v. Jordon, 18 Ga. 350; Calder v. Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359; Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige, 361; Dexter v. Harris, 2 Mason, 531. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's L. C. (7th Am. Ed.) 705. CURRENT TOPICS. The question of the right of a committee of an insane person to sue in his name for a divorce for the adultery of the other party to the marriage, was recently determined in the affirmative in Baker v. Baker, 28 W. R. 630, by the English Divorce Court. This question was considered to be left unsettled by the decision in the celebrated case of Mordaunt v. Mordaunt, L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 374, where it was held that a lunatic might be made defendant in divorce proceedings. Hannen, P., said: "No one can feel more strongly than I do the difficulty of administering the law of divorce when one of the parties is insane. One of the peculiarities of that law is that the public is deemed to be interested in the disclosure of the relations of the litigants to one another, and of the conduct of the complaining party. This was so strongly felt that, since the first act did not arm the court with sufficient power to investigate the petitioner's antecedents, a public officer was authorized to intervene in the proceedings. To allow the suit to proceed against an insane person is an abandonment of the most obvious and in most cases the only means of obtaining information which the legislature considered the public welfare to require; and with regard to the interests of a respondent, although the proceedings are not criminal, yet the same principles of justice and humanity which introduced into the criminal law the provision that no insane person can be called upon to answer a charge of having committed a crime when sane, seem equally applicable to proceedings, especially against a woman, for dissolution of marriage on account of adultery. It is said that the right to sue for a divorce is personal and can only be exercised by the individual who has been wronged. If sane, the petitioner could condone his wife's offense. He might be conscious of having committed matrimonial offenses which would debar him from a divorce, and his conscience might therefore prevent his asking for it. All these arguments are equally applicable to a suit for a judicial separation which, it is conceded, may be maintained on behalf of a lunatic. It has, however, been urged that in those cases the lunatic, if he recovered his senses, might forgive his wife and take her back, whereas in a suit for dissolution the mischief, if he should regard it as such, would be irreparable, for the divorced wife might have married some one else, but this argument is one which should rather have been addressed to the discretion of the Lords Justices, without whose consent these proceedings can not be taken, than urged upon this occasion, for it is to be observed that proceedings for a judicial separation would be productive, in some cases, of as great personal hardship to a lunatic as the disssolution of his marriage. Although insane on some subjects he might be capable of deriving comfort and advantage from the society of his wife, and might be willing to overlook her frailty in consideration of her kindness to himself or his children. I should add that the possibility of a husband forgiving his wife's adultery is not to be regarded as remote; for it is a fact of every day occurrence, as the records of this court abundantly show. On the other hand, it can not be denied that if reasons of expediency are to be considered, great wrong might arise from my holding that no proceedings for a divorce can be maintained against the adulterous wife of a lunatic. She might be left in possession of property settled upon her by her husband, which she and her paramour might enjoy to the exclusion of the lunatic; she might exercise a power of appointment in favor of the paramour or of the offspring of his and her adultery, by which the devolution of estates or titles might be altered in favor of illegitimate objects. Those evils could be averted only by a dissolution of the marriage. The consideration which has most pressed upon me in the support of the respondent's contention is this: It is well known that it is a part of the religious faith of all Roman Catholics and of many members of the Church of England, that the bond of marriage is indissoluble. This belief has been recognized in the statute under the authority of which divorces are granted, and no clergyman can be compelled to solemnize the marriage of a person who has been divorced on account of adultery. It is certainly startling that if a person who believes in his conscience that the dissolution of a marriage is unlawful in the sight of God should have the misfortune to become insane, the committee of his estate might be authorized, on account of some question of money,to obtain a decree dissolving the marriage. I do not feel that this consideration is disposed of by the fact that the Lord Justices have a discretio n in the matter, for how can they, or any other human tribunal. determine what might be the conscientious conviction of any person on such a subject? But this and all other considerations appear to me to have been overpowered by the decision of the House of Lords, which amounts to this: that since proceedings for divorce are civil, recourse must, in cases where lunatics are litigants, be had to the ordinary forms of civil courts, although no provision for the case of a lunatic is contained in the Divorce Act. I can see no distinction between lunatic petitioners and lunatic respondents, and therefore I think that the judgment of the House of Lords in Mordaunt v. Mordaunt is by necessary implication binding upon me in the present case. I must, therefore, hold that the insanity of a husband or wife is not a bar to a suit by the committee for the dissolution of the lunatic's marriage.'' In Hazelton v. Week, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, it was ruled that where a trespasser enters upon the land of another, and severs timber therefrom which he sells to a third party, and the buyer goes upon the land to remove it, the latter is liable in trespass, even though he was ignorant of the facts and had no intention of committieg a trespass. Said Cole, J., "As soon as the timber was out it became the personal property of the owner of the land, and Week, in going upon the premises, and removing the logs without authority from such owner, was a trespasser, and liable in damages for the wrong. It is not essential to that responsibility that the element of a wilful or intentional trespass should enter into the transaction; it was sufficient that he was taking away property which he had no right to remove. If he did not know who owned the land, he was bound to know that the logs severed from the soil were the property of the owner, whoever he might be, and that without the consent of such owner, he had no right to interfere with the property. This rule of law is well settled in this court." So in Dexter v. Cole, 6 Wis. 317, which was an action of trespass, it appeared that the defendant, who was a butcher in Milwaukee, was driving some sheep he had purchased towards the city, upon the highway, when they became mixed with a small lot belonging to the plaintiff, which were running at large upon the highway. The defendant drove the whole flock into a yard near the road, for the purpose of parting them, and did throw out a number which he did not claim, and pursued his way with the remainder to his slaugh case near ter-house, where they were slaughtered in his business. The evidence tended to show, and the jury found it did show, that some four of the plaintiff's sheep remained in the flock, and were driven to Milwaukee and slaughtered. The court maintained the action on the ground that any unlawful interference with, or acts of ownership over, property, to the exclusion of the owner, were sufficient to sustain the action, and that it was not necessary to show actual or forcible dispossession of property; that the intent did not necessarily enter into the trespass; that it was sufficient if the act done was without a justifiable cause or purpose. The est in point to the one at bar is Higginson v. York, 5 Mass. 341. The head note thus states the case: "A having entered the close of B, and having cut a quantity of cord-wood, sells the same to C, who hires D, the master of a coasting vessel, to go in company with C and transport the wood to market. D was held liable for the value of the wood in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought by B, although it was agreed he was ignorant of the original trespass committed by A." In Hobart v. Haggert, 12 Me. 167, which was an action of trespass for taking an ox belonging to the plaintiff, it was proved that the defendant met the plaintiff in the street, and bought of the latter an ox, which the plaintiff directed him to go and take out of his enclosure, and the defendant, by mistake, took the wrong ox. The defendant was held liable in the action. The court say: "The taking of the plaintiff's ox was the deliberate and voluntary act of the defendant. He might not have intended to commit trespass in so doing. Neither does the officer when, on a precept against A, he takes, by mistake, the property of B, intend to commit a trespass; nor does he intend to become a trespasser who, believing that he is cutting timber on his own land, by mistaking the line of division, cuts on his neighbor's land; and yet, in both cases, the law would hold them as trespassers.' ," Cooley on Torts, 348. Mr. Freeman, the reporter of the Supreme Court of Illinois, has just made an announcement which will be heartily received by the profession in that State. For several years past he has been importuned to furnish the lawyers of Illinois with advance sheets of the official reports, but this has always been an impossibility. At last, however, through the operation of the appellate court system which has so materially lessened the business in the Supreme Court, the reporter is enabled to make the following offer, viz.: To furnish to subscribers to the Illinois Reports, advance sheets of the cases in each volume, commencing with volume 95 (which will begin with the cases in which opinions have been filed in the months of May and June,) at the price of $1 per vol. in addition to the present price of the book ($2.25). This is simply the cash cost of the sheets to the reporter, such cost comprising the paper, press work, folding and stitching and postage-but not the type-setting or stereotyping, that expense being charged upon the book itself. These advance sheets will embrace the cases in each current volume, without the index. "In order that the profession may be fully advised of the advantages or lack of advantages, in this plan, says the reporter in his announcement, wish to suggest that it will sometimes happen that there will not be enough matter to complete a volume until another term of court shall have furnished more opinions-as will be the case with vol. 95-there are not cases enough now to finish that volume, and will not be until the court meet again in conference at the September term. But the general effect of my being up with the work of the office, so as to be able to furnish the advance sheets in the way I propose, will be to facilitate the issuing of the volumes themselves. Within thirty days after issuing the advance sheets which will finish any given volume, I expect to have the volume itself ready for delivery. While I do not expect to derive any profit from the advance sheets, the scheme may supply a want of the profession in furnishing at an early day the information they so much desire.." We hope the Illinois bar will recog nize the fact that this scheme completes a means of obtaining the decisions of the Supreme Court quite unequalled in the history of law reporting. Under our arrangements with the reporter, subscribers to the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL ILLINOIS ADDENDUM can obtain the official syllabi of all opinions in the Supreme Court within a few days after their filing. These will last them until the advance sheets of the reports come from Mr. Freeman. The subscribers to the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL and the Illinois Reports are surely to be envied. RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE. LIEBER'S HERMENEUTICS. This work has been out of print for nearly forty years, yet its teachings have left their manifest impress upon our American jurisprudence. So much attention is being given of late years to the investigation of all fundamental principles in the science of the law, that the new edition of Dr. Lieber's treatise. under the editorship of Professor Hammond, will at once find a place both in libraries, and on desks and study-tables. The author gives an extended and sufficiently full discussion of the rules that rationally and logically should govern in all cases of the interpretation and construction of language, the application being frequently general, yet always with special reference to legal and political questions. The distinctive feature of Dr. Lieber's system is the principle that any and all language by whomsoever used, and under whatsoever circumstanees, may become the subject of interpretation, because all language, even the clearest and most specific, is but the use of signs. which are always inadequate to the most complete and exact representation of human thoughts or ideas. Thus it is not ambiguity which calls in the first instance for interpretation, or rather, it is not any particular ambiguity, for all spoken or written language is necessarily ambiguous to some extent, as the author demonstrates; and interpretation to some extent is always necessary. To know how, then, to interpret language fairly, correctly and thoroughly, must always engage the attention of the honest student, no less than the philosopher. For convenience, Dr. Lieber uses the term "Utterer" to describe the person who employs the language to be considered, whether he be the party to a contract, the grantor in a deed, the testator in a will, the legisla Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with remarks on precedents and authorities. By Francis Lieber, LL.D., author of "Manual of Political Ethics," Third edition, with the author's last corrections and additions, and notes, by William G. Hammond, Professor of Law in Iowa State University. St. Louis: F. H. Thomas & Co. 1880. |