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[See SOCIETIES.] ATTACHMENT.

Issuing general execution not waiver of priority acquired by attachment, 36.

The owner is not restricted by the sheriff and mar shal's act (Mo.) to his claim under this statute; he may resort to his bond or to his action against the execution plaintiff. Franklin v. Gummersell, 130. Action between partners; attachment when not maintainable, 454.

Estoppel in attachment suits; article by Hon. J. O. Pierce, 481.

Parties to attackment suit not affected by action of replevin for same property, when? Query, 178; answers, 198, 218

ATTEMPTS.

S, having a grievance against W, solicited N to put poison in W's spring, so that the latter would be poisoned, and offered him a reward for so doing. N refused, and handed the package of poison back to S, but afterwards discovered it in his pocket. Held, that S could not be convicted of an attempt to commit murder by poisoning. Stabler v. Com., 404. ATTOR EY AND CLIENT.

[See, also, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LIENS; LIMITATION.¡ Attorney has no right to release client's judgment without his consent, 59.

Jurisdiction of court to disbar attorney for crime not affected by settlement between him and person injured, and entry of nolle prosequi, 76.

Attorney not liable to stenographer for services in suit, 94.

An attorney cannot in any case, without the client's consent, buy and hold otherwise than in trust, any adverse title or interest touching the thing to which his employment relates. Baker v. Humphrey, 126. B, who had agreed to sell lands, to which he claimed title, to H & S for $8,000, employed W, an attorney, who had long been employed by him to do legal business, to draw the contract of sale, which W did, and witnessed its execution. H & S then employed W to examine the title. In doing this W found that the title was apparently in C, though C had never asserted it. W, for a consideration of $25, represented that he wished it to protect the title of clients, procured a conveyance of the lands to his brother from C. The brother was not cognizant of this transaction. Thereafter W instituted an action of ejectment in his brother's name to recover the lands. In an action by B to have the deed to the brother of W declared fraudulent, etc.: Held, that the relation of client and counsel subsisted between B and W, and the conveyance from C to the brother inured to the benefit of B. Id.

Attorney has no power to compromise client's claim, 138. To justify the summary disbarment of an attorney who, being also an editor, published in his newspaper a gross libel on a judge, it must appear that his motive was to acquire an influence over him in the exercise of his judicial functions through the instrumentality of popular prejudice. Re Steinman, 326. What will authorize disbarment of attorney, 411. An attorney has an implied authority to indorse the name of his client on a check received in the course of litigation, for the purpose of collecting it, 440. Power of attorney to receive payment; no power to receive county warrants, 453.

Power to move for removal or suspension of attorney, carries with it power to resist re-admission of attor ney after he has been suspended from practicing law, 455.

No pleadings in application for re admission by suspended attorney are necessary, 455,

Such proceeding not being a civil action, applicant not entitled to trial by jury; in proceeding to suspend attorney, accused is entitled to jury trial, 455.

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BAILMENTS.

[See CARRIERS.]

BANKRUPTCY.

Discharge in, a bar to action for conversion, 297. BANKS AND BANKING.

Teller of National Bank may be convicted in State court upon iudictment charging him with fraudulently making false entries in books of bank with intent to injure and defraud bank, 197.

When banks may charge an insolvent depositor's account with the amount of an unmatured note due to it, 197.

Rights as against assignees of deposit by check or otherwise, 197.

A bank receiving a sum of money of a depositor is bound to pay it to him or his order, and can not refuse to do so on the ground that it is the property of another. First Nat. Bk. v. Mason, 245

Deposit of funds in bank forms sufficient consideration to authorize holder of check drawn against such funds by depositor, to maintain suit against such bank on its refusal to pay, 256.

Where a bank discounts a note, its officers knowing that the proceeds were to be used for an unlawful purpose, but not intending to aid such purpose, the note is not invalid, 379.

Transfer of shares in National banks, mode of, 397. Clearing-House Associations; article by W. H. Whitaker, Esq., 461.

Deposit of funds under order of court; failure; preference, 495.

Promissory note; mistake; clearing house; payment, 496.

BASTARDY.

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[See NEGOTIABLE AND ASSIGNABLE PAPER.] BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

[See APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.] BILLS OF LADING.

Validity of State Laws Regulating Bills of Lading; article by O. F. Bump, Esq., 181.

same

If a State law makes a bill of lading negotiable in the sense as bills of exchange and promissory notes, an indorsee who receives it from a fraudulent vendee, with instructions to take up a certain draft drawn by the indorsee, accepted by the vendee and discounted by a bank with the indorsement of the drawer thereon, is a bona fide holder. Tiedemann v. Knox, 186.

Although an indorsee receives a bill of lading from a fraudulent vendee, with instructions to take up a particular draft, yet if he is liable upon other drafts of the vendee, he may hold the goods to indemnify himself against that liability, although he receives notice of the fraud before the other drafts become due. Id.

Negotiability is a technical term derived from the usage of merchants and bankers in transferring, at first, bills of exchange, and, afterwards, promissory notes. Bills of exchange and promissory notes are exceptional in their character. Therefore, held, that under a statute making bills of lading negotiable by indorsement and delivery, all the consequences of an indorsement and delivery of bills and notes before maturity do not ensue, and are not intended to result from such negotiation. Nat. Bk. 189. Shaw v. Merchants

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National Digest, Vol. 8, 80. Trial Evidence, 100.

American Decisions, Vols. 16, 17, 223; Vols. 18, 19, 386,
Reports, Vol. 30, 59; Vol. 31, 379.
Bigelow's History of Procedure, 500.
Bradwell's Reports, Vol. 5, 79; Vol. 6, 318.
Burke on Public Schools, 340.

Carriers of Passengers, Thompson's, 319.
Charging the Jury, Thompson's, 339.
Conflict of Laws, Savigny's, 500.
Constitutional Law, Cooley, 59.
Contract, Anson on, 39.

Cooley's Constitutional Law, 59.

Criminal Evidence, Wharton's, 400.
Law, Wharton's, 400.

46

Pleading and Practice, Wharton's, 00.
Reports, Hawley, Vol. 2, 79.
Digest, Abbott's National, Vol. 8, 80.
Jacob's Fisher's, Vol. 4, 399.
United States, Vol. 10, 500.

Easements, Goddard on, 99.
Elections, McCrary on, 199.

Federal Reporter, The, 340.

Gaius, Institutes of, 500.

Goddard on Easements, 99.

Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 20.

Hermeneutics, Lieber's, 58.

History of Procedure, Bigelow's, 500.
Holland's Jurisprudence, 240.
Institutes of Gaius, 500.

Jacob's Fisher's Digest, Vol. 4, 399.

Jarman on Wills, Vol. 2. 279.

Jurisprudence, Holland's System of, 240.
Kansas Reports, Vol. 23, 79.

Lieber's Hermeneutics, 58.

Maxwell's Pleading and Practice, 519.
Michigan Reports, Vol. 39, 79.

McCrary on Elections, 199.

Nevada Reports, Vol. 14, 240.

New Jersey Chancery Reports, Vol. 5, 319.
Northwestern Reporter, The, 340.
Pleading and Practice, Maxwell's, 519.
Public Schools, Burke's, 340.

Reports, American, Vol. 30, 59; Vol. 31, 379.

Bradwell's, Vol. 5, 59; Vol. 6, 318.

Hawley's Criminal, Vol. 2, 80.

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BREAKING JAIL.

[See, also, ESCAPE.]

D was indicted for breaking jail. On the trial he offered to prove, as an excuse, that the condition of the jail was intolerable and injurious to his health. Held, inadmissible, 240.

BURGLARY.

One who secretes himself in a dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony therein, and being discovered escapes by unlocking a door, not guilty of, 59.

A banker suspecting S of an intention of robbing his bank, employed detectives to act as decoys and induce him to enter the bank with intent to rob it: Held, that he could not be convicted of burglary, 59 "Breaking and entering" defined, 198, 298.

Servant intrusted with key of office may be convicted of, in entering it, 313.

BURIAL.

Mortgage of burial lot void, 119.

The law as to gravestones, 225. CARRIERS.

Agents and Servants.

A conductor can not, in violation of a known rule of the company, license a man to occupy a place of danger so as to make the company responsible. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon, 30.

A local freight agent nas no authority to enter into a contract for the transportation of goods beyond the line of the company. Grover & Baker Sewing Mac. Co. v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 65.

Of Goods and Animals.

A common carrier received a package for transportation, agreeing to carry it for a stipulated sum prepaid, without inquiry as to its value or notice of a limited liability on account of value, and without misrepresentation or artifice on the part of the shipper. Discovering that the package was of greater value than he had supposed, he refused to deliver it to the consignee without additional compensation which the consignee paid. Held, that the latter might maintain an action to recover it back, 59. A railroad company may be bound by special contract, but not otherwise, to transport persons or property beyond the line of its own road. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Missouri, etc., R Co. 65.

Deviation by ship for the purpose of saving property not justifiable, 74.

Duty of express company as to delivery; liability for delivery to wrong person, 75.

Loss of dog caused by railway; condition limiting liability and including loss by wilful negligence, unreasonable, 75.

Railroad receiving goods from connecting line can not justify their detention on ground that, by their reg. ulations, goods so received are not to be forwarded until receipt of bill of back charges, 136.

When delivery by carrier complete, 358.

A horse in apparent good health was shipped on board a steamer, and was delivered at the end of the voyage in a sick and dying condition, but without any signs of external injury: Held, that this was not sufficient to charge the carrier, 520.

Of Passengers.

Right of a railroad company to make reasonable rules for its own protection, and for the safety and convenience of passengers, recognized. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon, 30.

A

passenger who voluntarily leaves his proper place in the passenger car, in violation of a known rule of the company, to ride in the baggage car or other known place of danger, and who is injured in consequence of such violation, can not recover damages for such injury. Id.

Where the rule violated is one having regard exclusively to the safety of passengers, it seems that damages can not be recovered for an injury resulting from such violation, even though the negligence of the company's servants was the cause of the collision or other accident by which the injury was occasioned. Id.

Negligence of railroad company not imputed to passenger, 36.

Not contributory negligence to ride in smoking car, 20.

Responsibility of carriers by water, 39.

Section 28 of the Indiana statute which provides that, "if any passenger shall refuse to pay his fare or toll, the conductor of the train and the servants of the corporation may put him off the cars at any usual stopping place," is permissive and not prohibitory in its terms, and under it a railroad company may

CARRIERS-Continued.

eject such passenger between stations. A passenger who refuses to pay the regular fare is from that moment an intruder, and wrongfully on the train, and has no lawful right to be carried gratis to the next station, but may be expelled at once. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 47.

rier having agreed to carry passenger over a ough route at a reduced rate, less than that asked ansport to some intermediate station, has no o prevent passenger from stopping at that on until he has paid additional fare, 60. Not liable for injury to passenger caused by unprecedented flood, 118.

Liability for carrying beyond destination, 157.

A United States mail agent, traveling on a train in the discharge of his duty, is a "passenger," 258. Liability of, for negligence, 276.

Overcrowding a car is a breach of contract and may amount to a trespass to those passengers who had previously secured compartments, 336.

Right of passenger to act on invitation of conductor, 337.

Liability of railroad company for injuries in Pullman car, 494.

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A statute which, without regard to its possibility or impossibility in any case, requires, as a prerequisite to the exercise of the right to vote, the previous registration of the elector, is unconstitutional. Dells v. Kennedy, 44.

Statute imposing penalty on railway conductors for failing to cause their trains to stop five minutes at every way station, constitutional, 59.

Statute limiting right of admission as attorney at law to white male citizens, not in confiict with Federal Constitution, 59.

Legislature cannot take away right of trial by jury, 71. Majority of all electors of State required to ratify constitutional amendment, 78.

Right of an individual to penalty incurred under statute, a "civil cause" within New Hampshire Constitution, nd cannot be taken away by repeal of statute, 225.

Statute taxing dogs constitutional, 236.

Statute prohibiting bakers from carrying on their business on Sunday is "special," and therefore unconstitutional. A law is not "general" within the meaning of the Constitution, simply because it bears equally upon all persons to whom it is applicable. A

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

"general law" must be as broad as its object. Ex parte Westerfield, 267.

Citizenship; article by Henry Wade Rogers, Esq., 281. When retrospective legislation prohibited, 314. The courts of the United States, in determining questions of general commercial law, are not controlled by the decisions of a State court, even in an action instituted by a National bank, located in the State rendering such decision, against one of its citizens, upon a negotiable note there executed and payable. Such decisions, not based upon local legislative enactments, are not "laws" within the meaning of the Federal statute, which provides that "the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Brooklyn City R. Co. v. Bank of the Republic, 330; and see 379. Provision'in Pennsylvania Constitution, that "the right of action shall survive, and the general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted," does not, in the absence of legislative enactment, give a right of action to the personal representatives of the deceased, 356. Constitution having designated offenses for which certain officers may be removed from office, Legislature has no power to prescribe removal from office as a penalty for offenses not so designated, 378. Nor can it, by declaring that given offense shall be deemed one of a class of offenses for which an officer may be removed, make it of that class and authorize or require the removal of an officer upon conviction of such offense, 378.

A law imposing a smaller license tax on proprietors of bars on steamboats than on bars on land is not unconstitutional because not uniform, 379.

The Supreme Court having on Feb. 8, 1878, decided that a tax collector has no authority to sell an undivided interest in the land, so as to constitute the purchaser a tenant in common with the owner; and that when the only previous notice was that the land or such undivided part thereof as might be necessary, would be sold, any sale, although of the entire parcel of land, was void-on May 6, 1878, the legislature passed a statute, to take immediate effect, in these words: "No sale heretofore made of real estate taken for taxes shall be held invalid by reason of the notice of sale having contained the words, 'or such undivided portion thereof as may be necessary,' or the words, for such undivided portions of them as may be necessary;' provided, however,that this act shall not apply to any case wherein proceedings at law or in equity have been commenced involving the validity of such sale, nor to any real estate which has been alienated since the 8th day of February of the current year, and before the passage of this act. Held, that this statute was unconstitutional and void. Forster v. Forster, 407.

Statute authorizing indictment in county other than than that in which offense was committed, unconstitutional, 415.

Texas statute taxing selling of wines and liquors, but exempting such as are made in State, unconstitutional, 452.

A State may abolish any public office created by law; but where a State makes a contract with a public officer, such a contract is within the constitutional prohibition, and cannot be impaired. Hall v. State,

468.

State statute which permits any debtor, assessed upon personal property, to deduct amount of his debts from valuation of all his personal property, including money capital, except bank shares, is unconstitutional as to National bank shares, 472.

Act requiring registry of judgments against city does not impair obligation of contract, 494.

Tax to reimburse public officials for losses, constitu tional, 497.

Statute which repeals an act, limiting the time within which crimes shall be proscribed, is not an er post facto law, within the meaning of the Federal or State Constitution. State v. Moore, 507.

A person committed certain crimes at a time more than two years antecedent to the finding of an indictment, and at a time when the law barred the prosecution for such crimes by the lapse of two years after two years had run and the prosecution was thus barred, the legislature repealed the act of limitation, and extended the time three years beyond the original limit. Held, that such repeal and extension were valid. Id.

Judicial power; eleventh amendment; jurisdiction of Federal courts, 514.

Regulation of commerce, 515.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.

Where officers of city or State provide public schools of equal excellence for all children between certain ages, but do not allow children of colored parents to attend the same schools with children of white parents, rights of former under Constitution and law of United States not impaired thereby, 520.

CONSTRUCTION.

[See INTERPRETATION.]

CONTEMPT.

Party to equity cause who is in contempt, will not be heard until contempt is purged, 419.

Courts of record have an inherent power to punish for disorderly conduct in the court-room, resistance of their process, or any other interference with their proceedings which amounts to actual contempt. Section 2 of ch. 28, Comp. Laws, (Kas.) 1879, places no limit on the power of the district court in matters of contempt, but only upon that of the district judge at chambers. In re Millington, 447.

CONTRACTS.

Illegal. See, also, OFFICES AND OFFICERS.
Contracts for delivery of grain when void, 56.
Agreement to refrain from prosecution when not in-
ferred, 95.

An agreement to withdraw from prosecution for lar-
ceny by a bailee, or for any other felony, or any mis-
demeanor of a public nature, with a view to private
benefit, bad, as against public policy, 215.
Contract to rent house for purpose forbidden by city
ordinance, illegal, 224.

Plaintiffs were champagne merchants at Epernay, in France. Defendant, whose name was the same as that of plaintiffs, having entered their house and learnt the business, acted for two years as their representative in England, and then wrote a letter to them, by which he undertook not to represent any other champagne house for two years after leaving plaintiffs' employment, and not to establish himself or associate himself with other persons or houses in the champagne trade for ten years after leaving them. Defendant left plaintiffs' employment in March, 1877, and in May, 1878, commenced business in London as a retail wine merchant, and sold champagne as well as other wines. In his circulars and advertisements, and on the labels and corks of the champagne bottles, were the words "Ay Champagne," but he had no establishment anywhere except in London. Held, that the defendant had committed a breach of the agreement. Held, also, that the agreement was valid, as the restriction was not larger than was necessary for the reasonable protection of the plaintiffs. There is no hard and fast rule that a contract in restraint of trade unlimited as to space is invalid, but the validity depends on the reasonableness of the contract. Rouissilon v. Rouissilon, 270.

Compounding public offense, an illegal consideration for a contract, 395.

Agreement not to follow calling within specified limits valid, 451.

When contract in restraint of trade is reasonable, subsequent circumstances, such as the covenantees ceasing to do business, do not affect its operation, 451.

Contract to procure a pardon or refrain from prosection illegal, 479.

Miscellaneous.

A, a baker in Detroit, ordered of B, an ornamental sign painter in New York, a quantity of show cards. The contract was entered into by correspondence, and in one of his letters A enclosed a sketch of what he wanted, which among other things contained a shield with the word "established" on one side of it and the figures "1875" on the other. The letter stated that A wanted "something of this style," referring to the sketch, and concluded by saying, "Give us a clean, neat label." The cards were completed and forwarded to A, who refused to receive them, for the reason that the word "established" and the figures "1875" were placed at the top instead of in the position indicated by the sketch. Held, that the contract gave B a discretion as to the artistic arrangement of the figures, and that A's refusal to accept could not be sustained. Thoubboron v. Lewis, 23.

Construction of contract; advertisement in book sold by subscription, 94.

Non-performance caused by act of God no breach, 138. Where parties contract for doing of certain work, and work is done and accepted, but there is a misunderstanding as to the price, law rejects understanding of each, and awards reasonable compensation, 178. Implied contract to pay for board of insane person,

218.

CONTRACTS-Continued.

Absolute covenant in contract not discharged by performance becoming impossible, 219.

Where negotiations for the sale of goods are pending between parties, and an offer of terms is made by one party, such offer remains in force as a continuing offer until the time for accepting or rejecting has arrived, unless it be revoked before accepta But a revocation in order to be operative, mu communicated to the other party before b patches his acceptance. Stevenson v. McL A contract to supply water for domestic purpo not be extended to furnishing water for sprinking streets, 236.

Breach of promise of marriage; right of party to cancel engagement, 257.

Where one settles upon the land of a railroad company which, by circulars printed and distributed by it, is offered to any one settling thereon at a price to be afterwards fixed, a contract is created of which equity will decree specific performance. Boyd v. Brieken, 287.

Death of contracting party ends contract, 297. Woman having no right of action for seduction, forbearance to sue not a sufficient consideration for a contract, 314.

To make a contract, the minds of the parties must meet as to its terms. Therefore, where A agreed to take a subscription book from the agent of B, the payment to be made by the proceeds of his office for a certain period, but the instructions to the agent prohibited any such agreement by the agent: Held, that B could not recover the publication price of the book except under the above agreement, as A had never assented to any other contract. Everts v. Selover, 470.

Q, having entered into a contract with a county board to do all the county printing at rates less than those allowed by statute, and having received and done such printing, sought to repudiate the contract rates and recover at those named in the statute. Held, that the contract rates controlled. Quigley v. Commrs. 510.

Where a contract is made to do certain work at certain rates, the contract rates control as to the work actually done, although all the work contracted for was not given by the employer to the contractor. The latter may not repudiate the contract in toto, and recover upon a quantum meruit, but may recover any damages sustained from the employer's breach of contract. Id.

Contract when not implied for work done, 516. Member of society of Shakers bound by his covenant with society, whereby on becoming member he stipulates never to make any claim for his services, 224.

Ratification.

Fraud which amounts to a crime can not be ratified; aliter, where the transaction is simply contrary to good faith, 17.

Forgery of indorsement of promissory note can not be ratified, 17.

Statute of Frauds.

The statute of frauds will be satisfied by such a statement in a written contract as ascertains the price to be paid, although it mentions no specific sum, as for instance, if to pay a price to be settled by arbitration, or upon the valuation of appraisers to be selected by the parties. Norton v. Gale, 129. Where a lease of lots, executed by boli parties, fixed the annual rent for the first five years, and then provided that the amount of the rent to be paid annually for the next five years should be six per cent, on the appraised value of the premises, to be ascertained by appraisers, one to be selected by each party, and they to select another, in case they could not agree, it was held that the contract was not within the statute of frauds, as to the rent to be paid for the second five years. Id.

Agreement to charge hereditaments with the value of property which has been lost through wrongful act of third person, is within the, 215.

R's servant being injured by the negligence of W, a
physician was sent for by W to treat him. R told the
physician that W was responsible for the accident,
adding, "But I will see that you are paid." Held,
that the promise of R was within the statute of
frauds. Rose v. O'Linn, 268.
A.

What not sufficient acceptance under, 374.
Telegraphic message, sufficient compliance with, 39 6
Promise by president of corporation of dividends if
party will take stock, not within, 397.

Parol contract concerning land may be subject of action, although it can not be enforced by specide performance, 415.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

[See CARRIERS; NEGLIGENCE.] CONVERSION.

[See, also, TROVER.]

When demand before action for, not necessary, 421. COPYRIGHTS.

[See PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADE-MARKS.]] CORPORATIONS.

[See, also, NEGLIGENCE.]

A corporation not a "person" within English statute as to selling poisons, 74.

A corporation may be indicted for Sabbath breaking,

94.

When liable to officer (president or director) for services, 118.

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Liability of company for wrongful issue of certificate of shares, 176.

Records of corporation not constructive notice to per sons dealing in stock, 176.

That corporation has not complied with law authorizing it to do business,good answer to action to collect debt, 316.

One who accepts and holds certificates for unpaid shares of stock in a corporation, and votes such shares at annual elections, is estopped from denying his liability as a stockholder to the corporation or its creditors, although such shares were issued to him under an agreement in writing that they were to be held in trust or as a security only, and were not subscribed for on the books of the company, or otherwise, in the usual manner of making such subscriptions. One may be constituted a stockholder by his conduct as effectually as by the rigid observ. ance of the usual formalities in making subscriptions. Griswold v. Seligman, 432. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that the stock was voted under an arrangement with the company, made outside of the written contract for a specific purpose, to the effect that such holder should have the privilege of voting the stock without attendant liability. Id.

In a proceeding to enforce such liability, it is unnecessary to show that the creditor became such subsequently to the acquisition of the stock by the defendant, or in consequence thereof, or altered his condi tion by giving credit to the company on the faith of defendant being a stockholder. Under the Missouri statute the liability attaches to the holder of the stock at the date of the execution. Id. Parties dealing with a corporation are not affected with notice of entries made upon its corporate books limiting the liability of holders of unpaid stock. Id. Capital stock issued by a railroad corporation to be held in trust, or as collateral security, is not within the protection of sec. 771 Rev. Stat. Mo., which provides: "No person holding stock in any such company as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and no person holding such stock as collateral security, shall be personally subject to any liability as a stockholder of such company; but the person pledging such stock shall be considered as holding the same and shall be liable as a stockholder accordingly, and the estates and funds in the hands of such administrator, guardian or trustee, shall be liable in like manner and to the same extent as the testator or intestate, or the ward or person interested in such fund, would have been if he had been living and competent to act, and held the stock in his own name." ." Id.

COUNTERCLAIM.

[See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.}

COVENANTS.

[See VENDOR AND VENDEE.]

CRIMES.

[See the various special titles.]

CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.

Action lies by husband for criminal conversation, even where wife has not consented to unlawful connection, 413.

In action for criminal conversation, testimony of husband and wife that they had had no intercourse at time child was begotten, and that defendant "must have been its father," inadmissible, 413. That wife consented to adultery, relevant, 475. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.

Miscellaneous.

Corroboration of testimony of accomplices, 76.

CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Continued,

Proof of the corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence, 111.

Admissibility of statements made before grand jury in another case, 138.

Confession when not admissible, 277.

Evidence given on preliminary examination admissible on trial, 296.

Admissibility of dying declarations, 296.

What not admissible as res gesta, 298.

Proof of guilt of co-derendant does not tend to show innocence of defendant, 454.

On trial for keeping game cock, declarations of party at time of arrest admissible, 514.

Witnesses.

Credibility of defendant as witness in criminal cases,

15.

At what time defendant may offer evidence to prove his character for truth, 16.

Admissibility of evidence of judge as to what occurred on former trial before him, 179.

Witness on cross-examination bound to answer criminating question, 236.

Proof of the corpus delicti; discussion of the question; the Globe Democrat on the subject, 258, 259.

Correct to ask witness as to his age, condition in life, etc., 298.

Voluntary testimony of party on preliminary examin ation may be put in by State, 315.

Court may allow witness to be recalled, 315.
Right of challenge, 478, 516.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE.

Jndgment, Sentence, etc.

A prisoner entered a plea of guilty under a belief that by so doing a less severe punishment would be awarded. The judge sentenced him to the maximum allowed by law for that offense. The prisoner then asked leave to withdraw his plea, which was refused and judgment entered. Held, error. State v. Stevens, 5.

Two years in the county jail is not a cruel and unusual punishment in the case of one who has beaten his wife, 59.

Where a defendant is convicted of separate misdemeanors charged in separate counts in the same indictment, the court has power to pass separate sentences exceeding in the aggregate the maximum punishment for one offense. Castro v. Queen, 291. C was charged in the first count of the indictment with perjury in a trial at Westminster, and in the second count with perjury before a commissioner in London, the same false statement being charged in both counts. He was tried in the Court of Queen's Bench at bar, convicted on both counts, and sentenced on the first count to seven years' penal servitude, and on the second count to a further term of seven years' penal servitude, to commence immediately on the expiration of the first term. A writ of error having been brought: Held, that the sentences were warranted by law. Id.

By 2 Geo. 2, ch. 25, sec. 2, and the Penal Servitude Acts a person convicted of perjury may be sentenced to penal servitude "over and besides such punishment as shall be adjudged to be inflicted on such person agreeable to the laws now in being." Held, that a sentence of penal servitude may be inflicted for perjury without any other punishment. Id.

The circuit judge has no power to set aside a judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was ren dered, and the only remedy in such case is by writ of error coram nobis, and the circuit judge has power in term, upon an assignment of an error of fact, to issue such writ. Adler v. State, 484. Miscellaneous.

Attorney employed to assist prosecution may ope case to jury, 376.

When comments of prosecuting attorney in speech jury not ground for new trial, 377.

Record may be corrected at same term nunc pro tune

416.

Expression of opinion that accused person is guilty by grand juror before sworn, not a ground of chal lenge, 472, 479.

Proceedings in grand jury room not provable, 472. Jury can not view scene of crime in absence of prison er, 477.

Right of challenge, 478.

The circuit court has power to order a change of venue from the circuit court of one county to that of another, so as to give the latter jurisdiction over the case; and, in criminal cases, only one change of venue will be allowed. Adler v. State, 484.

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