and a party to the bill deposed that the value of the property was increased $3,000 by the sewer. An amendment to the charter of Wilmington, passed January 30, 1866, confers upon the city council the entire jurisdiction and control of the drainage of the city, with power to pass ordinances for the opening of gutters, drains and sewers, and for the regulating, maintaining, cleansing and keeping the same and the natural water-courses, runs and rivulets within the city limits, open, clear and unobstructed, and for the entry upon private land for such purposes, and by general regulations to prescribe the mode in which the work shall be done, and who shall bear the expense thereof, and in its discretion to assess the costs thereof upon the persons and property, real and personal, of those particularly benefited thereby, or of those holding lands through, or along which, said sewers, drains and watercourses shall flow or pass, and prescribe the mode of collection thereof. The statute provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, but is silent as to the mode in which such compensation shall be ascertained. A city ordinance passed June 21, 1866, by virtue of the authority thus given, sets out in detail the manner in which the cost of constructing sewers, etc., shall be assessed. It makes it the duty of the street commissioner to keep an accurate account of the cost of such construction, and through the street committee, to report the same to the council, together with a list of the persons and estates particularly benefited thereby, as well as of those holding lands through, or along which, said sewers shall pass, and an estimate of the value of the lands upon which said expense ought to be assessed, the said value to be estimated independently of buildings or improvements. The city council may, or may not, order any part of such expense to be paid out of the general fund, and the whole or remainder, as the case may be, shall be apportioned among those persons and estates particularly benefited, or among those holding lands along which the sewer shall pass. If the owners be unknown, the assessment shall be generally against the lot or premises by particular or general description. The assessment, being approved by council, shall be entered on the lien book, and may be collected by warrant under the hand and seal of the mayor.

The bill denies the authority of the city to lay a special tax for the payment of the sewer, and assumes that the expense should be wholly defrayed out of the funds produced by general taxation. But the position most earnestly contended for by the complainants is, that the city having constructed a work partly for an unlawful object, namely, the diversion of a natural water-course without license from the owners thereof, such unlicensed act of diversion, being outside of its chartered powers, taints the entire work with illegality, and no portion of the expense can be lawfully assessed on the property holders, notwithstanding that another and a,lawful end may have been intended at the same time. The docrine insisted on is, that where a tax or assessment

is laid partly for a legal and partly for an illegal purpose, and such tax or assessment is entire and indivisible, the whole tax or assessment is illegal and void. The evidence, however, does not warrant the application of this principle to the present case. The city had the power, under the statute of 1866, to regulate and change the flow or direction of the natural drains and watercourses within its limits, to construct sewers and to assess the cost upon the owners of property specially benefited. No authority is given to invade or appropriate private property without compensation; this is expressly prohibited. It is true, the statute does not point out any way of fixing the compensation, but in this instance there was no necessity for ascertaining what might be due for taking for public use a property which was worthless and detrimental to its owners, who asked for its removal as a boon, and have derived a profit from its loss. These owners, and their privies in estate, stood by and saw the preparations made for depriving them of their property, without remonstrance or objection. The building and completion of the sewer occupied several months, and its uses and objects were well known. No attempt was made to interfere with the work, nor was the diversion of the water-course objected to. Some of the complainants requested the city council to carry off by perfect drainage the waters coming from above, and no word of disapproval was heard until the parties benefited were called upon to contribute to the payment of the expense. These facts admit of but one interpretation. The diversion having been made with the consent and approval, and to the evident advantage of the property owners, the action of the defendant corporation was not illegal or ultra vires. The water-course had no existing or prospective value for the driving of machinery or for domestic uses, and by its continuance in its old channel, rendered the lots through which it flowed, unsalable. Its appropriation by the city was more of a public burden than a public benefit, while it afforded a special and advantageous relief to the lot-owners. Such an appropriation, under all circumstances, does not fall within the definition of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. We may, therefore, dismiss the further consideration of the want of power in the city, under the statute of 1866, to make the diversion complained of, and direct our attention to the other points presented on behalf of the complainants.

That the expense of local improvements in a town or city may be met by local assessments, in whole or in part, appears to be so well established as to require no discussion. Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Pa. St. 255; 2 Dill. on Mun. Corp. 596 and notes. But when, under what conditions, and to what extent a court of equity should interfere to prevent the collection of such assessments, are questions which have not been nniformly decided. The inconvenience and confusion which might be caused by an indefinite delay in the receipt of municipal or other public revenues, and the serious embarrassments that might follow

such delay, are obvious, and courts of equity have therefore been disinclined to put any obstacle in the way of their prompt collection, except under special circumstances, such as left the complainant without any remedy at law, or where it was clear that the tax had been imposed without authority and was absolutely void. Even in the latter case, where the only question is one of excess of authority, depending on purely legal principles, it is doubtful whether equity should interpose. Those courts which most closely adhere to the distinctions between legal and equitable jurisdiction have generally refused to interfere by injunction with municipal assessments, except in cases which come under some one of the recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, and the doctrine is universally accepted that the collection of tax will not be enjoined except upon the clearest grounds. The most important question, therefore, to be considered, is that of jurisdiction; for though the arguments addressed to us by counsel were chiefly directed to other matters, this question was not waived, but it was expressly contended on the part of the city that the complainants, whatever might be their rights in a court of law, were not entitled to redress in a court of equity.

The complainants insist upon their right to an injunction for the reason that the assessment being illegal and void, a threatened sale thereunder for its collection casts a cloud upon their titles which they have no adequate legal remedy to remove; that such sale would cause them an irreparable injury; that some of the complainants having only an equitable title are absolutely without remedy at law; and that to refuse the writ would lead to circuity of action and a multiplicity of suits. These are recognized heads of equity jurisdiction, and we are to inquire whether the complainants' case falls under any one of them.

Is this assessment a cloud upon their titles? It is not every irregular or even void assessment that clouds a title. A lien or incumbrance, to throw a shadow upon title to real property so as to give the owner a right to relief in equity, must be one that is regular and valid on its face, but is in fact irregular and void from circumstances which have to be proved by extrinsic evidence. The test is well defined in Heywood v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 539, to be where there is an apparent validity in the incumbrance, and a total invalidity in fact, which can only be proved by evidence aliunde. If the authority under which the assessment was made is unconstitutional, or if the power to tax is conceded, and the officers intrusted with the duty of fixing the tax rate have exceeded their authority, or if from any other cause, appearing on the face of the proceedings, the tax is irregular and void, it will not affect the title, the defect being visible and undoubted. But a tax may be, from all that appears to the contrary, entirely regular and valid; the authority to levy it may be undisputed; and every preliminary step, necessary to be taken by way of notice to the owners of property and its valuation, the amount

of revenue to be raised and the final apportionment, may have been, on the face of the record, in strict compliance with the requirements of the law-and yet, by reason of fraud, corruption or neglect on the part of the officer making the assessment, the tax is void. The record may be false. Notice to owners and valuation of property may not, in fact, have been made, or the assessing officer may have conspired to make an unjust and partial assessment. An assessment or tax made and levied in the manner supposed, being apparently regular and legal, and in reality arbitrary and corrupt, but requiring extrinsic evidence to establish the fact, casts a cloud upon title. The contention here is, that the statute of 1866, which grants power to the city to regulate or change, within its limits, the course of natural rivulets, to construct sewers and assess the costs upon the parties specially benefited by the improvement, is unconstitutional, in so far as it undertakes to give the right of taking private property without providing any mode for ascertaining the amount of compensation to be paid to the owner; and that waiving this objection, and admitting the statute to be valid, certain conditions precedent, prescribed by the city ordinance, and which must be observed in order to make a legal assessment, have not been complied with. It is the duty of the street commissioner, under the ordinance, when he reports to the city council the cost of constructing a sewer, to present at the same time an estimate of the value of the lands upon which said expense ought to be assessed, the value of such lands to be estimated independently of any buildings or improvements thereon. It is charged that the commissioner failed to perform his duty in this respect, and that the records and proceedings of the city council do not show, nor does it appear from any other source, that the required estimate of value was made or presented. The only answer to this is the presumption that official duties have been regularly fulfilled. Without entering into any inquiry as to the effect of this alleged omission of duty by the commissioner, it is sufficient to know that the omission appears on the face of the proceedings. Conceding, then, all that is claimed by the counsel for the complainants, the assessment is void by reason of its inherent defects. An unconstitutional law eonfers no authority, and if a city ordinance imposes certain conditions which must be complied with in order to make a legal tax, the failure to comply with any one of the conditions renders the tax void, so that on one hand, the city council having acted without authority, and on the other, in violation of its own self-imposed restrictions, the assessment is not binding, creates no lawful lien, and does not cloud the titles of the complainants. But all these matters are wholly within the jurisdiction of a court of law, to be determined by an examination of the statute, an inspection of the journals and records of the city government connected with this particular assessment, and do not call for any outside evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of the tax. Authority in support of this view of what makes a clouded title

may be found in the opinion of Chancellor Walworth, in Wiggin ▾. Mayor of New York, 9 Paige, 23, a case involving the validity of an assessment for the opening of a street. "If the whole proceedings," says the chancellor, "in relation to the opening were absolutely void in law, and that fact appears upon the face of the ordinance itself, a sale for the assessment upon the claimants' lots would not even create a cloud upon his title. For as every person must be presumed to know the law, a proceeding which is upon its face not only illegal, but absolutely void, does not constitute a cloud upon the title to real estate against which a court of equity will relieve." In Van Doren v. Mayor of New York, 9 Paige, 389, the same eminent judge, reaffirming the principle of the previous case, adds: "A valid legal objection appearing upon the face of the proceedings, through which the adverse party can alone claim any right to the complainants' land, is not in law such a cloud upon the complainants' title as can authorize a court of equity to set aside or stay such proceedings. But where the claim of the adverse party to the land is valid upon the face of the instrument, or the proceedings sought to be set aside, as where the defendant has procured and put upon record a deed obtained from the complainant by fraud, or upon a usurious consideration, which require the establishment of extrinsic facts to show the supposed conveyance to be inoperative and void, a court of equity may interfere and set it aside as a cloud upon the real title to the land.” The chancellor cites Simpson v. Lord Howden, 3 My. & Craig. 97, in which it was decided that there is no jurisdiction in equity to order a legal instrument to be delivered up, on the ground of an illegality which appears upon the face of the instrument itself. In Pixly v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 127, it was held that if the sale which it was sought to restrain is such, that in an action of ejectment brought by the purchaser under the sale, the real owner would be obliged to offer evidence to defeat a recovery, then such a cloud would be raised as to warrant the interference of equity to prevent the sale. High on Injunction, § 272, recognizes the same rule as settled by the general current of authorities which draw a distinction between cases where the invalidity or illegality charged as the cloud is shown by evidence dehors the record, and where it appears upon the face of the proceedings. And while in the former case the relief is freely granted, in the latter, courts of equity will not interfere. To the same effect is Heywood v. City of Buffalo, already cited, approved by Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413, and by Dows v. Chicago, 11 Id. 108. In Ewing v. St. Louis, the court say, that with the proceedings and determinations of inferior boards or tribunals of special jurisdiction courts of equity will not interfere, unless it should become necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits or irreparable injury, or unless the proceeding sought to be annulled or corrected is valid upon its face, and the alleged invalidity consists in matters to be established by extrinsic evidence. The most recent case on this point that has come under our notice

is Wells v. City of Buffalo, 21 Alb. L. J. 234, which was an application to set aside an assessment as a cloud upon the title to the plaintiff's land, on the ground that the statute authorizing the assessment was unconstitutional, and the court held that no cloud could be created by an assessment which was void upon its face, and dismissed the complaint.

The owner of personal or real property, seized or sold under execution for the collection of an illegal municipal tax, has an adequate remedy at law, either by paying under protest the amount demanded, and bringing an action against the city to recover it back, or by an action of trespass for the recovery of damages. In the case of a sale of real property under a void assessment, as in the case of a sale by a sheriff on a void judgment, the purchaser buys at his peril, and the owner may fold his arms in defiance, or if dispossessed, maintain his rights by an action of ejectment. Under such circumstances the owner can sustain no irreparable injury, and would suffer a loss only by his own passive submission to a wrong. A party claiming title under a corporation tax sale must show that every pre-requisite to the power of sale has been complied with, and compliance with law must appear on the face of the proceedings. 2 Dill. on Mun. Corp. 658; Collector ▼. Day, 11 Wall. I13.

A writ of certiorari will afford the owner of property, subject to an illegal assessment, another mode of redress or relief. This remedy is expressly referred to as an appropriate one by Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court in Ewing v. St. Louis, and is approved by Judge Dillon in his excellent work on Municipal Corporations. That learned author remarks: "The unquestionable weight of authority in this country is, if an appeal be not given, or some specific mode of review provided, that the superior common-law courts will, on certiorari, examine the proceedings of municipal corporations, even although there be no statute giving this remedy; and if it be found that they have exceeded their chartered powers, or have not pursued those powers, or have not conformed to the requirements of the charter or law under which they have undertaken to act, such proceedings will be reversed or annulled. An aggrieved party is, in such case, entitled to a certiorari ex debito justitiæ.” 2 Dill. on Mun. Corp. 740.

Equity will interpose, in a proper case, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, excessive litigation, or circuity of action. A court of equity, on a bill being filed for a discovery, will sometimes proceed to take jurisdiction of all the matters in controversy between the parties, instead of sending them to a court of law, and thus avoid circuity of action. And so, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, as of one against many, or of many against one, in relation to the same cause of action, the aid of equity may be invoked. But multiplicity does not mean multitude, and equity will not interfere where the object is to obtain a consolidation of actions, or to save the expense of separate

actions. Sheldon v. Center School Dist. 25 Conn. 224; Dodd v. City of Hartford, 24 Id. 232; Lord Tenham v. Herbert, 2 Atk. 483; Eldridge v. Hill, 2 Johns. Ch. 283. Or where the claim of right rests on a mere question of law, as for ascertaining the legality of the proceedings of a municipal corporation. West v. Mayor of Albany, 10 Paige, 539. Chancellor Kent. in Eldridge v. Hill, supra, says: "Enjoining litigation at law seems to have been allowed in only one of those two cases, either where the plaintiff has already established his right at law, or where the persons who controvert it are so numerous as to render an issue under the direction of this court indispensable to embrace all the parties concerned, and to save multiplicity of suits." A distinction is also to be observed between bills for the prevention of multiplicity of suits or bills of peace, whose object is the suppression of useless and vexatious litigation, and cases where the real object of the relief sought is the consolidation of a number of suits of like nature, since in the former class of cases courts of equity may properly enjoin, but in the latter they will refuse to interfere, Thus, where an injunction was asked to stay proceedings in ninety-two actions of ejectment, until one or more might be tried, the parties, pleadings, title and testimony being the same in all the cases, the relief was refused, the real object sought being a consolidation of the actions which a court of law might properly grant. High on Inj. 329; Peters v. Provost, 1 Paine's C. C. 64. In Penn. Coal Co. v. Del. & H. Canal Co., 31 N. Y., it was said that where a right can only be adequately protected or enforced by ruinous and expensive lawsuits, courts of equity have interposed their jurisdiction, and have given the party redress by injunction, specific performance or other adequate relief, in order thereby to prevent litigation and the mischief which results from it. Bills of peace, says another authority, have been sustained by the court to settle the rights of parties in a single suit, in cases where the questions to be determined were questions of fact, or mixed questions of law and fact. But no such bill ean be sustained to restrain a defendant from suing at law, where the rights of the parties depend upon a question of law merely, and where the defendant in a suit at law must eventually succeed in his defense, without the aid of a court of chancery, if the law is in his favor. West v. Mayor of Albany, supra. The real object sought to be reached by the complainants being a consolidation of their actions, or remedies, against the defendant corporation, they have not presented such a case on the facts and the law as would warrant a court of equity in taking cognizance of their controversy to the exclusion of a common-law court, which has all the necessary jurisdiction and power to grant them full and adequate redress. It would be an evasion of principle to allow a dozen or twenty property owners to tie up the hands of a tax collector, while the individual owner was compelled to seek his remedy in a court of law. A combination of taxables could at any time arrest the operations of a municipal government by enjoining the col

lection of taxes and thus subordinate public to private interests.

The charge that some of the complainants, being only equitable owners of a portion of the real estate subject to the lien of the assessment, are absolutely remediless at law, would furnish a strong reason for interference if they were not represented by a trustee duly appointed, who has accepted the trust, is acting in that capacity, and has signed the bill of complaint. Holding the legal title to the land, he is in all respects competent to protect the rights and interests of his cestuis que trust in a court of law.

The applicaition for an injunction being unsupported by the facts and the settled principles and practice of equity, as we understand them, we think the bill was properly dismissed by the chancellor. In coming to this conclusion, we have purposely abstained from expressing any opinion on the sufficiency of the main objections to the assessment. The appropriate tribunal for their settlement is the Superior Court, by which they can be heard and determined without interrupting for a single hour the collection of the public taxes, and without impairing the rights or injuring the property of the complainants. Decree affirmed.

1. One who accepts and holds certificates for unpaid shares of stock in a corporation, and votes such shares at annual elections, is estopped from denying his liability as a stockholder to the corporation or its creditors, although such shares were issued to him under an agreement in writing that they were to be held in trust or as a security only, and were not subscribed for on the books of the company, or otherwise, in the usual manner of making such subscriptions One may be constituted a stockholder by his conduct as effectually as by the rigid observance of the usual formalities in making subscriptions.

2. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that the stock was voted under an arrangement with the company, made outside of the written contract for a specific purpose, to the effect that such holder should have the privilege of voting the stock without attendant liability.

3. In a proceeding to enforce such liability, it is unnecessary to show that the creditor became such subsequently to the acquisition of the stock by the defend. ant, or in consequence thereof, or altered his condition by giving credit to the company on the faith of defendant being a stockholder. Under the Missouri statute, the liability attaches to the holder of the stock at the date of the execution.

4. Parties dealing with a corporation are not affected with notice of entries made upon its corporate books limiting the liability of holders of unpaid stock.

5. Capital stock issued by a railroad corporation to be held in trust, or as collateral security, is not within the protection of sec. 771 Rev. Stat. Mo., which provides: "No person holding stock in any such company as exec. utor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and no person holding such stock as collateral security, shall be per

sonally subject to any liability as a stockholder of such company; but the person pledging such stock shall be considered as holding the same and shall be liable as a stockholder accordingly, and the estates and funds in the hands of such administrator, guardian or trustee, shall be liable in like manner and to the same extent as the testator or intestate, or the ward or person interested in such fund, would have been if he had been living and competent to act, and held the stock in his own name."

Appeal from Jasper Court of Common Pleas. The Memphis, Carthage & Northwestern Railroad Company, a Missouri corporation, authorized by its articles of association to issue $10,000,000 of capital stock, made a written contract, in February, 1872, with J. & W. Seligman & Co., whereby said firm agreed to become the financial agents of said company, and make certain advances to aid the construction of its railroad, in consideration that it would deposit with them its entire issue of mortgage bonds, and also deposit with them a majority of its authorized capital stock, to remain in their control for one year at least. Thereupon the board of directors resolved: "That, in making negotiations for money with J. & W. Seligman & Co., certificates of a majority of stock be issued to said J. & W. Seligman & Co., to be held by them in trust for the period of twelve months." Thereupon a certificate, in usual form, was issued to said firm for 60,000 shares of stock, which was accepted and is still held by them. This entry was made on the stock transfer book: "J. & W. Seligman & Co.; residence, New York; shares 60,000 (held in escrow); amount, $6,000,000. May 20, 1872." Said firm received and accepted said shares in the above manner, without any formal subscription by them, or any other person, and nothing was ever paid thereon. They voted said shares at two annual elections, electing one member of the firm a director, and controlling the organization and management of the company thereby. Evidence was introduced by defendants, tending to show that the stock was voted under an arrangement with the company, outside of the written contract, by which they were given the privilege of voting it. The plaintiff, Griswold, obtained a judgment against the company, and his execution issued thereon having been returned nulla bona, he thereupon instituted a proceeding, under Rev. Stat. sec. 736, to obtain an execution against said firm as the holders of unpaid stock of the company. The execution was denied. John P. Ellis and Joseph Shippen, for appellant; James Q. Broadhead, for respondent.

SHERWOOD, C. J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

This appeal questions the correctness of the ruling which denied plaintiff's motion for execution against defendants. The point thus presented for determination is, whether the defendants are answerable as stockholders.

The relation of stockholders may be created not only by the usual formalities of subscription and the acceptance of stock, but other acts are, in contemplation of law, the legal equivalent of

those just mentioned. That is to say, conduct on the part of the person sought to be charged is, of itself, sufficient to accomplish all that could be accomplished by the rigid observance of those formalities usually attendant on becoming a stockholder. The law declaratory of this position is well settled in America and by the earlier authorities in England. Thomp. on Stock. sec. 160. Thus, in an action of debt for calls, one who, though not a subscriber, had paid a call as such, was held estopped to deny his membership, and a like ruling was made in a similar instance, where the defendant had attended the half-yearly meeting of the proprietors. Railway Co. v. Graham, 2 Eng. Railway Cas. 870; Same v. Gunstone, Id. So, also, where the issue raised, as in the cases cited, was whether the defendant was the proprietor of shares and consequently liable for calls, and it appeared that he had represented himself to the company in that capacity, claiming to be registered as such in consequence of scrip certificates purchased by him and sent in to the company, for which he had received receipts and a notice from the company that the scrip would be exchanged for sealed certificates on demand, he was held estopped to deny his liability for calls, though the provisions of the act necessary to make him proprietor had not been complied with by the registry of his name or the entry of any memorial of transfer;-Lord Denman, C. J., remarking: "A party can not by his own conduct change his liability at pleasure. * * ** All the machinery which the legislature renders necessary to constitute a member is, in this instance, dispensed with by the conduct of the parties." Railway Co. v. Daniel, 2 Eng. Railway Cas. 728. And that case was held not distinguishable from one decided at the same time, where, in addition to the facts first noted, the defendant had paid calls on some shares and begged time as to others. Same v. Medina, Id. 735. In such cases it is held that a "valid and binding contract" is formed between the company and the person sought to be charged as contributory, if there has been a course of dealing with the company wherein they have permitted the alleged transferee to become a shareholder de facto. Straffon's Exrs. Case 1 DeG. Mac. & G. 576, and cases cited. The beneficial use of stock will also render the person so using it liable as shareholder. This is well illustrated in Maguire's Case, 3 DeG. & Sm. 31, where the son, unaware that two shares had been transferred to him by his father, signed certificates obtained from the company's office as proprietor, and on several occasions by this means secured a free passage in the vessels of the company, was held properly placed on the list as contributory, the vice-chancellor saying: "This gentleman is shown so plainly and.distinctly to have represented himself and to have acted as a proprietor, that, in my opinion, it is established that he is a proprietor, and if a proprietor, a partner and a contributory."

In this country instances are abundant where parties,sued as shareholders at the instance of the corporation or of creditors, have been held either