Happily for the people of the United States, the that she had a right to legislate for them in no case rise, progress, and adoption of their federative sys-whatsoever. How ably this controversy was maintained; how tern are now matters of authentic history, every where acknowledged and questioned by none. The thoroughly the doctrines which produced it were broad and ample line which divides that external discussed and understood; how long it lasted; how legislation over the union, which the federal consti- gloriously it terminated; and how dearly the rights, tution has delegated to congress the right to exer- and principles it established have been always vacise, from that internal legislation over which the lued, in Virginia, at least, let the valor of the dead, states reserved to themselves exclusive supremacy, the memory of the living, and the candor of history, was described by the wisdom of our ancestors, say. All these admonish us, that while this memorestablished by their valor, and endeared by their able conflict was going on, the people of the colosufferings, when impelled by necessity and guided nies established for themselves a confederacy of by fate, to beat down the principles of absolute so- common defence and general welfare, and declared vereignty in governments, and absolute subordina-"that each state should retain its sovereignty, freetion in the people. This broad and ample line has dom and independence, and every power, jurisdic. constantly adorned the political zodiac of the Ame- tion and right, which was not by their confedera rican people: it now looms larger to the public eye, [tion expressly delegated to the United States, in and is always pure and visible when purely shone congress assembled." To this federative system, upon. While the people of the United States were they apportioned power according to the princi. under the control of the British crown, the parlia- ples upon which they had declared their willingment contended that its legislative power over the ness t. continue their allegiance to the British colonies extended to all means necessary or conve- crown; conceding to parliament the regulation of nient, in its own opinion, for the attainment of its war, peace and commerce; and retaining for themobjects. The colonies willingly conceded u And, after their independence was ers of national war and of peace, and of regu- sary to their happiness, and leciclation lating commerce; not as matter of right, founded their liberties. upon the genuine theory and spirit of the British fully recognized, and the blessings of honorable constitution, but as matter of loyal affection and peace were restored to the colonies, they carefully mutual convenience to the whole empire. They revised their old system of common defence and ge denied, however, that this concession yielded any neral welfare, and in "order to form a more perfect means subversive of their own internal government; government, establish justice, isure domestic tran as to which they claimed to exercise absolute con- quility, provide for the common defence, promote trol. "The parliament contended, that the right the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberof making war, conceded by the colonies, implied a ty to themselves and their posterity," they ordainright of using all means necessary and convenient ed and established the present constitution of the for the attainment of success; such as raising reve- United States; by which they still continued to apnue, appointing collectors, raising troops and quar portion power between the general government tering them on the colonies; and that the right of and the several states, according to the principles regulating commerce involved a right of imposing upon which they had acquired it by a knowledge duties and establishing custom houses for their col- of their natural rights, and their valor in arms; and lection: arguing, that it would be absurd to allow by which it had been clearly developed under the powers and withhold any means necessary and pro- genuine spirit of the old articles of confederation. per to carry them into execution. The colonies And it is matter of authentic history, not now to be replied, that it would be more absurd to limit pow-questioned, that during all the cotemporaneous ers, and yet concede unlimited means for their ex- commentaries and discussions which the federal ecution, by which, the internal supremacy upon constitution underwent, it was constantly justified which their liberty and happiness depended, though nominally allowed, would be effectually destroyed. That the term supremacy, however applicable to that parliament, was applicable also to the colonial governments, as to internal powers: that the necessity of controling absolute power in governments, had been proved by experience, particularly in England, where magna charta, the petition of right, and many declaratory laws had limited its means, to a great extent; and, that however the means contended for by the parliament, might be useful for carrying on war, or regulating commerce; Thus, after the independence of the colonies, yet, that a restriction of those means would be still more useful, because it would be necessary for the each state, both under the former and the present preservation of their liberties." The parliament federative system, became a perfect independent denied this distinction which our forefathers re-nation; and as such, they entered into two distinct garded as of vital importance to their freedom and confederations, by which they relinquished certain happiness; and passed arbitrary laws declarative of specified national rights, and retained the rest. As their right to legislate for the colonies in all cases to the national rights retained, the states remain And it is perfectly obviwhatsoever. But, the first movement of the British perfect nations, wholly independent of each other parliament to enforce these laws, kindled up a de- and of all other nations. termined persevering resistance in the colonies, ous upon the soundest and only rational theory of and extinguished all hope of protection from the national rights, that a plain specification of the sovereign, and allegiance from the subject; and af-powers granted by national states, holding all the ter a long and arduous conflict, the assertion by powers antecedent to the grant, is a positive pro. Great Britain, of a power to legislate for the colo-hibition of the powers not granted. The general nies in all cases whatsoever, ended in the discovery, government, having no original primitive rights

and recommended, on the ground that it recognized the sovereignty, freedom and independence of the states, and that the powers not ceded to the general government were withheld from it. And, if at any time rational doubt could have existed on this subject, under the original text and genuine spirit of the federal constitution, it has wholly vanished before the 12th amendment to the constitution, which expressly declares "that the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

Yet, if it were proper and justifiable to depart antecedent to the federal compact, and being whol ly made up of the voluntary cessions by the states, from the plain manifest intention of the instrument is the mere creature of the national specified pow-constituting the federal compact, from whence all ers ceded by the states.

The committee, having thus carefully reviewed the nature and origin of the compact to which the states are parties in their highest sovereign charactet; from whence all the powers of the federal go vernment result, and by which these powers are clearly limited according to the plain manifest intention of the instrument,constituting that compact, proceed now to consider, whether this compact gives to the congress of the United States, power to authorise the establishment of lotteries within the corporation of the city of Washington, and to authorise the vending and distribution of their tickets within the territorial limits of a state forbid. ding it by a positive act of her legislature.

Under the constitution of the United States, power is given to congress "to exercise exclusi e legis lation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district, not exceeding ten miles square. as max by cession gress, become the seat of the government of the United States." This clause, it is believed was inserted in the constitution to bestow upon the general government freedom of rightful action without molestation; and to insure security against such troublesome intrusions as might otherwise disconcert the order of business expected from the federal legislature. For this purpose it was deemed necessary and proper that congress should have exclusive power of legislation over the seat of the general government. But the commit

tee cannot discover from the most attentive con

powers of the general government result, for the purpose of implying a surrender of this taxing power by the states, implied powers, proving a retention of this power by the states, might be as copiously deduced from the positive, undisputed rights of the states, as from those of the general government. The morals, the interests, and the happiness of the people internally, may be safely confided to the states, and surely were.. And if a state could not properly and regularly repel, within its territory, by penal sanctions, the effects of the laws of another state or nation, upon considerations of local policy, any other state or nation might afflict the morals, the interests, and the happiness of a people internally, and there would be power no where to prevent it. The necessity of this repelling power to the freedom and sovereignty of the states, is consequently as weighty and obvious as any that can be claimed for the general gernin

But reject the intervention of this undefined doctrine of implication and expedience, and vest the power of a state to repel, within its territory, by penal sanctions, the operation of other national laws upon the plain, manifest provisions of the federal compact, and the rational principles applicable to every just interpretation of it.

The committee believe, that it is a principle plain and well settled, founded in common sense, illustrated by general usage, and essential to the nature of compacts, that a delegation of specified powers leaves untouched, in the delegating party, the pow ers not delegated and antecedently possessed by it. When, therefore, the states, clothed with every perfect right and attribute of sovereign nations, delegate to congress exclusive power of taxation over exports and imports, they retain for themselves the right to legislate over all other subjects of taxation, just as effectually as positive language could have retained it. And the very necessity that was felt to prohibit the states from taxing exports and imports, clearly shews, that without this positive

sideration they have been able to bestow upon this, and every other clause in the constitution, from whence the power of congress is derived, to molest other governments in the exercise of their rightful constitutional powers. Because congress should be free, it does not reasonably follow that the state legislatures should be slaves; or, that a magnificent capital city is so necessary to the freedom of the federal legislature, as that the morals, the interests, and the happiness of the whole people of the Unit-prohibition; their right to legislate over these sub

ed States should contribute to adorn it.

reign character, as perfect national rights. The right to tax is of this perfect national kind; older than the federal compact, and coeval with the na tional sovereignty of the states; constantly exercised by the states, and separable from the states only by a forced and arbitrary implication, with which the internal sovereignty of the states cannot co-exist.

jects of taxation, would have been manifest and When it is remembered that the power of taxa- undisputed. There was no necessity to specify the tion indirectly affects all the moral, political, and state rights reserved in establishing the federal intellectual relations of mankind, it ceases to be compact, because these rights existed in the states matter of wonder that the exercise of such a pow- antecedent to the compact, and were never ceded. er, by the natural and rightful possessors of it, Being original rights, never ceded, but reserved, should be dearly valued and pertinaciously main-they still belong to the states in their highest sovetained against every encroachment directed against it; or, that the rivalry of opposing governments should frequently infringe the rules of public justice to acquire and monopolize it. But, as motives are the governing principles of national actions; and as human reasoning can discover no visible motive why the states, being perfect, sovereign, independent nations should surrender to the general government the power of taxation over persons and property within their territorial limits; so, arguments to prove the actual surrender of this power ought to be fairly and reasonably deduced from the positive provisions of the federal compact It cannot be expected that arguments deduced from the latitudinous and undefined doctrine of im. plied powers, and from the equally fertile sources of pretended necessity in the general government, will ever prove satisfactory to the people of the United States. The power is too precious; it can not pass so; whatever the policy for getting it may be.

It is true, that the power of taxation resides as well in the general, as in the state governments, and may be concurrently exercised upon the same subjects by the different governments at the same time. Under this concurrent power of taxation, they may each pass a law, both of which may be clearly constitutional, and yet these laws may militate and impede each other. Congress have the power to impose a tax upon whiskey stills. It cannot be denied that the states have a concurrent power to do the same. Suppose the states should impose the tax so heavily as to destroy the occupation of the distillers of the article, and by consequence,

one of the legitimate sources of revenue for the States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in general government. This would effectually de- such inferior courts as congress may ordain and estab feat any taxing power of congress exercised upon lish. The 1st clause in the 2d section of the same he same subject; and, would generate a conflict article expressly defines this judicial power of the btween two powers undoubtedly residing in the supreme and inferior courts of the United States, and repective governments. And yet, it has never limits it to "all cases in law and equity arising unbee imagined by the warmest admirers or the der the constitution, the laws of the United States, mos affectionate patrons of the federal government, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under that here was any authority in congress or the their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, suprene judiciary to abrogate this constitutional other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of state lav, defeating the constitutional law of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controverfederal legislature. Neither the constitutionality sies to which the United States shall be a party; of the congressional law, nor the absolute defeat to controversies between two or more states; be. of its operation by the state law, is any reason in tween a state and citizens of another state; bethe eye of the constitution for enlarging, diminish-tween citizens of different states; between citizens ing or controlling in any manner whatsoever, the of the same state claiming lands under grants of taxing power of the states. The right of passing different states; and between a state or the citi constitutional laws which conflict with the consti- zens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subtutional laws of congress is not prohibited to the jects."

states; nor, is the right of passing constitutional From these plain provisions of the constitution, laws which may conflict with the constitutional it is apparent that the framers of that instrument laws of the states, prohibited to congress. The never intended to distribute legislative power betwo legislative bodies revolve within specified or- tween a supreme, and subordinate legislatures, as bits circumscribed by the charter of the union; and they considered the federal and state legislatures neither can push the other from its sphere in the wholly independent of each other within their rewanderings of its course. If this occasional conflict spective spheres.-Had they considered the state of authority in the different governments of the legislatures subordinate to the federal legislature, union may be justly regarded as a dangerous con- the subordination of the former and the supremacy sequence of our federative system, the wise fra- of the latter, would have been explicitly declared mers of the constitution have prescribed no anti-by a positive provision in the federal constitution. dote against its possible and foreseen occurrence. The federal legislative power bears the same relaIt is highly probable they greatly preferred it to that fearful and absolute supremacy which could alone invest one government with power to abrogate the rightful laws of another; and the exercise of which by the general government would directly affect the existence of the state governments, the balance of the constitution and the integrity of

the union.

tion to the state legislative power, that the federal judicial power bears to the state judicial power; and, if either be independent of the other, whilst acting within its own sphere, both must also be independent of the other. And, if the federal legislature cannot abrogate state laws, the federal judiciary cannot abrogate state judgments. The word "supreme" as descriptive of the federal triIf authority is required to prove that congress, bunal, is relative, not absolute; and evidently imin virtue of this concurrent right, can impose no plies that the supremacy bestowed upon the sutax, to which the same right in the states does preme court is over the inferior courts to be ordainnot extend, that of the Federalist, so usually re-ed and established by congress; and not over the state sorted to, directly applies. "I affirm," says Mr. courts. This becomes more apparent from the apHamilton, "that (with the sole exception of duties portionment of jurisdiction between the supreme on imports and exports,) the individual states re- and inferior courts, which immediately follows in tain an independent and uncontrolable authority to the 2nd clause in the 2nd section of the same arraise their own revenue, in the most absolute and ticle, where it is declared, that "in all cases affectunqualified sense, and that an attempt on the part of ing ambassadors, other public ministers and conthe national government to abridge them in the exer- suls, and those in which a state shall be a party, cise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction." unwarranted by any article or clause in the constitu- In all other cases "before mentioned," the supreme tion. Suppose that the federal legislature, by court shall have appellate jurisdiction. This clearsome forced construction of its authority, upon the ly shews an intention to limit the jurisdiction of pretence of an interference with its revenues, the supreme court to the specified cases in the should undertake to abrogate a land tax, imposed preceding article. But a limited jurisdiction with by the authority of a state, would it not be evident an absolute supremacy over the state tribunals that it was an invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction would be no limitation at all; as the power of that in respect to this species of tax, which the consti- supremacy would annihilate every means in the tution plainly supposes to exist in the state govern. state governments to enforce the limitation, and ments? Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for make the extent of jurisdiction commensurate with the use of the U. States, would be supreme in its the pleasure of the supreme court. What more nature, and could not legally be opposed or con- fully fortifies this conclusion is, that if the word su trouled, yet a law abrogating or preventing the col-preme had conferred upon the supreme court a lection of a tax laid by the authority of a state controul over the state courts, it would have been (unless upon imports or exports) would not be the wholly unnecessary to enlarge the jurisdiction of supreme law of the land, but an usurpation of power the supreme court by a positive provision for that not granted by the constitution." purpose in a subsequent clause. This subsequent And now, the important question of jurisdiction clause declares that "in all cases affecting ambasdirectly arises;-whether the state authorities sadors, other public ministers and consuls, and within their respective spheres are controulable those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme by the authorities of the general government? court shall have original jurisdiction:"-in all the The 1st section of the 3d article of the constitu- other specified cases, the appellate jurisdiction of tion declares, that the judicial power of the United! the supreme court is bottomed upon the power of

the inferior courts. Hence, it follows, that if the word supreme does not extend the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it does not extend the jurisdiction of the supreme court; the latter deriving its powers altogether from the former. But the word supreme cannot possibly extend the jurisdiction of the inferior courts over the courts of the state, because the word supreme is not applicable to the inferior courts. And as the power of the inferior courts is made the basis of the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, (except in the few specified cases,) and the power of the inferior courts reaches not to the state courts, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that the supreme court has no jurisdiction over the state courts.

never excited murmurs from abroad, or disquietude at home.

It is a principle fully settled upon abstract reasoning and general usage, that a constitution settles the powers and arranges the jurisdiction of it own tribunals, and not those of another goverment; and although the convention had the pover to affect also those of the states, it does not apear and cannot reasonably be inferred, that theyever exercised it. All that is declared in the instrument of compact is, that the judicial power of the United States shall consist in a supreme court, ans in such inferior courts as congress may ordain and establish. But it, cannot reasonably be contended that the state tribunals are ordained and established by conTo defeat this reasoning, it will be indispensable gress. The judges of the state tribunals are neither to establish the doctrine, that the state courts are appointed, commissioned, remunerated or impeachconstitutionally erected into inferior federal courts in able by the U. States. And yet, constituted as pursuance of the power given congress to ordain they are, exclusively, by the states, they may be and establish inferior courts.-The 1st section of the driven from the benches of justice and effectually preceding article is the source of this congres- destroyed by the United States, in throwing upon sional power: and the 35th section of the judicial them a multifarious and oppressive mass of federact of the United States, is the result of its exer- al concerns, wholly disproportionate to the salaries cise. That section declares that "a final judg- they receive from the states. A power so well caiment or decree, in any suit in the highest court of culated to destroy the judicial functions of the law or equity of a state, in which a decision in the the state tribunals, could equally destroy every sesuit could be had, where is drawn in question the curity for the preservation of public order aud movalidity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority rality; as the violaters of the laws and the disturbexercised under the United States, and the deci- ers of public morals would pass unpunished and sion is against their validity, or where is drawn in unreproved for the want of tribunals to administer question the validity of a statute of, or authority justice. To obviate these consequences, it is plauexercised under any state, on the ground of their sibly contended that the state judges become fede being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or ral judges when deciding on the authorities of laws of the United States, and the decision is in the United States. In such case it would never favor of their validity, may be re-examined, and re-do to admit them to be state judges, because it versed or affirmed, in the supreme court of the would be inconsistent with the nature of sovereignUnited States, upon a writ of error." It was urged ty, for one government to supervise and control by the congress of the United States when they the decisions of another, possessed of the perfect enacted this law, that it was necessary to inspire rights and attributes of a sovereign nation. Hence confidence abroad in the fairness and impartiality they are denominated federal judges. But, how with which public justice should be administered do they become federal jndges? only in virtue of to litigant foreigners in the United States: that the judicial act, which declares, that if their dethe state courts, more intimately connected with cisions are favorable to the authorities of the United our people and more immediately dependent upon States they shall be raised to the dignity of sovethem, were too deeply interested to dispense im-reign judges, whose acts shall be binding and au partial justice to controversies instituted in this thoritative:-but should justice, and indepen. country by foreign subjects; and that international dence adorn the judgment seat, and the judges decollisions, always to be feared, would spring from cide against the authorities of the United States, the partial judgments of the state tribunals.-Con- they dwindle into the impotence of inferior federal cede that the preservation of honorable peace with judges, whose decisions are to be re-examined and foreign nations is much to be desired, and is most reversed by the supreme court of the United likely to be effected by a final determination before States. And here is the mockery of a judgment the federal court, of controversies instituted in the being final or not, as it may chance to be on one United States by subjects of foreign nations, still side or the other, and of a court being of the last the concession does not prove that the constitution resort or otherwise as its decisions may happen to has confided this important object exclusively to have been for one or other of the parties. "A no. the federal tribunals; because, neither judges nor vel spectacle, worthy of a system which only adlawgivers have any right to determine that a power mits the judges to be impartial on one side of a is actually bestowed, merely because, in their opi-plain question!"

nion, it ought to have been.-But this pretended Upon the whole, if the reasoning of the commit. necessity for a controling supervising power in the tee be correct, the conclusion is that no constitu federal tribunals, originates rather in the fictions of tional power resides in the federal authorities to the imagination than in the enlightened dictates make the state tribunals subordinate to, and conof the understanding. The people of the United trolable by the supreme court of the United States. States have solemnly decided that it is no cause of If the authority of American statesmen is deemoffence to foreign nations to have their controver-ed necessary to relieve this conclusion from the sies finally decided by the state tribunals; and have, censure of the wise and genuine friends of our fe by an amendment of their constitution, taken away derative system, that of cotemporary writers is from foreigners the right to sue a state before the surely the best. Happily, for the people of the the federal court, and confided the determination United States, the doctrines of statesmen, profoun of their suits to the state tribunals. And this re-ly versed in political science, and especially in ti striction of foreigners to the state judiciaries has principles of our federative system, are recorde ever since been regarded as reasonable upon prin-in authentic history and capable of distinct citaciple and beneficial in its consequences, and has tion. Would they could minister light to our

minds, harmony to our opinions, stability to our that, as in all other cases of compact among par principles and veneration to our political instituties having no common judge, each party has an tions! In the able and luminous debates in the equal right to judge for itself, as well of infracVirginia convention, upon the subject of the juditions as of the measure of redress. In the justly cial power of the United States, Mr. Marshall says, celebrated report by Mr. Madison to the Virgi "I hope no gentleman will think that a state will be nia legislature in 1799, which has been sanctioncalled to the bar of the federal court. Is there no ed by the renewed authentic public sense of the such case at present? Are there not many cases in people of Virginia, it is "Resolved, that the genewhich the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet ral assembly views the powers of the federal gothe state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose vernment as resulting from the compact to which that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense court. The intent is, to enable states to recover and intention of the instrument constituting that claims of individuals residing in other states. I compact; and as no farther valid than they are au contend this construction is warranted by the words. thorized by the grants enumerated in that comBut, say gentlemen, there will be partiality in it if pact." In another part of this report, this lucid a state cannot be defendant-if an individual can-reasoner remarks, that "when the constitution was not proceed to obtain judgment against a state, under the discussions which preceded its ratificathough he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff."

tion, it is well known that great apprehensions were expressed by many, lest the omission of some positive exception from the powers delegated, of certain rights, and of the freedom of the press parIn the elegant numbers of the Federalist, this ticularly, might expose them to the danger of being opinion of Mr. Marshall is uniformly countenanced drawn by construction within some of the powers and recommended to the American people. In one vested in congress; more especially of the power of them, Mr. Hamilton says, "the general govern- to make all laws, necessary and proper, for carryment can have no temptation to absorp the local ing their other powers into execution. In reply to authorities of the respective states. All those things this objection, it was invariably urged to be a funwhich are proper to be provided for by local legis-damental and characteristic principle of the constilation, can never be desirable cases of general ju- tution, that all powers not given by it were reserv. risdiction. It is, therefore, improbable that there ed; that no powers were given beyond those enushould exist a disposition in the federal councils, to merated in the constitution, and such as were fairly usurp the powers with which they are connected. But incident to them." "If the decision of the judicilet it be admitted, for argument sake, that mere ary, (continues the report), be raised above the wantonness and lust of domination would be suffici-authority of the sovereign parties to the constitu ent to beget that disposition, still it may be safely tion, the decisions of the other departments, not affirmed that the sense of the people of the several carried by the forms of the constituition before the states would control the indulgence of so extravagant judiciary, must be equally authoratative and final an appetite." In another, Mr. Madison says, "the with the decisions of that department. However federal and state governments are, in fact, but dif- true, therefore, it may be, that the judicial departferent agents and trustees of the people, institutedment is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms, with different powers, and designed for different of the constitution, to decide in the last resort; purposes." Again, Mr. Hamilton says, "there is this resort must necessarily be deemed the last, in not a syllable in the plan which directly empowers relation to the authorities of the other departments of the national courts to construe the laws according the government; not in relation to the rights of the parto the spirit of the constitution, or which gives them ties to the constitutional compact, from which the judi any greater latitude, in this respect, than may be cial as well as the other departments hold their deleclaimed by the courts of every state." And, says gated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation' Mr. Madison, "the local or municipal authorities of judicial power would annul the authority deleform distinct and independent portions of the supre-gating it; and the concurrence of this department macy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, with the others in usurped powers, might subvert to the general authority, than the general authority is forever and beyond the reach of any rightful remesubject to them, within its own sphere." dy, the very constitution which all were instituted

In certain resolutions of the Kentucky legisla-to preserve." In the late able and luminous construction of our ture, passed in 1798, the offspring and evidence of Mr. Jefferson's enlightended mind, it is solemnly political constitutions, written by John Taylor, of "Resolved, that the several states composing the Virginia, that eminent statesman remarks that "Mr. United States of America, are not united on the Jefferson, Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Marshall, and Mr. Gerprinciple of unlimited submission to the general ry, in their negociations with revolutionary France, government, but that, by compact, under the style have furnished us with an admirable treatise both and title of a constitution for the United States, and to fix the residence of the right, and to display the of the amendments thereto, they constituted a ge- wantonness of construction assumed without right. neral government for special purposes, delegated to Presidents Washington and Adams, all the succesthat government certain definite powers, preserving, sive members of the cabinet, and congress itself each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their concurred in the principles advanced by these genown self government; and that, whensoever the ge-tlemen. They prove that an exclusive right of neral government assumes undelegated powers, its construction in one party is a degradation of the acts are unauthoratative, void and of no force; that, other to a state of inferiority and dependence. to this compact, each state acceded as a state, and Their arguments might be applied with great force is an integral party; its co-states forming, as to itself, in many views to our subject. If the states made the other party; that the government created by the union, they demonstrate, that the same consent, this compact was not made the exclusive or final necessary to create, is necessary to construe.judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it- Wherever the creating consent resided, there we self; since that would have made its discretion, and are directed to look for the construing consent. not the constitution, the measure of its powers; but It would be a much grosser violation of their prin