The Reformation did not pretend to introduce any change in the ordinary faith respecting the Trinity. We shall therefore next proceed to make a few observations upon a controversy which arose in the Church of England.

In the year 1690, Dr. Sherlock, Dean of St. Paul's, and father of the celebrated bishop Sherlock, published his memorable Vindication of the Doctrine of the holy and ever blessed Trinity, against the Socinians. In this work, page 66, the author observes:

"The Athanasian creed teaches us, to worship one God in trinity, and trinity in unity, neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance, for there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost; but the Godhead of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the glory equal, the majesty coeternal. There are two things then which an orthodox Christian must take care of, neither to confound the persons, nor to divide the substance; that is, to acknowledge three distinct persons, and yet but one God; and nothing can be more apparent than both these in the account which I have given of the ever blessed trinity. 1. It is plain the persons are perfectly distinct, for they are three distinct and infinite minds, and therefore three distinct persons; for a person is an intelligent being, and to say they are three divine persons, and not three distinct infinite minds, is both heresy and nonsense: the Scripture, I am sure, represents Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as three intelligent beings, not as three powers or faculties of the same being, which is downright Sabellianism," &c.

This work, it appears, had been in circulation for three years, when an answer to it appeared from the pens of Dr. South and Dr. Wallis. In the preface to South's work, the author observes, that they overthrow the true doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, who introduce a trinity of Gods, 66 as they inevitably do, who assert the three divine persons to be three distinct infinite minds or spirits, which," says he, "I positively affirm is equivalent to the asserting the said three persons to be three Gods." And in confirmation of this view of the subject the author appeals to "All Professors of Divinity in the Two Universities of this Kingdom," to whom also he dedicates his work. "I doubt not," says he, "of your learned concurrence with me, and abetment of me in this affirmation." Accordingly the University of Oxford, in convocation, condemned the work as tritheistical. Of the character of Dr. South's work, the following notice is given us by Dr. Berriman, in his Lady Moyer's Lectures, preached at the University of Cambridge.

"The great increase and boldness of this heresy (viz. Socinianism)

gave occasion to a celebrated divine of our church, to write his Vindication of the Doctrine of the holy and ever-blessed Trinity: who, by some terms that he made use of in the explication of that great mystery gave but too plausible a color in the judgement of some persons for the charge of tritheism, which became the foundation of a most unhappy controversy, and provoked another great divine of our church, to enter the lists with him, and propose a different scheme, which, however it made use of the Catholic expressions, was nevertheless charged with Sabellianism." Ser. 8, page 426.

Note. The writer of these articles is much obliged by the perusal of a paper from a correspondent, who expresses himself much hurt by the observation in a former article, that "the existence of God is no where demonstrated in the Old Testament, yet it does not follow that the Old Testament denies his existence; on the contrary it is assumed, and enters as a fundamental principle into every part of the Bible" The writer objects, that "if in the book of God, his being is only assumed, the whole superstructure of revelation falls to the ground." Perhaps the writer will do us the favor to bear in mind, that in Euclid the axioms are only assumed; upon these axioms the superstructure of the demonstrations is built; in which case the demonstrations are founded only on assumptions, and yet we have no fear that the demonstrations will ever on that account fall to the ground. The fact is, intuitive evidence is always stronger than demonstrative evidence; it is from intuitive evidence that demonstrative evidence borrows its existence. Were there no intuitive evidence there could be no demonstrative evidence; to rest the being of a God upon intuitive evidence is, therefore, to rest it upon the strongest foundation. Moralists have of late years been approaching to the conviction of this truth, and been inclined to regard the proposition that "God is" more as a moral axiom than as a subject of metaphysical demonstration. Clarke's elaborate work On the Being and Attributes of God, never perhaps convinced any one. Where the moral instinct is wanting, by which to recognize the existence of a God, a person would be much better employed in removing the evils by which the light within him has been darkened, than by reading all the metaphysical demonstrations of the being of a God that ever were written. To demonstrate the existence of a thing, is to put it in doubt until it be demonstrated. Swedenborg shews how this has been one grand source of infidelity in regard to religion. Men first began to reason upon divine truth, whence it passed into a state of doubt, and finally of denial. Hence our Saviour said, "Let your conversation be yea, yea, and nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil." In accordance with this view of the subject, an ancient English poet, in a drama, in which he introduces the characters of Mephistopheles and Faustus, shrewdly represents Mephistopheles as asking Faustus to prove the existence of God; and though the former admits that it may be demonstrated, he is only watching to take advantage of the doubt or suspense with which Faustus must necessarily begin. The office of reason, if used upon the subject at all, is rather to confirm and illustrate, than to prove or demonstrate God's existence. We sincerely trust that our correspondent will find this explanation perfectly satisfactory.

(To be continued.)

EXTRACT FROM RICHER.

ON CORRESPONDENCES;

Or the Symbolic Relations which exist between the Spiritual and Natural Worlds.

"Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God; but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables." (Mark 4. 11.) PHILOSOPHY, fable, poetry, and the most refined metaphysics, have not been able to form an idea of the universe which surrounds us, without at the same time imagining another universe of which this is the image. Where is this spiritual world,—this world of causes, which ancient wisdom contemplated with so much delight? Is it lost for ever? Is it abandoned among the fables with which credulous antiquity amused itself? Created by the imagination of man, was this world only an illusion? Was it then neither the consequence of a divine revelation, nor the result of the researches of a profound philosophy? Oh! how void would the universe appear to us, deprived of these spiritual forms which constituted its real substance! The other world would be an abstraction without a foundation, which would only rest upon the arguments of thinking men, more or less favorable to it. Ready to vanish with its wonderful forms and events, it would only leave faint traces in our memory of a vain and confused hope of possessing it one day or other. It would be left to weak souls only, as a means of consolation; but strong minds would not be able to avow it, without rendering themselves liable to a charge of superstition.

At length a man has arisen who has restored the forgotten remembrances of the other world. With him we can believe, without being accused of credulity; with him we can demonstrate the other life, without ceasing to be true, profound and reflective. The enthusiasm of the heart does not take any thing away from the exactness of reasoning. For the disciples of the New Jerusalem behold that other world made known to them, of which ours is only the image; they behold this world brought to light, and peopled with beings, who feel like ourselves, surrounded with beautiful objects, of which earthly forms are only the shadow. Our world is the assemblage of certain material particles combined, according to their primitive or spiritual forms, which constitute the real world; the active force by which the universe is rendered visible in an exterior work; it exists independently of the material parts which receive it, and give it fixed

ness. It is that force which has produced the natural world, with its beings and its forms. The earth which we inhabit is the basis, which ministers to life from above those material forms and periodical generations; out of these spheres of material existence is then that world, where the same life is no longer subject to the laws of space and of time. The forms remain, although terrestrial matter is taken away; events diversify it, although it no longer knows the succession of duration which produces the physical movement. In a word, the two worlds are similar, and if the copy is conformable to the model, it is because the objects represented by it, correspond to the forms which the model produces.

The spiritual world, says Swedenborg, is united to the natural by correspondences. Every thing in the universe which we inhabit, necessarily corresponds to something in the spiritual world, since it is there that the vital energy resides, which gives to every thing existence and form.

The spiritual world subsists by love and wisdom; the natural world subsists by the two corresponding properties, namely, heat and light. Hence we say, in common language, that love warms, and wisdom enlightens; that love is a fire which vivifies us, and that wisdom or truth is a flame which guides us. Thus the natural world does not differ from the spiritual, as what is gross from that which is pure, but as what is posterior differs from that which is prior. The communication between things discrete, and not continuous, can only have place by correspondence. That which corresponds to an object, is not of the same nature as the object itself; it has not the quality of it in itself, but only that quality which is proper to it in its sphere of existence.

A correspondence is, as it were, a mysterious signification. There is no object without a signification; it is this, which, well understood, does not only manifest to us the essence of the object, but its spiritual origin. This is the reason why nothing of the other world is perceived by our eyes, otherwise than by correspondence. Our eyes only receive a light conformable to their substance. To seek for the spiritual in a material object would be to deceive ourselves completely. This presents to us the signification, but it does not reveal any thing of the quality of a world, which is not its own. This is the reason that men who seek for the mind in matter, are so grossly deceived. They wish to feel with the instrument of one world, that which is only accessible to an instrument formed for the other. If we were to say to a man, in shewing him a flower, See, where resides the wisdom of

God; if this man expected to find at the bottom of the corolla of the flower something substantial, called the divine wisdom, he would be as infatuated as he who sought for the human soul in the body. The organs of the flower, like those of the body, doubtless, signify something, but this is only a correspondence, and not a spiritual object in itself. That which they contain is revealed by correspondence, and not by sensation. If we sought for heat in love, we should not find it; but we perceive very well the analogy, or correspondence which exists between love and fire.

Hence has arisen for us a new science, and immense in its application, the Science of Correspondences. By it is established a direct communication between heaven and man. Man by his fall, turning

his eyes to the earth, no longer sees celestial things. The first men, on the contrary, being constantly occupied with heavenly things, were instructed in these mysteries by the knowledge of correspondSt. Clement of Alexandria, positively affirms, that the ancients made use of it as a symbolic language.* I said the first men, and not the first man, for Adam, in the new doctrine, is a collective name. An entire society is designated by this name.

ences.

Adam, says Bergier, is in Hebrew, an appellative name for man in general. Adam, according to the Cabalists, was not one man, but the whole human race. It appears, moreover, that this custom was general amongst the ancients. Many of the learned have endeavored to prove that the names of Homer, Hippocrates, and other celebrated persons of antiquity, were also collective names. It is this primitive society which has left some traces of its existence in Asia; it is the antideluvian people, which our learned men have so diligently explored, that ancient church of which we shall speak hereThese people are the inventors of those fables and hieroglyphics which astonish us, and of which we shall find the key in the Science of Correspondence.

after.

Here is really opened for the learned an inexhaustible source of delightful contemplation. Plutarch, in his Treatise of Isis and Osiris says, that Egyptian Theology had two significations, the one holy and symbolic, the other common and literal; and consequently, the figures of animals, which these people had in their temples, and which they appeared to worship, were only so many hieroglyphics in order to represent the divine attributes. The most ancient people of Greece, the Arcadians, had taught Pausanias that it was under the fanciful form of mythological fables, that the ancient philosophers in* Stromats, liv. 2. + Baruch, liv. 3. partie, ch. 10.