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pose that he may have other reasons for it beside that "his majesty is offended."

Of Mr. G.'s impassioned comparison (vol. ii, pp. 246– 248) we take no notice. He must reason and not declaim -not play the orator but the philosopher.

2. Mr. G.'s attention is engaged next by "the wisdom of the Deity." (Vol. ii, p. 248.) His argument on this topic is very brief. You maintain that mankind were "destined to be for ever happy." "Eternal torture (punishment) was not at first intended." "Is not (then) the original design of God defeated?" (Vol. ii, pp. 248, 249.) Mr. G. forms but an awkward guess at what we maintain; and, therefore, we must inform him. We maintain that God made man to be a probationer, intending to "set before him life and death, blessing and cursing," but to enjoin him to "choose life that he might live," Deut. xxx, 19, and to reward his voluntary obedience with eternal life; or to punish his final disobedience with eternal fire. With such purposes, how could God's original design be defeated?

3. Mr. G. makes an awkward transition from the wis. dom to "the goodness, benevolence, and mercy of God. Of this glorious attribute of the Deity, finite beings (he thinks) can never form an adequate conception." (Vol. ii, p. 249.) No, nor of his justice. Why then did he presume to argue from premises which he did not comprehend, and that even in the face of him who does comprehend them? Why did he presume to argue that God cannot do that which as a just God he declares that he will, and that he must do that, as a merciful God, which he has not promised? Or rather, Why does he not relinquish this inconclusive mode of argumentation; and, on a question which only the Scriptures can determine, appeal only to the Scriptures?

As Mr. G. cannot comprehend infinite goodness, he argues from human goodness. Thus Moses, Paul, and (goodly associate!) Mr. White, the Universalist, are cited, as men of such benevolence that they could willingly have suffered for their fellow creatures. Is it necessary to remind the reader that such is the benevolence of God to man, that "he gave his only begotten Son ?" That such is the benevolence of Christ, that he was "made a

curse for us?" Whatever of benevolence may be found in Moses, Paul, or Mr. White, the Saviour of men has done more for their salvation than any of these men thought of doing. The argument drawn from the benevolence of man to man can, therefore, conclude nothing farther. What these men wished or proposed to do, Jesus Christ has actually done. Again: God is more wise and just than either Moses or Paul. When, therefore, the former said, "Yet now, if thou wilt, forgive their sin; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book," the Lord said unto him, "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book." And when the latter "could have wished himself accursed for his bre thren's sake," it was not permitted.

"What! shall benevolence itself pursue a course of conduct at which imperfect human goodness would absolutely shudder.?" God will do that at which Mr. G. affects to shudder; and has often done that," the hearing of which would make a man's ears to tingle," 1 Sam. iii, 1; 2 Kings xxi, 12; Jer. xix, 3. Yes: and many who really shudder at the thought of it now, will hereafter approve it. When "the smoke" of them that are judged "shall rise up for ever and ever," they will imitate the heavenly host and sing, "Alleluia, salvation, and glory, and honour, and power unto the Lord our God: for true and righteous are his judgments," Rev. xix, 1-3.

"But God does not look upon mankind as enemies." (Vol. ii, p. 252.) So says Mr. G. And what say the Scriptures? "But these mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither and slay them before me," Luke xix, 27.

4. He argues from the divine prescience :-" He that before the beginning of time foresaw every thing that would come to pass, would he have created such beings? created to destroy?" The divine prescience is a subject a little too difficult for a human mind to scan: especially as there is nothing in nature by which it can be illustrated. All the arguments founded upon it are therefore founded on what we do not understand. It is not impossible, however, to give them a rational

answer.

(1.) The Scriptures declare that "known unto God

are all his works, from the beginning of the world," Acts xv, 18; and yet the same Scriptures declare that the wicked "shall go away into everlasting fire," Matt. xxv, 41. But the Scriptures cannot be inconsistent with themselves. (2.) If there be no impropriety in the manner in which God treats mankind as known, no man can fix upon it any impropriety as foreknown. (3.) We have already shown that, in our opinion, the design with which man was created was, that he might be placed in a state of probation. In that case, God created mankind with a positive design, neither that they should be eternally happy, nor that they should be eternally miserable. That man should choose death rather than life, is not, therefore, the fault of Him that made him, but his own. It is not God's, because he affectionately forewarned him of the danger, earnestly entreated him to be happy, and amply provided for him all the means requisite to his happiness. (4.) If there were any weight in the argument from the divine prescience, it would disprove the possibility of any mea. sure of human misery, as well as of eternal misery.

5. His last philosophical argument is deduced from the divine immutability. "All the natural evils which are suffered to befall us (here) tend to the production of good." Mr. G., therefore, presumes that "unless the nature of the immutable Jehovah should change," "the punishment of a future world will be of a similar nature." (Vol. ii, pp. 255, 256.)

Just so, we might presume that, because good men are afflicted here, they will also be afflicted hereafter. But "presumptions" are not arguments. It must be proved that such is the design of future punishment; for the im. mutability of the divine nature will not change his purpose or his word. The truth is, it is one of Mr. G.'s first presumptions, that to make all his creatures finally happy is God's absolute design. Setting out on this unfounded theory, he proceeds from one error to another, and fills his book with "presumptions." That the present is the time of probation, and the future the time of retribution, he cannot see, or will not acknowledge.. Hence he supposes earth and hell to be much alike, and the end of suffering in both states to be the same. Even while he describes the present state of human existence,

as "chequered with pleasure and pain," (vol. ii, p. 255,) he cannot advert to the fact, that in hell the damned have not "a drop of water to cool their tongue;" nor while he argues that "love is strongest, and in its own nature most powerful to attract and to persuade," (vol. ii, p. 294,) can he infer that if that infinite goodness which here pierces the clouds of affliction do not win the hearts of rebels, there is but little probability that all the weight of divine wrath will teach them to love their Maker. He has not as yet proved the salutary nature of "the damnation of hell," and he cannot prove it from the divine immutability, unless he can first prove that from the beginning it was the absolute purpose of God that every man shall be finally happy.

There is one species of Socinian argumentation which Mr. G. has not brought formally before us, though his lecture abounds with it. We have one specimen of it where he says, "Vindictive passions cannot exist in God." (Vol. ii, p. 246.) This remark contains a fundamental principle of Socinianism; and yet it is itself a mere assumption; a dogma by which an important part of divine revelation is contradicted. In revealing himself to mankind, God has often used a figure called anthropopathy, by which human passions are attributed to the divine Mind. The ideas conveyed by those allusions certainly are not the precise and proper ideas of the divine attributes; but rightly understood, and divested of every thing which is weak and sinful in man, they suggest the most appropriate ideas of the ways of God which we can conceive. The ways and the thoughts of God are high above ours, as the heaven is above the earth. But if we do not imitate himself, in imputing to him something like human passions, we exchange revealed knowledge for philosophical ignorance. How often does God speak of his desire, compassion, pity, mercy, and love? The Socinians seldom dream that these are human passions, and that as human passions they "cannot exist in God." Whatever can be fairly, or even speciously inferred from these passions in men, they presume that they may equally infer from them in God. No pains are then taken even to show that all idea of human weakness must be removed from them. But when God speaks of his

anger, wrath, indignation, fury, and vengeance, then we are not only taught that these passions are not such in God as they are in man, but are barefacedly told that they "cannot exist in God," and that in such unqualified terms as leave us no substitute for those ideas of the ways of God which he himself has suggested. To remedy this, we demand, in the name of Scripture and common sense, that the Socinians either desist from reasoning according to their present practice, on the former class of passions, or that they do us the justice to reason in the same manner on the latter, in which they now reason on the former.

One word on Mr. G.'s concluding reflections. "The first is, that the system of universal restitution contains no tenets which present the slightest drawback to the practice of any Christian duty." "The second is, that the doctrine of universal restitution presents the strongest incentive to the practice of any Christian duty, by giving a double efficacy to the motives of gratitude and love." We think otherwise. Humble fear, and holy love, give life to all genuine piety. He that believes the eternal punishment of the wicked, and embraces the Christian salvation, will have the greatest reason to fear and love. We do not, however, found our doctrine on a mere opinion concerning what is most conducive to virtue and piety, but on the express declarations of the word of God.

CHAPTER XII.*

Of the Divine Inspiration of the Sacred Writings.

THE divine inspiration of the sacred writings is of the utmost importance to their establishment as the faithful records of religion, and the standard of the principles and practice of piety. This may not be the opinion of those who, with unlimited confidence in the powers of their own reason, profess to demonstrate a priori, the existence, the nature, the attributes, and the will of God; but it may be easily and consistently granted by those who believe that

*The author has not been able to insert this chaper and the three following in what he judges to be their proper place, in consequence of being necessarily governed partly by the order which Mr. G. has

observed.

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