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Is the quoque too clumsy? The misreading of q. for 99. is obviously simple. XXIX 20:

Hunc Gallie timet et Britannie.

I have independently conjectured Nunc Gallie timetur et Britannie; but I find that this reading has already been proposed, and has been rejected on account of the introduction of a spondee in the first foot. But is this fatal? This solution is palaeographSuppose the line written thus:

ically so simple.

nuncgallietimet'et britannie,

the ur in timetur being indicated by an apostrophe, an ordinary mark of abbreviation. Nothing more simple than for a copyist to have mistaken the apostrophe merely for a mark separating the two adjacent et's.

If this reading were allowed, I would also change hunc into nunc in line 21. Does it not seem rather absurd that two persons should be asked why they pamper one of themselves? In your commentary you seem to recognize the weakness of the 2d plural verb being addressed to Caesar and Mamurra in connection with hunc.

XXIX 23:

Eone nomine urbis opulentissime.

I feel pretty certain that the key here lies in the word urbis. Commentators generally have attacked opulentissime alone, and have accepted urbis. Opulentissime is such a monstrous word, that the scribes could only have twisted it out of something, much defaced, which looked like it. I believe that, having misread the preceding word or words as urbis, they fitted on opulentissime merely as a possible epithet. The correct reading should obviously be something abusive of the Socer generque-and the weakness of urbis has been noticed.

Do you think that o bis improbissimi would be possible?

I have no doubt that the original word misread as opulentissime had a letter with a long stroke below the line (p), and one with a tall stroke above the line (b, h, 1). Therefore, improbissimi is not impossible.

Believe me,

Yours very truly,

E. MAUNDE THOMPSON.

REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

Critique of Some Recent Subjunctive Theories, by CHARLES EDWIN BENNETT. (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, IX, 1898.)

In No. IX of the Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, Bennett subjects my theories regarding certain uses of the Latin subjunctive to much illuminating criticism, and points out a few inaccuracies of which I have been guilty in matters of detail. I never find any great satisfaction in discussing syntactical questions which there is reason to believe can never be definitely settled; and, at first sight, it would now seem that we here have to do with just such questions. The personal equation seems sometimes to cause no end of trouble even in the field of syntax. Delbrück, for instance, regards my theory that questions of obligation or propriety like cur non laeter? developed from the Indo-European optative, as established beyond all possible doubt (Vergleichende Syntax, II, p. 389)1; Bennett regards this theory as without the slightest foundation to rest upon (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, No. IX, pp. 1-30). Again, Geddes (Classical Review for Oct. 1898, p. 355 ff.), after an independent investigation of the entire field covered by my discussion of the Latin prohibitive, and after extending this investigation also through the period of Silver Latin (a period not covered by my own investigation), says that his results for all periods are "largely confirmatory" of my own. conclusions. Bennett, on the other hand (pp. 48 ff.), after a careful examination of Plautus, regards these conclusions as quite groundless. When authorities reach conclusions so diametrically opposed to each other, after a study of exactly the same material, it might well seem useless to hope that, without new material to work with, conclusions could be reached that would be generally accepted. I venture to believe, however, that some of the more important differences between Bennett's views and my own are more apparent than real. This is certainly true as far as my theory regarding the force of tenses in the prohibitive is concerned, and the primary purpose of the present article is to make my position

This view has also been adopted in the new edition of Harkness' Latin Grammar ($557).

2 Since the above was written, Professor Clement, who has made a careful examination of my theory as applied to Silver Latin, has published (Proceedings of the Am. Phil. Ass. XXX, p. xxxvi) statistics showing that my claim regarding the energetic force of ne with the perfect subjunctive in earlier times holds good for that period also.

on this point clearer than I seem to have done in my original discussion. There are, to be sure, here and there a few real differences between Bennett and myself in our interpretations of certain passages. For instance, in Merc. 113 Bennett regards caue praeuorteris as " merely a mild self-exhortation," instead of an emotional prohibition, as I claimed it was. I am at a loss to know how Bennett can justify his interpretation. At the moment of uttering this prohibition, the speaker, intensely excited, is in such headlong haste to get to his master that he is gasping for breath (114), has burst his lungs, as he claims, and is spitting blood (138), threatens to knock over every one that gets in his way (115-116) and fight him (119), if need be. Finding that his knees are failing him, he cries out "perii! perii!" (124-125). A moment later (130) he threatens to knock the door into splinters. Furthermore, the act involved in the prohibition caue praeuorteris is the very act through fear of which he is so greatly agitated. Is one to look for "mild self-exhortation" under such circumstances as these? In several other passages Bennett's interpretation seems to me equally improbable (see below). But, apart from a few details of this nature, the seeming differences between us, so far as I can see, are due to the fact that Bennett has misunderstood what my theory really is. He seems to think that I claim that, whenever a person is aroused from any cause whatever, he uses the perfect in making a prohibition, quite regardless of the character of the act itself that is involved in the prohibition. I make no such claim as that. The emotion, or earnestness, which I claim lies in the prohibition comes from alarm, indignation, or the like, caused by a fear (real or pretended) that the act prohibited will take place. If this act itself is of such a character that no particular harm would be likely to result from its performance, I should not expect the perfect to be used (however much excited the speaker might be from other causes), except in those rare instances where energetic utterance is purposely affected for some reason. To illustrate: if, in reply to a threat of punishment, some one excitedly says 'Don't strike me!' I should expect the perfect tense. In fact, one would have to search a long time for an instance of the present tense used in such an answer (see comments on Epid. 595, below) to such a threat. On the other hand, just such cases are not uncommon among the instances of the perfect tense. In every such case, if the prohibition is not complied with, the speaker will be made aware of the fact by some disastrous result. To show the contrast between such a prohibition as this and one in which an excited speaker uses the present tense, let us take the passage found in Rud. 968 hunc homo feret a me nemo: ne tu te speres potis, a passage cited against me by Bennett. I quite agree with Bennett that the speaker here is excited; but I do not see any reason for uttering ne speres with greater emphasis, or energy, than any other unemphatic word, or phrase, in the sentence, e. g. than feret or potis. Indeed, all of

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the emphasis is upon tu and te. This would be made flat and ridiculous by translating For God's sake don't you hope (or, don't you hope) that you can!' It means merely 'Don't you hope that you can!', with no emphasis whatever upon the speres. Whether the act of hoping takes place or not, is in reality a matter of no particular concern to the speaker. Indeed, the interests of the speaker are so little involved in the act of hoping that he will never even so much as know whether the prohibition is complied with or not, unless some one takes pains to tell him. The present tense is exactly what my theory demands here. Ne speraueris is probably unknown to the Latin language,' and in my Latin Prohibitive I lay the utmost stress upon the rarity of the perfect tense with verbs of this class. Indeed, the scarcity of the perfect and the frequency of the present with such verbs form one of the main grounds for my theory. I can imagine a situation under which I should expect even such a prohibition as 'Do not think!' to take the perfect tense. If, for instance, a girl were inclined to think her betrothed guilty of some disgraceful deed and threatened to dismiss him as a result of this suspicion, and if he were passionately pleading with her to believe him innocent, I should expect him to use the perfect tense in saying Do not think me guilty!'; for her thinking so would mean the ruin of his happiness. Wherever the failure to heed a prohibition even of a purely mental act would be fraught with serious consequences either to the speaker or to some other person in whom the speaker takes a deep interest, my theory would lead one to expect the perfect tense. But it happens that no such condition of things is found among the instances of ne with verbs of mental activity, except irata ne sies in Am. 924 (see further comments upon this passage below).

I find that more than one reader of my original discussion have understood my position to be substantially that which Bennett has attributed to me. I am, however, considerably consoled by the fact that most of my reviewers have not misunderstood me. In re-reading my discussion, I still fail to see how any one can get the impression that my theory concerns merely the mood of the speaker without any reference to the character of the act prohibited, to the speaker's attitude toward that particular act, and to the results that will follow a failure to comply with the prohibition. I can, to be sure, detect a lack of clearness in two or three sentences I use referring to the context in which prohibitions stand, but in laying down the fundamental principles with which

1In Luc. Phars. 8, 451 both the MSS and editors are divided between nec speraueris and ne speraueris. In view of the usage elsewhere, there can, I think, be little doubt that nec is here the correct reading. Still, I can not vouch for the entire absence of such uses as ne speraueris from the period of decline. Professor Clement has kindly called my attention to ne inuideris (Val. Flac. 5, 507 and Plin. Ep. 6, 17, 4), ne expectaueris (? Curt. Ruf. 4, 10, 32), and ne credideris (Curt. Ruf. 7, 8, 29).

I start as the sole foundation of my whole theory and upon which alone that theory depends, I am so explicit that I might fairly expect everything that follows to be interpreted in the light of those fundamental principles. When I appeal to the context, it is only for the purpose of getting side-light where side-light is needed for the clearer understanding of the speaker's attitude toward the act of the prohibition itself. With a prohibition like ne speres such a side-light is never (or, at least, seldom) needed; with one like ne feceris, such a side-light is always needed, since, without the context, one can never know whether the act involved is one of particular importance or not. As the fundamental conception upon which my whole theory rests, I claim (pp. 138-139 [6-7]) that the difference between ne feceris and ne facias is, that ne feceris is used of an act which must be prevented at all hazards; it implies that the speaker can not abide the thought of its happening; while ne facias is used when the speaker is taking a comparatively calm, dispassionate view of the prohibited act. Regarding this distinction my words are as follows (p. 139 [7]): "I wish to insist upon this (feature of the perfect tense) as the only real distinction between the two tenses with ne." After elaborating this idea, that the choice of tense depends upon the character of the act as viewed by the speaker, I account for the predominance, in the present tense, of verbs indicating mental activity, in the following language: (p. 146 [14]): "If my distinction between the two tenses is correct, we should expect that a prohibition dealing with mere mental action, e. g. 'Do not suppose,' 'Do not be surprised,' 'Do not be afraid,' would commonly take the present tense, because, . . . as far as the interests of the speaker are concerned, it matters little whether the prohibition be complied with or not." As the acts involved in such prohibitions are in their very nature of such a character that the thought of their occurrence would not ordinarily alarm the speaker, or arouse him to vigorous utterance, I claimed them forthwith as supporting my theory. I did not under these circumstances think it worth while to consider whether the speaker in any given case was, or was not, aroused from some cause not connected with the prohibition, for the reason that the question whether he was, or not, did not have the slightest essential bearing upon the application of my theory to the prohibition of acts of this character. Though the points above indicated are the essential points in my theoryconstitute, in fact, all there is in the theory-Bennett seems oftentimes to have left them wholly out of consideration, and to have classified his instances merely according to the presence, or absence, of "special excitement" on the part of the speaker, without any regard whatever to the importance of the act prohibited. I may note, in passing, that Bennett makes too much out of the word 'excitement.' A desire for mere energetic utterance, without excitement, plays quite as important a part in my theory as does excitement. How, for instance, can any one get the impres

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