in Caecil. 19. 61: Ego, si superior ceteris rebus esses, hanc unam ob causam te . . . repudiari putarem oportere.

If the last case be examined, it will appear that the apodosis is not unreal; if it were, it would make Cicero imply that he did not think Caecilius should be rejected for this one cause: on the contrary, he means to say that he does think so, and would still do so even were there mitigating circumstances; that, in general, is the force of the apodosis in this use.

Though the si-clause itself seems to suffer no change when used to express concession, so far as form is concerned, it would not be unnatural to suppose that a speaker could prepare his hearer for the kind of apodosis that was to follow; in English we do this by the tone of voice, e. g.:

(1) If I were rich, I should not be as saving as I am. (2) If I were rich, I should still be as saving as I am.

If these sentences are read with a view to bringing out the thought clearly, it will be found that the stress in each condition falls on the word rich, but that the tone in which it is pronounced varies.

Figures are not at hand to make possible a comparison of the frequency of this concessive use, in the Orations and other styles; apparently the proportion is large here, and, if so, it may be due to the fact that the sentences are to be spoken: this gives a chance for the element of tone to enter. On the written page, as said above, we get no clue to the meaning of the si-clause till the apodosis is reached.

V. Verb-meaning.

Verbs of action in the imperfect tense will be discussed under this heading.

A. In Protasis.

It will be remembered that three main classes of reality are. opposed by the imperfect subjunctive; (a) general truth, (b) a reality somewhat time-limited, and (c) a reality of the immediate present. To render these into English we have two forms at our disposal, 'if they talked' and 'if they were talking'; (a) and (b) are correctly translated by the first of these; e. g. 'if men talked less, they would less often get into trouble' and 'if I talked for my own ends, my audiences would be smaller'. Class (c) sometimes can be rendered by the second English form:

1 The second English form would be possible for this last.

...

p. Deio. 2. 6: Hanc enim causam, C. Caesar, si in foro dicerem, .. quantam mihi alacritatem populi Romani concursus adferret! Here the idea of action is almost merged into that of a state, hence we may render 'if I were speaking in the Forum.'

Aside from such cases, one has the feeling that verbs of action in protases of Class (c) do not fit into the category of unreality in the same natural way that the verbs do which denote a state.

p. Quinct. 26. 81: Si enim illud diceres, improbe mentiri viderere.

in Verr. II 3.72. 169: Si hercle te tuam pecuniam praetorem in provincia faeneratum docerem, tamen effugere non posses.

p. Mur. 3. 5: Etenim, si largitionem factam esse confiterer idque recte factum esse defenderem, facerem improbe ...

p. Rab. Post. 7. 18: Si iam vobis nuntiaretur in senatu sententias dici, ut his legibus teneremini, concurrendum ad curiam putaretis; si lex de ea re ferretur, convolaretis ad rostra.

p. Mil. 28. 77: Quam ob rem, si cruentum gladium tenens clamaret T. Annius...: esset vero timendum, quonam modo id ferret civitas.

The Latin is consistent in holding these sentences down to the unreal form, but I think an English speaker with the same ideas to express would choose a different form; e. g. the last case cited might be rendered 'if Milo were to take a bloody sword and cry aloud...' (implying that he is doing no such thing and is unlikely to do it); the preceding example might be rendered 'if it should be announced to you' (vague supposition).' The Latin too shows some indication that a future idea is not far removed from these verbs of action in protasis :

in Verr. II 1. 17. 44: nihil dicam... nisi id, quod si in alium reum diceretur, incredibile videretur.

in Caecil. 13. 43: Ac si tibi nemo responsurus esset, tamen ipsam causam... demonstrare non posses.

In the first case the time is set by dicam: Cicero is simply telling what he is going to say, and diceretur must reflect the time of dicam. It may be remembered that when Class (c) was first

1 A really remarkable case of this sort may be found in p. Caec. 30. 88, where Cicero uses a full conditional sentence in a simile, strangely enough choosing the unreal form where we certainly would use the other.

2 It has already been shown that the essence of this clause lies in alium; the unreality implied by this word may help in holding the verb down to the unreal form.

defined it was made large enough to include such cases as this, opposed to a future.

Latin may be said, then, to be a little more conservative than the English in holding to the unreal form.

B. In Apodosis.

Here the verbs of action are clearly opposed to a future, as shown by the following defined cases1:

p. Sex. Rosc. 30. 83: Neque enim id facerem nisi necesse esset, et id erit signi me invitum facere, quod non persequar longius quam salus huius et mea fides postulabit.

p. Rab. Perd. 6. 19: Lubenter, inquam, confiterer, si vere possem ...; sed, quoniam id facere non possum, confitebor id, quod ...

p. Sulla 1. 2: ... cum huius (Sullae) periculi propulsione coniungam defensionem officii mei. Quo quidem genere orationis non uterer, si mea solum interesset. Cp. 3. 10, 16. 47 and p. Flacc. 16. 38.

...

We are at no loss to render these into English: our ambiguous form of apodosis with would and should meets the issue very well. The suggestions offered in this paper may perhaps have brought into light, or, at least, into clearer light, some of the forces that are at work in the conditional sentence.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

H. C. NUTTING.

1 By defined cases is meant those whose context throws light upon the meaning of the words with which we are dealing; just as in the sentence Utatur sane: non peto, the independent subjunctive standing alone might have many shades of meaning; but sane and non peto settle beyond a doubt that concession is intended. Just so here the futures in the context throw light upon the time to which the imperfect subjunctive is opposed.

III.-APĀM NAPAT AGAIN.

There has recently appeared in the Archiv für Religionswissenschaft, III. Band, 1. Heft, pp. 18-51, a very interesting article on the Indo-Iranian deity Apam Napāt, by Mr. Louis H. Gray, of Columbia University. In this article, citing numerous passages in support of his view, Mr. Gray argues with considerable force that Apam Napāt was originally a water deity.

In two brief articles dealing with the same subject, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. XIX, pp. 137-50, I have already expressed the opinion that the Hindu Apaṁ Napāt was originally a lightning deity, and that he became absorbed by Agni in Vedic times. While these two views are apparently contradictory, they are by no means irreconcilable—indeed, they may readily be brought together upon common ground. It is simply a question of one's point of view. To my own mind, the problem presented is this: What was the natural phenomenon, if any, upon which the Indo-Iranian deity called Apaṁ Napāt by the Hindus, was based? Mr. Gray has taken up the question from quite a different standpoint, and his problem may be stated in the form, What was the Indo-Iranian view of the nature of the Avestan deity Apam Napāt? In other words, one paper has to do with the native view of the nature of the deity, while the other two, my own, deal with the question, What was the actual nature of the object or phenomenon worshiped as a deity under this name?

It thus becomes evident that the deity in question may have been a lightning deity in reality, though it may have been regarded by its native worshipers as a water deity. That the Hindu Apam Napāt originally had none of the attributes of a fire god, I have long been satisfied: that he was looked upon in the early days as a water god, I can readily believe; and yet that he was after all, in the last analysis, originally a lightning god pure and simple-i. e. that the Indo-Iranians, while doubtless supposing themselves to be worshiping a water god, were in reality actually worshiping the lightning's bolt-I am more convinced than ever, after reading the new evidence brought forward in the article already cited.

It has been my good fortune to be able to study the thunderstorm in ten different States of the Union. As a child, living in Maine and Massachusetts, I felt a sort of unreasoning terror of the comparatively mild New England storms. This was soon taken out of me, later on, by the terrific thunder and lightning of Central Iowa; and the thunderstorm became an exceedingly interesting natural phenomenon. In the Northern Mississippi Valley, on the Western Plains, and possibly also, in spite of its forests, in Northern Michigan, with all of which I am familiar, the climatic conditions must resemble somewhat those of the extensive region in which the Indo-Iranians are supposed to have lived and wandered. In any case, it is sufficiently clear that the country to the north of the Hindu Kush and to the east of the Caspian is a region of fearful thunderstorms.' That the phenomena observed in storms of this kind should not excite the religious imagination of such a people as the Indo-Iranians is hardly to be thought of. That they should recognize the true nature of the phenomena is quite as difficult to believe, however, no matter to what extent their worship of these manifestations of the power of nature may have been developed. How, then, did they worship the lightning?

According to my own belief, it was in three ways. First, as a smiting fire god, the Avestan Verethraghna, the Vedic Agni Vṛtrahan, but of this more at another time; second, as a wonderful, brilliant 'water-sprite,' the Apām Napāt of this paper; and, lastly, as a heavenly manifestation, to which, for lack of a better name, they gave the title 'Third,' Vedic Trita, who is probably to be recognized in the highly anthropomorphic Avestan Thraetaona Athwja.

If, now, a careful study be made of the epithets used, in both the Avestan and the Vedic literature, of Apaṁ Napāt, it will appear that every one of them readily adjusts itself to the homage which a primitive people might be expected to give to such a phenomenon as the distant, descending bolt, or the falling ball of fire, which is sometimes called 'chain-lightning." That they

2

1 Even if the view be accepted that the original home of Apam Napāt was regarded as the river Aras (see Mr. Gray's article, cited above, p. 29), the position taken in this paper will in no wise be invalidated.

2 So called because, to the popular fancy, it resembles a chain hanging from heaven to earth, the waving line being suggestive of links. Many, however, use the term of zigzag lightning,' and it is frequently so defined, the falling