Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive CommitmentHarvard University Press, 1994 - 741 páginas What would something unlike us - a computer, for example - have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language - the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures - that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where accounts of the relation between language and mind have traditionally rested on the concept of representation, this book sets out an alternate approach based on inference, and on a conception of certain kinds of implicit assessment that become explicit in language. Making It Explicit attempts to work out in detail a theory that renders linguistic meaning in terms of use - in short, to explain how semantic content can be conferred on expressions and attitudes that are suitably caught up in social practices. |
Conteúdo
Toward a Normative Pragmatics | 3 |
From Normative Status to Normative Attitude | 30 |
Linguistic Practice and Discursive Commitment | 141 |
Direitos autorais | |
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Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment Robert Brandom Visualização parcial - 1994 |
Termos e frases comuns
according acknowledging anaphorically dependent antecedent application ascribed ascriptions asking for reasons assertional commitments assessments asymmetric attributing Begriffsschrift belief Chapter claim commitments and entitlements concepts conceptual contents consequences correct corresponding definite descriptions deontic attitudes deontic scorekeeping deontic statuses derived categories dicto discursive practice distinction doxastic commitment endorsement equivalence classes explain explicit expressive role Frege giving and asking implicit incompatible inferential commitments inferential role inferential significance inferentially articulated intentional intentional stance intentionality interlocutor interpretation involved language Leibniz linguistic practice locutions logical vocabulary ment noninferential normative status notion objects performances play possible practical commitment pragmatic significance predicates premises propositional attitude propositional contents reference relation reliable representational response rules sapience semantic semantic content sense sentential sentential logical singular terms SMSICS sort sortal specify speech acts subsentential expressions substitution-inferential substitutional commitments taking or treating talk theory tion tional tokenings true truth truth conditions understanding understood undertaking Wittgenstein