CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. SECTION I. Of the Theories which have been formed by Philosophers to explain the Manner in which the MIND perceives exter- nal Objects 11. Of certain natural Prejudices, which seem to have given rise to the common Theories of Perception III.—Of Dr. Reid's Speculations on the subject of Perception IV.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Inferences with re- spect to the Use of Language as an instrument of Generalization are subservient SECTION VI.-Of the Errours to which we are liable in Speculation, and VII. Continuation of the same Subject.-Differences in the intellectual Characters of Individuals, arising from their SECTION I.-General Observations on this Part of our Constitution, and on the Language of Philosophers with respect to it 4. Of Invention in the Arts and Sciences V.-Application of the Principles stated in the foregoing Sec- PART II. Of the Influence of Association on the Intellectual and on the SECTION I. Of the Influence of casual Associations on our speculative IV. Continuation of the same Subject.-Aid which the Me- mory derives from Philosophical Arrangement V.-Continuation of the same subject.-Effects produced on the Memory by committing to writing our acquired Knowl- VI.-Continuation of the same Subject.-Of Artificial Memory VII. Continuation of the same Subject.-Importance of mak- ing a proper Selection among the Objects of our knowl- ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. INTRODUCTION. THE Of the Nature and Object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. HE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphysical speculations, seems to arise chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, secondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and absurd discussions which abound in the writings of most metaphysical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if such discussions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded, as no inconsiderable evidence of the progress which true philosophy has made in the present age. Among the various subjects of inquiry, however, which, in consequence of the vague use of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphysics, there are some, which are essentially distinguished from the rest, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general discredit, into which the other branches of metaphysics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be ascribed, the little progress which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a science, so interesting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could scarcely have failed, in these inquisitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general at |