“And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions "separately, is, that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within "themselves, make use of words instead of ideas, at least when the subject of their "meditation contains in it complex ideas.”—LOCKE, book iv. c. 5. § 3, 4. 66 But to return to the consideration of truth. We must, I say, "observe two sorts of propositions, that we are capable of making. "First, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of "words put together or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agree"ment or disagreement. "Secondly, verbal propositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas, put to"gether or separated in affirmative or negative sentences, &c." Ibid. § 5. "Though the examining and judging ideas by themselves, their names being "quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge; yet "through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom "practised. Every one may observe, how common it is for names to be made use "of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their "own breasts: especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great col"lection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions "so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very hard to speak in"telligibly of the one, without explaining the other. "All the knowledge we have, being only of particular or of general truths, it is evi"dent that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter can never be "well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived and ex"pressed in words." Book iv. c. 6. § 1, 2. From these passages it appears, that Locke conceived the use which we make of words in carrying on our reasonings, both with respect to particular and general truths, to be chiefly the effect of custom; and that the employment of language, however convenient, is not essential to our intellectual operations. His opinion therefore did not coincide with that which I have ascribed to the Nominalists. On the other hand, the following passage shews clearly, how widely his opinion differed from that of the Realists; and indeed it would have led us to believe that it was the same with Berkeley's, had not the foregoing quotations contained an explicit declaration of the contrary. "To return to general words, it is plain, by what has been said, that general and "universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and "creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, "whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for "signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular "things; and ideas are general, when they are set up as the representatives of "many particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which "are all of them particular in their existence; even those words and ideas which "in their signification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the ge"nerals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature be"ing nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying "or representing many particulars. For the signification they have, is nothing "but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them." Book iii. c. 3. § 11. On the whole, it is evident, that Mr. Locke was neither completely satisfied with the doctrine of the Nominalists, nor with that of the Realists; and therefore I think it is with good reason, that Dr. Reid has classed him with the Conceptualists. Indeed, Mr. Locke has put this matter beyond all doubt himself; for, in explaining the manner in which we conceive universals, he has stated his opinion in the strongest and most paradoxical and most contradictory terms. The ridicule bestowed on this part of his philosophy by the Author of Martinus Scriblerus, although censured for unfairness by Dr. Warburton, is almost justified by some of his expressions. Note (L.) page 112. In a letter from Leibnitz to a Scotch gentleman (Mr. Burnet of Kemney) dated in the year 1697, there is the following passage: "J'ay consideré avec attention le grand ouvrage du charactere réel, et langage "philosophique de Monsieur Wilkins. Je trouve qu'il y a mis une infinité de belles "choses, et nous n'avons jamais eu une table des predicamens plus accomplie. "Mais l'application pour les characteres, et pour la langue, n'est point conforme à "ce qu'on pouvoit et devoit faire. J'avois consideré cette matiere avant le livre "de Monsieur Wilkins, quand j'etois un jeune homme de dix neuf ans, dans mon "petit livre de arte combinatoria, et mon opinion est que ces characteres veritable"ment réels et philosophiques doivent repondre a l'analyse des pensées. Il est 66 vray que ces characteres presupposent la veritable philosophie, et ce n'est que presentement que j'oserois entre pendre de les fabriquer. Les objections de M. "Dalgarus, et de M. Wilkins, contre la methode veritablement philosophique, ne "sont que pour excuser l'imperfection de leurs essais, et marquent seulement les "difficultés qui les en ont rebutés."* 66 The letter of which this is a part, was published at the end of A Defence of Dr. CLARKE, (which I believe is commonly ascribed to Dr. Gregory Sharpe,) and which was printed at London in 1744. The person mentioned by Leibnitz under the name of M. Dalgarus, was evidently George Delgarno, a native of Aberdeen, and author of a small and very rare book, entitled, "Ars Signorum, vulgò char"acter universalis et lingua philosophica, qua poterunt homines diversissimorum "idiomatum, spatio duarum septimanarum, omnia animi sui sensa, (in rebus fa"miliaribus,) non minus intelligibiliter, sive scribendo, sive loquendo, mutuo com"municare, quam linguis propriis vernaculis. Præterea, hinc etiam poterunt juvenes, philosophic principia, et veram logica praxin, citius et facilius multo imbi"bere, quam ex vulgaribus philosophorum scriptis."+ 66 It is very remarkable that this work of Dalgarno is never (at least as far as I recollect) mentioned by Wilkins; although it appears from a letter of Charles I. prefixed to Dalgarno's book, that Wilkins was one of the persons who had recommended him to the royal favour. The Treatise de Arte Combinatoria is published in the second volume of Dutens' edition of Leibnitz's works, but it does not appear to me to throw much light on his views with respect to a philosophical language. I must request the indulgence of the reader for adding to the length of this note, by quoting a passage from another performance of Leibnitz; in which he has fallen into a train of thought remarkably similar to that of Mr. Hume and Dr. Campbell, in the passages already quoted from them in this section. The performance is entitled, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis, and is printed in the second volume of Dutens' edition. "Plerumque autem, praesertim in analysi longiore, non totam simul naturam "rei intuemur, sed rerum loco signis utimur, quorum explicationem in praesenti "aliqua cogitatione, compendii causa, solemus praetermittere, scientes aut creden"tes nos eam habere in potestate: ita cum chiliogonum, seu polygonum mille "aequalium laterum cogito, non semper naturam lateris, et aequalitatis, et mille"narii (seu cubi a denario) considero, sed vocabulis istis (quorum sensus obscure "saltem, atque imperfecte menti obversatur) in animo utor, loco idearum, quas de * [I have considered with attention the great work of Wilkins on a Real character and Philosophical language. I find in it a multitude of fine things, and we have never had a more complete table of positions. But the application to characters and language is not such as might and ought to have been effected. I had treated of this matter before the book of Mr. Wilkins, when a young man of nineteen, in my little work on The Art of Combination; and my opinion is, that characters, real and philosophical, ought to conform to the analysis of the thoughts. It is true, such characters presuppose a just philosophy, and I should not at present dare to construct them. The objections of Wilkins and Dalgarno against this truly philosophical method, serve only to excuse the imperfections of their attempts, and to mark the difficulties which have deterred them.] + [The Art of Signs, commonly called The Universal Character and Philosophical Language, by means of which persons of different languages will be enabled, in the space of two weeks, to communicate to each other in common affairs, all their thoughts, either in writing or conversation, and not less intelligibly than in their vernacular tongues. Moreover, by means of this art, young students will be able to learn the elements of philosophy and the true exercise of logic, much more easily and in a shorter time than from the usual writings of philosophers.] "iis habeo, quoniam memini me significationem istorum vocabulorum habere, ex"plicationem autem nunc judico necessariam non esse; qualem cogitationem cae"cam, vel etiam symbolicam appellare soleo, qua et in algebra, et in arithmetica ❝utimur, imo fere ubique. Et certe cum notio valde composita est, non possumus " omnes ingredientes eam notiones simul cogitare: ubi tamen hoc licet, vel saltem "in quantum licet, cognitionem voco intuitivam. Notionis distinctae primitivae "non alia datur cognitio quam intuitiva, ut compositarum plerumque cogitatio "non nisi symbolica est. "Ex his jam patet, nos eorum quoque, quae distincte cognoscimus, ideas non per"cipere, nisi quatenus cogitatione intuitiva utimur. Et sane contingit, ut nos saepe "falso credamus habere in animo ideas rerum, cum falso supponimus aliquos ter"minos, quibus utimur, jam a nobis fuisse explicatos: nec verum aut certe ambi"guitati obnoxium est, quod aiunt aliqui, non posse nos de re aliqua dicere, intelli66 gendo quod dicimus, quin ejus habeamus ideam. Saepe enim vocabula ista sin"gula utcunque intelligimus, aut nos antea intellixisse meminimus, quia, tamen "hac cogitatione caeca contenti sumus, et resolutionem notionum non satis prose"quimur, fit ut lateat nos contradictio, quam forte notio composita involvit."* Note (M) page 122. As the passage quoted in the text is taken from a work which is but little known in this country, I shall subjoin the original. "Qu'il me soit permis de présenter à ceux qui refusent de croire à ces perfectionnemens successifs de l'espèce humaine, un exemple pris dans les sciences où la "marche de la vérité est la plus sûre, où elle peut être mesurée avec plus de préci❝sion. Ces vérités élémentaires de géométrie et d'astronomie qui avoient été dans "l'Inde et dans l'Egypte une doctrine occulte, sur laquelle des prètres ambitieux "avoient fondé leur empire, étoient dans la Grèce, au temps d'Archimède ou "d'Hipparque, des connoissances vulgares enseignées dans les écoles communes. "Dans le siècle dernier, il suffisoit de quelques années d'étude pour savoir tout ce "qu'Archimède et Hipparque avoient pu connoître; et aujourd'hui deux années "de l'enseignement d'un professeur vont au-delà de ce que savoient Leibnitz ou [But for the most part, especially in the longer analysis, we do not contemplate at once the whole nature of any thing, but instead of things we make use of signs, the explanation of which, in any immediate investigation, we are accustomed for the sake of brevity to pass over, knowing or at least believing that we have it within our command. So when I think of the thousand equal sides of a chiliogon or polygon, I do not always distinctly reflect upon the nature of a side, their equality, or the property of each as being the thousandth, or the cube of ten, but I use these words, the meaning of which is present to my mind, though perhaps obscurely and imperfectly, instead of the ideas they denote; recollecting that I well know the signification of these terms, but judging the explanation of them for the present unnecessary. This kind of contemplation I am wont to call obscure or even symbolical, which yet we use in algebra, arithmetic, and indeed in almost every thing. And indeed when an idea is very complex, we cannot at the same instant think of all the simple ideas of which it consists. Where this is possible, at least as far as it is possible, I call that intuitive thought. Of a simple primitive idea, there can be no conception but what is intuitive, as of complex ideas it is for the most part only symbolical. From these premises it is clear, that of those things which we clearly understand, we cannot receive ideas, except so far as we make use of intuitive thought. And indeed, it sometimes happens, that we erroneously believe we have in the mind ideas of things, when we are mistaken in supposing that some terms which we make use of have been explained: nor is that true, at least it may be doubted, which some assert, that we cannot speak of any thing understandingly, unless we have at the same time an idea or notion of it. For as we often understand these single words in part only, or remember that we have understood them heretofore, because we have been content with an indistinct reflection, and have not sufficiently examined the analysis of our ideas, it may happen that some contradiction lies concealed, which is involved in the complex idea.] "Newton. Qu'on médite cet exemple, qu'on saisisse cette chaîne qui s'étend d'un "prêtre de Memphis à Euler, et remplit la distance immense qui les sépare; qu on "observe à chaque époque la génie devançant le siecle présent, et la médiocrité at"teignant à ce qu'il avoit découvert dans celui qui précédoit, on apprendra que la "nature nous a donné les moyens d'épargner le temps et de ménager l'attention, et "qu'il n'existe aucune raison de croire que ces moyens puissent avoir un terme. "On verra qu'au moment où une multitude de solutions particulieres, de faits "isolés commencent à épuiser l'attention, à fatiguer la mémoire, ces théories dis"persées viennent se perdre dans une méthode générale, tous les faits se réunir dans "un fait unique, et que ces généralisations, ces réunions répétées n'ont, comme les "multiplications successives d'un nombre par lui-même, d'autre limite qu'un infini "auquel il est impossible d'atteindre.”—Sur l'Instruction publique, par M. Con DORCET. How much is it to be regretted, that a doctrine so pleasing, and, at the same time, so philosophical, should have been disgraced by what has been since written by Condorcet and others, concerning the Perfectibility of Man, and its probable effect in banishing from the earth, Vice, Disease, and Mortality! Surely they who' can reconcile their minds to such a Creed, might be expected to treat with some indulgence the credulity of the multitude. Nor is it candid to complain of the slow progress of Truth, when it is blended with similar extravagancies in Philosophical Systems. While, however, we reject these absurdities, so completely contradicted by the whole analogy of human affairs, we ought to guard with no less caution against another Creed, much more prevalent in the present times;-a Creed, which taking for granted that all things are governed by chance or by a blind destiny, overlooks the beneficent arrangement made by Providence for the advancement and for the diffusion of useful knowledge; and, in defiance both of the moral suggestions and of the universal experience of mankind, treats with ridicule the supposed tendency of truth and justice to prevail finally over falsehood and iniquity. If the doctrine which encourages these favourable prospects of the future fortunes of our race, leads, when carried to an extreme, to paradox and inconsistency; the system which represents this doctrine, even when stated with due limitations, as altogether groundless and visionary, leads, by a short and inevitable process, to the conclusions either of the Atheist or of the Manichæan. In the midst, indeed, of such scenes of violence and anarchy as Europe has lately witnessed, it is not always easy for the wisest and best of men to remain faithful to their principles and their hopes: But what must be the opinions and the views of those, who, during these storms and convulsions of the Moral World, find at once, in the apparent retrogradation of Human Reason, the gratification of their Political Ambition, and the secret triumph of their Sceptical Theories? Fond, impious Man! Think'st thou yon Sanguine Cloud, To morrow, be repairs the golden flood, And warms the Nations with redoubled ray. Note (N.) page 137. It may be proper to remark that under the title of Economists, I comprehend not merely the disciples of Quesnai, but all those writers in France, who, about the same time with him, began to speculate about the natural order of political societies; or, in other words, about that order which a political society would of itself gradually assume, on the supposition that law had no other object than to protect completely the natural rights of individuals, and left every man at liberty to pursue his own interest in his own way, as long as he abstained from violating the rights of others. The connexion between this natural order and the improvement of mankind, has been more insisted on by the biographers of Turgot than by any other authors; and the imperfect hints which they have given of the views of that truly great man upon this important subject, leave us much room to regret that he had not leisure to execute a work, which he appears to have long meditated, on the principles of moral and political philosophy. Vie de M. TURGOT. Partie ii. p. 53. It is merely for want of a more convenient expression that I have distinguished these different writers by the title of Economists. It is in this extensive sense that the word is commonly understood in this country; but I am sensible that it is somewhat ambiguous, and that, without the explanation which I have given, some of my observations might have been supposed to imply a higher admiration than I really entertain of the writings of M. Quesnai, and of the affected phraseology employed by his sect. The connexion between M. Turgot and M. Quesnai, and the coincidence of their opinions about the most essential principles of legislation, will I hope justify me in ranking the former with the Oeconomists; although his views seem to have been much more enlarged than those of his contemporaries; and although he expressly disclaimed an implicit acquiescence in the opinions of any particular sect. "M. Turgót étudia la doctrine de M. Gournay et de M. Quesnai, en profita, se "la rendit propre; et la combinant avec la connoissance qu'il avoit du Droit, et "avec les grandes vues de législation civile et criminelle qui avoient, occupé sa "tête et intéressé son cœur, parvint à en former sur le gouvernement des nations "un corps de principes à lui, embrassant les deux autres, et plus complet en"core. Mémoires sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M. TURGOT, par M. DUPONT, p. 40, 41. "Il a passé pour avoir été attaché à plusieurs sectes, ou à plusieurs société qu'on "appelait ainsi; et les amis qu'il avait dans ces socités diverses lui reprochaient "sans cesse de n'être pas de leur avis; et sans cesse il leur reprochait de son côté "de vouloir faire communauté d'opinions, et de se rendre solidaires les uns pour "les autres. Il croyait cette marche propre à retarder les progrès mêmes de leurs "découvertés."+-Ibid. p. 41, 42. Note (O.) page 194. The foregoing observations on the state of the mind in sleep, and on the phenomena of dreaming, were written as long ago as the year 1772; and were read (nearly in the form in which they are now published) in the year 1773, in a private literary society in this university. A considerable number of years afterwards, at a time when I was occupied with very different pursuits, I happened, in turning over an old volume of the Scots Magazine (the volume for the year 1749,) to meet with a short essay on the same subject, which surprised me by its coincidence with some ideas which had formerly occurred to me. I have reason to believe that this essay is very little known, as I have never seen it referred to by any of the numerous writers who have since treated of the human mind; nor have even heard it once mentioned in conversation. I had some time ago the satisfaction to learn accidentally, that the author was Mr. Thomas Melville, a gentleman who died at the early age of 27; and whose ingenious observations on light and colours (published in the Essays of the Edinburgh Philosophical Society) are well known over Europe. The passages which coincide the most remarkably with the doctrine I have stated, are the following. I quote the first with particular pleasure, on account of the [Mr. Turgot studied the doctrine of Messrs. Gournay and Quesnai, profited by it, made it his own, and combining with it the knowledge he had of Public Law, and with the great views of civil and criminal legislation which had occupied his thoughts and interested his feelings, came at length to form from them a body of principles of his own, embracing those of the two others, and still more complete.] [He passed for being a member of many sects, or rather of many societies to which they gave that appellation, and the friends whom he possessed in these different societies, reproached him continually with not being of their party. In his ́turn, he accused them of wishing to establish a community of opinions, and to become bound for each other. He thought this conduct necessary to retard the progress itself of their discoveries.] |