CHAPTER XLVI.

AS TO THE RENDITION OF FUGITIVE SLAVES.

ART. 4, SEC. 2, PAR. 3.

"No person held to service or labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due."

§ 549. The cases cited under this provision of the Constitution that are important to its interpretation, have already been considered under the clause relating to habeas corpus, and the section which defines the judicial power of the Courts. (Ante, pp. 235-304.)

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CHAPTER XLVII.

AS TO THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES.

ART. 4, SEC. 3, CL. 1.

"New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress."

§ 550. The Supreme Court has not been called to consider any of the questions which rest directly upon the several limitations of this clause of the Constitution. The State of West Virginia was created by act of Congress, with the consent of the State of Virginia, and of the new State of West Virginia. (Stat. 1863, v. 12, 633.) The act for the admission of the State of West Virginia sets forth in the preamble that the inhabitants of the portion of Virginia known as West Virginia had framed for themselves a constitution with a view of becoming a separate and independent State, and also that the Legislature of the State of Virginia had given its consent to the formation of a new State within the said State of Virginia, to be known by the name of West Virginia. That act was to take effect whenever the conditions otherwise provided in the statute had been complied with, of which information was to be communicated to the country by the proclamation of the President of the United States. That proclamation was issued the twentieth day of April, 1863. (Stat. v. 13, 731.)

§ 551. By virtue of the authority given to the Congress to admit new States into the Union, the Court held in the case of the State of Alabama, that the State was entitled to the soil under the navigable waters within the limits of the State, if such soil had not been previously granted to private parties. (The Pollards, Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.)

CHAPTER XLVIII.

AS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TERRITORIES.

ART. 4, SEC. 3, PAR. 2.

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

§ 552. It has been held that Congress has absolute power to govern the Territories of the United States, whether that power is incident to its capacity to acquire territory as a sovereign, or whether it is derived from the provision in this clause of the Constitution which gives to Congress power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.

§ 553. As to power to acquire territory the Court said: "The Constitution confers absolutely upon the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty."

§ 554. On the transfer of territory, whether by the exercise of the war power or by the exercise of the treaty-making power, it is held that the inhabitants of the acquired territory maintain the relations with each other which existed previous to the acquisition, until those relations are changed by legislation. An act which transfers a territory, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it, and the law which may be denominated political, is changed necessarily; but that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force until altered by the newly

created power of the State. (American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511.)

§ 555. It follows as a matter of course that Congress has power to authorize the lease of lands or of mines that are of the territory of the United States, and not within the limits of any State. (United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526.)

§ 556. It is further apparent from the operation of the same doctrine that the power of Congress to dispose of the public domain cannot be interfered with or its exercise embarrassed in any manner by State legislation. Nor does any State statute of limitation or any occupation of lands of the United States within a Territory, give to the occupant any title by virtue of possession. The patent issued by the United States under a law of Congress passes the title, and in an action of ejectment in the Federal Courts, from lands derived from the United States, the patent is conclusive evidence of title for the patentee, unless there be some irregularity in the patent which is apparent on its face. Neither State statutes of limitation nor laches can be successfully pleaded as a bar to title when supported by a patent. (Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.)

§ 557. The Courts of a Territory are not inferior Courts under the Constitution, as they are authorized and described in Section 1 of Article 3. They are legislative Courts of the Territory created under the authority of the clause now under consideration, and are a part of the needful rules and regulations for the government of the Territory. (Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434.)

§ 558. The general legislation of Congress in regard to the Territories, and the special legislation of Congress applicable to a particular Territory, are binding absolutely upon the Territorial authorities. In harmony with this doctrine, it follows that the enactments of a Territorial legislation may be affirmed or declared invalid, in whole or in part, as to Congress may seem wise. It is true, however, that

legislative acts of a Territorial Legislature, if within the scope of the authority conferred by act of Congress, are binding, and protect all parties acting under them, until they have been qualified or set aside by Congress. (National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129.)

§ 559. An Indian reservation within a Territory is subject to the legislation of Congress, which may enact laws to punish offences committed thereon, whether by Indians or by whites. (United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567.)

§ 560. The jurisdiction of the United States over the Indians is very fully considered by the Court in the case of Mackey against Coxe (18 How. 100). The Court said in that case, speaking of the Indians: "They are not only within our jurisdiction, but the faith of the nation is pledged for their protection. In some respects they bear the same relation to the Federal government as a Territory did in its second grade of government under the ordinance of 1787. Each Territory passed its own laws, subject to the approval of Congress, and its inhabitants were subject to the Constitution and acts of Congress."

§ 561. Speaking of the Cherokee Indians, the Court said further: "The principal difference consists in the fact that the Cherokees enact their own laws under the restriction stated, appoint their own officers and pay their own expenses. This is, however, no reason why laws and proceedings of the Cherokee territory, and so far as relates to rights claimed under them, should not be placed upon the same footing as other Territories in the Union. It is not a foreign, but domestic territory, and territory which originated under our Constitution and laws." These remarks in the main are as applicable to Territories occupied by white inhabitants as to Territory occupied by the Cherokees.