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CHAPTER XXX.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES.

ART. 1, SEC. 10, PAR. 3.

"No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay."

§ 363. The third clause of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution contains inhibitions upon the powers of the States which have been brought within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and concerning which opinions have been rendered, namely: Tonnage duties and Compacts between States.

§ 364. The first decision in regard to Compacts is reported in the case of Greene v. Biddle (8 Wh. 1). A compact was made between Virginia and Kentucky, when the latter was created a State, to which reference has already been made, and by which private rights and interest in lands within the limits of Kentucky were to remain valid and secure under the laws of Kentucky, and in conformity with the laws existing in the State of Virginia when the separation took place. The point was made that the compact not having received specifically the "consent of Congress," as required by the clause of the Constitution, was not binding upon the new State. The Court held that it was not necessary that the "consent of Congress" to a compact between two States should be expressed in any particular form, and that when Congress consented to the separation of Kentucky, and its erection into a State, it must be taken to have consented to the compact by which the separation so agreed to was made.

§ 365. Another point was raised in the case of Poole against Fleeger (11 Pet. 185). The Court declared in that case that the power to make a compact between States resided in the several States, although it could be exercised only with the consent of Congress.

366. In the case of Achison against Huddleson (12 How. 293) the Court recognized an existing compact between the United States and the State of Maryland respecting the Cumberland Road. The State of Maryland having imposed upon the mail contractors a tax of four cents for every passenger carried in a mail-coach over that road, the Court held that it was a tax upon the United States, a violation of the compact, and consequently void.

CHAPTER XXXI.

TONNAGE DUTIES.

§ 367. The construction of the phrase in regard to tonnage duties has given rise to several controversies and to some very nice distinctions. In the case of Huse v. Glover (119 U. S. 543) the Court has defined the meaning of the phrase "duty of tonnage" in these words, namely: "A duty of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution is a charge upon a vessel according to its tonnage as an instrument of commerce for entering or leaving a port, or navigating on public waters of the country." Under that definition, but previous to its announcement in form, the Court held that a State tax imposed upon vessels at so much per ton of the registered tonnage, was a violation of the provision of the Constitution in regard to tonnage and duties, although it was competent for a State to levy a tax upon vessels as property, according to the valuation of the same. (State Tonnage Taxes, 12 Wall. 204.)

§ 368. The city of New Orleans by an ordinance provided that all steamboats which should moor or land in any part of the port of New Orleans should be subject to a duty to be measured by the tonnage of the vessel. This was held to be a violation of the Constitution, and therefore void. The Court said in substance, that any duty or tax or burden imposed under the authority of the States which is in its essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States, and which is assessed on a vessel according to its carrying capacity, is a violation of the Constitution, unless the consent of Congress shall have been obtained. (Cannon v. City of New Orleans,

20 Wall. 577.)

The same doctrine was maintained in the case of the Inman Steamship Company against Tinker (94 U. S. 238).

§ 369. The requirement by the laws of a State that each vessel passing a quarantine station shall pay a fee fixed by the statute, for examination as to her sanitary condition, and an inquiry as to the ports from which she came, is a part of all quarantine systems, is a compensation for service rendered a vessel and is not a tax within the meaning of the Constitution concerning tonnage taxes imposed by the States. (Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455.)

§ 370. With stronger reason than in the tonnage tax cases reported in the 12 Wall. 204, the Court say in the case of Peete against Morgan (19 Wall. 581) that the inhibition against a tonnage duty applies when the vessels are owned by citizens of another State, and are engaged in commerce between States over which Congress has control.

§ 371. A municipal corporation, having by its charter a right to erect wharves on navigable waters may regulate wharfage rates and collect wharfage from the owners of vessels mooring and landing at the wharves and using the same. The charge for such service must be such as is only a fair equivalent for the convenience provided, and in no sense. must it be a tax or duty upon commerce or a hindrance to free navigation. The charge for wharfage is regarded as proper compensation for the use of property, and in no sense an assertion on the part of the local authorities of sovereignty over the subject of commerce. (Packet Company v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, and in the case of Ouachita Packet Company v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444.)

CHAPTER XXXII.

RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND

VICE PRESIDENT.

ART. 2, SEC. 1, CL. 1, 2, 3.

§ 372. The first section of article two of the Constitution relates to the election of President, to the manner of election, to the persons who are eligible to the office, to the mode of procedure in case of the death, resignation or inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the office, to his removal from office, to his compensation and, finally, to the oath that he is to take before he enters upon the execution of his office. The provision in regard to the mode of election by the electors was amended by the substitution for the original text, of the twelfth amendment, which was ratified by the requisite number of States, as appears by the proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 25th day of September in the year 1804. Of the provisions of this section of the Constitution, only that relating to the mode of electing electors has been brought before the Supreme Court. Under the authority granted to Congress by the third clause of the section, the time of choosing electors has been made uniform, and occurs on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in every fourth year, succeeding every election of a President and Vice President. (R. S. Sec. 131.)

§ 373. The Legislature of Michigan having passed an act for the division of the State into districts for the election of electors, the constitutionality of the statute was considered in the case of McPherson v. Blacker (146 U. S. 1). The Court held that the subject was left to the States, except only as to the time when the election should be held.

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