neglect of the officers of the corporation to obey an injunction granted by Mr. Justice Grier. (18 How. 421.)

§ 204. While these proceedings were pending, Congress passed an act by which the bridge, as it had been authorized by the State of Virginia, was made a legal structure, and established as a Post Road "for the passage of the mails of the United States."

§ 205. The Court, by a majority, were of opinion that the act of Congress afforded full authority to the defendants to reconstruct the bridge, and that the decree directing its alteration or abatement could not, therefore, be carried into execution after the enactment of the law. Consequently the motion for an attachment for disobedience of the former decree was denied.

Justices Wayne, Grier and Curtis were of opinion that the attachment for contempt should be issued.

§ 206. This opinion is of value in connection with the act of Congress making the Wheeling Bridge a United States Post Road, as warranting the conclusion that the power to establish Post Roads is limited only by the discretion of Congress.

CHAPTER XIV.

INVENTIONS AND DISCOVERIES.

ART. 1, SEC. 8, PAR. 8.

"The Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

§ 207. Although the legislation of Congress under the clause which confers power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," has brought to the attention of the Court a great variety of questions, both practical and theoretical in their nature, it is yet true that the validity of that legislation under the Constitution has never been the subject of controversy.

The most that can be said is that authors and inventors have only those rights of property and protection in their respective writings and inventions, which are secured to them by the statutes of the country. No rights are derived directly from the Constitution. (Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218; Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Gregg, 8 Pet. 591; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S., 244.)

In the trade-mark cases (100 U. S., 82) the Court refused to recognize a trade mark as within the scope of this clause of the Constitution, it being neither an invention, nor a writing, nor a discovery.

The suggestion is made that a trade mark could only be protected by legislation under the clause of the Constitution which gives to Congress power to regulate commerce.

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CHAPTER XV.

PIRACIES AND FELONIES.

ART. 1, SEC. 8, PAR. 10.

"The Congress shall have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the Laws of Nations."

§ 208. In the case of the United States against Palmer (3 Whea. 610) the Court was called, incidentally, to consider whether the clause of the Constitution, which gives to Congress power "to define and punish piracies," should be so construed as to authorize Congress to declare that certain acts were piracies, which by the laws of nations were not so recognized when the Constitution was formed, or whether the power was so limited that Congress could only name and provide for the punishment of acts that were then so recognized as acts of piracy.

§ 209. By the eighth section of the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 131), it was provided "that if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, murder or robbery, or any other offence, which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death" every such offender shall be deemed a pirate and felon, and being convicted thereof, shall suffer death."

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§ 210. The Court was called to decide whether the word which related to the phrase, "murder or robbery, or any other offence," or was limited to the phrase or "any other offence." The latter interpretation was adopted by the Court, and thus a robbery, which if committed within the body of a county was not punishable by death under the laws of the United

States, was declared to be piracy. The opinion was given by Chief Justice Marshall, and it contained an able argument in support of the position taken by the Court.

§ 211. From that opinion Mr. Justice Johnson dissented in language indicating deep feeling and strong convictions as to the wisdom and justice of the decision.

He says: "Singular as it may appear, it really is the fact in this case, that these men's lives may depend upon a comma more or less, or upon the question whether a relative, which may take in three antecedents just as well as one, shall be confined to one alone. Upon such a question I here solemnly declare, that I never will consent to take the life of any man in obedience to any Court; and if ever forced to choose between obeying this Court on such a point or resigning my commission, I would not hesitate adopting the latter alternative."

§ 212. As the interpretation then given to the statute has not been changed, and as the statute itself remains in force (Rev. Stat. 5372), it may be considered settled doctrine that those acts which by the laws of the United States are declared to be acts of piracy must be so recognized by the Courts of the country, and that without regard to the laws of nations.

§ 213. The constitutionality of the embargo act of 1794 (1 Stat. 372), and of the non-intercourse act of 1809 (2 Stat. 506-528), was never controverted, although several cases for the enforcement of these statutes were before the Supreme Court. (Schooner Hoppet v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 389, and others.)

CHAPTER XVI.

WAR POWERS.

ART. 1, SEC. 8, PAR. 11.

"The Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water."

§ 214. In the case of Brown against the United States (8 Cranch, 110), the question was considered whether in a state of war, property of a citizen or subject enemy found upon land, could be confiscated by an order of Court without a legislative act authorizing its confiscation.

On this point, Chief Justice Marshall said: "That war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded.

When the sovereign authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will shall be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the Court."

§ 215. The war powers of Congress were very fully considered and treated in the opinion of the Court in the case of Miller and the United States (11 Wall. 268). From the conclusions of that opinion, Justices Field and Clifford dissented.

At the hearing the constitutionality of two statutes, which provided for the confiscation of the property of persons engaged in the rebellion, was controverted. (12 Stat. 319, 589.)

The following propositions seem to be established by the opinion of the Court, viz.:

(1.) That in civil war the government de jure has the rights of a sovereign and of a belligerent as well: