(7) The term "regulation" shall mean any regulation prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury for carrying out the provisions of this Act, and the commissioner is authorized to make such regulations. per Any act authorized to be done by the commissioner may be formed by any assistant or agent designated by him for that purpose. Records required to be filed with the commissioner may be filed with an assistant commissioner or other person designated by the commissioner to receive such records. The U. S. Supreme Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the War Prohibition Act, defining the term "intoxicating liquor," which definition is identical with that of the permanent Prohibition Code in the case of Ruppert v. Caffey, decided January 15, 1920, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep., 141; 251 U. S., 264, said: "For the legislation and decisions of the highest courts of nearly all of the states established that it is deemed impossible to effectively enforce either prohibitory or other laws merely regulating the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, if liability or inclusion within the law is made to depend upon the issuable fact whether or not a particular liquor made or sold as a beverage is intoxicating. "In other words, it clearly appears that a liquor law, to be capable of effective enforcement must, in the opinion of the Legislatures and courts of the several States, be made to apply either to all liquors of the species enumerated, like beer, ale or wine, regardless of the presence or degree of alcoholic content; or if a more general description is used, such as distilled, rectified, spirituous, fermented, malt or brewed liquors, to all liquors within the general description regardless of alcoholic content; or to such of these liquors as contain a named percentage of alcohol; and often several such standards are combined so that certain specific and generic liquors are altogether forbidden and such other liquors as contain a given percentage of alcohol. "A test often used to determine whether a beverage is to be deemed intoxicating within the meaning of the liquor law is whether it contains onehalf of 1 per cent of alcohol by volume. "The decisions of the Courts as well as the action of the Legislatures make it clear-or, at least, furnish grounds upon which Congress reasonably might conclude that a rigid classification of beverages is an essential of either effective regulation or effectve prohibition of intoxicating liquors." The court then quoted with approval the case of Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S., 192, which reads as follows: "The State, within the limits we have stated, must decide upon the measures that are needful for the protection of its people, and, having regard to the artifices which are used to promote the sale of intoxicants under the guise of innocent beverages, it would constitute an unwarrantable departure from accepted principle to hold that the Prohibition of the sale of all malt liquors, including the beverage in question, was beyond its reserved power.” The Court further said: "The Federal government would, in attempting to enforce a prohibitory law, be confronted with difficulties similar to those encountered by the States is obvious; and both this experience of the States, and the need of the Federal government of legislation defining intoxicating liquors as was done in the Volstead Act clearly set forth in the reports of the House Committee on the Judiciary in reporting the bill to the Sixty-Fifth Congress, Third Session, Report 1143, February 26, 1919, and the Sixty-Sixth Congress, First Session, Report 91, June 30, 1919. . "It is therefore clear both that Congress might reasonably have considered some legislative definition of intoxicating liquor to be essential to effective enforcement of Prohibition and also that the definition provided by the Volstead Act was not an arbitrary one." (Italics ours.) This decision was followed in the Eighteenth Amendment cases, 253 U. S. 350, 64 L. Ed. 946, by reference as follows: "While recognizing that there are limits beyond which Congress can not go in treating beverages as within its power of enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the provision of the Volstead Act, wherein liquors containing as much as one-half of 1 per cent of alcohol by volume and fit for use for beverage purposes are treated as within that power. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S., 264." See also the following cases: Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 56 So. 316, 226, U. S. 192. United States v. Cohn, 52 S. W. 38, 2 Ind. T. 474. Feibleman v. State, 30 So. 384, 130 Ala. 122. Marks v. State, 48 So. 864 (Ala.). State v. Centennial Brew. Co., 179 Pac., 296 Mont. State v. Lebrecque, 97 A., 747 (N. H.). State v. Kenny, 75 So. 422, 141 La. 594. State v. Reno Brew. Co., 178 P. 902 Neb. State v. Stickle, 131 N. W. 5. State v. Fargo Bottle Works, 124 N. W. 387 N. D.; Sawer v. Botti, 124 N. W. 787, Iowa. Pennell v. State, 123 N. W. 115, 141 Wis. 35. Commonwealth v. Henry, 65 S. E. 570, Va. U. S. v. Baumgartner, 259 F., 722. Edmonson v. State, 142 S. W. 887. Ex Parte Hunnicut, 123 Pac. 179. State v. Miller, 142 Pac. 979, 92 Kans. 994. State v. Reynolds, 47 Pac. 573, 5 Kan. App. 515. State v. Lynch, 96 A. 32. Barbour v. State, 92 S. E. 70, 146 Ga. 667. State v. Hampton, 91 S. E. 314, 106 S. C. 275. State v. Bales, 130 S. W. 111 U. S. v. Pittsburg Brewing Co., 260 683. U. S. v. Kinsel, 263 Fed. 141. v. State (Tex.), 227 S. W., 668. State v Gill, 95 N. W. 449, 89 Minn. 502. Reeves Non-intoxicating beverages may be prohibited to prevent subterfuge, evasion of the law and fraud. State v. Centennial Brewing Co. (Mont.), 179 Pac. 296. Thatcher v. Reno Brewing Co. (Nev.), 178 Pac. 902. Pennell v. State, 141 Wis., 35; 123 N. W., 115; Sawyer v. Botti, 147 Iowa, 453; 124 N. W., 787. Construction of Statute when percentage of alcoholic content or a specific beverage is named in the law. State v. Hemrich, 93 Wash. 439, 161 Pac. 79, L. R. A. 1917B, 962n. Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 Pac. 578. Thatcher v. Reno Brewing Co. (Nev.), 178 Pac. 902. See also, United States v. Schmauder (D. C.), 258 Fed. 251. State v. Barr (Vt.), 77 Atl. 914. State v. Killeen (N. H.), 107 Atl. 601. Coates v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 215 S. W. 856. Landers v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 210 S. W. 694. Liquors not specified in law included under general term. State v. Hemrich, 93 Wash. 439, 161 Pac. 79, L. R. A. 1917B, 962n. State v. Miller, 92 Kan. 994, 142 Pac. 979, L. R. A. 1917F, 238, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 365. Mullins v. Commonwealth, 115 Va. 945, 79 S. E. 324. Marks v. State, 159 Ala., 71, 48 So., 864. State v. Merrill (Ala.), 85 So., 28. State v. Hansley (W. Va.), 103 S. E., 204. State v. Jackson (Kan.), 227 S. W., 646. Shaw v. State (Ga.), 103 S. E., 470. Gordon v. State (Ga.), 103 S. E., 38. Patterson v. State (Ga.), 100 S. E., 641. Intoxicating preparations fit for beverage use. State v. Centennial Brewing Co. (Mont.), 179 Pac. 296, 297. Roberts v. State (Ga. App.), 60 S. E., 1082. Cooper v. State, 19 Ariz., 486, 172 Pac., 276. Collins v. State (Ark.), 221 S. W., 455. State v. Andrews (Iowa), 176 N. W., 637. Payne v. State (Miss.), 88 So., 483. Comm. v. Lanides (Mass.), 131 N. E., 302. Arbuthnot v. State (Tex.), 120 S. W., 478. City of Montrose v. Price (Col.), 196 P., 863. State v. Johnson (S. C.), 101 S E., 851. State v. Bales (Mo.), 130 S. W., 111. See also Schemmer v. State (Neb.), 180 N. W., 581. Joseph Triner Co. v. Shanks (S. D.), 180 N. W, 955. Geer Drug Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. C., 104 S. C., 207; 88 S. E., 448; Ann Cas. 1917, C. 908. State v. Barksdale (N. C.), 107 S. E., 505. Substitutes for beer. State v. Mattox Cigar, etc., Co. (Ala.), 77 So. 756. Brown v. State, 17 Ariz. 314, 152 Pac. 578. Dees v. State (Ala. App.), 75 So. 645. Howard v. Acme Brewing Co., 143 Ga. 1, 83 S. E. 1096, L. R. A. 1917A, 91. Hall v. State, 19 Ariz., 12, 165 Pac., 300. Patterson v. State (Ala.), 88 So., 360. Purvis v. City of Ocilla (Ga.), 102 S. E., 241. Malt liquors. State v. Lynch, 5 Boyce's (28 Del.) 569, 96 Atl. 32. State v. Hemrich, 93 Wash. 439, 161 Pac. 79, L. R. A. 1917B, 962n. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 109 Va. 828, 64 S. E. 54. Bradley v. State, 3 Ala. App. 212, 58 So. 95. Purity Extract, etc., Co. v. Lynch, 100 Miss. 650, 56 So. 316. State v. Centennial Brewing Co. (Mont.), 179 Pac., 296. Claunch v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 203 S. W., 891. State v. O'Connell, 99 Me., 61; 58 A., 59. La Follette v. Murray, 91 N. E., 294; 81 Ohio St., 474; Flanders v. Comm., 130 S. W., 809; 140 Ky., 38. Sec. 2. "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents, and inspectors shall investigate and report violations of this Act to the United States attorney for the district in which committed, who is hereby charged with the duty of prosecuting the offenders, subject to the direction of the Attorney General, as in the case of other offenses against the laws of the United States; and such Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents, and inspectors may swear out warrants before United States commissioners or other officers or courts authorized to issue the same for the apprehension of such offenders, and may, subject to the control of the said United States attorney, conduct the prosecution at the committing trial for the purpose of having the offenders held for the action of a grand jury. Section 1014 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby made applicable in the enforcement of this Act. Officers mentioned in said. Section 1014 are authorized to issue search warrants under the limitations provided in Title XI of the Act approved June 15, 1917 (Fortieth Statutes at Large, page 217, et seq.)" R. S., Sec. 1014-Offenders against the United States, how arrested and removed for trial. For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any commissioner of a Circuit Court to take bail, or by any chancellor, judge of a Supreme or Superior Court, chief or first judge of Common Pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any State where he may be found, and agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and at the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case. And where any offender or witness is committed in any district other than that where the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for his removal to the district where the trial is to be had. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 1014 REVISED STATUTES Following State Practice-Generally. "Mode of process" means mode of proceeding. It was the intention of Congress "to assimilate all the proceedings for holding accused persons to answer before a court of the United States to the proceedings had for similar purposes by the laws of the state where the proceedings should take place." U. S. v. Rundlett (1854), 2 Court, 41, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16, 208; U. S. v. Horton (1873), 2 Dill, 94, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 393; U. S. v. Martin (1883), 17 Fed., 150; Marvin v. U. S. (1890), 44 Fed., 405; U. S. v. Sauer (1896), 73 Fed., 671; U. S. v. Dunbar (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1897), 83 Fed., 151, 27 C. C. A., 488; U. S. v. Green (S. D. N. Y. 1900), 100 Fed., 941; Cohen v. U. S. (C. C. A., 9th Cir., 1914), 214 Fed., 23, 130 C. C. A., 417. See also U. S. v. Ruroede (S. D., N. Y.), 220 Fed., 210. The term "agreeably to the usual mode of process against offenders in such state," as used in the statute, should be so construed as to include all the regulations and steps incident to the proceedings before the commissioner from its commencement to its termination, as prescribed by the state laws, so far as they may be applicable to the Federal courts. U. S. v. Sauer (1896), 73 Fed., 671. Validity of Warrant. Must particularly name or describe the person. West v. Cabell (1894), 153 U. S., 78, 14 S. Ct., 752, 38 U. S. (L. ed.), 643. Seal. By Act of June 28, 1906, Ch. 3573, 34 Stat. L., 546, Commissioners are required to have a seal which shall be affixed to each jurat or certificate of the official acts of said commissioners, but no increase of fee shall be allowed by reason thereof. To be Made Returnable. The omission to make a warrant returnable, at sometime or before some person, affords ample reason for quashing all authority derived from it. U. S. v. Almedia (U. S. Cir. Ct. 1806), 2 Wheel. Crim. (N. Y.), 576. Preliminary Examination. There must first be a complaint supported by oath or affirmation showing probable cause, followed by an arrest and examination, with the right of the accused to contest the probable cause on his examination. U. S. v. Shepard (1870), 1 Abb., 431; 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16, 273. Quantum of Proof-Probable Cause. Chief Justice Marshall said: "On an application of this kind I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed, on a trial in chief; nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused; but I ought to require, and I should require, that probable cause be shown; and I understand probable cause to be a case made out by proof furnishing good reasons to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it." U. S. v. Burr (1807), 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14, 692a. Confession by Defendant. Upon a preliminary examination, a confession by the defendant of the commission of the crime is sufficient to justify commitment, even when there has been no evidence produced of the actual fact of the commission of the offense independently of the confession of the prisoner. U. S. v. Bloomgart (1868), 2 Ben., 356, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14, 612. The Justice Department made the following ruling on the question of issuing warrants May 29, 1920: "THE RIGHT OF FEDERAL INSPECTORS TO SECURE SEARCH WARRANTS "(1) The National Prohibition Act is not an Internal Revenue law and expressly authorizes Prohibition agents to swear out warrants for offenders against it. The approval of United States Attorneys, therefore, is not required for the issuance of warrants on complaints charging violations of its provisions. "(2) Warrants charging offense against the Internal Revenue laws, as distinguished from the National Prohibition Act, must, as heretofore, be approved by the United States Attorney before being issued. Respectfully, "A. MITCHELL PALMER, Examination Waived by Accused. When accused persons, arraigned before a commissioner, offer to waive examination and to enter into the proper recognizance, the examining officer may use his discretion whether to suspend the examination or not, as he shall deem best for the public interest. An immediate development of the evi |