Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy and OrderRoutledge, 8 de mai. de 2014 - 256 páginas Is the state a necessity, a convenience, or neither? It enforces collective choices in which some override the preferences and dispose of the resources of others. Moreover, collective choice serves as its own source of authority and preempts the space it wishes to occupy. The morality and efficacy of the result are perennial questions central to political philosophy. In Against Politics Jasay takes a closely reasoned stand, based on modern rational choice arguments, for rejecting much of mainstream thought about these matters. In the first part of the book, Excuses, he assesses the standard justification of government based consent, the power of constitutions to achieve limited government, and ideas for reforming politics. In the second part, Emergent Solutions , he explores the force of first principles to secure liberties and rights and some of the potential of spontaneous conventions for generating ordered anarchy. Written with clarity and simplicity, this powerful volume represents the central part of Jasay's recent work. Fully accessible to the general reader, it should stimulate the specialist reader to fresh thought. |
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action agreed agreement alternative Anthony de Jasay argument benefits choose claim classical liberal coercion coercive cognitivist collective choice collective decisions common communitarian consequentialist constitution contractarian convention cooperation coordination game cost course decisive coalition default democracy democratic deontological distribution distributive justice dominant economic ends enforcement equal equilibrium ethics exclusion expected favor feasible force freedom freedom of contract gain game theory group rights harm Hayek hence Hobbesian holistic imposed individual institutions interests justice kind least legitimate less liberal liberties limited logic marginal matter maximizing means ment meta-ethics moral mutual normative obligation one’s ordered anarchy outcome parties payoff perform perhaps players political Popper possible preferences presumption principal-agent problem principle prisoner’s dilemma problem promises question rational reason redistributive respect self-enforcing sense social choice social contract social engineering social order society solution spontaneous order strategy theory thing threat tion tive tort unowned violate voluntary