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throughout the Northern States to put down the war by force, conspiracies which issued in the year following in the New York riots. General Lee's second invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland was induced by the expectation and assurance received that such invasion would be attended with a general uprising against the Administration. This conspiracy had its organized ramifications throughout all the Northern States, out of New England. So assured had the conspirators become, that during the sessions of the legislature of the State of Michigan in February 1863, a member of each House affirmed, before the body of which he was a member, that within a very few weeks the war would be ended by a general uprising of the people throughout the Northern States. When called to order for such treasonable utterances, they were repeated with the defiant declaration that in a very short time blood would flow in torrents throughout the nation. We were in Lansing when those utterances were given forth. A single fact will indicate the extent and spirit of these organizations. With an Irishman who had for years been employed about the college, we had formed quite a strong friendship. At length he began to talk ominously about the uprising that was soon to occur, and of the blood that was then to flow. After this he stated that in a few days blood would be shed. "Well,” I replied, to test his spirit, "if such an event should occur, you would not injure me, your friend?" With a wolfish growl he replied: "I would take your life, sir, as soon as I would that of any other man." We immediately hastened down to the city, and stated the facts and our apprehensions to Major Cole, who had retired from the army on account of wounds received. "It is true," he replied, "that these conspiracies exist, and that these uprisings are contemplated. But do you know what exists on the other side?" "No," we answered. "Let me assure you that Unionists throughout the Northern States are perfectly organized, armed, and equipped, with all their officers appointed and their signals and places of rendezvous all agreed upon. Should a rising occur in this city, for example, at certain strokes of the bell every man will be in his place; and let me assure you that after the first blow shall fall, the treason will never be repeated." It was, we repeat, with a full

knowledge of these treasonable organizations, and of their promised uprisings, that General Lee made his second invasion, and fought the desperate battle of Gettysburg.

But the most important result of the conduct of the war was the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the Constitutional Amendments which followed that event. It has been said that "if we had not had a McClellan, we should not have had a Grant." It is equally true that if McClellan, Halleck, and Buell had not been substituted for Fremont and others of kindred spirit and ability, we should never have suffered the unexampled defeats and calamities which rendered that Proclamation, in the judgment of the Administration, and that contrary to all previous plans and expectations, an absolute national necessity. But for the calamities which followed, in the year 1863, under General Halleck as Commander-in-Chief, the coloured man would not have become a soldier, and up to this time we should not have had more than the Thirteenth Amendment. A letter received from Mr. Sumner in the latter part of the year 1862, we having fully expressed to him, in successive letters, our views of the conduct of the war, and who had laid the same before the President,-a letter from Mr. Sumner, we say, contains these words (the first sentences have been given before):-"I have, from the beginning, been profoundly impressed with your views. A Government more quick and positive than ours would have adopted them early, and the war would have been ended long since. Perhaps, however, these delays and disasters. may result in consequences which you and I value more than we do any present victories and advantages." These were considerations which, all along, rendered us hopefully patient, in view of the events which we have detailed.

CHAPTER XVI.

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1863.

HAVING, as stated in the Introduction, made the science of war a subject of careful study from my youth, and having fully acquainted myself with the characteristics of the leading campaigns of past ages, particularly those of the present century and of the preceding one, and having done so for the specific purpose of attaining to a clear understanding of the chief causes of the successes and failures of such campaigns, and having observed that the entire conduct of the war under consideration was, on our part, in palpable violation of all the known principles and examples of successful warfare, and in equally palpable accordance with the very worst principles and examples known to the science of war, or represented in history, or representable in thought, I felt it a sacred duty to pre sent my views of the subject to the military authorities at Washington. I accordingly, immediately after the first disaster at Bull Run, entered into correspondence with such individuals as Secretary Chase, senators Sumner, King, and Chandler, and members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. In these communications, special criticisms were made upon the general conduct of the war, developing its fundamental errors, and showing what ought to have been done. Similar criticisms were presented of the different particular campaigns as they occurred. These views were laid before the President particularly, and pressed upon his consideration. The following communication from Secretary Chase will interest the reader. It was sent in reply to a very long

communication containing the main criticisms found in the preceding pages. In this communication I made this general statement, that if it had been the fixed and deliberate aim of our military authorities to conduct this war in accordance with the worst principles condemned in military science, and the worst examples known in history, or representable in human thought, they could not have succeeded, in my honest judgment, better than they had done. To this communication the Secretary sent the following reply. The letter was, of course, confidential at the time, reasons for privacy being now removed :—

"MY DEAR SIR,

"TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Oct. 29th, 1862.

"I have attentively read your letter, and agree with you entirely in regard to the management of the war hitherto. In my judgment, no General has a right to be continued in service an hour after it becomes evident that success cannot be achieved under his lead. I have often expressed views substantially similar to yours to the President, but other counsels have better approved themselves to his judgment. I think that experience has wrought some change in his views, though not so complete a change as I could wish. The substitution of Rosecrans for Buell is a beginning. The appointment of Mitchell to the department of the south is also good. Other changes, I think, will be made, and a greater vigour in every direction may be expected. If disappointed in this, I shall almost despair; but I do not expect to be disappointed.

"I shall be glad to receive any practical suggestions you may make. They will be instructive to me, and may be useful to the country.

"Yours very truly,

"S. P. CHASE."

After receiving such communications, and after the terrible defeat at Fredericksburg, I determined to visit Washington, and through the influence of my friends there, lay my views before the President and Secretary of War.

I arrived there on the last day of December 1861, and spent most of the next forenoon with Secretary Chase. Through him a hearing was obtained with Secretary Stanton. In the opening of our communication with the latter, we commenced a criticism on the past conduct of the war. This the Secretary interrupted, saying that he had understood from Secretary Chase that I had developed a plan for the future conduct of the war and he wanted to hear that. We then gave him a full statement of the plan. "Where is your General," exclaimed the Secretary, "to carry out such a plan as that? "I did not come here, Mr. Stanton, to furnish a General, but to develop a plan by which this war can be brought to a speedy and almost bloodless termination." "Well, give us a General," responded the Secretary; "the best plan that can be proposed is the worst, if you have not a General capable of carrying it out." "I should suppose, Mr. Stanton," I replied, "that if a definite and practicable plan were submitted, a General capable of carrying it out might be found." "Give us a General; name your man,' was the reply of our Secretary of War. So the interview ended, and with it all hope of any favourable results from that department. I then spent a full half day with senators Wade and Wilson, laying before them my criticisms on the conduct of the war thus far, and

my plan for the future. Both the criticism and plan were unqualifiedly endorsed by both, each saying that he now understood the whole subject as he had never done before. By agreement, we spent the next evening with the President, who, with great interest, listened to all I had to say. He then requested that I would reduce my views to writing, saying that he would give them a most careful investigation. After preparing the document, and reading it to the senators, they accompanied me a second time to the President's office. After an attentive hearing of the document, and a full discussion of its presentations, the President addressed Messrs. Wade and Wilson in these words: "Gentlemen, I am in earnest in what I am now about to say to you. If you senators advise it, I will adopt this plan, and appoint a new Commander-in Chief to carry it out,"

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