JANUARY, 1834.] Removal of the Deposits. [H. OF R. be impossible for the local banks to relieve the | winding up the affairs of the bank without discountry. Was this the policy adopted by the turbing the public tranquillity, and sacrificing old Bank of the United States? I was grati- all the great interests of the country. I hope fied, sir, to hear the gentleman from Pennsyl- that such will be their future conduct, that, vania defending that ancient institution. What- some twenty years after the institution shall ever may have been its political conduct, it have expired, some friend may be able to defend never can be censured for the manner in which it with equal justice and ability. But if, on the it wound up its concerns. No; the policy pur- other hand, the Bank of the United States sued by the president and directors of that should persist in this vain struggle for a new institution towards the local banks and the charter-if it should continue to set public great interests of the country, affords a striking opinion at defiance—to agitate trade-to sacriand an unfortunate contrast to the course now fice, all interests, and to disregard the ruin it adopted by those who manage the affairs of the may produce, by pursuing the policy of an existing bank. In what manner the old Bank exasperated and expiring institution-it will of the United States wound up its concerns, we not only go down, but it will close its concerns are informed by a writer of that day. I quote amidst the universal execrations of the country. from a scienfic work-from an authority with which the gentleman from Pennsylvania is undoubtedly familiar: WEDNESDAY, January 15. Removal of the Deposits. "The public prosperity might have received a severe shock, and Government itself been exposed to difficulties and embarrassments much more serious than those under which it must now necessarily labor from the want of a national bank, if the same course of deliberate prudence which has marked the conduct of the late Bank of the United States throughout had not been also pursued in their mode of withdrawing from business. But they proceeded in their work so slowly, and acted towards individual debtors, and towards other banks on which they had claims, with so much liberal forbearance, that time was gained to supply the public with the circulating medium of new bank credits in lieu of those to be withdrawn-a conduct which was, moreover, dictated by the interests of the expiring institution itself, and singularly favored by the general stagnation of commerce at the period when it took place." What a contrast does this policy present to that pursued by the present institution for three years past! "The same course of deliberate prudence."-"They proceeded in their work so slowly, and acted towards individual debtors, and towards other banks on which they had claims, with so much liberal forbearance.""A conduct which was, moreover, dictated by the interests of the expiring institution itself." What, sir, would have been the actual condition of the country, had the president and directors of the present institution adopted, in 1831, a similiar" course of deliberate prudence," instead of expanding its commercial loans, and placing itself in a worse condition for winding up its affairs in 1834, than it was at the beginning of 1831, by eleven millions of dollars? In his letter to Congress, the Secretary of What would have been the present condition the Treasury recites the following clause from of our trade and industry, had the Bank of the the act of 1816, as the authority under which United States "acted towards individual debt- he removed the public deposits: ors, and towards other banks on which it had "And be it further enacted, That the deposits of claims, with such liberal forbearance?" How the money of the United States, in places in which different would have been our present condi- the said bank and branches thereof may be estabtion, had the affairs of the bank been adminis-lished, shall be made in said bank or branches tered with a proper view to the interests of its stockholders, and a just regard to the country! I trust that its president and directors will be admonished by the prudent and just course of their predecessors, and hereafter proceed in Mr. SAMUEL MCDOWELL MOORE said: The question as to the propriety of the President's act, in removing his late Secretary from office, seems to me to have been improperly brought into this discussion, to which I humbly apprehend it does not belong; and it is not necessary that I should express any opinion upon it. But as I feel no disposition to avoid the expression of an opinion on a question which has been so much debated, I may be permitted to remark, that, although I am convinced that the position that the President may, at his pleasure, dismiss executive officers, without violating the constitution, is but too well established by long-settled practice, yet that I cannot approve of the act in question, if that act was induced solely from a determination on the part of the President to cause the public deposits to be removed. I do not approve of the dismission on that ground, because I am of opinion that the deposits ought not to have been removed, and because I do not regard the duties of the Secretary, in relation to the deposits, as constituting any part of his duties as an executive officer. If the dismission took place, however, in consequence of the offensive language used by the Secretary in his correspondence with the President, I am only surprised that the President permitted him to remain in office as long as he did; and, in that point of view, I imagine it will be a much more difficult task to account for his ever having been appointed, than to justify his dismission. thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; in which case, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediatemediately after the commencement of the next ly lay before Congress, if in session, and, if not, imsession, the reasons of such order or direction." H. OF R.] It will be perceived that this clause relates | marked and most important distinction between exclusively to deposits to be made, and gives the cases in which the power of removal was no power to take money out of the Treasury exercised by former Secretaries, and that in of the United States, (which, for the time, was which it has been exerted by the present inthe vault of the United States Bank,) and place cumbent of the office. It is this: In all forit elsewhere. It is certainly known that the mer cases, the removals were made with the Secretary has caused money to be taken out of consent of the Bank of the United States and the United States Bank, which was there ante- the approbation of the Government; in this rior to his order of October last, and to be case, it was done against the consent of the transferred to some of the State banks. The bank. In transactions between individuals, fact is admitted by the Treasurer, in his corre- consent of parties takes away error; and the spondence with the cashier of the bank at Phila- same rule seems applicable to the parties condelphia; and the power to do so is claimed in cerned in the disposition of the deposits, viz.: the report before me. From whence does the to the bank and the Government. But even Secretary derive his authority for this? The if the cases cited had been exactly parallel clause I have read does not give it to him, inas- to the one we are discussing, the authority much as its operation was evidently, from its would by no means be sufficient to justify the language, intended to be prospective, and not act, though it may seem to palliate or excuse it. retrospective. Is it from that clause of the We have the authority of the President himself constitution which says "no money shall be for refusing to consider precedent as condrawn from the treasury but in consequence of clusive in favor of the exercise of authority, appropriations made by law?" This clause furnished us in his famous veto against the does not authorize, but forbids, the act of the renewal of the charter of the present Bank of Secretary; inasmuch as there had been no the United States. So far from the exercise appropriation made by law of the money in the of the power in question being justified by the treasury to the purposes to which it was ap- precedents quoted, they only serve as another plied. The act of 1789 gives to the Secretary example to show how universal the disposition of the Treasury the power to " grant all war- is, in all men in office, to exercise powers not rants for money to be issued from the treasury granted to them; and to prove how neces in pursuance of appropriations to be made by sary it is that the representatives of the people law." The same act makes it the duty of the should watch, with ceaseless vigilance, against Treasurer (not of the Secretary of the Treasury) dangerous assumptions of authority by the "to receive and keep the money" of the nation. officers of Government. There is no other act which gives the Secretary of the Treasury the power which he has exercised, of taking the money out of the United States Bank, and lending it to the State banks. The act, then, is not only unauthorized, but it is in violation of the constitution and laws of the land. The only plausible ground which has been resorted to, for the purpose of justifying the acts of the Secretary, is that which is furnished by the examples of Mr. Crawford and other Secretaries of the Treasury, and the acquiescence of the Government in times past; and I readily admit that if the fact of other Secretaries having exercised the power in question is to be considered as settling the question, there appears no further ground for dispute. Indeed, from the quotations made by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. POLK,) from the correspondence of Mr. Crawford, I should suppose that it would be difficult to conceive of any exercise of power which might not be sanctioned upon the principles on which Mr. Crawford appears to have acted. And, sir, I freely admit, that if the gentleman from Tennessee had quoted from the correspondence of former Secretaries merely for the purpose of defending the present Secretary of the Treasury from the imputation of having assumed and exercised a power never claimed by any of his predecessors in office, he would have been eminently successful. There is one circumstance, however, which creates a What, sir, is to be the consequence, if we acquiesce in the doctrines contended for by the Secretary of the Treasury? What is there, if his views are correct, to prevent a young and ambitious President of the United States, who may wish to place a Crown upon his head, and to transmit it to his posterity, from trampling our liberties under his feet, and accomplishing his designs? May he not divert every dollar of the revenue from its legitimate object, and place it in his own pocket, or spend it in hiring foreign mercenaries to sustain him upon his throne, if the Executive has, in fact, the power of removing the deposits, and placing them where he pleases? How shall it be prevented? Shall I be told that money can only be drawn out of the treasury in pursuance of appropriations made by law, and upon the warrant of the Treasurer and the Secretary of the Treasury? It would be idle to tell me so, when it is admitted that the President could at any moment turn out those officers, and put in others more submissive to his will, should they presume to refuse to grant warrants to draw money out of the treasury for any pur pose whatsoever, for which he might design to use it. Shall I be told that Congress would interfere to prevent it, when the power of Congress to interfere, or to pass any act for remov ing the deposits, even if it "should be satisfied that the public money was not safe in the care of the bank, or that the interest of the people JANUARY, 1834.] Removal of the Deposits. [H. OF R. of the United States imperiously demanded it," | from the bank, and now denies our right to is denied by the Secretary of the Treasury in the interfere in the matter. passage from his report which I have just read? Let it not be supposed, Mr. Speaker, that I intend to impute to the present Chief Magistrate of this nation any such designs against the liberties of his country. The case I have supposed cannot apply to him; nor do I believe he entertains any such views. If, sir, I thought he did, I hope I should not be so deficient in moral courage as not to say so. But, sir, the general confidence reposed by the people in the purity of the President's intentions makes it the more important that we should guard against the establishment of precedent which may hereafter be appealel to by men actuated by more dangerous motives. I contend, in the next place, that Congress not only had not the right to transfer the power claimed for the Executive over the deposits, and that they did not do so, but that they never designed to do so. Why did Congress require the Secretary to report his reasons for changing the place of deposits to themselves, and not to the President? Was it merely for the purpose of ascertaining how handsome a letter he could write? or was it because they intended to hold him responsible to themselves, and to correct his acts if they were erroneous? Again, sir; why was any power given to the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposits? It was, sir, for the same reason that we are sent here, which is, not because the people cannot manage their own concerns, or are less competent to do so than we are, but because it is not convenient for them to do so. And, for similar reasons, were certain powers confided to the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposits. Congress is not always in session, and, when it is, it is impossible that it can act with that celerity which exigencies might require; it was therefore necessary to appoint an agent to act for it in such emergencies; who was never expected to exercise his power except in cases which would not admit of delay, and, even then, under a strict responsibility to Congress, and to Congress alone. The Secretary is, therefore, mistaken in supposing that his power over the deposits is a part of the executive duties of his office. Congress never intended any thing of the kind. He is, in truth, but the mere agent of Congress, or the trustee of Congress and the bank. And I understand, sir, that, among individuals, it is well understood that the parties to a contract may not only alter it or abolish it at pleasure, but they have an unlimited control over the acts of their trustee. We have, however, a novel case before us-one in which a trustee not only disregards the expressed wishes of the parties, and acts in avowed opposition to the wish of one of the parties, and refuses to wait to ascertain the wishes of the other; but actually denies the power to control him to be in either or both of the parties. He takes away the deposits But, Mr. Speaker, the most extraordinary position taken by the Secretary in his report is this: that Congress having made a contract with the bank, by which the deposits were to remain in the bank until the expiration of its charter, they cannot pass a law for removing the deposits, without breaking their pledge given to the bank, and a breach of faith; but that he, the agent of the Government, may remove the deposits at pleasure, without there being any breach of faith committed. Now, sir, I have always understood it to be a sound principle that what a man does by his agent he does by himself; and that any act which would amount to a fraud, if done by himself in person, is equally a fraud if done through the instru mentality of an agent. The same principle applies to Governments in their intercourse with each other, and in their transactions with individuals and corporations. Another very extraordinary position taken by the Secretary, nearly akin to the preceding one, is, that the Government has, by its compact, deprived itself of the power to remove the deposits from the United States Bank, without a violation of a pledge given, although every department of the Government should be unanimous in passing a law for that purpose, for the best possible reasons; and yet one of these departments may remove them for no reason at all, without any breach of a pledge given, or the least impropriety. In other words, the entire Government, consisting of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President, can in no case cause the deposits to be removed; but the President himself may do it at pleasure, without any injustice to the bank. It would, according to this mode of reasoning, be a fraud in the President to sanction a law for removing the deposits, but it would be perfectly fair for him to do it without law. The pledge given to the bank is, that the deposits shall remain in its vaults until the charter expires, and it is obligatory on the whole Government. This pledge was undoubtedly required by the bank for its own benefit and greater security. But if the Secretary of the Treasury is right in his opinions, then this pledge does not increase, but greatly diminishes, the security of the bank. Without the pledge, (Congress having, as is admitted by the Secretary, a controlling power over the deposits,) when the deposits were once placed in the bank by order of Congress, they could only be removed by a law passed by the concurrence of both Houses, and approved by the President; but the pledge being demanded and given, the security of the bank is reduced to one-third of what it was, and the President alone may remove the deposits of his own accord. If any man had predicted that such a construction would have been put upon the charter at the time it was created, it would have been regarded H. OF R.] The Pension Laws-Indian Wars. [JANUARY, 1834. as absurd; and, if the bank had known that | inquiry into two classes of cases. Under the such was to be the interpretation of the pledge, law, as it now stands, the applicant, to entitle it would have been rejected with disdain. The himself to the benefit of its provisions, must idea of a pledge binding upon the three branches show a service at one or more periods, amountof the Government collectively, but voidable ing in all to six months. Many of those who at pleasure by one of them, is in itself too were most efficient in the Indian wars during monstrous an absurdity to deserve the least the revolution, before the treaty of peace, never respect. Does any man believe that the bank enlisted, nor were they called out to perform a would ever have consented to give a bonus of tour of duty in the militia. The frontier of $1,500,000 to the United States, for the privilege | Virginia then extended from Pittsburg to the of retaining the deposits in her vaults, if it had mouth of Green River. The State relied upon been understood that the continuance of that these western settlers to defend this extended privilege was to depend upon the mere caprice frontier, and they were therefore never called or whim of the Secretary of the Treasury, out to perform duty in the East. They protect or the Executive ? Who would ever have ed the settlements more in the interior, and subscribed to a bank which had agreed to give thus enabled the State to direct her energies one million and a half of dollars for such a pre- against the more powerful foe. Under these carious advantage? No man in his senses circumstances, though they may not be embrac would have done so, sir. ed in the letter, who can doubt that they come the pension laws, entitled to the benefit of these provisions. They allege the Indian war was brought upon them by the revolution; it was that part of the revolutionary war which occurred in the West; and, with them, it never ter If the construction put upon the bank char-within the spirit of the pension laws, and are ter by the Secretary of the Treasury be just as clearly entitled, upon every principle, to the if his power to remove the deposits was not bounty of the Government, as any of those dependent in any degree upon their being safe whose names are inscribed on the pension roll? in the United States Bank-and he might at The resolution also proposes to inquire whether any time, as he asserts, remove the deposits if, all who were engaged in these wars, down to the in his opinion, the public convenience or inter-treaty of 1795, are not, upon the principles of est would, in any degree, be promoted by it, without any breach of faith or moral impropriety; then it would appear to have been his duty to have removed the deposits the moment the bonus of a million and a half of dollars was paid up, and to have struck another bar-minated until the treaty of 1795. The signing gain for a like sum with some of the State banks, and to have continued the same traffic as long as it proved profitable, inasmuch as it would undoubtedly have been convenient to have as much money as possible to apply to the payment of the public debt. Such conduct, to be sure, between man and man, would be regarded with abhorrence, as downright swindling; but, according to the casuistry of the Secretary of the Treasury, there would be nothing improper in such a course, if pursued by the Government towards the bank. I had always supposed that what the plain dictates of common honesty required of men, in their intercourse with each other, was not less obligatory on Governments and public bodies; and that what would be criminal in an individual, could not be justified in a nation. THURSDAY, January 16. The Pension Laws-Indian Wars. The resolution offered by Mr. CHILTON, on the subject of extending the provisions of the pension laws to those who were engaged in the Indian wars on the frontier, from the peace of '83 to the treaty of Greenville in 1795; together with the amendment thereto proposed by Mr. BOULDIN, suggesting an inquiry as to the moral effects of the pension system, and the propriety of repealing the pension laws, coming up as the unfinished business Mr. ALLEN, of Virginia, said: The resolution of the gentleman from Kentucky proposes an of a treaty does not of itself terminate hostilities; they may continue; and, in the West, did continue, after the treaty of 1783. This treaty gave repose to the East. But did it silence the war-whoop, or extinguish the conflagration, or quench the torch of sacrifice in the West? It did not. The war continued, and with redoubled fury. The attention of the British Government and her agents was withdrawn from the East, but they stimulated the savages to renewed efforts. From motives of revenge, or to impede the settlement of the western country, they exerted themselves to inflame the Indians against us. The whole frontier was desolated, and, as late as 1794, outrages were committed in the district I have the honor to represent. Removal of the Deposits. Mr. BEARDSLEY said the removal of the deposits was a step indisputably lawful and valid. The Secretary of the Treasury was clearly authorized to do what he did. The expediency of the measure was another question, but one with which the bank had no concern. The measure was met by the bank in anger and in menace-not so much at the Government, which happily is above its reach, as at the State institutions and the prosperity of individuals. It aimed to crush the former, and to bring the lat ter in pliant submission, or in ruin, at its feet. The attempt was made, and made at the time the bank deemed most propitious for its own objects. A new Congress was about to convene; it was hoped, by raising a loud cry of distress, to alarm the representatives of the people here, and shake their otherwise fixed determination. At such a time, and for such a purpose, all the fury of this mighty “legal entity" was poured out upon the devoted cities of the seaboard. Where men congregate, they are easily agitated, and can be moved in masses. Money in large cities is the bread of life. Curtail the supply, and you excite the wildest and the deepest passions. A whole community heaving to and fro, and tossed about by its own convulsions, is incapable of reflection. It feels and fears: no one stops to inquire or reason. Give, then, to this perturbed mass some cause, little matter how trivial or absurd, for its own agitation and distress, and it is seized upon as the true and the only one. The bank managers knew all this: they had studied human nature, and they would now practise upon it. They coolly went to work to create alarm, to destroy confidence, to produce the greatest possible pecuniary distress; and as coolly to induce the belief that it was all produced by the change of the public deposits. Thus local banks and commercial associations were to be compelled, as some have been, to ask a restoration of the deposits, and, of consequence, a recharter of this institution. The compressive and coercive energies of the bank were applied, and, it must be admitted, with some effect. Not a few of its victims have been made to kiss the rod of the scourger. [H. OF R. power and the hostile purpose of the bank; it would "rule or ruin." It would neither give aid itself, nor permit others to do it. Those who control this bank are fully conscious of the power they possess. It was but recently that its president, in answer to a question propounded to him, announced, as his deliberate conviction, "that there were very few banks which might not have been destroyed by an exertion of its power." What engine is this, sir, which can, at a blow, prostrate one and all of the State institutionswhich holds the keys of life and death over the commerce of our country? It is the financial agent of this Government, reared to preserve and protect the liberties and welfare of the people: an agent, however, over which no department has any adequate control. It is an agent, sir, which has cast off its allegiance, and stands in an attitude, not only of vengeance towards the State institutions, but of defiance to this Government. Sir, the bank has made war upon the people of these States. If it ever stood in an amicable relation, it has changed that position. If it once petitioned, it now threatens. If it ever sought to win its way by good deeds, it is now not less determined to have revenge, if it cannot have victory. The issue is fairly made up. It will be our master, or it must perish. And let it perish. Sooner than extend its existence, or enlarge its means of mischief, let it perish, and in its fall carry down to ruin every bank in the Union. Sir, I would infinitely rather see this, than submit to the misrule of a purse-proud oligarchy, or a corrupt and sordid corporation. The bank, sir, was badly advised. Instead of aggravating what it affected to regard as an evil, had it exerted its great power to alleviate it; had it been just, and generous, and magnanimous; had it even behaved with ordinary Sir, I shall not go into a detail of its deeds moderation and mercy, it would have planted for good or for evil. My objections are of a itself deeply in the affections of many who now broader cast. Its power is too great. It is danregard it with horror. It adopted an opposite gerous from its magnitude and its irresponsibilcourse. It commenced a systematic and unpar-ity. It is too closely intertwined with all the alleled persecution. State banks, bank debtors, men largely commercial-all felt, though few have fallen beneath its vengeance. And now, sir, all having been felt which the bank could inflict, is it not matter of astonishment that no greater ruin should have followed from so mighty a cause? Let us be consoled. It proves the solid foundation of the local currency, and the firm basis of commercial operations. I trust, sir, we may hope to weather the storm in safety, merciless and ruinous as it was intended it should be. Let us be consoled. "The blood of the martyrs nourished the church!"--the distress, and suffering, and ruin, thus wantonly inflicted and designed by the bank, will make men see and feel the justice of its complete and speedy overthrow. business relations of the country. It brings too large a proportion of the people within its grasp. It is our sacred duty, as I believe, to keep it strictly within its charter limits, while living, and to rejoice at its approaching dissolution. Let it expire gradually; its death struggles will be less violent and less dangerous. It knows its own power; it is corrupt and reckless in the use of that power. I will not attempt to count up the sum of its offences. It has sought to control and coerce freemen; it has aimed to poison and corrupt the press; to pollute the fountain and streams of information; to alarm, and madden, and render vicious the people at large; to enslave them in chains of their own forging. No officer, sir, from the highest to the lowSir, is it not idle, and worse than idle, to est, would have dared to use one farthing of the pretend that the transfer of some five or six mil-public treasure to stimulate, to control, or to lions from this bank, whose annual operations exceed three hundred and forty millions, to the State banks, has necessarily led to the distress which has been felt in the large commercial cities? It is incredible. No: it was the known buy up the press. Such an instance cannot be found; it does not exist. The most infamous would not dare thus to tamper with "the public purse." He would be hurled from office amidst execrations on every side. He would |