Personal Identity: Volume 22, Part 2

Capa
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, Jeffrey Paul
Cambridge University Press, 4 de jul. de 2005 - 383 páginas
What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory? These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy.

De dentro do livro

Conteúdo

LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
25
DAVID S ODERBERG
70
Personal Identity and SelfOwnership
100
MARVIN BELZER
126
The Normativity of SelfGrounded Reason
165
JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE Rationality Means Being Willing
204
STEPHEN E BRAUDE
226
JOHN FINNIS
250
KAMM
283
MICHAEL H SHAPIRO
308
Index
375
Direitos autorais

Termos e frases comuns

Referências a este livro

Real Essentialism
David S. Oderberg
Prévia não disponível - 2007

Sobre o autor (2005)

Ellen Frankel Paul is Deputy Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center and Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University. Jeffrey Paul is Associate Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center and Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University.

Informações bibliográficas