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least a part of the $5,228 00, unpaid interest for the year 1838, thought themselves justified in appropriating $11,400 00, for the support of branches for the year 1839. There will, however, it is feared, be a very great deficit in this item, because John Norton, Jr., Esq., treasurer of the board, it is found, has deposited in the State bank of Michigan, $7,442 13, which is at present an unavailable fund. And the Regents are, at this moment, compelled to draw upon the fund arising from the $100,000 00 loan for the current expenses of the branches as well as contracts for buildings, although this fund is upon interest at 7 per cent so far as it remains unexpended.

Is it not, therefore, most evident, that the branches must be discontinued, as well as all building operations beyond the contracts existing, should this bill pass? The Regents, so far from designing any thing like a threat, as alleged by the Senator from Niles, feel humiliated in view of the possible contingency. The grandeur and eventual utility to the state of the plan contemplated for the university of Michigan, has been applauded and eulogized in almost every state in the Union. The Regents feel that they must be, even personally, most deeply involved in the reproach and obloquy inevitably consequent upon the entire failure of the whole system. Withdraw the pecuniary resources of the university to the amount of $800,000,or about nine-tenths of the whole, and what but total abandonment of the branches, and the curtailment of the parent institution to the level of our smallest and most limited colleges, can enable the Regents to meet their present liabilities?

The important question then presents itself for the grave consideration of the legislature, what should be done in the premises? The regents of the university join issue with the Senator from Niles, in the proposition, "fiat justitia-ruat cœlum."

This leads to a consideration of the inquiry, what is justice and what is equity between the university on the one part and the settlers on the other? For the purpose of meeting this inquiry upon unquestionable grounds, we will discard, for the sake of argument, all considerations arising from the vested rights of the Regents under the act of congress of May 20th, 1826, and confine the question to the rights of the Regents arising under the legislative enactments of this state, and next the rights of the settler.

Assuming the postulate, which however the Regents deny, that the legislature had the right to establish the price of the university lands and the sale of the same at $20 per acre. it does not follow that the legislature can afterwards exercise this right and alter ad libitum. The legislature did establish the price at $20 per acre, and did further enact, that the Regents be authorized to borrow, upon the credit of the state the sum of $100,000, on con

dition that the funds of the university be hypothecated for the payment of interest and ultimate redemption of the principal. A contract has been made for the $100,000 under that law. But what are the funds of the university, under the act of Congress and the existing constitution and laws of the state, which are thus pledged? Not the principal arising from the sales of the lands, but the interest only. The parties to the contract understood this according to the existing laws, to wit: the interest accruing upon all lands which the university had sold or might hereafter sell at a minimum. price of $20 per acre. Do not the respective rights of the parties become vested immediately upon consummating the contract, and has not the legislature exhausted all its powers of control over the fund, at least until this contract shall be fulfilled?

Again the Regents of the university have made contracts, as was understood, in good faith, with the principals of seven branches. These gentlemen have been induced to remove from other states and other literary institutions, where it is known they received a support for themselves and families, upon the condition-certainly reasonably and very strongly implied--that their situations would be, not temporary, but permanent, so long as they continued faithfully and competently to discharge the duties incumbent upon them. These are the known and well established terms upon which all literary professors enter upon their arduous and responsible avocations. And it is well known that the trustees of colleges in the different states do not assume or insist upon their right to discharge professors, even when found incompetent, by a mere vote of the board. Perhaps no instance of such a course can be found. On the contrary, when it is found expedient or necessary to vacate a professor's chair, with a view to another appointment,it is always made a subject of compromise between the incumbent and an appropriate committee. The result generally has been to effect the voluntary resignation of the professor, by giving such pecuniary remuneration as may be entirely satisfactory. There could be no one act, on the part of the Regents, more delicate or conducive to tarnish the high and honorable character to which they should aspire, or more like to bring suspicion or contempt upon the university, than that it should be understood and believed that the professors are mere tenants at the will of the board. Great caution should be observed in making appointments, but, when made, they must be, as far as practicable, permanent. Have not the principals of branches, then, an equitable, or perhaps legal claim at least to meet the disbursements incident to their removal from their places of former residence, and for a reasonable time to seek other employment? Other rights on the part of the university could readily be adduced, such as the public expectation and will upon this subject

were opportunity given for their expression-the partial operation of the bill, by affording relief to the settler upon one description of state lands, and denying like privileges and immunities to the settlers upon the common school and other state lands. It is demonstrated that there now are and for many years have been a multitude of settlers upon section sixteen, (reserved for common schools,) upon salt spring sections, where it is known no salt will ever be manufactured, and where none in fact exists.

The rights vested too as is believed, of the university and others in and to the lands in question, have thus been exhibited, and the inexpediency, if not inefficacy, of further legislation fully established.

The rights, so called, of the settlers, will next be canvassed in the spirit of candor and impartiality, so far as the same can be done consistently with all the facts in their case.

The rights of the settlers are based upon the privileges which the pre-emption act of congress, dated June 22d, 1838, would have granted to them, had not the lands been previously located for the university. The following are the provisions of that law:

The benefits of the law are expressly declared, not to extend to any land "in consequence of any settlement or improvement made before the extinguishment of the Indian title nor to any land specially occupied or reserved for town lots, or other purposes, by authority of the United States." But, lest this provision should not be sufficiently broad and explicit, at the express instance, as is said, of our senators in congress, the following and further provision was introduced: "And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect any of the selections of the public lands, for the purposes of education, the use of salt springs, or for any other purpose, which may have been or may be made by any state, under existing laws of the United States." This law is guarded in its provisions (under penalty of the forfeiture of all claim,) that the patent shall be granted only to the original claimant, upon his making oath that he has not even contracted for the future sale or conveyance of the land claimed. The claimant, therefore, would not be entitled tɔ a grant by virtue of settlement made prior to 1832, for in that year the Indian title was extinguished. It is alleged that these settlers were pioneers of the west, and located themselves in a then wilderness. Such is not the fact; they knew that this land would have been purchased even prior to 1832, had it been in market, and that it would have been previously occupied by others, but for the known prohibition to settlers upon Indian reservations. At the very time these lands were settled, the settlers well knew that these lands were worth more than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, or than any other lands upon which they could have located themselves. They were in the midst of

settlements and immediately contiguous to the villages of Niles and Bertrand. Under these circumstances, therefore, have these settlers the highest claims to our compassion or sympathy? They have been trespassers from the first, with a full knowledge of all the facts, and of what they might expect. They were apprized, at a time when no pre-emption law existed, that these lands were located for university purposes; all improvements made since 1836, when these lands were so located, were made by the settlers under a full sense of their situation. Mr. C. C. Douglass, when he examined the lands, with a view to selections for the uni. versity, requested the settlers, in many instances, to point out the quarter sections upon which they had improvements, that he might omit such. The settlers declined, saying that they preferred being in the hands of the university rather than be subjected to the competition of individual purchasers, when the lands should be brought into market at the public sales. It is moreover alleged, that better lands can be now purchased by the university at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, than those already located. Where, then, is the injustice of obliging the settlers to remove, if they can procure other farms equally good, or better? If rumour be believed, these settlers can never obtain patents for these lands under the provisions of the existing pre-emption law, if there were no other impediment, simply for this reason: that most of them have entered into contracts for the transfer of a part or the whole of the lands claimed, to gentlemen, (not settlers) against that provision, "that the settler shall not directly or indirectly, make any agreement or contract in any way or manner, with any person or persons, whatever, by which the title which he might acquire should enure to the use or benefit of any one, except himself."

What then, are the rights of these settlers upon the university lands? Legally, clearly none. And how far they are entitled, equitably, to the favorable consideration of the legislature, may be inferred from the preceding facts of their case.

But the Regents of the university are not desirous of dealing with the settlers in exact accordance with the merits of their claims. The Regents are not only willing, but anxious, that a liberal policy towards these settlers shall be observed, so far as can be done short of prostration and ruin to the university. The board of Regents are willing to appoint disinterested arbiters to whom this whole subject may be submitted, who shall ascertain the full value of all improvements made by the settlers, and who shall also take into consideration the value of the net proceeds of all crops, timber or other emolument heretofore obtained by the settlers, deduct the one from the other, and that for the payment of the balance adjudged to be due the settler, the interest now or hereafter received from the university fund shall be pledged. To such an

arrangement no reasonable objection, it is believed, can be made by the settler. He would be fully and fairly compensated for all labor and expense bestowed upon lands, the fee of which he never could have anticipated when he entered upon them. The act of congress of June 22d, 1838, was the first and only law that could have ever inspired such a hope, and even this, as has been shown, expressly excluded his case. Why, then, should the legislature attempt to sacrifice the entire interests of the university, present and prospective, when ample justice may thus be done to these settlers, without very materially infringing upon the permanent fund of the university? Why should not the legislature rather keep within the limits of the laws of this state and of the Union, rather than take that step in legislation which may ultimately deprive the settlers of all compensation, and certainly and speedily involve them in all the cost and vexation incident to a protracted legal litigation?

J. KEARSLEY.

Ross Wilkins' Statement.

The undersigned, at the request of Judge Woodbridge, respectfully submits the following brief of his views in relation to bill No. 41, of the House of Representatives.

The bill proposes that the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the state of Michigan shall, without the consent of the university of Michigan, sell to actual settlers, the lands granted to the said university by the government of the U. States, the proprietor of the soil, at a price far below the actual value of the lands. Two questions arise

First. Has the state, from the character of the grant, the power to direct such sale?

Second. If the state has such power over the subject matter, can the legislature constitutionally exercise it?

1st. If the state has the power, it must be derived from the United States. Now, the act of congress of 1826, DOES NOT grant the lands to the state, for the use of an university, as some apprehend. For the state, as a political community, was not then in existence, or known to the grantor; and moreover, the very words of the grant expressly exclude such a position. Congress gave the lands to the university of Michigan. The act uses this lan guage, viz: "That the secretary of the treasury reserve from sale, for the use of the university of Michigan," &c. Not to the territory-not to the state-but to the university. Could the legislature pass a law directing the sale of these lands at a fixed price, without the consent and against the express remonstrance of the

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