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B.C. 218.] CHARACTER OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR. B.C. 218 TO B.C. 201.

429

"In parte operis mei licet mihi præfari bellum maxime omnium memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum; quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginiensis cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium atque roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello: et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculo fuerint qui vicerunt."

CHARACTER OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR-ITS THREE PERIODS AND THREE SCENES, ITALY, SPAIN, AND AFRICA FIRST PERIOD: MARCH OF HANNIBAL THROUGH SPAIN AND GAUL-MOVEMENTS OF THE CONSUL SCIPIO-HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS-BATTLES OF THE TICINUS AND THE TREBIA-HANNIBAL IN ETRURIA-BATTLE OF THE TRA66 "" SIMENE LAKE-FABIUS MAXIMUS MADE DICTATOR, QUI CUNCTANDO RESTITUIT REM -HANNIBAL IN APULIA-CNEIUS SCIPIO IN SPAIN-THIRD CAMPAIGN: BATTLE OF CANNÆ ROMAN FORTITUDE-REVOLT OF CAPUA-CARTHAGINIAN WINTER-quarters-SECOND PERIOD: HANNIBAL'S FIRST DEFEAT, AT NOLA-HIS REPULSE FROM AND CAPTURE OF TARENTUM-ROMAN SUCCESSES IN SARDINIA AND SPAIN SICILIAN WARDEATH CF HIERO-REVOLUTION AND REVOLT OF SYRACUSE-ITS SIEGE AND CAPTUREDEATH OF ARCHIMEDES-DEATH OF THE TWO SCIPIOS IN SPAIN-HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ROME-HIS RETREAT-RECOVERY OF CAPUA AND TARENTUM-DEFEAT AND DEATH OF MARCELLUS-HASDRUBAL MARCHES TO AID HANNIBAL-HIS DEFEAT AND DEATH AT THE METAURUS THIRD PERIOD: P. CORNELIUS SCIPIO-HIS CONQUEST OF SPAIN-HIS JOURNEY TO AFRICA-HIS ELECTION ΤΟ THE CONSULSHIP-INVASION OF AFRICADEFEAT OF THE CARTHAGINIANS-LEAGUE WIIH MASINISSA-HANNIBAL'S RECALL FROM ITALY-BATTLE OF ZAMA-CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

THOUGH more than twenty centuries have passed since the second war between Rome and Carthage, and the world has witnessed, and still witnesses, conflicts compared with which its mere magnitude and the very principles at issue were insignificant, it is still in many respects "the most memorable of all wars ever waged." It displayed to the world two of its greatest generals, one perhaps the greatest of all, except him who never made a mistake in war and never lost a gun. It bequeathed to the students of the art of war every form of example and of warning, and left to free states in every age the far nobler lessons of effort, self-sacrifice, long-endurance, and confidence amidst desperate fortunes. Above all, it decided the future destiny of the world, whether the nations should become the slaves of a commercial oligarchy and of oriental superstitions, or be united under the laws of a free state, which even as a conqueror respected their liberties, in readiness to receive the truth that should make them free indeed.

Nor is the Roman historian less discriminating in the prominence he assigns to the Carthaginian leader: for it was not so much a war between two republics as between the genius of Hannibal and the resources of the Roman people. As we watch the great captain's course, Carthage remains altogether in the background, grudgingly contributing a few supplies, but more discouragements through the intrigues of Hanno and his party, and utterly failing in the extreme crisis, when Hannibal was compelled to fall back upon her resources. The nearest parallel in history is the position of General Buonaparte, at about the same age, during his first campaign in Italy; but a brilliant issue relieved the latter in a few months from the anxieties which Hannibal endured for fifteen years. Accordingly it is his steps that the historian follows, and his alternations of success and reverse mark out the three periods into which the eighteen years of the war are naturally divided. Three campaigns conducted him in triumph from New Carthage to the field of Cannæ (B.c. 218-216). Then came the first check: the tide seemed to turn in favour of the Romans: but Hannibal held his ground in Italy with various fortune for ten years, till the successes of Scipio, and the fatal battle of the Metaurus, cut him off from his true military base in Spain (B.C. 215-206). At length he was called back to meet the danger, to avert which he had begun the war,-the invasion of Africa by a general who knew how to avoid the errors of Agathocles and Regulus. The election of Scipio to the consulship marks the beginning of the last period of the war, which was concluded five years later by his triumph for the victory of Zama (B.C. 205-201). And the war has three scenes, as well as three periods Italy, Spain, and Africa-besides the episode of the Syracusan war consequent upon the death of Hiero. It is especially important to keep an eye fixed upon the events in Spain. for it was their early occupation of that base of Hannibal's operations, that alone enabled the Scipios to sow the seeds of victory which they reaped on the field of Zama.

In the spring of B.C. 218, Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, Africans and Iberians, in the proportion of about two to one, and with 37 elephants. The passage of the Ebro placed him beyond the limits of the Barcine kingdom, among the wild tribes of Catalonia, ever renowned for their fierce independence, and inclined, if to either party, to the Romans. The four months and fourth part of his army, exhausted in subduing them, were not deemed a cost

B.. 218.]

HANNIBAL PASSES THE RHONE.

431

too great for making Spain secure; and he left, besides, 11,000 men under Hanno to guard the newly-conquered province. The intricate passes of the Pyrenees gave many of the Spaniards the opportunity of desertion; but so far from regretting this weeding of his forces, Hannibal is said to have sent back a large part of his army, as a contradiction to the presentiment that few were destined to return. He entered Gaul with a picked force of 50,000 horse and 9000 foot, and marched without serious opposition to the Rhone, reaching it opposite to Avignon about the end of July.

It was here for the first time that he met with even the show of resistance from the Romans. Their councils had been wavering and their forces wasted in petty enterprises, as if Carthage had been thoroughly subdued, and the time for action everywhere left at their disposal. While making a new enemy in Macedonia, they had neglected to crush the Celts and make themselves masters of the Alps, or to resist the growth of the Barcine power in Spain-at least, if not before, by sending a force adequate to save Saguntum, and failing that by seizing the country between the Pyrenees and Ebro or to anticipate the crisis by employing their fleet of 220 sail to strike a decisive blow in Africa. Even when the allotment of the provinces to the new consuls had indicated the proper course of action, it was not followed up with any vigour. The repeated rumours that Hannibal had passed the Ebro filled the Romans with a vague alarm, and reduced their policy almost to the defensive. The consul Sempronius remained in Sicily, while his colleague Scipio waited to quell some disturbances in Cisalpine Gaul. It was about the end of June when Scipio landed at Massilia on his voyage to Spain, and learned that Hannibal was in full march towards the Rhone. He postponed all else to the object of disputing the passage of the river, and made arrangements for that purpose with the friendly Gallic tribes, who were under the influence of the Massaliots. The consul himself was still at Massilia, deliberating on the best way of guarding the passage, when 'Hannibal, reaching the river, found the left bank occupied only by the Gauls, whom he outflanked by sending a detachment across on rafts two days' march higher up, and easily forced the passage. Scipio, first enlightened by a cavalry reconnoissance, hastened up the river only to find that Hannibal was three days' march beyond the river. He now resolved to sail back to Pisa and aid his colleague to meet the invader in Cisalpine Gaul; but after all his blunders he took a step which contributed mainly to

save the state, by sending the bulk of his army into his allotted province of Spain under his brother Cneius, thus providing occupation for Hasdrubal, and checking the flow of Hannibal's supplies and reinforcements.

Two passes then led across the Alps from the banks of the lower Rhone, for the coast-road through the Riviera-to say nothing of resistance from the Massaliots-would have placed Hannibal far from his expected allies in Cisalpine Gaul. The one by the Cottian Alps (Mt. Genèvre), though lower and more direct, led through the more difficult country into the territory of the savage Taurini (round Turin), who were the enemies of the Insubrians. Besides these reasons for the rejection of that route, the easier though higher pass of the Graian Alps (Little Mt. St. Bernard) was the ordinary and well-known route from Gaul to Italy, and it is now almost universally agreed that this route was Hannibal's. But the passage of light-armed hordes of Celts, though they doubtless suffered terribly in their migrations across the Alps, was a very different task from the transit of a great army, with baggage, cavalry, and elephants, at a season when the autumn snows were falling, and resisted by the mountaineers, against whom they had to fight their way to the very summit of the pass.* * The descent, though free from enemies, was still more dangerous, and in one spot on the banks of the Doria, where the avalanches glide along an almost vertical slope, it required the labour of three days to make the road practicable for the elephants. It was about the middle of September when the shattered army rested in the plain of Ivrea, amongst the friendly people of the Salassians. Since the passage of the Pyrenees the army had lost more than half its force,

It seems equally unnecessary to trouble the reader with the arguments upon a question which may now be considered settled, or, in these days of Alpine travel, to dwell on the details of the passage. Livy's rhetorical embellishments probably bear much the same proportion to the truth as David's picture of Napoleon on his impossiblypoised charger to the grey-coated traveller toiling up the rocky steps on his mule. After all that has been done to smooth the passage, a personal knowledge of the ground gives an idea of the achievement such as no words could convey to one who has never crossed the Alps: but the traveller must not forget the contrast, so beautifully drawn by Rogers, between "the path of pleasure" which modern engineering has "flung like a silver zone" round mountains and along ravines, and the pathless chasms through which

"The Carthaginian, on his way to Rome

Entered their fastnesses. Trampling the snows
The war-horse reared, and the towered elephant
Upturned his trunk into the murky sky,
Then tumbled headlong, swallowed up and lost,
He and his rider."

B.C. 218.]

BATTLE OF THE TICINUS.

433

and numbered only 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. Military critics have censured an enterprise achieved at such an enormous sacrifice; but a first experiment is always costly, and the boldness which carried Hannibal through the unknown dangers of mountains, rivers, and barbarian tribes must have had an ample reward when he felt that he had kept his early oath and realized his father's projects by his very presence on the soil of Italy. "The unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and on the plain of Cannæ."

In reverting to the obvious parallel of Napoleon's passage of the Alps, we ought not to overlook the resemblance to Wellington's invasion of the peninsula in the smallness of the army led by each against the forces of an empire. Out of the 700,000 fighting men who formed the levy of Italy, no army was prepared to fall upon the exhausted troops. The last barrier of the Alps had been yielded, like those of the Ebro, the Pyrenees, and the Rhone. Hannibal had time to rest his forces, to capture the hostile city of Turin, and to gain over by threats or promises all the Celtic and Ligurian tribes of Piedmont, before he was called upon to measure his strength with Scipio. The consul, with a force of less than 20,000 men,* so far from being able to guard the Alpine passes, had been fully occupied in keeping down risings among the Gauls; and now, in the midst of insurgent tribes, he had to check the advance of the Carthaginian. It was while marching up the left bank of the Po that his advanced guard encountered that of Hannibal in a plain beyond the Ticinus (Ticino). A skirmish, in which both generals took part, proved the superiority of the Numidian horse; and Scipio, severely wounded, owed his life to the courage of his son Publius, a youth of seventeen, who afterwards saved the state itself.

The great military talents by which Scipio atoned for his previous errors now extricated his army from destruction. While Hannibal was preparing for a pitched battle, with the advantages of a plain for his cavalry and elephants, and a broad river in the enemy's rear, Scipio retreated across both the Ticino and the Po, and took up a station under the walls of Placentia. Thence, refusing the battle offered by Hannibal, he fell back upon a strong position on the hills on the right bank of the Trebia (Trebbia), a

* This was an army stationed in Cisalpine Gaul under two prætors, of which Scipio had taken the command.

VOL. II.-28

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