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But as to

1824.

and the rule is not now to be doubted.
the principle upon which a ruzure avoids a deed,
it is not too much to say, that the law of the sub-
ject appears to have got into some confusion.
Modern decisions, particularly of our own Courts,
lean against the excessive rigour with which
some writers and some cases disfigure it. In the
case of the United States v. Cutts, (1 Gall. 69.) a
bond; that had been cancelled and mutilated, the
seal torn away by the joint act of the defendant
and the plaintiff's bailee, was still held, and rightly
held, to be sustainable as the deed of the party. In
the case of Speak et al. v. United States, (9Cranch,
28.) a bond was sustained, notwithstanding the
striking out of one joint and several co-obligor,
in the absence of the others, and the insertion of
another. And so, as to revenue bonds, there is not
a Court of the United States which has not sus-
tained them against the plea of non est factum, not-
withstanding that both sum and parties have been
inserted after the execution by one of the obligors,
and this, in his absence, because the contract was
not altered, and the good sense of the law pre-
vailed against its technicalities.

There is a great paucity of decisions, in modern times, on the subject of razures and interlineations. If we mount to its origin, we find it, in the YearBooks, and in Perkins, who cites them, given as the ground of suspicion and inquiry. And so, unquestionably, it ought to be, and frauds or mutilations, to which the parties having the custody of deeds are privy, cannot be taken too strongly

Miller

V.

Stewart.

Miller

V.

Stewart.

1824. against them. But when we encounter the doctrine, as laid down in Pigot's case, "that when a deed is altered in a point material, by a stranger, without the privity of the obligee, even by drawing a pen through the midst of a material word, that it shall be void," without reference to the fraud, privity, or gross negligence of the obligor, it certainly is time to pause; and I highly approve of the hesitation of my brother STORY, ip Cutt's case, as to the authority of Pigot's case. As an adjudication, the value of that case should be limitcd to the single point, "that an immaterial interlineation, without the privity or command of the obligee, does not avoid the bond." The case does not call for the decision of another point, for it is upon a special verdict, and that the only question submitted. Yet, the Reporter, who seldom lets an opportunity escape him, that furnishes an apology for exemplifying his indefatigable research, makes it authority for a score of positive decisions, and the introduction to a mass of law, upon questions totally distinct. But it should be noted of this learned Judge, that his reports, like the text of Littleton, are only to be considered as the occasion or excuse for displaying his acquirements in the law learning of his day, and expressing his opinions upon juridical topics.

It is certainly true, that some of the decisions in the books have carried this doctrine a great way. As, for instance, the case of the lease of the Dean of Pauls, in which the counterpart expressed a rent of 27 pounds, and the tenant al

Miller

V.

Stewart.

tered his deed from 26 to 27 pounds, to make it 1824. accord with the counterpart and the true contract. Yet it was held to avoid his lease. (1 Roll. 27. Cro. Eliz. 627.) But the utmost that can be made of these cases is, that they apply to those instances in which the deed is, necessarily, an entire thing; and the reason assigned is, that the witness can no longer testify to the deed, as the deed which he saw delivered. Surely this reason is not applicable to the present case; for, let the witness be examined upon this instrument, as to the county of A,, as introductory to the proof of the money collected in A., and so on as to the counties B., C., and D., and what is to prevent his proving the execution of this deed? That which may just as well have been executed in as many detached sheets of paper as there are counties, certainly has nothing of necessary entirety or indivisibility in its nature. Any other rule, as applied to this case, would, we conceive, be permitting frauds to be covered by a principle which was intended to prevent frauds.

Certificate for the defendant.

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A bond, given on the 4th of December, 1813, for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office, by a Collector of direct taxes and in ́ternal duties, appointed (under the act of the 22d of July, 181ś, ch. 16.) by the President, on the 11th of November, 1813, to hold his office until the end of the next session of the Senate, and no longer, and subsequently appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the 24th of January, 1814, is to be restricted (as to the liability.of the sureties) to the duties and obligations created by the Collection Acts passed antecedent to the date of the bond.

The second commission, issued under the appointment, with tile advice and consent of the Senate, operates a revocation of the first commission, issued under the appointment by the President, which was to continue until the end of the next session of the Senate, and no longer; and the liability of the sureties in the bond did not extend beyond the duration of the first commission.

In general, laches is not imputable to the Government: and where the laws require quarterly or other periodical accounts and settlements, a mere omission to bring a suit, upon the neglect of the officer or agent to account, will not discharge his sureties.

The case of The People . Jansen, (9∙ Johns. Rep. 582) distin guished; and, so far as it conflicts with the present case, overruled.

In general, the debtor has a right to make the appropriation of payments; if he omits it, the creditor may make it: but neither party has a right to inake an appropriation after the controversy has arisen.

In cases of long and running accounts, where balances are adjusted, merely for the purpose of making rests, the law will apply payments to extinguish the debts, according to the priority of time.

ERROR to the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

This was an action of debt, commenced by the United States, in the Court below, against the defendants in error, J. Kirkpatrick and others, as the obligees of a bond, given by them to the United States, on the 4th of December, 1813, conditioned for the true and faithful discharge of the duties of the office of Collector of direct taxes and internal duties, by Samuel M. Reed, who had been appointed to that office by the President, on the 11th of November, 1813, and, by the terms of his commission, was to hold his office during the pleasure of the President, "and until the end of the next session of the Senate of the United States, and no longer." On the 24th of January, 1814, he was re-appointed to the same office, by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and by the new commission issued to him, was to hold his office "during the pleasure of the President of the United States, for the time being." The pleadings upon which the cause was tried in the Court below, were extremely informal and confused, but they resulted substantially in the following questions of law, upon which the Judge instructed the jury, and a bill of exceptions was taken.

1. Whether the liability of the sureties to the bond, was limited to the duties and obligations imposed upon the Collector by the act of the 22d of July, 1813, ch. 16, and other acts relating to the assessment and collection of direct taxes and internal duties, passed antecedent to the execution of the bond, thus excluding the liability for mo

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1824.

U. States

V.

Kirkpatrick

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