The Merino, et al. 1824. ther, contains a provision, that the said vessel may be libelled and condemned for the use of the person who shall sue for the same. The right to seize the vessel, and slaves on board, would seem to be a necessary consequence of the right to enforce the forfeiture. The possession of the vessel, then, being lawfully vested in Col. Brooke, at the time she was boarded by the revenue boat, off Mobile Point, it could not, with any propriety, be asserted, that she was employed in carrying on trade, contrary to law, at the time she was so boarded. Her employment in such trade was completely terminated by the first seizure, and she was on her way for adjudication when the second seizure was made. If, under these circumstances, a capture of the vessel could not be legally made by the revenue boat, then the claims of the owners of the slaves on board, is not precluded by the 4th section of the act of 1800; the sentence above quoted applying only to persons interested in the voyage in which the vessel was employed at the time of such capture. The Court is, therefore, of opinion, that in the case of Antonio de Frias and David Nagle against eighty-four African slaves, the sentence of the Court below is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and that a decree of restitution ought to be made. Sentence in the case of the Constitution affirmed. Sentences in the cases of the Louisa and Merino reversed, with leave to amend. Sentence reversed as to the claim of Frias and Nagle, and restitution decreed [INSTANCE COURT. SLAVE TRADE ACTS. LIEN OF MATERIAL MEN.] The ST. JAGO DE CUBA. VINENTE, and others Claimants. A question of fact, under the Slave Trade Acts. Condemnation pronounced. The claim of seamen, for wages, on a voyage, undertaken in violation of the Slave Trade Acts, out of the proceeds of the forfeited vessel in the registry, rejected. The claims of seamen, for wages, and of material men, for supplies, where the parties were innocent of all knowledge of, or participation in, the illegal voyage, preferred to the claim of forfeiture on the part of the governnient. Material men have a lien, which may be enforced by a proceeding in the Admiralty, in rem, for necessaries or supplies, furnished in a port to which the vessel does not belong. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Maryland. 1824. The St. Jago de Cuba. This cause was argued by the Attorney-Gene- Feb. 20th. ral for the appellants, and by Mr. Winder for the respondents and claimants. Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of March 15th. the Court. This vessel, with her lading, found on board at the time of seizure, were libelled for an infraction of the laws prohibiting the African slave trade. The causes of forfeiture alleged in the libels, comprise all those contained in the 1st section of the act of 1794, and those of the 2d section of the act of 1818, with the exception of the offence of being laden for the prohibited trade. 1824. The St. Jago de Cuba. The claims filed to this libel, were, 1. That of one Vinente, a Spanish subject, who alleges her to be a regularly documented Spanish vessel, engaged in traffic sanctioned by the laws of Spain. This claim goes both to vessel and cargo. 2. Of certain seamen, who demand compensation for their wages from the proceeds of the vessel. 3. And, lastly, of several material men, who claim the payment of their bills, alleging the vessel to be foreign, and their being employed in her equipment and repairs by the captain, and one Strike, as his agent. The Court below condemned the vessel, but restored the cargo, and from that decree the Spanish claimant has not appealed. The fate of the vessel, therefore, is irrevocably fixed; but the United States having appealed from the decree of restitution in favour of the cargo, that appeal gives rise to a complicated inquiry. The Court below repelled every other charge against the vessel, except that of having been "caused to sail," with a view to be employed in the prohibited traffic. But "being caused to sail," is not among the offences enumerated in the latter part of the, 2d section of the act of 1818, under which alone the lading of the vessel is subjected to forfeiture. That offence is among those enumerated in the enacting clause. of the section, but in the forfeiting clause it is dropped; and if, therefore, the case of this vessel exhibits no other offence, than that which in the decree below was inade the ground of her condemnation, the de- 1824. cree restoring the cargo would be well sustained; The St. Jago hence it becomes necessary to review the whole de Cuba. case. One John Gunn, it appears, built and equipped this vessel in the port of Norfolk, as a packet, intending her for sale; but falling in debt, it became necessary to raise a sum of money upon her hull, and he accordingly took her to Baltimore for that purpose. When there, he addressed himself to one Maher, who advanced him the money, and instead of an hypothecation in ordinary form, Gunn executed a bill of sale to Maher, admitted, on all hands, to have been intended to serve only as the means of enabling Maher to expedite the vessel on a voyage to Cuba, there to be sold, and to account with Gunn for the proceeds, as well of freight as of sale. This purpose appears soon to have abandoned, for an enterprise of a very different nature. The vessel was put up for freight, and various applications ensued; but Maher undertook himself to load her for St. Jago de Cuba, and Gunn left Baltimore under the persuasion that her destination was fixed. Some time, however, having clapsed, and not hearing of her sailing, he writes to Maher on the subject, and is then informed, that he had despatched her, in ballast, to St. Jago de Cuba, under the care of Strike, a personage who; from that time, makes a conspicuous figure in the res gesta. For no sooner does she arrive at St. Jago, than she is colourably conveyed to Vinente, but still under the absolute control of Strike; and without having 1824. The St. Jago de Cuba. shipped an article, appears at once with a valuable cargo on board, the property also of Strike, furnished with a Spanish coasting license, on a voyage to Havana, thence to Matanzas, where a part of her cargo is sold, and she is completely equipped, colourably a Spaniard, but really an American, for the African trade. On her voyage thence to the coast of Africa, she is pursued by hostile vessels, and in the chase sustains damage, which compels her to put into Baltimore to refit. There she encounters Gunn, her original and equitable owner, but who finds in her nothing of her original character, but what served to identify his vessel, and expose to him how his confidence had been abused, and his property forfeited, through his own indiscretion, in conveying her to Maher. In the present cause, his interests are out of the question, and he appears only as a witness, on behalf of the prosecution. It is immaterial to inquire whether this vessel was in the inception of her voyage, “laden" for the illegal purpose for which she was caused to sail. The Court below has attached much importance to the omission of this allegation; and, certainly, as a substantive offence, the vessel could not have been condemned for that cause, unless comprised among the allegations in the libel. But as to the liability of the lading, found on board at the time of the seizure, to forfeiture under the act, that consequence is made to depend upon the liability of the vessel herself to condemnation; and, although this Court is not |