section of the proposed act that working more than eight hours in any one day shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of the statute, there is difficulty. There are many statutes in which the legislature has enacted that the existence of a fact which ordinarily creates the strong probability of the commission of an offense shall be prima facie evidence of guilt and such. statutes have been held constitutional. Commonwealth vs. Williams, 6 Gray 1; Commonwealth vs. Pillsbury, 12 Gray 127; Commonwealth vs. Rowe, 14 Gray 47; Commonwealth vs. Barber, 143 Mass. 560, 562. The provision of the section of the proposed act differs from those referred to in these decisions and is not within the principles on which the cited cases rest. Under this act, "in cases where a Saturday half holiday is given, employes may work more than eight hours on other days of the week.' Such cases will be common, and, in all of them, work for a longer time. than eight hours on any other day will not indicate a violation of the law. To provide that such a fact shall constitute a prime facie evidence that warrants a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would be contrary to the fundamental principles of criminal law. See opinions in Commonwealth vs. Williams, 6 Gray 1. We are of the opinion that the legislature has no constitutional authority to punish any citizen merely upon evidence of the existence of a fact, which in ordinary cases has no tendency to establish guilt. For this reason question in the negative. we answer the Agreement Not Observed A court decision, April 15, 1912, by the supreme court of Montreal, Que., is based on the ground that a labor union did not live up to its agreement. The judgment is reported as follows: "In the superior court, on this 15th day of April, 1912. Present: His Lordship Justice Greenshields. The Syndicated Longshoremen of the Allan Line, Donaldson Line, Thompson Line, White Star Line, Leyland Line, Manchester's Liners, Canada Line, South African Line, Mexican Line, Black Diamond Line, Head Line, etc. The court having heard the parties. by their counsel and their witnesses upon the issues joined in the cause, having examined the pleadings and documents of record and deliberated: Whereas the plaintiffs ask by their action that a certain contract dated the thirteenth day of May, 1910, be declared annulled and forfeited and the defendants condemned to pay to the plaintiffs two thousand dollars, and allege in effect; that in the month of April, 1910, with a view to avoiding a strike, the plaintiffs, then being employes of the defendants, entered into a certain contract dated the 13th of May, 1910, which contract is fully recited and set forth in plaintiffs' declaration; that to guarantee the fulfillment of said contract, the plaintiffs and the defendants each deposited with the Royal Trust Co. two thousand dollars and at the same time, following the recommendation made by a certain board of conciliation or arbitration formed a permanent board. of conciliation; that differences arose under said contract and the same were referred to the said permanent board of arbitration, which board rendered a decision upon the same which decision is also fully set forth in plaintiff's declaration and is dated the 29th day of June, 1911; that one Gustave Franq was the member of said permanent board representing the plaintiffs, but has since resigned and another (evidently a misprint. "Another", apparently, ought to read, "no other") one has been named to replace him; that the said defendants have failed to carry out the obligations under said contract as fully set forth in detail in paragraph 7 of plaintiff's declaration and the subparagraphs thereunder. Whereas the defendants plead; denying the material allegations of plaintiff's declaration and alleging that in any event the complaints or griev ances alleged in plaintiff's declaration are grievances arising under the contract of the 13th day of May, 1910; that the said plaintiffs and defendants agreed that all such differences, disputes or complaints should be submitted to a permanent board of conciliation or arbitration; that said agreement is valid and binding and was a condition precedent to the taking of any action under said contract, such as the action taken by the plaintiffs. Whereas the plaintiffs answer the said plea generally. Considering that at the hearing the plaintiffs and defendants in order to save costs of enquete agreed that judgment should be rendered on the question as to whether the agreement to submit all differences or grievances under such contract to a board of arbitration was valid and binding upon the parties and was a condition precedent to the taking of the present action: Considering that by the agreement between the parties dated the 13th of May, 1910, it was agreed that in order to give effect to the recommendation contained in the award of the board of conciliation and investigation dated 19th of April, 1910, all grievances arising between the parties should be submitted to a permanent board of conciliation composed of one member appointed by each party and a third to be chosen by the two, and failing an agreement, the third to be appointed by a judge of the superior court of its jurisdiction, but is a condition precedent which must be fulfilled before an action in court would lie. Considering that the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the said agreement and are without right to sue and their present action is premature. Considering that the defendants' plea in that respect is well founded. Doth declare the plaintiffs' action. premature; doth maintain the defendants' plea for the present, and Doth dismiss plaintiffs' action, but without costs, reserving to the plaintiffs all future rights. Intimidation Forbidden An appeal to the supreme court of the Province of Nova Scotia from an order for the continuance of a court order enjoining members of a miners' labor organization from intimidating men working for a mining company was denied by Judge Drysdale-Cumberland Coal & Railway Co. vs. McDougall et al., 44 N. S. Reports, 535; reported as follows: Judge Drysdale in his judgment said: "I have examined with care the affidavits produced by defendants' counsel in answer to the case made for the injunction and I am of opinion that the case has not been met. I am satisfied that since the strike now existing and since the plaintiff company has been endeavoring to carry on its works by the hiring and introduction of men for that purpose the defendants have been and are parties to an organized system of intimidation and coercion, intended and having for its object the prevention of employment by the company of men and the prevention of work by men engaged for work in and about the company's property upon terms mutually agreed upon by the company and such men. This is clearly against the settled jurisprudence of the country and should be restrained. The cases are numerous on the subject and have recently been cited by Mr. Justice Lawrence In in another case and I deem it unnecessary to expound them here. my opinion, a case has been made for a continuance of the injunction until the trial." A restraining order was granted was granted by the judge based upon alleged violations of the criminal code, section 51, restraining defendants, pending the trial of the action, from the commission of certain acts of intimidation alleged to have been committed by them for the purpose of preventing the company from carrying on operations in connection with its coal mines by hiring other men to take the places. of those of its employes who had gone out on strike. The evidence showed concerted action on the part of the strikers with a view to preventing the company from cperating its mines until the demands of the strikers were complied with. The supreme court held, (1) that where the judge in the exercise of his discretion, after considering the affidavits before him, thought the case a proper one for a restraining order, a strong case must be made out to induce the court to interfere; (2) that in such a case the balance of convenience must be considered, and in this case was in favor of continuing the restraining order. There is apparently no rule or authority to the effect that as a pre-requisite to suing an association or class of individuals in the name of some of them, an order of the court or a judge must be obtained authorizing this to be done. Mr. Kirby is Re-elected The National Association of Manufacturers at its seventeenth annual convention in May, elected John Kirby Jr. president for the fourth time. J. Philip Bird was re-elected as general manager and George S. Boundinot was re-elected secretary. Alonzo B. See, president of the A. B. See Electric Elevator Co., New York City, was elected treasurer to succeed Francis H. Stillman, deceased. In accepting a fourth term as president, Mr. Kirby said: "I have been criticized for devoting so much of my time and thought and attention to the work of the association, but I can assure you that if it was not so close to my heart; if I did not feel a deep sense of patriotism in connection with this work, you have not money enough in the association to hire me for another term. But I feel that under all the circumstances I ought to serve the association another year, if it is the desire of the association, which it evidently. appears to be. All I can say is that I thank you most heartily for your kind and hearty support and I have no word of fault to find with any member of the National Association of Manufacturers because of any criticism he has made or because of anything else. I have found my associates in the New York office more than anxious and over-willing to relieve me as much as possible of the details and burdens of the work, and when I have called on any member of the association, I have found the same hearty response. For all these things I feel grateful and this has had much to do with my making up my mind to serve the association for another year." McNamaras Cost $175,000 It has cost Los Angeles county, California, upwards of $175,000 to prosecute the cases against John J. and James B. McNamara, in which the McNamaras eventually pleaded guilty, according to figures made up by the county auditor. This does not take into account the trial of Clarence Darrow, now under way, an outgrowth of the McNamara case. It is said that only the Thaw trials in New York have exceeded the McNamara cases in their expenses to the state. The auditor says bills amounting to $150,000 have so far been paid. Summary of the Court Decision Daily Papers Did Not, Generally, Print Much Censuring Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, in the severest terms, and including in his condemnation as scarcely less culpable, Frank Morrison and John Mitchell, Gompers' associate officials in the A. F. of L., Justice Wright, of the district supreme court of Washington, D. C., June 24, 1912, adjudged the three guilty of contempt of court in violating the order of the court in the case of the Buck Stove & Range Co. against the American Federation of Labor. Gompers was sentenced to a year and Morrison to six months in the district jail and the sentence of Mitchell was deferred. Mitchell being absent on a speaking tour, Gompers and Morrison gave $5,000 bonds and will appeal to the higher courts. It was announced that the entire district supreme court bench concurred in the decision. Several of Justice Wright's associates occupied the bench with him. The proceedings were the outgrowth of an alleged violation of an injunction issued by Justice Ashley M. Gould, on Dec. 18, 1907, and becoming effective Dec. 23, following, restraining the American Federation of Labor and its officers from carrying on a boycott against the Bucks Stove & Range Co., of St. Louis. It was charged that the three respondents ignored the court. decree in public utterances, circulars, and editorials in the American Federationist, the official organ of the federation. In 1908, the three men were adjudged guilty of contempt and Gompers was sentenced to one year, Mitchell to nine months and Morrison to six months. Later, May 15, 1911, the United States supreme court reversed the judgment. on the ground of a mistake in the method of procedure. The decision of June 24, 1912, was 79 typewritten pages long. In summarizing his findings, the court said: Fairly summed up, the case is this: A citizen, whose business was being unlawfully interfered with by these defendants, asked this court to enjoin them from so doing, and this court, having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, issued its injunction. That injunction the defendants refused to obey, claiming that they had a right to do what they were doing, although the point had been decided against them, and that the injunction, in forbidding them to do the things complained of, violated their constitutional right to speak freely and freely print. Acting under this claim, they openly and consistently violated the injunction and defied the court. The case itself, in which the injunction was issued, was taken on appeal to the district court of appeals, where the injunction was modified in some of its terms, but otherwise affirmed and continued. Thereupon an appeal was taken to the supreme court of the United States, but before argument was reached, the case was settled by agree. ment with a new management, which had come into control of the plaintiff's affairs. In the meantime the defendants had been called upon in this court to answer for violating the injunction. They were tried, found guilty and sentenced. On appeal to the district court of appeals, the decision and sentence were affirmed. On appeal to the supreme court of the United States, it was decided that the injunction did not violate the right of free speech or of free press, as claimed by the defendants, and that they had no right to disobey it, but that the proceedings in which they had been sentenced for contempt were erroneous in form. Wherefore the case was sent back with leave to this court to renew the proceedings against them, in the form indicated by that opinion. Immediately such proceedings were begun. The defendants have been again tried and found guilty. They have been reminded that the supreme court of the United States has decided that the injunction did not violate their constitutional rights, and that it was their duty to have obeyed it; and they have been called upon to say whether, in view of this decision of the highest tribunal in the land, they were prepared to acknowledge their error and assure the court that they intended to obey such orders of the court in the future. This they have steadily refused to do. What then remains for the court? Can it omit to pass sentence without acknowledging that any defendants may with impunity refuse to obey its orders? And if its orders are not to be obeyed, why should it issue any orders? And, if it is not to issue orders, why should it continue to exist? It is plain that we must eigther pass sentence or admit the extinction of the office which we hold. The defendants, by acknowledging their error and assuring obedience in the future, could have relieved the court of this necessity. This, as already said, they have refused to do. The defendants are here at the court's bar to answer. They have been afforded full opportunity to hear the evidence against them and to say what, if any, reasons can exist against their punishment. Every part of their response-for they offer no defense--is measured by the words of their leader, Gompers: "The things I am charged with, I did. * * * Go to with your injunctions." There is no room for temporizing; they are ready to repeat, in equally determined fashion, the sedition of the past; all assurance to the contrary they have themselves distinctly and repeatedly refused to give. Lawless as are their teachings, they still proclaim them and still incite the ill-disposed to follow: In the meeting out of the law's punishments, judicial tribunals are obligated to one principal concern-to make such example of offenders, in proportion to the gravity of their offenses, as will serve to deter others from offending in like manner, thus establishing in advance, so far as courts can, a universal consciousness that the supremacy of law so permeates the land as to restrain beforehand those who are otherwise ready to transgress. * * * Where else does the history of jurisprudence show so bold, so broad, so effectual a contempt of the judicial arm of the government as here? When before has an instance occurred where the power of established sovereignty was rendered so forceless, and the law for a case was made so to fail in its effort to secure to an outraged citizen the establishment and vindication of his rights? While the court is ever cautious, ever reluctant to extend the punishment for contempt of its authority beyond the extreme already to be found in precedents, yet the court feels itself bound to administer to the chief offender here at least, the extreme which such established precedents contain. That the six months imprisonment imposed for the violation of an injunction in the Debs case (158 U. S., p. 564) served as no deterrent from defying court decrees, is shown by the instance at bar, which well enough demonstrates that that penalty is insufficient admonition, to those disposed to such offendings, to take heed. The contempt admitted by the least of these offenders was more pernicious and malignant than that of Debs, in that it was an open and deliberate attack upon the foundations' of society and of the law, and did indeed put down the law so that it did not operate, so that it did not protect, so that it failed to secure to a citizen his rights For the chief offender (Gompers) the duty of the court, if it be measured by its obligation to administer justice "without respect to persons", requires it. in determining an appropriate penalty, at least to parallel the penalty fixed by the good precedent of Savin's case (131 U. S., p. 267). He endeavored to deter a witness from testifying against a defendant in a criminal trial. Although he did not succeed in corrupting the witness, he was found in contempt of court and sentenced by the United States district court to imprisonment in jail for one year. The rightness of this decision was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States when his case came thither. Judged by this standard, how can a lesser punishment be inflicted here? Illness prevented the chief justice from sitting at the hearing of this case. All the rest of my associates listened to the arguments and have considered the record. By them I am authorized to announce that they concur in the conclusions the court has reached, in the reasons given to support them, and in the sentence about to be imposed. The duty that devolves upon the court is not a pleasant duty. We should have been glad if a different result could have been reached without doing violence to the truth or abdicating the office that we fill; but when the law is to be vindicated, who, if not the judges of the law, are to attend to its vindication? "Who shall defend the citadel, if those who are appointed to defend shall abandon or betray it?" |