if it be strong) ariseth from experiment of our author's fidelity and skill, as shall appear hereafter. For our present proceedings we take it here as granted, or supposed, that this word belief, as it is usually taken, is more general than that assent or persuasion which relies upon authority; yet not so general as to comprehend these assents or persuasions, which are evidently certain.

8. It may be objected, that the apostle calleth evident knowledge belief, when he saith, The devils believe there is a God, and tremble. For it should seem, that the devils know as evidently that there is a God, as we do that the sun did shine but yesterday, or this morning. For they once enjoyed the presence of God, and saw his glory, and since have had evident experience of his power.

9. Of God's being (no doubt) they have evident certainty; albeit of his other attributes their knowledge is not so direct nor evident, but conjectural, or a kind of belief. Wherefore unto this place of our apostle we may answer two ways; either that under this word belief he comprehends not only their assent unto the being or existence of the Godhead, but their assent unto other attributes of God, which they know not so evidently, and therefore may be said to believe them. Or if he understand only that assent which they gave unto the existence or being of the Godhead, he calleth this (though joined with evident knowledge) a belief, in opposition or with reference unto the belief of hypocrites, (against whom he there speaks,) which was much less then this assent of devils. For albeit that which is greater in the same kind cannot be properly and absolutely said to be the less; as we cannot properly and absolutely say that four is three, but rather contains three in it: yet upon some reference of the

greater unto the less contained in it, or unto some other third, we may denominate the greater with the name of that which is less in the same kind: as we may say of him that promised three and gave four, that he gave three, because three is contained in four. So the philosopher saith, that habitus est dispositio, "every habit is a disposition," not absolutely and properly, for it is more; yet because it is more, with reference unto that which is less, or unto the subject in whom it is, we may say it is dispositio, that is, it contains disposition in it, albeit no man would say that habitus were dispositio, if he should define it.

10. And men usually object to such as scoff at matters of religion, that the day will come, wherein, if they repent not, they shall believe the things which now they little regard; albeit they cannot be said in that day to believe them, if we speak properly and absolutely, without reference to their former incredulity: our meaning is, they shall do more than believe them, for they shall feel them. Nor can we say properly that the elect after the resurrection shall believe the articles of faith; seeing all agree, that of these three principal virtues, faith, hope, and love, only love shall then remain. The reason is that which you have heard already; because evident knowledge must be excluded from the nature of faith and belief; and the godly shall then clearly see Christ face to face, and 4 fully enjoy the fruit of his passion, which now they only believe.

11. As for certainty, we may not exclude it from the nature of belief, unless this speech be warily understood. For the certainty of the articles of our faith ought to be greater than the certainty of other knowledge; for we must believe them, although they be contrary to the capacity of our understanding: for

even this must we believe, that many things (as all supernatural things) surpass the reach of our understanding. Yet this we may safely say, that the certainty of the articles of our belief, [as of Christ his death, of his and our resurrection,] cannot be so great to us in this life as it shall be in the world to come, when we shall evidently know them. This rule then is infallible; That the knowledge of any thing is more certain than the belief thereof; although the belief of some things (as of Christ his passion) be more certain than the knowledge of other things; as namely, than the knowledge of human sciences. So then out of this it is evident, that belief taken generally doth neither exclude all certainty, nor necessarily require any; seeing some belief hath a kind of certainty adjoined with it, and some cannot admit it. Wherefore it remaineth, that assent is the essence of belief in general; I say, such an assent as is not joined with evidency.

12. This assent may be weaker or stronger, and so come nearer unto, or be further from certainty, according to the nature of that object whereunto we give assent; or according to the nature of that whereupon our belief is grounded; or lastly, according to our apprehension either of the object, or that which is the ground of our assent. Excess in the first of these [to wit, in certainty or stability of the object] doth rather argue a possibility of firmer belief, or more credibility, not more firm or actual belief. For as many things are more intelligible than others, and yet are least understood of many: so many that are most credible are least believed.

13. Excess in the second of these, whence the assent of belief may be strengthened, [that is, in the ground of belief,] doth rather argue a stronger hypothetical belief, than any absolute belief; unless the ap

prehension or conceit of this ground be strong and lively. In ordinary reports or contracts, it skills not of what credit the party be, unto whose credence or authority we are referred for the truth of any promise or report; unless we have good inducements to think that he did either say or promise as we were told. If we be not thus persuaded by some apprehension of our own, we give only conditional assent unto the report or promise, and believe both with this limitation, [if he say so, whose credit we so esteem.] But if we can fully apprehend that he said so, we believe absolutely.

14. As in science or demonstrations it is requisite both that we know the true cause of the effect, and also that we apprehend it certainly as the true cause; (otherwise we have only an opinion;) so in true and absolute belief it is requisite that we have both a sure ground of our belief, and a true apprehension of that ground, otherwise our belief must needs be conditional, not absolute. It remaineth therefore that we set down, first the nature of the objects that may be believed ; secondly, the several grounds of belief; and thirdly,5 the manner of apprehending them; albeit in some the apprehension of the object itself, and the ground of belief, are in a sort all one; as in that belief which is not grounded upon the authority of the teacher. This rule is general; wheresoever the objects are in themselves more credible, the ground may be more strong, and the apprehension more lively, so men be capable of it, and industrious to seek it: and equal apprehension of such objects as are more credible in themselves, (upon such grounds as are more firm,) makes the belief stronger than it could be of objects less credible, or upon grounds less firm. Cæteris paribus, every one of these three; first, greater credibility of the object;

secondly, surer ground of belief; thirdly, more lively apprehension of the object or ground, increase belief.

15. For the objects of belief, (whence this assent must be distinguished,) they are either natural or supernatural: but first of that which is natural. The objects of natural belief are of two sorts, either scibilia or opinabilia; either such things as may be evidently known in themselves, but are not so apprehended by him that believes them; or else such things as we can have no evident or certain knowledge of, but only an opinion. And of this nature are all the monuments of former ages, and relations of ancient times, in respect of us which are now living: all future contingents, or such effects as have no necessary natural cause why they should be, nor no inevitable let or hinderance why they may not be; as whether we should have rain or fair weather the next month, whether such or such nations shall wage war against each other the next year. These matters past, and contingent which are not yet, but may be, albeit they agree in the general nature of opinabilia, that neither of them can be exactly known, but only by opinion believed; yet both differ in that which is the ground of our assent or belief. The ground or reason why we believe things past, (as that Tully lived in Julius Cæsar's time, or that the Saxons inhabited this land,) is the report of others. The ground or reason why we believe future contingents, is the inclination or propension which we see in second causes to produce such effects; or the coherence betwixt any natural or moral contingent cause, and their possible or probable issue. As if we see one kingdom mighty in wealth, and at peace and unity in itself, bearing inveterate hate to another; or if we know that the one hath suffered wrong not likely to be recompensed, and yet able in politic estimation