Dean vs. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company. that the cow was worth $40 for beef, he referred to her value before she was injured. He says "she was worth $40 for beef at that time;" and speaking of her value for milking purposes, he also says that she was worth $50 at the time. The time referred to in both cases was doubtless a time immediately preceding the injury. There is no proof of her value for beef after she was injured, or that she was suitable for beef thereafter. In the absence of proof on the subject, we may be permitted to doubt whether the carcass of an animal bruised and broken as this was, is fit for human food, and especially so when the animal was a milch cow. Neither is there any evidence tending to show that the carcass was not worth as much after the cow was killed in the evening, as it would have been had she been killed immediately after she was injured; or that the plaintiff failed to dispose of it to the best advantage. The plaintiff testified that the cow was as good at night as in the morning- meaning, no doubt, that she was worth as much killed at night as she would have been had she been killed on the morning of the injury. There is no direct evidence to the contrary. As the evidence stands, the jury must necessarily have found that the plaintiff disposed of the remains of his cow to the best advantage. Hence, under the instruction given on behalf of the defendant, they must necessarily have assessed the same damages that they would have assessed under the other instruction. Had either instruction been omitted, the result must have been the same. We leave this branch of the case with the remark that the rule of damages was laid down too favorably to the defendant; for the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable allowance for his time and trouble in disposing of the remains of his cow, and should only have been charged with the net proceeds realized, or which might have been realized by him, after deducting such allowance. 2. In Chapman v. Railway Co., 26 Wis., 295, which was a Dean vs. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company. case like this, a direction to the jury to allow interest from the commencement of the action, on the immediate damages suffered by the plaintiff, was upheld. We do not understand that the authority of that ruling has been shaken by any subsequent decision of this court. In the present case the direction was to compute interest on the immediate damages from the time the cow was killed. This may have been an unjustifiable extension of the rule of Chapman v. Railway Co. We do not say whether it is so or not. If it is So, it may be that the improper allowance of interest on an insignificant sum for the few months intermediate the injury and the commencement of the action presents a case for the application of the maxim, de minimis non curat lex. However that may be, we think no sufficient exception was taken to the instruction to enable us to review it on this appeal. The exception is to "each and every part" of the instruction. This is but a general exception to the whole instruction. To be available, it should have been specific; for it is well settled that a general exception to an instruction is insufficient if any portion of the instruction can be upheld. We have already seen that, under the evidence, the balance of the instruction is unobjectionable. Had the exception been specific, the attention of the learned county judge would have been directed by it to the alleged error, and probably he would have required the plaintiff to remit the excess of interest as a condition of denying the motion for a new trial. See Eldred v. Oconto Co., 33 Wis., 133, and cases cited. It may also be observed that the grounds assigned therefor in the motion for a new trial are equally general, and the exception to the order denying the motion does not aid the defective exception, as it did in Wells v. Perkins, ante, p. 160. The insufficiency of the exception was not noticed on the argument of the cause; but it is disclosed in the record, and we cannot disregard it. Finding no error in the record which the defendant can be Hartwell vs. The Supervisors of Waukesha County. heard to allege, we must affirm the judgment of the county court. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. HARTWELL VS. THE SUPERVISORS OF WAUKESHA COUNTY. Sheriff's account against county. 1. Officers take their offices cum onere, and services required of them by law, without specific provision for payment, must be considered compensated by the fees allowed for other services. Crocker v. Brown Co., 35 Wis., 284. 2. Under the statutes regulating the compensation of sheriffs, they cannot charge the county for the board and services of a turnkey or deputy sheriff in taking charge of the county jail and performing the duties of jailer. Tay. Stats., ch. 187, and § 147, ch. 13. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Waukesha County. The defendant board appealed from a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. Edwin Hurlbut, for the appellant, argued that the sheriff had power under the statute (Tay. Stats., ch. 13, § 147, p. 321) to appoint a jailer, and, if he had done so, the statute having fixed no compensation for the jailer, the county would be liable to reimburse the sheriff for all reasonable amounts paid the jailer for his services; but that, as the sheriff and his deputy themselves, in this case, did all the work of jailer, and as the compensation of those officers is fixed by law, and they are forbidden to ask or take any other fees than such as are provided by law, this action could not be maintained. 2 Hill, 411; 1 S. & R., 505; 21 Ind., 32; 31 id., 463; 14 Wis., 502, 518; 35 id., 284. The cause was submitted for the respondent on the brief of Vernon Tichenor and Samuel A. Randles. They contended Hartwell vs. The Supervisors of Waukesha County. that where a duty is enjoined upon an officer, he is entitled to recover any necessary expense incurred in the discharge of it. Massing v. The State, 14 Wis., 505; Jefferson Co. v. Besley, 5 id., 134; U. S. v. Duval, Gilpin, 356. COLE, J. In this case the sheriff charged the county for the services and board of a turnkey, or deputy sheriff, who took charge of the county jail and performed the duties of jailer. The county board disallowed the claim, and an appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the sheriff obtained a judgment for the amount of his claim. Exceptions were taken on the part of the county to various rulings of the court below, which, from the view we have taken of the case, need not be specifically noticed. The statute provides that the sheriff shall have the charge and custody of the jails of his county, and of the prisoners of the same, and shall keep them himself, or by his deputy or jailer, for whose acts he and his sureties shall be responsible. Tay. Stats., ch. 13, § 147, and ch. 187. The expense for maintaining persons charged with of fenses and duly committed for trial, and those who are confined in the county jail, or who may be committed for the nonpayment of any fines, and expenses for safe keeping, are made payable out of the county treasury, the accounts of the keeper being first allowed by the county board: "provided, that such keeper shall be entitled to and receive such compensation for maintaining persons in said jail, as shall be allowed by the board of supervisors of the proper county, not less than two dollars per week for each convict." Ch. 187, § 3. The keeper is required to furnish necessary bedding, clothing, fuel and medical aid for all prisoners who shall be in his custody, and is to be paid therefor by the county; but such payment is not to be deducted from the sum the keeper is entitled to receive for the weekly support of the prisoners. §15. But it will be seen that while the statute expressly Hartwell vs. The Supervisors of Waukesha County. charges the county with the board, necessary clothing, and medical aid furnished all prisoners in the county jail, it gives no per diem or fees to the sheriff for performing the duties of jailer. It is true, the statute speaks of "the expenses for safe keeping," etc., as being a charge upon the county; but it is evident, from the connection in which these words are used, that they refer to the maintenance or necessary support of the prisoners, and not to the personal services of the sheriff. For these services, in contemplation of law, the sheriff is compensated by the fees provided by law for performing other duties. In the general statute regulating the fees of sheriffs, the sheriff is allowed specific fees for every commitment to prison, and discharge therefrom; and, though these fees may seem entirely inadequate to compensate the sheriff for taking charge of the jail and custody of the prisoners, yet no other recompense is provided for that service. These fees, therefore, must be deemed the sole compensation to the sheriff for performing the duty of jailer; and no other can be charged or obtained. For, as remarked by DIXON, C. J., in Crocker v. The Supervisors of Brown County, 35 Wis., 284-286, "officers take their offices cum onere, and services required of them by law, for which they are not specifically paid, must be considered compensated by the fees allowed for other services." The case at bar cannot be distinguished in principle from the Crocker case, and the rule there affirmed is decisive in this appeal. If the compensation of the sheriff for performing the duty of jailer is inadequate, the legislature can increase it; but, as the law now stands, no separate compensation can be demanded for such services, inasmuch as the legislature has not seen fit to provide for it. In the case of Fernekes et al. v. The Board of Supervisors of Milwaukee County [ante, p. 303], it was held that the county was liable for meals and lodging furnished a deputy sheriff who attended upon a jury in a murder trial by order of the court. But this was put upon the express ground that it was |