THIS Convention met on the 5th of July, and was occupied the first day chiefly in arranging the order of business. During the forenoon of the second day, while the Convention was waiting for the report of the Committee on Resolutions, several speakers were called up, and among others Mr. Stewart, of Penn., who addressed the Convention, and in the course of his speech, claimed for the federal government the most extended power over internal improvements. When he sat down, Mr. Field, of New-York, was called to the stand, and said :-"This call, gentlemen, is entirely unexpected. I had not intended to speak, except in the ordinary course of debate, upon resolutions before the Convention; but now that I am on the stand, inasmuch as I think the doctrines of the gentleman from Pennsylvania ought not to pass unchallenged, I shall take this occasion, notwithstanding the apparent favor with which they were received, to express my dissent, and to give my reasons against them. The great interest which the subject possesses as a national question, induced us to address to Mr. Field, a member from New-York, the following: DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, Esq. New-York, August 10, 1847. Dear Sir,-As you were the only member of the late Chicago Convention who spoke on the Democratic side of the Constitutional question involved in its proceedings, and as your argument, though on all sides pronounced a very able one, has not yet been in any form brought before the public, we shall take great pleasure in making the Democratic Review the medium of its publication, either in the form of a Review article, based on the outline of your remarks at Chicago, or in that of the speech itself, with such further illustrative evidence and argument as you may desire to add. The present prominence of the question, with its constant and still increasing importance, will, I am sure, make such a paper as that which I hope to receive from your pen, one of the most valuable and interesting articles at this moment that could be inserted in the Review. Yours, very respectfully, &c. THOMAS P. KETTELL, Ed. Dem. Review. In reply he sent us the following, with a copy of the speech and notes: New-York, August 20, 1847. Dear Sir-With this I send you, as most convenient for me, the best sketch of my speech I can make, together with some notes, which may be useful. I cannot give the precise language used by me, except so far as my recollection has been assisted by others, for I had not thought of speaking five minutes before I began. But I can give you the argument correctly, because my previous reflection upon the subject had fixed it in my mind. You will find no allusion to the interruptions which took place, for the reason that it is not necessary to the argument. Though they were in bad temper and worse taste, considering that all parties had been invited there, yet as the Convention afterwards expressed its regret at their occurrence, they need not be recalled. Very truly, yours, &c. THOMAS P. KETTELL, Esq., Ed. Dem. Review. 1 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD. In common with many others of similar opinions, I came here in earnest to promote, as far as I might be able, the avowed and legitimate objects of this Convention. We are ready to do so yet, but we cannot assent to the constitutional doctrines of that gentleman, nor acquiesce in the policy which he advocates. Indeed, I think I may venture to predict, that if his views are adopted by the Convention, the questions which should command its attention will be merged in party issues. For my own part, I am prepared to affirm at the outset, that the federal government has the same power over commerce among the states, and over all its incidents, that it has over foreign commerce; and in that respect, that our inland lakes and rivers are included in the same category with our sea-coast. Whatever right the government has to improve the rivers and harbors of the Atlantic, it has the same to improve those of the North-west. It may build a break-water in Lake Michigan as rightfully as in Delaware Bay. But there I stop, and deny altogether the power of the government to engage in any general scheme of internal improvements-to dig canals, build railways, or open new avenues for commerce.* Let me explain what I conceive to be the true construction of the constitution on this subject. In doing so, I purposely omit all reference to the In the Convention which formed the Constitution, the following proceedings took place on one of the last days of its session-that is, on Friday, the 14th of Sept. 1787-the final adjournment taking place on the Monday following.-(See 3 Madison Papers, 1576) "Doctor Franklin moved to add after the words "post roads," Article I. Sec. 8, a power "to provide for cutting canals, where deemed necessary." Mr. Wilson seconded the motion. Mr. Sherman objected. The expense in such cases, will fall on the United States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be cut. Mr. Wilson. Instead of being an expense to the United States, they may be made a source of revenue. Mr. Madison suggested an enlargement of the motion, into a power "to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the United States might require, and the legislative provisions of individual states may be incompetent." His primary object was, however, to secure an easy communication between the states, which the free intercourse now to be opened seemed to call for. The political obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones, as far as possible, ought to follow. Mr. Randolph seconded the proposition. Mr. King thought the power unnecessary. Mr. Wilson. It is necessary to prevent a state from obstructing the general welfare. Mr. King. The states will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it. In Philadelphia and New-York, it will be referred to the establishment of a bank, which has been a subject of contention in those cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies. Mr. Wilson mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals the communication with the Western settlements. As to banks, he did not think with Mr. King, that the power in that point of view, would excite the prejudices and parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies, they are already included in the power to regulate trade. "Col. Mason was for limiting the power to the single case of canals. He was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by any means already implied by the constitution, as supposed by Mr. Wilson. "The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question specifying and limited to the case of canals. "Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia-Ave, 3. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina-No, 8. "The other part fell, of course, as including the power rejected." Three things are especially observable in this passage. 1. That the Convention had constantly in mind the distinction between the power to regulate commerce between the states, and a power to open avenues for that commerce. Mr. Madison's argument for granting the latter power, was that "the political obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones, as far as possible, ought to follow." The Convention however refused it. 2. That a reason pressed upon the Convention for granting the power, was "the importance of facilitating by canals, the communication with the Western settlements." The convention, nevertheless, remained inexorable. 3. That the power to provide for cutting canals," was not already in the constitution, according to the judgment of the persons who made it. How would those venerable men have been astonished, if they had witnessed at Chicago, the other day, the uproar occasioned by a member's venturing to express his opinion, that Congress had not this power "to provide for cutting canals." Dr. Franklin, it seems, made a senseless motion, and neither he, nor the other members of the Great Convention, knew what they had been doing! Members of the Chicago Convention knew better!! power of congress to construct ports and open avenues as a means of carrying on war. Acts may be constitutional and justifiable as war measures, which would be neither, considered as measures of peace or commerce. I omit equally all reference to the power of the government as proprietor of the public lands. As owner of the soil, and sovereign of the territories, it may do what it cannot do as the government of the states. What I have to say shall be confined to the power it may exert within the jurisdiction of the states, and in the exercise of its ordinary constitutional functions. There are two provisions of the constitution, under which is claimed the power to improve rivers and harbors; the first subdivision of the eighth section of the first article, in these words-" The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and the third subdivision of the same section-" To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." Whatever power there may be over the subject, I believe is to be found, not as many seem to think, in the former of these provisions, but as an incident to the latter, pursuant to the supplementary provision, contained in the eighteenth subdivision, which is in these words: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers, vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." The first provision has been, as we all know, the subject of a great deal of controversy. It was once insisted by the advocates of a large construction, that the words, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States," were themselves a substantive grant of power; but that ground has been abandoned, and it is now admitted that they are not a grant, but a limitation of the power conferred by the previous words in the same sentence. How strict, then, is this limitation? What does it signify? Does it mean that congress may raise and apply money to any purpose which may conduce to the general welfare, or what in practice is the same thing which it may vote to be for the general welfare, or does it mean that congress may raise and apply money to any of the designated objects of the constitution? We insist that the latter is its true meaning. 66 The reasons for it are these. While the language of the sentence is susceptible of either interpretation, the design and character of the whole instrument favor one and reject the other. The language, I admit, is susceptible of either interpretation. In the one case the words, as herein declared," are understood; in the other, "according to the discretion of congress." I read the whole sentence as if it were written thus: "The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, in order to pay the debts of the United States already contracted, or for the purposes herein declared hereafter to be contracted, and to provide. for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, as herein declared, but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." If the qualification thus given is not understood in the former part of the sentence, then the general expression, " to pay the debts of the United States," more especially when taken in connection with the subsequent power, "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," would amount to a power to contract a debt for any purpose whatever. But notwithstanding the generality of these expressions, I suppose the qualification is understood, that the debts which the government may contract, are debts for the purpose of executing its specified powers. In the same way, I suppose, a qualification is understood to the rest of the sentence, and that the general welfare which the government may provide for, is also in the execution of the specified powers. If the language of the sentence leave the interpretation undecided, very different is the scope of the whole instrument. The design and character of this at once decide it. In the first place, the whole design of the constitution was to create a federal government for certain purposes, and to give it a revenue adequate to those purposes. The ends to be promoted by the government were few. The taxing power was given as a means to those ends. No one thought of creating a government for the purpose of taxing, but for other purposes, to accomplish which taxation was necessary. The means, then, would be naturally, and in the intention of the framers, necessarily proportioned to the ends, co-extensive with them, not proceeding beyond them. There could be no motive for giving a revenue power, broader than the objects for which the government was instituted. It could not, therefore, be the design of the constitution to give the government revenues for other purposes than those for which it had created it. In the second place, in its character, this is a government of limited and strictly defined powers. Such was the intention of the framers of the Constitution; such was the understanding of the people who adopted it. And to guard against all possibility of misunderstanding on that head, one of the first amendments adopted was this:-"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Now, any other meaning than that which I have given, makes this government, practically, undefined and unlimited. That power which can raise and appropriate money to any purposes whatever, which it may choose to think will promote the general welfare, has no check and no bounds but its own discretion. It can take at will from the minority of the states, for the benefit of the rest, and it can control by its expenditures, those which it does not oppress by its burdens. Almost every purpose of any government can be accomplished by money. Give that, without stint and without control, and what need would there be of more? The careful enumeration of other powers was a mere ceremony. Therefore the argument for such a construction of the power in question is inadmissible, since it proves too much.* The following extract from the Federalist is important, as showing a contemporaneous construction of the provision. The extract from the Kentucky resolutions shows Mr. Jefferson's opinion of it. Mr. Madison's report on the Virginia resolutions is very explicit, and his letter to Mr. Stevenson contains the ablest exposition that has ever been published concerning it : From the Federalist.-No. 41-"It has been urged and echoed, that the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power, which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for ob ections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms, "to raise money for the general welfare." But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms, immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it; shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification |