which hinder them from seeing such things as are really beneficial to them. For an instance, he asks Alcibiades, Whether he would not be thoroughly pleased and satisfied, if that god, to whom he was going to address himself, should promise to make him the sovereign of the whole earth? Alcibiades answers, That he should doubtless look upon such a promise as the greatest favour that could be bestowed upon him. Socrates then asks him, if, after receiving this great favour, he would be contented to lose his life; or if he would receive it though he IO was sure he should make an ill use of it? To both which questions Alcibiades answers in the negative. Socrates then shews him, from the examples of others, how these might very probably be the effects of such a blessing. He then adds, that other reputed pieces of good fortune, as that of having a son, or procuring the highest post in a government, are subject to the like fatal consequences; which nevertheless, says he, men ardently desire, and would not fail to pray for, if they thought their prayers might be effectual for the obtaining of them.

Having established this great point, that all the most apparent 20 blessings in this life are obnoxious to such dreadful consequences, and that no man knows what in its events would prove to him a blessing or a curse, he teaches Alcibiades after what manner he ought to pray.

In the first place he recommends to him, as the model of his devotions, a short prayer, which a Greek poet composed for the use of his friends, in the following words: 'O Jupiter, give us those things which are good for us, whether they are such things as we pray for, or such things as we do not pray for: and remove from us those things which are hurtful, though they are such 30 things as we pray for.'

In the second place, that his disciple may ask such things as are expedient for him, he shews him that it is absolutely necessary to apply himself to the study of true wisdom, and to the knowledge of that which is his chief good, and the most suitable to the excellency of his nature.

In the third and last place, he informs him that the best methods he could make use of to draw down blessings upon himself, and to render his prayers acceptable, would be to live in a constant practice of his duty, towards the gods and towards men. 40 Under this head he very much recommends a form of prayer the

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Lacedemonians made use of, in which they petition the gods to give them all good things, so long as they were virtuous. Under this head likewise he gives a very remarkable account of an oracle to the following purpose.

When the Athenians, in the war with the Lacedemonians, received many defeats both by sea and land, they sent a message to the oracle of Jupiter Ammon, to ask the reason why they, who erected so many temples to the gods, and adorned them with such costly offerings; why they who had instituted so many 10 festivals, and accompanied them with such pomps and ceremonies; in short, why they, who had slain so many hecatombs at their altars, should be less successful than the Lacedemonians, who fell so short of them in all these particulars. To this, says he, the oracle made the following reply: I am better pleased with the prayers of the Lacedemonians, than with all the oblations of the Greeks. As this prayer implied and encouraged virtue in those who made it, the philosopher proceeds to shew how the most vicious man might be devout, so far as victims could make him, but that his offerings were regarded by the gods as bribes, and 20 his petitions as blasphemies. He likewise quotes on this occasion two verses out of Homer, in which the poet says, That the scent of the Trojan sacrifices was carried up to heaven by the winds; but that it was not acceptable to the gods, who were displeased with Priam and all his people ".

man, whoever

The conclusion of this dialogue is very remarkable. Socrates, having deterred Alcibiades from the prayers and sacrifice which he was going to offer, by setting-forth the above-mentioned difficulties of performing that duty as he ought, adds these words, 'We must therefore wait till such time as we may learn how we 30 ought to behave ourselves towards the gods, and towards men.' 'But when will that time come,' says Alcibiades, and who is it that will instruct us? For I would fain see this he is.' 'It is one,' says Socrates, who takes care of you; but as Homern tells us that Minerva removed the mist from Diomedes his eyes o, that he might plainly discover both gods and men, so the darkness that hangs upon your mind must be removed before you are able to discern what is good and what is evil.' 'Let him remove from my mind,' says Alcibiades, the darkness, and what else he pleases; I am determined to refuse 40 nothing he shall order me, whoever he is, so that I may become

the better man by it.' The remaining part of the dialogue is very obscure: there is something in it that would make us think Socrates hinted at himself, when he spoke of this divine teacher who was to come into the world, did not he own that he himself was, in this respect, as much at a loss, and in as great distress as the rest of mankind".

Some learned men look upon this conclusion as a prediction of our Saviour, or at least that Socrates, like that high priest, prophesied unknowingly, and pointed at that Divine Teacher who Io was to come into the world some ages after him. However that may be, we find that this great philosopher saw by the light of reason, that it was more suitable to the goodness of the divine nature to send a person into the world who should instruct mankind in the duties of religion, and, in particular, teach them how to pray.

Whoever reads this abstract of Plato's discourse on prayer, will, I believe, naturally make this reflexion. That the great founder of our religion, as well by his own example, as in the form of prayer which he taught his disciples, did not only keep up to those 20 rules which the light of nature had suggested to this great philosopher, but instructed his disciples in the whole extent of this duty, as well as of all others. He directed them to the proper object of adoration, and taught them, according to the third rule above mentioned, to apply themselves to him in their closets, without shew or ostentation, and to worship him in spirit and in truth. As the Lacedemonians, in their form of prayer, implored the gods in general to give them all good things so long as they were virtuous, we ask in particuiar, 'that our offences may be forgiven, as we forgive those of others.' If we look into the second rule which 30 Socrates has prescribed, namely, that we should apply ourselves to the knowledge of such things as are best for us, this too is explained at large in the doctrines of the gospel, where we are taught in several instances to regard those things as curses which appear as blessings in the eye of the world; and on the contrary, to esteem those things as blessings, which to the generality of mankind appear as curses. Thus, in the form which is prescribed to us, we only pray for that happiness which is our chief good, and the great end of our existence, when we petition the Supreme Being for the coming of his kingdom, being solicitous for no other temporal 40 blessing but our daily sustenance. On the other side, we pray

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against nothing but sin, and against evil in general, leaving it with Omniscience to determine what is really such. If we look into the first of Socrates his rules of prayer, in which he recommends the above-mentioned form of the ancient poet, we find that form not only comprehended, but very much improved in the petition, wherein we pray to the Supreme Being that His will may be done: which is of the same force with that form which our Saviour used, when he prayed against the most painful and most ignominious of deaths, nevertheless not my will but thine be done. This compre10 hensive petition is the most humble, as well as the most prudent, that can be offered up from the creature to his Creator, as it supposes the Supreme Being wills nothing but what is for our good, and that he knows better than ourselves what is so.-L.

No. 219. On the Love of Honour and Distinction; the sources of human superiority; titles; the mistakes of this world will be rectified in the next; social order necessary.

Vix ea nostra voco.-OVID. Met. xiii. 141.

There are but few men who are not ambitious of distinguishing themselves in the nation or country where they live, and of growing considerable among those with whom they converse. There is a kind of grandeur and respect, which the meanest and most insignificant part of mankind endeavour to procure in the little circle of their friends and acquaintance. The poorest mechanic, 20 nay, the man who lives upon common alms, gets him his set of admirers, and delights in that superiority which he enjoys over those who are in some respects beneath him. This ambition, which is natural to the soul of man, might, methinks, receive a very happy turn; and, if it were rightly directed, contribute as much to a person's advantage as it generally does to his uneasiness and disquiet.

I shall therefore put together some thoughts on this subject, which I have not met with in other writers; and shall set them down as they have occurred to me, without being at the pains to 30 connect or methodize them.

All superiority and pre-eminence that one man can have over another, may be reduced to the notion of quality, which, considered at large, is either that of fortune, body, or mind. The first

is that which consists in birth, title, or riches; and is the most foreign to our natures, and what we can the least call our own, of any of the three kinds of quality. In relation to the body, quality arises from health, strength, or beauty; which are nearer to us, and more a part of ourselves, than the former. Quality, as it regards the mind, has its rise from knowledge or virtue; and is that which is more essential to us, and more intimately united with us, than either of the other two.

The quality of fortune, though a man has less reason to value 10 himself upon it than on that of the body or mind, is however the kind of quality which makes the most shining figure in the eye of the world.

As virtue is the most reasonable and genuine source of honour, we generally find in titles an intimation of some particular merit that should recommend men to the high stations which they possess. Holiness is ascribed to the pope, majesty to kings; serenity or mildness of temper to princes; excellence or perfection to ambassadors; grace to archbishops; honour to peers; worship or venerable behaviour to magistrates; and reverence, which is of 20 the same import as the former, to the inferior clergy.

In the founders of great families, such attributes of honour are generally correspondent with the virtues of the person to whom they are applied; but in the descendants they are too often the marks rather of grandeur than of merit. The stamp and denomination still continues, but the intrinsic value is frequently lost.

The death-bed shews the emptiness of titles in a true light. A poor dispirited sinner lies trembling under the apprehensions of the state he is entering on; and is asked by a grave attendant how his Holiness does? Another hears himself addressed under 30 the title of highness or excellency, who lies under such mean

circumstances of mortality as are the disgrace of human nature. Titles at such a time look rather like insults and mockery than respect.

The truth of it is, honours are in this world under no regulation; true quality is neglected, virtue is oppressed, and vice triumphant. The last day will rectify this disorder, and assign to every one a station suitable to the dignity of his character; ranks will be then adjusted, and precedency set right.

Methinks we should have an ambition, if not to advance our40 selves in another world, at least to preserve our post in it, and