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then go back to the military history of our Revolu tion; follow Washington from Cambridge to Yorktown; follow Greene from Charlotte to Charleston; and you will find that the strategy which defended the thirteen Colonies from the overwhelming power of Great Britain was in spirit and principle the same strategy which saved Italy from Hannibal, and carried Frederic in triumph through a seven years' war, with two thirds of Europe leagued against him and but one ally at his side.

There are many other events which deserve mention, even in an outline of this war; many other names which have strong claims to our grateful remembrance. There was Sullivan's Rhode Island expedition in 1778, unsuccessful in its immediate object, but remarkable for a well-fought battle, and a skilful retreat. There was Sullivan's expedition against the Six Nations in 1779, planned with judgment and executed with energy. There was the gallant defence of Redbank, and the brilliant capture of Stony Point by storm. How many pleasant associations gather round the true-hearted and genial Knox. How well deserved was the respect which men felt for Lincoln; how well earned their confidence in MacDougall. If little Rhode Island had her Olney and her Angell, and her Christopher Greene, little Maryland had her Williams and her Howard; never was cavalry led to the charge more gallantly than the cavalry of

William Washington: never did partisan warfare bring out a bolder spirit than Marion; never was Henry Lee excelled in the skilful conduct of an advanced corps, in hanging on the enemy's rear, and beating up his quarters. Who would willingly forget the sturdy wagoner, Morgan, who with his keen-eyed riflemen decided the day at the first battle of Stillwater? or that Pennsylvanian, ever foremost in desperate encounters, eagerly scenting the battle from afar; the mad Anthony of the soldier, but to the friends he loved the high-minded, the generous, the affectionate Wayne? Gladly would I speak of these, and of many more who fought by their side, and whose memories, if we had not too often permitted ourselves to be drawn by the cares or the pursuits of the present into a wicked forgetfulness of the past, would have been preserved by statues and monuments, and all the testimonials by which a grateful people rewards the devotion of its benefactors. But all that I could do in a single lecture I have endeavored to do; still remembering, even while I selected single names as the representatives of the whole war, that neither Washington nor Greene could have brought it to a successful termination if they had not found clear heads and skilful hands to comprehend and execute their designs.

LECTURE IX

THE FOREIGN ELEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION

WE

E come now to a very interesting, though a very difficult part of our subject,

the foreign element in the war of the Revolution. It is very interesting to know how much help our untrained officers received from the well-trained officers of Europe who fought by their side. It is equally interesting to know how large a proportion of those who served in the ranks and bore the brunt of the war were men of foreign birth. The last is a question of statistics for which the data are extremely imperfect, or rather, almost entirely wanting. We know that there were many foreigners among the common soldiers; for we know that on more than one occasion when men were chosen for special service, special care was taken to employ none but natives. We know that there was a German legion; and German and Irish names meet us constantly in the imperfect musterrolls that have escaped the moths and rats, or not been burnt for kindling. But we know, also, that

then as now, hundreds bore German and Irish names who had never seen Ireland or Germany. Conjecture and analogy then must supply the want of positive evidence; and the analogy in the present war bears us fully out in the conjecture that by far the greater portion of the common soldiers were natives of the land for which they fought.

Of foreign officers, the proportion in the higher ranks was much larger. Out of twenty-nine major-generals, eleven were Europeans; there were sixteen Europeans among the brigadiers; and if, as we descend to colonels, captains, and lieutenants, we find the number comparatively less, we must remember that what the greater portion of them sought in the American service was increase of rank. Few would care to serve as captains or lieutenants in the half-clad, half-starved army of America, who could be captains and lieutenants in the well-clothed and well-fed armies of France or Prussia.

But it is not by numbers that we are to estimate the services of these officers. Many of them had been trained to arms from their childhood. Many had served through the Seven Years' War, at that time the greatest war of modern history as a school of military science. All of them were practically familiar with the rudiments of their profession, the life of a camp, the duties of a field day. Ten soldiers of such make as composed the bulk of European armies might have very little influence in

moulding the character of a regiment of American farmers and mechanics. But a single officer, of even moderate experience, could hardly fail to make his American colleagues painfully conscious of their deficiencies, even where the daily sight of his example did not go far towards correcting them. A colonel at a loss for some important evolution must have been greatly relieved to find that his lieutenant-colonel, or his major, knew all about it. And more than one general may have felt stronger at the head of his division, after a few weeks of daily intercourse with generals who had passed their lives in camps. It surely is not assuming too much to say that, regarded merely as a contribution to the general stock of military science, the foreign element was a very important element in the army of the Revolution.

But the war of the Revolution was a civil war; a war of opinions and convictions, in which men fought, not for a few miles more or less of a territory, that whether won or lost would add nothing to their individual aggrandizement, but for rights which involved not only their own happiness, but that of their remotest descendants. Every American who drew his sword knew that a fearful penalty was attached to his failure, a glorious reward to his success. He had relinquished positive advantages, broken strong ties, often sacrificed cherished affections and brilliant hopes. But he had done it conscientiously as the only thing which

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