not transcending such prohibition. The statute was held not to be so confined, and hence was declared invalid. * In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 49, 18 Sup. Ct. 757, some prior cases were reviewed, and the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Peckham, said: "The general rule to be deduced from the decisions of this court is that a lawful article of commerce cannot be wholly excluded from importation into a state from another state where it was manufactured or grown. A state has power to regulate the introduction of any article, including a food product, so as to insure purity of the article imported, but such police power does not include the total exclusion even of an article of food. "In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. Ed. 455, 3 Interst. Com. R. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, it was held that an inspection law relating to an article of food was not a rightful exercise of the police power of the state, if the inspection prescribed were of such a character, or if it were burdened with such conditions, as would wholly prevent the introduction of the sound article from other states. This was held in relation to the slaughter of animals whose meat was to be sold as food in the state passing the so-called inspection law. The principle was affirmed in Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. Ed. 862, 3 Interst. Com. R. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. 213; and in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 97, 41 L. Ed. 632, 644, 17 Sup. Ct. 265." The exclusion in the case at bar is not as complete as in the cited cases. That, however, makes no difference if it is within their principle; and their principle does not depend upon the number of states which are embraced in the exclusion. It depends upon whether the police power of the state has been exerted beyond its province, exerted to regulate interstate commerce,-exerted to exclude, without discrimination, the good and the bad, the healthy and the diseased, and to an extent beyond what is necessary for any proper quarantine. The words in italics express an important qualification. The prevention of disease is the essence of a quarantine law. Such law is directed, not only to the actually diseased, but to what has become exposed to disease. In Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U. S. 455, 30 L. Ed. 237, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, the quarantine system of Louisiana was sustained. It established a quarantine below New Orleans, provided health officers and inspection officers, and fees for them, to be paid by the ships detained and inspected. The system was held to be a proper exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of health, though some of its rules amounted to regulations of commerce with foreign nations and among the states. In Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 32 L. Ed. 695, 2 Interst. Com. R. 407, 9 Sup. Ct. 277, certain sections of the laws of Iowa were passed on. One of them imposed a penalty upon any person who should bring into the state any Texas cattle, unless they had been wintered at least one winter north of the southern boundary of the state of Missouri or Kansas; or should have in his possession any Texas cattle between the 1st day of November and the 1st day of April following. Another section made any person having in his possession such cattle liable for any damages which might accrue from allowing them to run at large, "and thereby spreading the disease among other cattle, known as the Texas fever," and there was, besides, criminal punishment. The court did not pass upon the 1st section. In commenting upon the 2d some pertinent remarks were made on the facts which justified the statute, and the case of Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. Ed. 527, was explained. It was said that the case "interpreted the law of Missouri as saying to all transportation companies: 'You shall not bring into the state any Texas cattle, or any Mexican cattle, or Indian cattle, between March 1st and December 1st in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not, no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the state or not; and if you do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the state without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities.' Page 473, L. Ed. 531. Such a statute, the court held, was not a quarantine law, nor an inspection law, but a law which interfered with interstate commerce, and therefore invalid. At the same time the court admitted unhesitatingly that a state may pass laws to prevent animals suffering from contagious or infectious diseases from entering within it. Page 472, L. Ed. 530. No attempt was made to show that all Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle coming from the malarial districts during the months mentioned were infected with the disease, or that such cattle were so generally infected that it would have been impossible to separate the healthy from the diseased. Had such proof been given, a different question would have been presented for the consideration of the court. Certainly all animals thus infected. may be excluded from the state by its laws until they are cured of the disease, or at least until some mode of transporting them without danger of spreading it is devised." In Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 42 L. Ed. 878, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, the Husen Case was again commented upon, and what the law of Missouri was and was not was again declared. A statute of Kansas, however, which made any person who shall drive or ship into the state "any cattle liable or capable of communicating Texas, splenetic or Spanish fever to any domestic cattle of this state shall be liable* * for * * damages," was held not to be a regulation of commerce. It was also held that the statute was not repugnant to the act of Congress of May 29, 1884 HALL CASES CONST.L.-9 (23 Stat. at L. 31, chap. 60 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 299]), known as the Animal Industry Act. What, however, is a proper quarantine law-what a proper inspection law in regard to cattle-has not been declared. Under the guise of either a regulation of commerce will not be permitted. Any pretense or masquerade will be disregarded, and the true purpose of a statute ascertained. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, sub nom. Henderson v. Wickham, 23 L. Ed. 543, and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550. But we are not now put to any inquiry of that kind. The good faith and sincerity of the Texas officers cannot be doubted, and the statutes under which they acted cannot be justifiably complained of. The regulations prescribed are complained of, but are they not reasonably adaptive to the purpose of the statutes,-not in excess of it? Quarantine regulations cannot be the same for cattle as for persons, and must vary with the nature of the disease to be defended against. As the court of civil appeals said: "The necessities of such cases often. require prompt action. If too long delayed the end to be attained by the exercise of the power to declare a quarantine may be defeated and irreparable injury done." It is urged that it does not appear that the action of the live-stock sanitary commission was taken on sufficient information. It does not appear that it was not, and the presumption which the law attaches to the acts of public officers must obtain and prevail. The plaintiff in error relies entirely on abstract right, which he seems to think cannot depend upon any circumstances, or be affected by them. This is a radical mistake. It is the character of the circumstances which gives or takes from a law or regulation of quarantine a legal quality. In some cases the circumstance would have to be shown to sustain the quarantine, as was said in Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 32 L. Ed. 695, 2 Interst. Com. R. 407, 9 Sup. Ct. 277. But the presumptions of the law are proof, and such presumptions exist in the pending case, arising from the provisions of and the duties enjoined by the statute, and sanction the action of the sanitary commission and the governor of the state. If they could have been, they should have been met and overcome, and the remarks of the court of civil appeals become pertinent: "The facts in this case are not disputed. The plaintiff sues as for a conversion, because of a refusal to deliver his cattle at Fort Worth. It is necessary to his recovery that he show that it was the legal duty of the defendant company to make such delivery. It is for the breach of this alleged duty he sues; yet it nowhere appears from the record that before the quarantine line in question was established the sanitary commission did not make the most careful and thorough investigation into the necessity therefor, if, indeed, that matter could in any event be inquired into. So far as the record shows, every animal of the kind prohibited in the state of Louisiana may have been actually affected with charbon or anthrax; and it is conceded that this is a disease different from Texas or splenetic fever, and that it is contagious and infectious and of the most virulent character." Judgment affirmed. [HARLAN and BROWN, JJ., gave dissenting opinions, with the former of which WHITE, J., Concurred.] WABASH, ST. L. & P. RY. CO. v. ILLINOIS. (Supreme Court of United States, 1886. 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. 4, 30 L Ed. 244.) [Error to the Supreme Court of Illinois. An Illinois statute penalized unjust discriminations practiced by railroads against shippers, and enacted that charging the same or a greater amount of toll for any transportation within the state than was charged for like transportation over a greater distance on the same road should be prima facie evidence of such discrimination. The defendant railroad charged fifteen cents a hundred pounds for carrying carload lots of certain goods from Peoria, Illinois, to New York City, and twenty-five cents a hundred for a similar carriage from Gilman, Illinois, to New York, although Peoria was 86 miles further from New York. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained a suit against the railroad for this act, and this writ was taken.] Mr. Justice MILLER. The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case now before us, conceding that each of these contracts was in itself a unit, and that the pay received by the Illinois railroad company was the compensation for the entire transportation from the point of departure in the state of Illinois to the city of New York, holds that, while the statute of Illinois is inoperative upon that part of the contract which has reference to the transportation outside of the state, it is binding and effectual as to so much of the transportation as was within the limits of the state of Illinois (People v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 104 I11. 476); and, undertaking for itself to apportion the rates charged over the whole route, decides that the contract and the receipt of the money for so much of it as was performed within the state of Illinois violate the statute of the state on that subject. If the Illinois statute could be construed to apply exclusively to contracts for a carriage which begins and ends within the state, disconnected from a continuous transportation through or into other states, there does not seem to be any difficulty in holding it to be valid. For instance, a contract might be made to carry goods for a certain price from Cairo to Chicago, or from Chicago to Alton. The charges for these might be within the competency of the Illinois Legislature to regulate. The reason for this is that both the charge and the actual transportation in such cases are exclusively confined to the limits of the territory of the state, and is not commerce among the states, or interstate commerce, but is exclusively commerce within the state. So far, therefore, as this class of transportation, as an element of commerce, is affected by the statute under consideration, it is not subject to the constitutional provision concerning commerce among the states. * * * * The Supreme Court of Illinois does not place its judgment in the present case on the ground that the transportation and the charge are exclusively state commerce, but, conceding that it may be a case of commerce among the states, or interstate commerce, which Congress would have the right to regulate if it had attempted to do so, argues that this statute of Illinois belongs to that class of commercial regulations which may be established by the laws of a state until Congress shall have exercised its power on that subject. ** [Here follow quotations from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 135, 24 L. Ed. 77; C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 163, 24 L. Ed. 94; and Peik v. Chic. & N. W. Ry., 94 U. S. 164, 177, 178, 24 L. Ed. 97.] These extracts show that the question of the right of the state to regulate the rates of fares and tolls on railroads, and how far that right was affected by the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, was presented to the court in those cases. And it must be admitted that, in a general way, the court treated the cases then before it as belonging to that class of regulations of commerce which, like pilotage, bridging navigable rivers, and many others, could be acted upon by the states, in the absence of any legislation by Congress on the same subject. By the slightest attention to the matter, it will be readily seen that the circumstances under which a bridge may be authorized across a navigable stream within the limits of a state for the use of a public highway, and the local rules which shall govern the conduct of the pilots of each of the varying harbors of the coasts of the United States, depends upon principles far more limited in their application and importance than those which should regulate the transportation of persons and property across the half or the whole of the continent, over the territories of half a dozen states, through which they are carried without change of car or breaking bulk. * * * * It will be seen from the opinions themselves, and from the arguments of counsel presented in the reports, that the question did not receive any very elaborate consideration, either in the opinions of the court or in the arguments of counsel. * * It was strenuously denied, and very confidently, by all the railroad companies, that any legislative body whatever had a right to limit the tolls and charges to be made by the carrying companies for transporta |