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dwell on these, farther than to say that unmistakable traces of relation are discernible between the Mound-Builders and the Mexican Indians, and again between these and the Pueblos, and these and one or two of the South American peoples. These traces are so confusing that it is impossible to mark out any probable course of migration or conquest by which either of these peoples could have been derived from the others; yet that much migration and conquest has taken place among them seems certain. The "civilization" of Mexico cannot be traced farther back than the Maya period, whose beginning, according to legend, was many centuries before the beginning of our era. The three Nahuatl races-Toltec, Chichimec, and Aztec-followed successively, until the evolution of a civilization was checked by the Spanish conquest. "Everything goes to prove that the ancient races of Central America possessed an advanced culture, exact ideas on certain arts and sciences, and remarkable technical knowledge. The Spanish succeeded in destroying a civilization undoubtedly superior in many respects to that which they endeavored to substitute for it." The human sacrifices, however, are mentioned as a serious limitation to this opinion. The fact is noted that instead of being, as usually supposed, an empire, the Aztec government was an extreme elective democracy, and the ideal of the socialistall offices and posts, even that of the "emperor," being elective; land held in common; children educated in common; complete abolition of the hereditary principle: and that the result of these institutions, "which ignorance and theory delight in holding up to the human race as the beacon lights of the future," was, "the most complete anarchy"-hatred and struggles so fierce that to Mexican allies, as much as to their own prowess, the Spaniards owed their victory. Under the still higher civilization of Peru, the communistic system, under which no man could become poor and no

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man rich, so that neither prudence nor ambition stimulated to exertion and created energy, nor ownership of soil created patriotism, is held responsible for that lack of any spirited patriotism which made Pizarro's conquest possible.

Without touching upon any more of these interesting points, we will simply give Dr. Dall's conclusion as to the origin of the American races: That they undoubtedly reached the west coast of America from Asia by Behring's Strait (where even now the peoples on either side pass back and forth), and probably also by way of Polynesia, where the ocean currents are such as to make it possible to very primitive people to reach South America. This immigration took place at an incalculably early period, when the immigrants were in the most primitive stage-mere wandering savages, hunting the mastodon, and eating each other. Their later culture was purely self-developed, and the theory of any connection whatever with old-world civilizations is illusion. The many resemblances to Egyptian, Persian, Chinese, Greek, Hindoo, or Etruscan art, which have set so many unscientific ethnologists off upon enthusiastic theories, prove only the similarity with which the human mind works everywhere, the same needs producing the same results, without the least collusion. The Asiatic origin of the Americans does not make them descendants of the Mongols, the Malays, or any other race now in Asia; for, at so immense an antiquity their arrival here must have taken place, that there is no reason to suppose that any of the present races then inhabited the Asiatic coast; nor, perhaps, that any races now living in the world had then acquired tribal existence. There may have been successive migrations, but all dated back to the most primitive condition of man; and by successive separations into tribes, mingling and parting, crossing, migrating, trading, the divisions of race and culture found here were developed.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY.1
Joseph Le Conte ]

WE have read this book carefully, and with very great interest. It is stimulating in the highest degree, not only to the thought, but also to the true religious feelings. It will doubtless be repudiated, and, perhaps, even ridiculed, by the orthodox; and yet there is in it more honest thinking and more real religion than in many bushels of ordinary sermons. The most deeply important questions are treated with wonderful analytical skill, and yet in language so clear and untechnical that it is not beyond the reach of the thoughtful reader, even though he be not by vocation a philosopher. We cannot, however, advise any one to undertake it who reads for mere intellectual enjoyment-who expects to enjoy the pleasure of passively imbibing. Close attention and hard thinking will be necessary from beginning to end. And yet, from time to time, in the ends of his chapters and in the practical application of his conclusions, the author rises into the highest plane of stirring eloquence-an eloquence not meant for effect, but the natural outcome of elevated thought and noble feeling.

The reader of this notice will expect some analysis of the work; but this is simply impossible, because it is so closely woven in its logical texture that every thread is necessary to the resulting fabric. Yet we must say something. We will, therefore, glance very briefly at its method and some of its main results.

The book is divided into two parts: Part 1. is "A Search after a Moral Ideal"; Part II., "A Search after Religious Truth." In both searches the author commences by trying all prevalent views, shows the irrationality of each successively, and ends in utter skepticism. From this skepticism, he again emerges into Faith, which he regards as rational, though many will think meager and unsatisfactory.

1 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. By Josiah Royce. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1885.

In Part I., or A Search after a Moral Ideal," he shows first the necessity of an ideal ; then the warfare of contradictory ideals and their mutual destruction; then tries the solutions offered by Spencer and by Schopenhauer, and finds them wanting; and then, as final result of this search, the moral ideal is found in what he calls moral insight. We stop to explain this. In animals and, in a less degree, in many men, the whole life is concentrated in the present moment and in the self. As prudent conduct consists in extending one's consciousness, thoughts, and motives beyond the present, over the past and the future, by memory and by foresight, so that our consciousness and motives include all time, and we act accordingly; so moral conduct consists in extending one's consciousness and will beyond the self to all other selves by insight, so that our consciousness includes all other consciousnesses, and our will realizes all other wills, by insight, and acts accordingly. This is evidently naught else than the second law announced by Jesus, viz: "Love thy neighbor as thyself"-only reached by thought, and put into philosophic language. The great difficulty with most men in trying to act rightly is not so much active ill-will towards others as it is an absorption of consciousness and will in self, and an inability to realize the consciousness and will of the neighbor. By moral insight we appreciate, thoroughly realize, the conscious life of others as we do our own, weigh all in equal balances, and our conduct is the outcome of such just estimate.

In the practical application of this conclusion, in the chapter on "Organization of Life," it is interesting to observe that the rules of duty given are only translation in other, and perhaps more philosophical, anguage, of the rules given by Jesus. Our rst and highest duty is to "seek to extend the moral insight." This is very like the com- . mand "Go preach the gospel "-extend the

kingdom of God. Again: "Seek to make men happy, but only so far as happiness helps the moral insight"; for the moral insight eventually produces the greatest happiness. This is very like "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all these things will be added." We do not say this in dispraise; on the contrary, it is the highest possible praise: for the function of philosophy is to verify the intuitions and inspirations of truth.

In the second part-the "Search after Religious Truth"-the author pursues a similar method. He graphically describes what he calls "the world of doubt," and the various conflicting theories concerning the external world of matter and of force, and shows that they are all either mutually or self destructive. He then tries postulates. He shows that science always works by postulates which it assumes but seeks not to prove. These are working philosophic hypotheses absolutely necessary for progress in knowledge. So also religious activity must have its postulates-its working assumptions-absolutely necessary for activity. He shows that these postulates-scientific and religious-stand on similar ground. If one chooses he may, as many do, reject the religious postulates; but let him remember that to be consistent he ought to reject also the scientific postulates. If he discards religious faith, all well; but then he must discard scientific faith also. But we must not stop with postulates. These are necessary in the beginning, but philosophy must verify them, or we cannot be satisfied. Faith must precede reason, but reason must justify faith. So he continues his search.

In the chapter on idealism the author draws a very necessary distinction between subjective idealism and absolute idealism. Subjective idealism supposes the external world to have no existence except in the mind of the observer. It is but internal states externalized by the activity of the mind. It is a dream of the observer, and each dreamer makes his own world. Absolute idealism, on the contrary, makes the external world the objectified, realized thoughts of God, and therefore a reality

external to and independent of us. In the chapter on "possibility of error," the author shows that to the thorough-going subjective idealist there can be no such thing as truth or error, as good or evil. He therefore adopts absolute idealism. According to him, God, the object of worship, is absolute, allincluding thought. As with us error is only partial view, and truth always a wider view, including and explaining many mutually-excluding partial views; so the Infinite Thought-the Absolute Truth-includes and explains all facts, phenomena, and partial views, past, present, and to come. In this Infinite Thought all things have their existence.

His solution of the problem of evil is, we believe, in part, at least, the true solution. He puts aside external evil, or evil in the external world, as perhaps insoluble, because too partially understood: but attacks the question of evil in the moral consciousness, and asserts that without evil there could be no good; that moral good consists in, and only in, the triumph of the good will over the evil will; that without evil will and its conquest by the good there might indeed be innocence but not goodness. This, we think, will be admitted by all who reflect upon their own experience. The harder question of abstract evil he explains in the same way, though most will hesitate to follow him here. According to him there could be no absolute good, i. e., good in the Infinite Consciousness, without evil. Good consists in the triumph over and the condemnation of the evil in the Infinite Consciousness.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to exposition, brief and wholly inadequate, we know, but sufficient, we hope, to attract attention to the book. But in questions so profound it is impossible that any reader can submit to merely follow, and the author would be the last to desire it. The work is wonderfully stimulating to thought, but it is the nature of thought to doubt and question. We wish, therefore, to point out what seem to us shortcomings in the search after religious truth. In "Search after a Moral Ideal" we find little to criticise.

The final result, it will be seen, is that the infinite divine reality is absolute thought. This may be formulated in three words: "God is Thought." Now, we would ask, Is this exhaustive? Surely the Christian formula, "God is Love" is not only equally true, but far more practical; for life is mostly conduct and not pure thought. But there is a difference between the Christian philosophy and the author's. The formula "God is Love" does not pretend to be exhaustive, but only to present one aspect, but that the most precious and practical to man; while the formula "God is Thought" the author insists is exhaustive. For him God is neither will nor emotion, but only conscious thought. He argues this question fully in the section on "The World of Powers," but it seems to us that he uses the term power in the sense of a force exerted externally. In this sense it cannot, perhaps, be predicated of God, since there is nothing outside of him. But may not will-essential energy-belong to him as well as thought? To come to the main point at once, the world is the realized thought of the Infinite : but what determines the order of succession? If it be answered, With God there is no time, then we ask what determines the order of succession for man? If not chance, then it must be will. In a word, God is absolute Thought, God is absolute Will, God is absolute Love. All these are true, but none exhaustive. There is but one exhaustive formula: "God is absolute Spirit." Doubtless the philosopher will select "God is Thought" as his favorite formula; but the good man who is not a philosopher will prefer "God is Love." Will it be said, thought is more fundamental and includes all other spiritual phenomena? We answer, Not so: if there be any which is truly fundamental, it is self-consciousness. It may be, therefore, that "God is the absolute Self-Consciousness" is truly exhaustive, because equivalent to "God is the absolute Spirit."

Evil," the author very properly divides the problem into two parts, viz: that which concerns the external evil and that which concerns the internal evil; ¿ e., evil in the external world and evil in the moral consciousness, or the evil will. His solution of the evil will in consciousness of man, we think right. His solution of the same in the infinite consciousness may be more doubtful, but we know of no better one. The other half of the problem, viz: evil in the external world, he does not attempt to solve. But why so? It seems to us that this is quite as soluble as evil in the moral consciousness. Surely, evil in the external world or the inimical aspects of nature is as absolutely necessary a condition of knowledge as evil in the moral consciousness is of goodness. Every step of advance of knowledge in man—yea, of evolution of the animal kingdom-is conditioned upon a ceaseless struggle with what seems an inimical environment. We confess the problem of evil has never troubled us as it has many others. It may be because we do not see deep enough into it.

One other criticism: The author in his preface and elsewhere speaks doubtingly of the ability of even the intelligent popular reader to follow him. In this he seems to us to do scant justice to the intelligence of his readers, and especially to his own power of clear exposition. He even advises many readers to skip. This is all wrong. No reader who is compelled to skip has any business to read at all. It is true, close attention is necessary to follow the author, but those who read attentively will find little difficulty in doing so.

In conclusion, we would heartily recommend the book to all who read for something more than amusement. We have for some time past regarded the author as one of the acutest and most independent of American thinkers. The book before us has more than confirmed our opinion. California has a right to be proud of her son, and

Again, in his section on the "Problem of the University of her graduate.

C

BASSNETT'S THEORY OF THE SUN.1

John Beboult)

IN the preface to this volume, the author informs us that "the work is not written for the man of science. It does not soar above the general level of an educated understand ing, nor out of the region of experience." This is certainly a most extraordinary announcement, in view of the subjects discussed in the volume. No one can deny that they constitute the most difficult problems in physical science-problems in which no the oretical views are entitled to serious consideration, unless they are capable of being verified by observation or experiment. Indeed, it seems to us very evident that on such questions the trained physicist is alone qualified to give a rational opinion. It is impossible that the general public, however intelligent, should be able to form a reasonable conclusion in relation to problems demanding the precise and accurate knowledge of many departments of physical science. Those who sound the depths of science are, from the very nature of the case, not expected to be fully understood by the multitude. In such cases, we ought not to count the suffrages: it is far wiser to weigh them.

The history of the speculations of Mr. Bassnett is quite interesting and instructive. It seems that about the middle of the current century, "the author was led to speculate on the hidden causes which are competent to change in a few hours the balmy quiet of a summer eve into a night black with tempest and roaring with the sweep of the besom of destruction." The result of those speculations was published in 1854, under the title of "Outlines of a Mechanical The ory of Storms." "The present work may be considered a supplement to that, by giving a more explicit account of many physical 1 The True Theory of the Sun; showing the Common Origin of the Solar Spots and Corona, and of Atmos pheric Storms and Cyclones. By Thomas Bassnett, author of "Outlines of a Mechanical Theory of Storms." New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1884.

Vol. V.-35.

questions which were then only briefly indicated." (Preface.)

Mr. Bassnett appears to be one of those earnest and enthusiastic men whose imperfect knowledge of physical laws has led him to speculate on some of the most obscure and recondite problems of nature, with the positiveness which is born of half-knowledge. There can be no question that the great diffusion of semi-scientific information among the multitude, so characteristic of the present phase of civilization, has opened a proportionately extensive domain to the pernicious enterprise of those enthusiasts, who, having gathered a few ill-observed facts or ill-considered, unverified theories, vociferously proclaim themselves the discoverers of new laws of nature.

While residing in the town of Ottawa, La Salle County, Illinois, it seems that, in speculating on the phenomena of hurricanes, the author came to the conclusion that the moon is a potent factor in disturbing the weather; but that the influence could not be dependent upon her phases, nor upon her distance from the earth. This idea was put into more definite shape in 1844, in the form of a memorial to Congress, which was presented by Senator Breeze of Illinois, and was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, where it still slumbers. Ten years later (in May, 1854), Mr. Bassnett read a paper before the Meteorological Section of the "American Association for the Advancement of Science," in which he gave the details of his "Theory of Storms "; whereupon a committee of thirteen members (with Professor Henry as chairman) was appointed to investigate it, with instructions to report to the association at its next annual meeting.

The following is a brief statement of the theory: "The theory contends that the existence of a universal, imponderable medium, possessing inertia and great specific heat, and subject to all the laws of matter and mo

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