to compel a delivery thereof to the plaintiff. It seems to be now settled that a specific performance of a contract relating to personal property, including stocks, will in certain cases be enforced. The general rule is that it will not. It is only when the detention of chattels cannot adequately be redressed by damages that the jurisdiction of equity attaches. If there be any peculiar value to the personal property-such as an heirloom, a painting, title-deeds, and the like—or it be stock not purchasable in the market, or such that its value cannot be ascertained, or it have a special peculiar value in the future to the plaintiff, then courts of equity will decree specific performance, because an adequate compensation in damages cannot be ascertained or given at law. Pom. Spec. Perf. §§ 11-14; Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 434. So in cases where the plaintiff has put money or other property in the hands of the defendant, so as to create a fiduciary relation between them, or the defendant, in any proper sense, has made himself the trustee of the plaintiff, the jurisdiction in equity is enlarged, and performance of a contract relating to personal property will be decreed. Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337; Pom. Spec. Perf. § 14. But in all cases it is clear that when the plaintiff himself has put a value upon the property which he asks decreed to him, as in this case, an adequate compensation in the form of damages can be recovered in a legal action, and equity cannot be invoked. The plaintiff here has expressly fixed his damages at $75,000. Pom. Spec. Perf. § 17, and cases cited.

The facts alleged do not bring this case within any of the recognized exceptions to the rule. The subjectmatter has not any peculiar value as an article of curiosity, antiquity, or affection; not one which the defendants alone can supply to enable the plaintiff to fulfill an engagement to a third person; not one of unknown or uncertain value, compensation for which cannot be given in money; not a subject of trust placed by the plaintiff in the hands of the defendants to be used or returned in a certain manner. The subjectmatter, on the other hand, is a broker's commission of $75,000, which the defendants Ryan and associates agreed to pay the plaintiff for services rendered. The remedy at law is clear, adequate, and its enforcement attended with no special doubt or difficulty, except as in many cases where process must be served and litigation had over a disputed claim. The right of a stockholder to compel the corporation to issue to him certain stock is conceded to be one enforceable in equity in proper cases. Dousman v. Smelting Co., 40 Wis. 418. See Tanner v. Gregory, 71 Wis. 490, 37 N. W. Rep. 830. But the relief here asked for is not at all analagous. The plaintiff is not a stockholder. The corporation is not organized. There is no stock in esse. The subject-matter of the suit for specific performance does not exist, and never has existed. If it had once existed, so as to entitle the plaintiff to sue in equity therefor, and thereafter the defendants had put it out of their power to comply with their contract, a court would be justified in holding the suit in equity for awarding compensation in money. Hall v. Delaplaine, 5 Wis. 206, 207; Pom. Spec. Perf. §§ 475477. But in this case the contract, as I think, was of such a nature that equity could and would not enforce it, and consequently the court will not hold the case to award a money judgment. This contract, if enforced, would compel the court just to create the subject-matter of the suit, and then order its delivery to the plaintiff. I do not think, upon authority or in reason, the court could compel a defendant to create a corporation, even if all the provisions of the charter or articles had been definitely agreed upon, which

corporation should create certain common and certain preferred stock, even if the exact conditions of such stock had been prescribed in the agreement, so that the subject-matter might be brought into esse for the purpose of being delivered to the plaintiff. Courts refuse to compel the building of railroads, or the erection of buildings, or the cultivation, cutting, and delivery of crops, etc. Pom. Spec. Perf. § 312, and note; 2 Mor. Priv. Corp § 1136, and note. With much more reason, it seems to me, should they decline to compel the organization of corporations and the creation of stock, with all the details necessarily accompanying such proceedings, especially in a case where the plaintiff has a clear remedy at law, and has himself fixed the exact amount of his damages by reason of a vlolation of the contract made with him.

1. Object. It is not the object in this article to deal with all the perplexing questions in which the subject of discharges under foreign insolvent and bankrupt laws presents. To do so would require more space than the policy of the publisher or the patience of the reader will permit.

It is the purpose of this article to give a summary merely of those principles of international and intestate law regulating discharges under insolvent or bankruptcy laws, (1) where the parties are all subjects of the State in which the discharge is granted; (2) assignments which contravene the law of the situs; and (3) conveyance under foreign bankrupt and insolvent laws.

2. Where the Parties are all Subjects of the State in which the Assignment is made.-As against citizens of other States, and especially as against citizens where the assignment was made, an assignment valid by the laws. of the State in which it is made is held to be valid everywhere, so far as it deals with

1 Greene v. Strague Manuf. Co., 52 Conn. 330; Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366; In re Wait, 99 N. Y. 433; Faulkner v. Hyman (Mass.), 2 N. Eng. Rep. 181; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 465; Moore v. Willett, 35 Barb. 663; Smith's Appeal, 104

And

personalty, even by the courts of a State the law of which makes such an assignment fraudulent in that it delays creditors. where such assignment does not conflict with the law of the place where the personal property is situated, operates to transfer the title to the assignee as against process in favor of resident creditors. Other cases hold that foreign assignments for the benefit of creditors are not to be recognized as against claims of resident creditors.5

3. Effect of Assignment.—A voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, valid at the assignor's domicile, will pass title to his personal estate wherever situate; but an asPa. St. 381; Zuppan v. Bauer, 17 Mo. App. 678; Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 131; Lamb v. Fries, 2 Pa. St. 83; Holmes v. Remson, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 460, 8 Am. Dec. 581; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320; overruling 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 416; Hooper v. Tuckerman, 3 Sandf. (N. Y..) 311; J. M. Atherton Co. v. Ives, 20 Fed. Rep. 894; In re Paige v. Sexsmith Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 136; Van Winkle v. Armstrong, 41 N. J. Eq. 402, 4 Cent. Rep. 53; Varnum v. Camp, 1 Gr. (N. J.) 326, 25 Am. Dec. 476; Moore v. Bonnel, 2 Vr. (N. Y.) 90; Bird v. Caritat, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 342, 3 Am. Dec. 433.

2 But the bankrupt law of a foreign country cannot of itself operate as a legal transfer of property in this coun'ry. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cr. (U. S.) 289; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213: And it has been said that the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction over property of the bankrupt in foreign countries, and cannot compel an assignment thereof by him. Phelps v. McDonald, 2 McA. (D. C.) 375, 16 Bankr. Reg. 217. 3 Greene v. Sprague Manuf. Co., 52 Conn. 330; Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 131.

4 Kelsladt v. Reily, N. Y. Daily Reg. Aug. 9 1878; Moore v. Willett, 35 Barb. N. Y. 663; Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 131; Speed v. May, 17 Pa. St. 91, 55 Am. Dec. 540; Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. St. 185; Bholen v. Cleveland, 5 Mason, C. C. 174; Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'r., 19 N. Y. 207; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103; Greene v. Mowry, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 163; Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 267; Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 242. However, there are decisions which seem to place foreign voluntary assignments upon the same basis with foreign bankrupt assignments. Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass, 146, 7 Am. Dec. 132; Fox v. Adams, 5 Greenl. (Me.) 245; Borden v. Summer, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 265, 16 Am. Dec. 338; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 286, 17 Am. Dec. 372; Fall River Iron Works v. Croade, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 11; 2 Kent's Com. 407.

5 Van Winkle v. Armstrong, 41 N. J. Eq. 402; Varnum v. Camp, 1 Green (N. J.) 326, 25 Am. Dec. 476; Moore v. Bonnell, 2 Vroom (N. J.), 90. See Schuler v. Israel, 27 Fed. Rep. 851; Richardson v. Rogers, 45 Mich. 951.

6 Smith's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 381; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 460, 8 Am. Dec. 581; Hooper v. Tuckerman, 3 Sandf. (N. P.) 311; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 355; Chafee v. Fourth Nat. Bk. of N. Y. 71 Me. 514: J. M. Atherton Co. v. Ives, 20 Fed. Rep. 894. The reason of this evidently is because the succession to aid the distribution of personal property

signment of real property will not pass title to property in another State, unless the assignment is valid according to the laws of the State where the property is situated, except in those cases where it is in conflict with the rights of resident creditors.8

It has been held in New York, that an assignment by the receiver of a foreign insolyent corporation of its choses in action in that State passes a good title to the same as against the debtors by whom they are owing.9 And in Massachusetts, it has been said that an assignment is not void as against an attachment because it gives preferences.10

While the title of foreign assignees in bankruptcy will not be recognized in New York, solely by virtue of the foreign statute, it will be recognized and enforced where it can be done without prejudice to creditors pursuing their remedies under the New York statutes.11 But a voluntary assignment made in New York, and valid there, has been held not to be valid in Massachusetts against an attachment, if such assignment is one which, were it made between citizens of the latter State, it would be imperative for want of compliance with statutory requisitions.12

It has been said that the insolvent laws of a State do not by their declaratory force solely, without any other investiture of title, the possession remaining in the debtor, remove the property of the debtor beyond the reach of a creditor who is a resident of another State and who proceeds in the circuit court. 13 Yet when the Canada Southern

is regulated by the law of the owner's domicile and not by the law of the situs. See Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196, 202; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424; Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N. Y. 163; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 112; Ballard v. Webster, 9 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 410; Lyman v. Parsons, 28 Barb. 573; Stewart v. McMartin, 5 Barb. 441; Isham v. Gibbons, 1 Bradford, 74; Peterson v. Chemical Bank, 27 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 501, 2 Robt. (N. Y.) 607; Parsons v. Lyman, 18 How. Pr. 198; Schultz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 363.

7 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208. But see Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53, 6 N. E. Rep. 486; Van Winkle v. Armstrong, 41 N. J. Eq. 402; Richardson v. Rogers, 45 Mich. 591.

8 Schuler v. Israel, 27 Fed. Rep. 851. See Phelps v. Borland, 103 N. Y. 406; In re Wait, 99 N. Y. 433.

9 Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320; overruling 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 416.

10 Train v. Kendall, 137 Mass. 366.

11 In re Wait, 99 N. Y. 433; overruling Mosselman v. Caen, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 66.

12 Faulkner v. Hyman (Mass.), 2 N. Eng. Rep. 181.

18 Odgen v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. (68 U. S.) 223, 17 L. ed. 531;

Railway Company, a Canadian corporation, became embarassed, the Canadian parliament passed an "arrangement act," patterned upon similar English and Canadian acts. These acts partake partly of the nature of a reorganization after foreclosure and partly of the nature of proceedings in bankruptcy. The act in question, without providing for notice or hearing, sought to conclude the rights of bondholders. The Canadian parliaThe Canadian parliament not being restricted from enacting laws impairing the obligation of contracts, it was held that the act was clearly binding upon Canadian bondholders, and that the corporation being a Canada corporation, and the scheme partaking so largely of an adjudication in bankruptcy, it should be deemed binding upon bondholders within the United States as well. 14

Under the Alabama law a woman's property is her own and not liable for her husband's debts. A man there converted his wife's property into money, thereby becoming her debtor. They then moved to Tennessee, where he contracted debts, and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors in which he prefered his wife as a creditor. It was held that the Tennessee courts would respect the preference, on the principles of interstate comity. 15

4. Title of Foreign Assignees.—It is a general practice among nations to give effect to the title of foreign assignees in bankruptcy.16 But as the statutes of a foreign State can in no case have any force or effect in a State ex pro prio vigore, hence it has been held in New York, that the statutory title of foreign assignees in bankruptcy can have no recognition solely by virtue of the foreign statute. But the comity of nations allows effect to such titles when they can be recognized and enforced without prejudice to the rights of creditors pursuing their rights under the State statutes, and when they are not in conflict with the laws or public policy of the State.17 A general assignment for creditors will

Towne v. Smith, 1 Woodb. & M. C. C. 136; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 411, 18 L. ed. 432; Mississippi Mills Co. v. Ranlett, 19 Fed. Rep. 191.

14 Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527.

15 Columbia Bank v. Walker, 14 Lea (Tenn.), 299. 16 Bird v. Caritat, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 342, 3 Am. Dec. 433; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 460, 8 Am. Dec. 581.

17 Waite's Accounting (N. Y.) 1 Cent. Rep. 15.

carry personal property although situated in a State whose laws would not permit the assignment, if it had been made therein.18 Thus foreign assignments for the benefit of creditors are valid in Minnesota, though not made in conformity to the Minnesota statutes. 19 And an assignment made in another State for the equal benefit of all creditors of the assignor, is held to be operative on property in Missouri; and this is so although the courts of such other State would not give a similar effect to an assignment made in Missouri. 20

The title acquired by an assignee for the benefit of creditors, although good as to the property assigned, is, as to assets in other States whose policy is not to recognize, as against the claims of creditors of the assignor domiciled therein, the validity of general assignments with preferences, is liable to be defeated by attachment sued out of the courts of such other States, by creditors domiciled therein, to recover their debts out of such assets.21

5. Effect of State Law on Foreign Assignments-But a State law prescribing the effect of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, can have no effect on an assignment made in another State, of an instrument executed in the former;22 and where questions as to the extraterritorial property arise between for eign assignees and foreign creditors domiciled in the same State, the foreign laws to which such parties are subject will be upheld.

18 Livermore v. Jenckes, 21 How. (62 U. S.) 126, 16 L. ed. 702.

19 In re Paige v. Sexsmith Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 136. 20 Zuppann v. Bauer, 17 Mo. App. 678.

21 Kimball v. Lee (N. J.), 4 Cent. Rep. 332.

22 Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McL. C. C. 397. The law of Ohio which declares that an assignment by a debtor in failing circumstances to a part of his creditors in preference to others, shall be for the benefit of all creditors, can have no effect on an assignment made in another State of an instrument executed in Ohio. Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McL. C. C. 397.

23 Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq. 462, revg. 18 N. J. Eq 366; Abraham v. Plestors, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 540, 20 Am. Dec. 738; Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 236; Sanderson v. Bradford, 10 N. H. 260; Hall v. Boardman, 14 N. H. 38; Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474; Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 335; Moore v. Bonnell, 2 Vr. (N. J.) 90; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 25; Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 335; Martin v. Potter, 11 Gray (Mass.), 137. Bishop says that it is not easy to say how far this doctrine was intended to be effected by the decision in Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 139, 19 L. ed. 109. And Dr. Wharton distinguishes Green v. Van Buskirk, upon the ground of the positive enactment of the State of Illinois in

6. Validity of a Foreign Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors.-The validity of an assignment for the benefit of creditors is generally governed by the laws of the State of the debtor's domicile, though it embrace real and personal property situate in other States. 24

Thus an assignment for the benefit of creditors, executed in another State, valid by its laws, need not be recorded under the Pennsylvania statute in order to be operative in that State. 25 And it has been said that the validity of an assignment of personal property in New York, for the benefit of creditors, made in Virginia by citizens of Virginia carrying on business in both States, signed and acknowledged in Virginia and delivered and accepted in New York, is to be determined by the law of New York.26

7. Assignment of Real Estate.-The validity of every disposition of lands, whether the disposition be absolute or qualified, whether it passes an estate or merely imposes a charge, depends exclusively upon the municipal law of the country or State in which the lands are situated.27

It has been held in Pennsylvania that an assignment in insolvency, under the laws of another State, passes lands in that State. 28 But under the West Virginia acts,29 non-residents not being entitled to homestead exemptions, it was held that, where a resident of Virginia was declared a bankrupt by a United States district court sitting in that State, he was not entitled to a homestead in land situated in West Virginia, as against his

reference to the recording of chattel mortgages. He says: "If a State provide that no title shall pass to property within its borders except on certain conditions, such provisions cannot be overridden by any foreign law which parties domiciled abroad may chose to interpolate." Whart. Conf. L. § 371.

24 D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 63; Livermore v. Jenckes, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 126, 16 L. ed. 55; Wickham v. Dillon, 2 West. L. Mo. 3-11.

25 Speed v. May, 17 Pa. St. 91, 55 Am. Dec. 540. 26 Grady v. Bowe, 11 Daly (N. Y.), 259.

27 Nicholson v. Leavitt, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 252, 276; Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N. Y. 157; Slatter v. Carroll, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 573; Hutcheson v. Peshine, 1 C. E. Gr. (16 N. J. Eq) 167; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 23, 19 L. ed. 545; Osborne v. Adams, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 247; Loving v. Pairo, 10 Iowa, 282, 77 Am. Dec. 108; Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41; Rodgers v. Allen, 3 Ohio, 489; Nelson v. Bridport, 8 Beav. Ch. 547; Brodie v. Barry, 2 Ves. & B. 131; Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Ves. 537; Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 9 Bligh, 32; Harrison v. Harrison, 42 L. J. Ch. 495.

28 Lamb v. Fries, 2 Pa. St. 83.

29 1877, Ch. 114, § 1.

creditors there, though the land had been so set apart by his assignee in Virginia, and confirmed by the bankrupt court there.30

It has been said that "it is of no consequence where the instrument containing the disposition is made or delivered, nor where the parties reside, since, in all cases, it is neither the lex loci contractus nor the lex domicilii, but solely the lex loci rei site that governs the construction, and so universal is the rule that neither in the law of England nor in our own (although it seems to be otherwise in some foreign countries) has a solitary exception ever been admitted.''31

Bishop says that "while this rule is admitted in its full force, it does not follow that because an assignment executed in one State covers real property situated in another State, that, therefore, it cannot be assailed here (New York), on the ground that the instrument was in fraud of citizens here, or that it was obtained fraudulently from the grantor.'

132

8. Choses in Action.-All choses in action, since they can have no locality, are said to follow the person, and pass by a general assignment, even though the persons owing the debts are foreign to the domicile of the assignor. 33

The decision of an assignee as to the allowance of a claim made subsequent to a judgment rendered thereon in another State, the claim having been presented prior to the judgment, is a bar to recovery on that judgment, in the State of the assignee's jurisdiction.34

9. Property in Transitu and Ships at Sea. -It is a familiar principle that property at sea or in transitu passes by any valid con

30 Gibbs v. Logan, 22 W. Va. 208. However, see Brady v. Brady, 71 Ga. 71, where it was held that property set aside by the bankruptcy court as the bankrupt's exemption, cannot be levied on by process from a State court; and Brengle v. Richardson, 78 Va. 406; where it is declared that a wrongful allowance by a bankruptcy court of the exemption claimed by the bankrupt cannot be remedied in a State court. 31 Story, Conf. L. § 428.

32 Bishop on Ins. Debt. 239, 240. See also D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 63, 80; Nicholson v. Leavitt, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 252, 276, 277.

93 Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657, 6 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 522; Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. Jr. C. C. 131; Speed v. May, 17 Pa. St. 91, 55 Am. Dec. 540; Noble v. Smith, 6 R. I. 446; Clark v. Connecticut Peat Co., 35 Conn. 303; Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 267; Whart. Conf. L. § 545.

34 State v. Kansas Ins. Co., 32 Kan. 655.

35 Whart. Conf. L. § 356; Plestoro v. Abraham, 1 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 236.

36 Moore v. Willett, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 663; Southern Bank v. Wood, 14 La. An. 561, 74 Am. Dec. 446; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. (83 UT. S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 430; Oliver v. Towne, 14 Martin (La.), 93, 102; Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Martin (La.), 318, 353, 354, 12 Am. Dec. 508; Lanfear v. Summer, 17 Mass. 110; Lamb v. Durant, 12 Mass. 54, 7 Am. Dec. 31; Caldwell v. Ball, 1 T. R. 205; Bholen v. Cleveland, 5 Mason, C. C. 174; Conrad v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (U.S.) 386, 445; Nathen v. Giles, 5 Taunt. 558; Simpson v. Fogo, 1 H. & M. 195, 1 J. & H. 18; 9 Jur. (N. S.) 403; Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter, L. R. 4 Eq. 62, 3 Ch. App. 479.

Supreme Court of Indiana, September 18, 1889.

1. In an action for damages, allegations that defendant negligently and carelessly rode his bicycle in the center of the road at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, up to within twenty-five feet of the faces of plaintiff's horses, whereby they became frightened, are not sufficiently specific as to defendant's negligence, where the negligence sought to be charged is in the manner of riding such bicycle, and not in the speed and place in which it was ridden.

2. A person in a carriage drawn by horses, and the rider of a bicycle, have equal rights upon the highway; and allegations that defendant rode a bicycle in the center of the road at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, up to within twenty-five feet of the faces of plaintiff's horses, whereby they became frightened and ran away and injured plaintiff, do not state a cause of action.

OLDS, J. This is an action for damages. The first paragraph of the complaint alleges that "the plaintiff, on the 16th day of August, 1885, was seated in a two-seated carriage, to which two gentle and well-broken horses, both properly harnessed with good and sufficient harness, were properly and securely attached and hitched in the usual way; which said horses were then and there carefully and properly driven by a careful and competent driver, seated in said carriage, and was then and there driving said team and carriage in which plaintiff was seated, as aforesaid, on the public road and highway leading from Cambridge City, Ind., to Jacksonburg; and when about two miles east of said Cambridge City, and in said county of Wayne, and driving carefully along and upon said highway, and in the part thereof usually driven upon by such teams and

carriages, they were met at the place in said highway last above named by said defendant, seated upon and riding a large bicycle,-the wheel of which bicycle was sixty inches in diameter, who then and there negligently and carelessly rode said bicycle at a rapid rate of speed, to-wit, fifteen miles per hour; and negligently and carelessly run the same along and in the center of said highway at said rapid rate of speed towards and into the faces of said horses, and in this way approached to within twenty-five feet of the faces of said horses, when and whereby said horses became and were greatly frightened, and became and were wholly unmanageable and ran away, and in their fright ran along said road at a great speed, and upset said carriage, whereby the plaintiff was thrown violently to the ground," and sustained severe injuries, etc. The averments of the defendant's acts of negligence are the same in the second and third paragraphs of the complaint as in the first paragraph. There is a variance as to some other averments, it being averred in the second that the strap by which one of the horses was fastened to the end of the pole of the carriage broke. After the horses became frightened, the defendant dismounted and took hold of the bridle of one of the horses and endeavored to hold them, but let go of the horse before the driver dismounted. The infancy of the defendant was suggested, and Reuben Bartch was appointed as his guardian að litem. The defendant moved the court to require the plaintiff to make the complaint more specific, as to how and in what manner the defendant rode and used said bicycle negligently and earelessly, and in what the alleged carelessness and negligence of the defendant consists, in the use of the said bicycle, and what acts and conduct of the defendant in riding and using said bicycle were negligently and carelessly done and performed by him, by reason of which said horses were frightened and caused to run away, causing said injuries to the plaintiff alleged in the complaint, which motion to make such paragraph of said complaint more specific was sustained by the court, and exceptions reserved. The plaintiff refused to amend said paragraphs and make them more specific, and assigns the ruling of the court on the motion as error.

The allegations of the defendant's negligence in these paragraphs of the complaint in brief charge that the plaintiff and defendant were traveling towards each other upon the highway, the plaintiff in her carriage and the defendant upon his bicycle, and that the defendant then and there negligently and carelessly rode his bicycle at the rate of speed of 15 miles per hour up to and within 25 feet of the faces of the horses drawing the carriage in which the plaintiff was seated, whereby the horses became and were greatly frightened, and became and were wholly unmanageable. The allegations of negligence are general, and the theory we take of these paragraphs of complaint is that the negligence sought to be