ST. LOUIS, AUGUST 23, 1889.

THE meeting of the American Bar Association, which is to be held in Chicago on August 28, 29 and 30, will undoubtedly be a memorable affair. They will be entertained by the Illinois State Bar Association and by the Chicago Bar Association and there is no doubt that everything will be done to make the visit agreeable and the work of the convention interesting. The venerable David Dudley Field will preside. The President's address will be made on Wednesday morning, Aug. 28, at ten o'clock. In the afternoon papers will be read by Henry B. Brown, of Michigan, on Judicial Independence; and by Walter B Hill of Georgia, on the Federal Judicial System. On Wednesday evening there will be a reception at the Union League Club. On Thursday morning the annual address will be delivered by Simeon E. Baldwin of Connecticut, on "The Centenary of Modern Government," and after this there will be reports of committees and miscellaneous business. On Thursday afternoon there will be an excursion to Pullman; on Thursday evening report and debate on commercial law and other reports. On Friday morning nomination of officers and miscellaneous business. The meeting will close on Friday evening with a banquet at the Grand Pacific Hotel.

Special notice of the State and local bar associations is called to the fact that each State bar association may appoint delegates not exceeding three, and if there be no State association any city or county bar association may appoint two delegates. Notice must be sent to Edward Otis Hinckley, secretary, 215 N. Charles street, Baltimore, Md.

THAT which is known as the "Meat Inspection Law," enacted by the last legislature of Minnesota, has been declared unconstitutional by three of the circuit judges of that State. The tenor of the law is to prohibit the selling of meat, not inspected "on the hoof," within the State, before slaughter, and its effect has been, to exclude all VOL. 29-No 8.

cision was that the act was an infringement of the constitutional provision giving to congress alone the right to regulate inter-state commerce and that it was not a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it was an attempt to exercise it with respect to a subject beyond its control, and that in the exercise of such power the State could not establish unnecessary or unreasonable regulations, and the court was bound to judge whether an act is a proper exercise of police control from its operation and effect, notwithstanding its language and ostensible purpose, and the court believed and held that as a police regulation it went entirely too far, and established unnecessary and burdensome regulations; that the act contained no provision for the inspection of fresh meats to ascertain whether or not they were in a pure condition, but made provisions for the destruction of any meats from an animal that had not been inspected on the hoof in this State before slaughter, and that the effect was to destroy trade in one of the most important articles of traffic. We very much doubt whether this conclusion will be upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal. The right of a State to regulate and even to prohibit, that which to the law making power seems injurious, or susceptible of injurious use, has been repeatedly declared. Iowa, Kansas and many other States have enacted laws prohibiting the sale of alcoholic liquors, and these laws have, in every instance, been upheld, even to the extent of denying the right to sell in such States, in the original package, liquors brought from without the State. It is difficult to distinguish any tenable ground of difference between the exercise of the power to prevent the sale of liquor, and its exercise to prevent the sale of meats, except under such conditions as the legislature thinks necessary to protect the public health. If it can be alleged, in the case of the meat inspection law that the regulations go too far, and that they are unreasonable, the same thing can be said with equal truth of the Iowa law, forbidding the sale of liquor which the majority of mankind believe to be harmless, and even wholesome when properly used. Besides, the Minnesota law does not in words exclude meat brought from without the State

and it cannot be asserted, as a matter of judicial notice, that the regulations imposed will necessarily have that effect.

In many of the States-notably Missourilaws were passed prohibiting the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine. They were not supported by any evidence that the article declared against was unwholesome, for, on the contrary, it. has been shown to be composed largely of the same ingredients as butter and quite as healthy. Yet the constitutionality of the acts was affirmed without hesitation by the Supreme Court of Missouri and of many other States. In many of these cases, the effect has been practically "to destroy trade in some of the most important articles of traffic" but the concurrent decisions of the highest courts have upheld them as within the police power of the State.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

THE distinction between negotiable certificates issued in the course of administration of municipal affairs by a municipal corporation and the negotiable paper of commercial law is pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of District of Columbia v. Cornell. The court of claims had held the District of Columbia liable upon certificates of indebtedness which after having been redeemed and stamped as cancelled, were stolen by a clerk, cleansed from the stamps and sold to a bona fide purchaser. In reversing this decision Mr. Justice Gray says:

When the maker of a negotiable instrument lawfully cancels it before maturity, his liability upon it is extinguished, and cannot be revived without his consent. It is immaterial whether the cancellation is by destroying the instrument, or by writing or stamping words or lines in ink upon its face, provided the instrument, in the condition in which he puts it, unequivocally shows that it s been canceled. Scholey v. Ramsbottom, 2 Camp. 485; Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. 193; Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 82, 86; Yglesias v. Bank, 3 C. P. Div. 60. In Burbridge v. Manners, Lord Ellenborough said: "It is the duty of bankers to make some memorandum on bill and notes which have been paid;" clearly indicating his opinion that the making of such a memorandum upon the securities would be sufficient to protect the bankers from being afterwards held liable to any holder thereof. The decison in Ingham v. Primrose, holding the acceptor of a bill of exchange, who had torn it in halves and thrown the pieces into the street, liable to one who afterwards took it, in good faith and for value, from one who had picked it up and pasted the

pieces together, proceeded upon the ground that the tearing of the bill into two pieces, as manifest on its face, "was at least as consistent with its having been divided into two for the purpose of safer transmission by the post as with its having been torn for the purpose of annulling it." And the decision can be maintained, if at all, on that ground only. Baxendale v. Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 525, 532. In Baxendale v. Bennett, one who had given his blank acceptance on stamped paper to another, and authorized him to fill in his own name as drawer, and received it back from him unfilled, and put it in the unlocked drawer of his desk, from which it was afterwards stolen, and filled up, without his authority, by inserting the name of another person as drawer, was held not liable to an indorsee for value. In State v. Wells, 15 Cal. 336, cited by the claimant, treasury warrants of the State of California had been once lawfully issued, presented, and paid, but never canceled in any way before they were stolen and again put in circulation; and the suit was not upon the warrants, but was brought by the State against bona fide holders who had presented them a second time, and to recover back the value of bonds which the State had delivered to them in exchange for the warrants, and which they, in good faith, had since parted with. Much reliance was placed by the claimant upon the case of Cooke v. U. S., 91 U. S. 389, in which the United States were held by a majority of this court to be liable to a bona fide holder of interest bearing treasury notes, printed by the treasury department from genuine plates, and perfect in form, complete and ready for issue, and never issued by any authorized officer, but fraudulently or surreptitiously put in circulation. In the opinion, much stress was laid upon the considerations that the notes were perfect and complete as soon as printed, and did not require the signature of any officer, but, as soon as they had received the impression of all the plates and dies necessary to perfect their form, were ready for circulation and use; that in this respect they did not differ from coins of the mint when fully stamped and prepared for issue; and that these notes were intended to circulate and take the place of money, to some extent, for commercial purposes; were made a legal tender for their face value, exclusive of interest, as between the government and its creditors, and passed readily from hand to hand as or in lieu of money. 91 U. S. 404. We are not prepared to extend the scope of that decision, and the facts of this case, as found by the court of claims, are quite different. The certificates in suit, after they had been redeemed according to law, were canceled by the proper officers, by distinctly stamping in ink across the face words stating that fact, and in that condition were made up in bundles, and put away on a shelf, whence they were afterwards stolen by a clerk, who had no duty or authority connected with their redemption or care, and who afterwards fraudulently effaced the marks of cancellation by the use of detersive soap, and by pasting coupons over them, and then put the certificates in circulation. The provision of the act of congress of March 3, 1875, ch. 162, § 16, by which officers of the District of Columbia are required to destroy by burning all redeemed certificates, is in terms and effect merely directory, and does not make the District liable on such certificates fraudulently put in circulation, after they have been otherwise unmistakably canceled. 18 St. 505. These certificates having been lawfully extinguished by stamping across their face marks of cancellation as clear and permanent as the original signatures, the liability of the district upon them as negotiable paper could not be revived by its omission to take additional

precaution against their being stolen and fraudulently restored to their original condition by such means as ingenious wickedness might devise. Moreover, these certificates were in no sense money, or the equivalent of money. Though negotiable instruments, they belonged to a peculiar class of such instruments, being made by a municipal corporation, and having no validity unless issued for a purpose authorized by law, and as to which this court has repeatedly laid down and acted on the following rule: "Vouchers for money due, certificates of indebtedness for services rendered, or for property furnished, for the uses of the city, orders or drafts drawn by one city officer upon another, or any other device of the kind, used for liquidating the amounts legitimately due to public creditors are of course necessary instruments for carrying on the machinery of municipal administration, and for anticipating the collection of taxes. But to invest such documents with the character and incidents of commercial paper, so as to render them in the hands of bona fide holders absolute obligations to pay, however irregularly or fraudulently issued, is an abuse of their true character and purpose." Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468, 477; Wall v. Monroe Co., 103 U. S. 74; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400.

THE defense of former conviction in criminal law was considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Hurst v. State. There it was held that a person who commits the offense of carrying a file into a jail, with intent to aid in the escape of two prisoners, one convicted of a misdemeanor and the other of a felony, may plead his conviction under an indictment for aiding in the release of the former, in bar of an indictment for aiding in the release of the latter. Somerville, J., says:

If we hold this plea of former cenviction to be bad, we can see no reason why a defendant could not be indicted and convicted 100 times, in case he should, by a single act, effect the simultaneous escape of a hundred prisoners, lawfully confined in a county jail or other prison. It is the familiar case of a single criminal act producing several different results, each of which, standing alone, and dissociated from the others, would have been an indictable crime. Is each result a separate and distinct crime, liable to be indicted as such, or is it a mere consequence of a single unlawful act, done with criminal intent? An analogous inquiry would be: If one should cast a stone into a crowd, and wound a dozen men at one blow, is he liable to one or a dozen indictments? If he burns a hundred houses by one act of arson, knowing the probable consequence of his unlawful act, would he be guilty of a hundred crimes? Or should he blow up a hotel with dynamite, murdering a thousand guests, would he be separately triable for the perpetration of a thousand homicides? The authorities are in direct conflict on this subject, and we shall make no effort to reconcile them. It is our judgment that none of the legitimate purposes of punishing crime require the adoption of the policy of multiplying prosecutions in cases of this nature. Such in fact seems to be the policy of our legislation as to framing indictments, as declared by section 4384 of our Criminal Code. It is there provided that, "when an act is criminal if producing different results, such results may be charged in the same count in the alternative." Code 1886, § 4384; Code 1876,

4797. It has often been decided that a single crime cannot be split up or subdivided into two or more indictable offenses. As said in Moore v. State, 71 Ala. 307, "a series of criminal charges cannot, under our system of jurisprudence, be based on the same offense or criminal act, at least, as concerns the dignity of the same sovereignty. If the State elects, through its authorized officers, to prosecute a crime in one of its phases or aspects, it cannot afterwards prosecute the same criminal act under color of another name." It is accordingly held by the great preponderance of authority that the stealing of several articles at the same time and place, although they belong to different owners, constitutes but a single indictable crime, and can be prosecuted as such but once. "An indictment," says Mr. Freeman, "could not be found for the larceny of one of the articles, and after the verdict another indictment sustained for the stealing of the remaining articles. Indeed, to put such a power in the hands of the prosecuting attorney would be to render the salu'tary doctrine of prior jeopardy in many instances practically nugatory." Roberts v. State, 58 Am. Dec. 539, note, and cases cited; Quitzow v. State, 28 Am. Rep. 396, and cases cited. See Oleson v. State, 20 Wis. 58; Woodford v. People, 62 N. Y. 117; Ben v. State, 22 Ala. 9; Clem v. State. 42 Ind. 420; State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. Law 361. We might add to this opinion many other decisions of like import to those above cited but deem it unnecessary. So there are other adjudications holding to the opposite doctrine. State v. Nash, 86 N. C. 650, 41 Am. Rep. 472, note, 475; State v. Elder, 32 Am. Rep. 69; Ben v. State, 58 Am. Dec. note 240-242; Teat v. State, 24 Am. Rep. 708; Roberts v. State, 58 Am. Dec. note, 539, 540; Whart. Crim. Pl. & Pr. § 470. Some of the modern decisions make a distinction between cases where the two pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are interposed, which seems to be supported by sound reason, but this we do not stop to discuss. Simco v. State, 9 Tex. App. 348; Roberts

v. State, 58 Am. Dec. 547, 548. The case of State v. Standifer, 5 Port. (Ala.) 523, does not necessarily con. flict with the views above expressed. See, also, State v. Johnson, 12 Ala. 840; Gorden v. State, 71 Ala. 315; Fiddler v. State, 7 Humph. 508. In the case at bar the gist of the offense charged is the act of carrying the file into the jail, with the criminal intent of aiding certain prisoners to escape. This intent was compound, being more or less aggravated, according to the nature of the crime with which the escaping prisoners were charged. It was competent for the State to elect to prosecute for the higher grade of the crime -the aiding of one to escape who was charged with felony. The prosecutor, in the language of Mr. Bishop, "may carve as large an offense out of the transaction as he can, but he must cut only once." 1 Bish. Cm. Law, § 1060.

AN interesting question in the law of negligence came before the Court of Appeals of New York in Cusick v. Adams. Defendant built a bridge across a river, from his own private premises on one side to a highway on the other. The bridge had been used more or less by the public, but without any invitation by plaintiff to do so, or any advantage accruing therefrom to him, and it had become defective, its dangerous condition being very apparent. Plaintiff, for his own pleasure,

and without any invitation from defendant, attempted to cross over the bridge, and was injured by reason of the defects. It was held that defendant owed plaintiff no duty in regard to the bridge, and was not liable for the injury. The court, in reversing the supreme court, says:

Did the defendant, in constructing the bridge for his own convenience or purposes, thereby assume any active duty of vigilance to see that those who went upon it voluntarily, and by no invitation, express or implied, of his, but simply by his sufferance, were not injured? I do not see how, by my connecting my premises with a public highway, there is imposed any duty upon me to maintain and protect that connection for a public use. The duty of the individual is to use his property in such wise as not to injure his neighbor, and he may not maintain a nuisance upon his premises; but this case does not fall within the application of such rules. The plaintiff was an utter stranger to the defendant. He was not upon the bridge by the defendant's invitation, nor upon any business of his. The evidence does not disclose any reason for his being there at all, with which the defendant was connected or concerned. It does appear that the bridge was used by the public for the purpose of crossing over to the island; but it was not so used by any agreement with the defendant, or with his permission. It was merely by his sufferance that they made use of it. The principle is now well settled by repeated adjudications in this country and in England that where a person comes upon the premises of another without invitation, but simply as a bare licensee, and the owner of the property passively acquiesces in his coming, if an injury is sustained by reason of a mere defect in the premises the owner is not liable for negligence; for such person has taken all risk upon himself. The theory of liability in negligence cases is the violation of some legal duty to exercise care. Among the numerous cases, I refer to the following only as necessary to illustate the general rule of liability. Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 371; Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 743; Burchell v. Hickisson, 50 Law J. Q. B. 101; Ivay v. Hedges, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 80; Sutton v. Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 243; Larmore v. Iron Co., 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E. Rep. 752; Splittorf v. State, 108 N. Y. 203, 15 N. E. Rep. 322; Donahue v. State, 112 N. Y. 142, 19 N. E. Rep. 419; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1; Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306; Parker v. Portland Co., 69 Me. 173; Vanderbeck v. Hendry, 34 N. J. Law, 467. In Whittaker's Smith on Negligence (1st Amer. Ed.) the cases are collected, and the doctrine is discussed. The case of Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 292, does not help the plaintiff. In that case there was an affirmative act on the defendant's part, which contributed to the occurrence. There the owner had long suffered the land to be used by the public as a part of the highway before his hotel, and, while the hotel stood, it was rather to his advantage to leave the strip of land open to the public. Upon this land the owner had made an excavation, which he left unprotected, and the plaintiff fell in one dark night. That was a different case from this, where the defendant, on the proof, was not shown either to be advantaged by any use by the public of his bridge, and where he was charged with no affirmative act. He had undoubtedly suffered the bridge to get out of repair. For what reason, or what his interest in its maintenance was, we are not in

formed, nor are we concerned; and the knowledge is immaterial to the case. We may observe, further, that the dangerous condition of the bridge was not concealed. The holes were very apparent, and the bad condition of the bridge had existed for several years. It therefore cannot be said that the bridge was in any sense a trap, which rendered innocent persons subject to injury. In the recent case of Ivay 1. Hedges, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 80, the court went very far in support of the doctrine of non-liability of an owner for injuries occasioned to others while upon his premises. There a landlord let out a house to several tenants, each of whom had the privilege of using the roof for the purpose of drying their linen. The plaintiff, one of the tenants, while on the roof, slipped, and, the rail being out of repair (and known by landlord to be so), fell through it into the court below. Lord Coleridge said that no liability rested upon defendant for not keeping the rail in repair, in the absence of an absolute contract for the use of the roof. He held that "the tenant takes the premises as he finds them." The opinion of Lindley, L. J., in the case of Burchell v. Hickisson, 50 Law J. Q. B. 101, is much in point. I think the general term judgment proceeded upon the wrong theory, and that this case falls clearly within the doctrine laid down by the authorities I have cited. The principle upon which the cases of Larmore v. Iron Co., Splittorf v. State, and Donahue v. State, supra, were decided, is applicable here; and the opinions of Judges Andrews and Ruger are instructive reading upon the question of liability raised in this case.

THE question whether a belief in spiritualism is an insane delusion sufficient, in itself, to constitute a want of testamentary capacity, was decided in the negative by the Prerogative Court of New Jersey, in Middleditch v. Williams. They say:

Is a belief in spiritualism an insane delusion? Sir John Nicholl, in the celebrated case of Dew v. Clark, 3 Adams, Ecc. 79 (2 Eng. Ecc. R. 441), defined "insane delusion" as follows: "Wherever the patient once conceives something extravagant to exist, which bas still no existence whatever but in his own heated imagination, and wherever, at the same time, having once so conceived, he is incapable of being, or at least of being permanently, reasoned out of that conception, such a patient is said to be under a delusion, în a peculiar, half technical sense of the term, and the absence or presence of delusion, so understood, forms, in my judgment, the true and only test or criterion of present or absent insanity." Dr. Haggard's report of the opinion pronounced in Dew v. Clark attributes somewhat different language to Sir John Nicholl. The following is the definition, as he reports it: "When persons believe things to exist which exist only, or at least in that degree exist only, in their own imagination, and of the non-existence of which neither argument nor proof can convince them, they are of unsound mind; or, as one of the counsel accurately expressed it: 'It is only the belief of facts which no rational person would have believed that is insane delusion."" 1 Williams, Ex'rs, 35; 1 Redf. Wills, 71. Sir James Hannen, in Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 64-68, adopted the definition as reported in 3 Adams as the true one. He said he believed it would solve most, if not all, the difficulties which could arise in investigations of the kind now under

consideration. Chief Judge Denio, in Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619-624, said: "If a person persistently believes supposed facts, which have no real existence except in his perverted imagination, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he is, so far as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion; and delusion, in that sense, is insanity." And Cockburn, C. J., in Banks v. Goodfellow (page 560), says; "When delusions exist which have no foundation in reality, and spring only from a diseased and morbid condition of the mind, to that extent the mind must necessarily be taken to be unsound." According to these definitions, it is only a delusion or conception which springs up spontaneously in the mind of a testator, and is not the result of extrinsic evidence of any kind that can be regarded as furnishing evidence that his mind is diseased or unsound; in other words, that he is subject to an insane delusion. If, without evidence of any kind, he imagines or conceives something to exist which does not in fact exist, and which no rational person would, in the absence of evidence, believe to exist, then it is manifest that the only way for which his irrational belief can be accounted for is that it is the product of mental disorder. Delusions of this kind can be accounted for upon no reasonable theory, except that they are the creations of some derangement of the mind in which they originate. To illustrate: In Smee v. Smee, 5 Prob. Div. 84, the testator imagined himself to be the son of George the IV., and that when he was born a large sum of money had been put in his father's hands for him, but which his father, in fraud of his rights, had distributed to his brothers; and in Smith v. Tebbitt, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 398, the testatrix imagined herself to be one of the persons of the Trinity and her chief legatee to be another. The delusion, in both instances, as will be noticed, was indisputably a wild and baseless fancy, not the product of evidence of any kind, but obviously the offspring of a disordered condition of mind. But where a testator is induced, by false evidence or false statements, to believe a fact to exist which does not exist, or where, in consequence of his faith in evidence which is true, but which is wholly insufficient to prove the truth of what he believes, he believes a fact to exist which in reality has no existence, his belief may show want of discernment, that he is over credulous and easily duped, or that he lacks power to analyze and weigh evidence, or to discriminate between what is true and what is false, but it furnishes no evidence whatever that his mind is diseased. His belief may show lack of judgment or want of reasoning power, but not that his mind is unsound. The testator's belief in spiritualism was not a morbid fancy, but a conviction produced by evidence. The proofs show that when he first commenced attending what are called "seances" he was inclined to be skeptical. Afterwards his mind seemed to be in an unstable condition - he sometimes believed and at others doubted; and it was not until the spirits gave an extraordinary exhibition of their power, by printing or painting on a pin, worn by his mother-in-law on her neck, in brilliant letters, which sparkled like diamonds, the word "Dickie," a pet name of his dead wife, that his last doubts as to the reality of the manifestations were removed. Believing, as I do, that these manifestations were correctly described by ViceChancellor Giffard, in Lyon v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655681, when he called them "mischievous nonsense, well calculated, on the one hand, to delude the vain, the weak, the foolish, and the superstitious, and, on the other, to assist the projects of the needy and of the

adventurer," still it seems to me to be entirely clear that it cannot be said that a person who does believe in their reality is, because of such belief, of unsound mind, or subject to an insane delusion. No court has as yet so held. No cases on this subject were cited on the argument. Those which I have examined uniformly hold that a belief in spiritualism is not insanity. The court, in Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, said: "Belief in spiritualism is not insanity, nor an insane delusion. The term "delusion," as applied

to insanity, is not a mere mistake of fact, or the being misled by false testimony or statements to believe that a fact exists which does not exist." And in Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376, it was said: "The court cannot say, as matter of law, that a person is insane because he holds the belief that he can communicate with spirits (of the dead), and can be and is advised and directed by them in his business transactions and in the disposal of his property." Substantially the same view was expressed in Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa, 23, 15 N. W. Rep. 578, and also in the matter of Smith's Will, 52 Wis. 548, 8 N. W. Rep. 616, and 9 N. W. Rep. 665. The utmost length to which any court has as yet gone on this subject is to declare that a belief in spiritualism may justify the setting aside of a will, when it is shown that the testator, through fear, dread, or reverence of the spirit with which he believed himself to be in communication, allowed his will and judgment to be overpowered, and in disposing of his property followed implicitly the directions which he believed the spirit gave him, but in such case the will is set aside, not on the ground of insanity, but of undue influence. Thompson v. Hawks, 14 Fed. Rep. 902.

JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS OVER ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS.

§ 1. Constitutional Limitations-Statutes.

§ 2. Control over Wills.

§ 3. Conflict of Jurisdiction between Federal and State Courts.

Statutes.

§ 1. Constitutional Limitations -By the terms of the federal constitution congress has power to confer on federal courts, inferior to the supreme court, jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different States and between citizens and aliens.1 The federal constitution imposes no limitation upon the classes of cases involving such controversies, and congress may therefore lawfully provide for bringing, at the option of either of the parties, all such controversies within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. e. g., suits by and against executors, administrators, devisees, legatees and heirs. 2

1 U. S. Const. art. 3, §§ 1, 2; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dallas, 8; McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 616; Cary Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245.

v.

2 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10; Ellis v. Jefferson Davis, 109 U. S. 485; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73..