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tional compact, must ultimately decide whether it has been violated, that such a decision ought to be interposed, either in a hasty manner, or on doubtful and inferior occasions.

"The resolution has, accordingly, guarded against any misapprehension of its object, by expressly requiring, for such an interposition, the case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the exercise of powers not granted by it.'

"But the resolution has done more than guard against misconstruction, by expressly referring to cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous nature. It specifies the object of the interposition which it contemplates to be solely that of arresting the progress of the evil of usurpation, and of maintaining the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to the States, as parties to the Constitution."

No one can read this, without perceiving that Mr. Madison goes the whole length, in support of the principles for which I have been contending.

The gentleman has called upon us to carry out our scheme practically. Now, sir, if I am correct in my view of this matter, then it follows, of course, that the right of a State being established, the federal government is bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, at least so far as to make an appeal to the people for an amendment of the Constitution. This solemn decision of a State, (made either through its legislature or a Convention, as may be supposed to be the proper organ of its sovereign will-a point I do not propose now to discuss,) binds the federal government under the highest constitutional obligation, not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting State. How then can any collision ensue between the federal and State governments, unless, indeed, the former should determine to enforce the law by unconstitutional means?

Sir, I will put the case home to the gentleman. Is there any violation of the constitutional rights of the States, and the liberties of the citizens, (sanctioned by Congress and the Supreme Court,) which he would believe it to be the right and duty of a State to resist? Does he contend for the doctrine "of passive obedience and non-resistance? Would he justify an open resistance to an Act of Congress sanctioned by the Courts, which should abolish the trial by jury, or destroy the freedom of religion, or the freedom of the press? Yes, sir, he would advocate resistance in such cases; and so would I, and so would all of

us.

But such resistance would, according to his doctrine, be revolution: it would be rebellion. According to my opinion it would be just, legal, and constitutional resistance. The whole difference between us, then, consists in this: the gentleman would make force the only arbiter in all cases of collision between the States and the federal government. I would resort to peaceful remedy-the interposition of the State to "arrest the

progress of the evil," until such times as "a convention, (assembled at the call of Congress or two-thirds of the several States,) shall decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs." Sir, I say with Mr. Jefferson, (whose words I have here borrowed,) that "it is the peculiar wisdom and felicity of our Constitution, to have provided this peaceable appeal, where that of other nations," (and I may add that of the gentleman,) " is at once to force.'

Mr. WEBSTER (in some closing remarks said): A few words on the constitutional argument, which the honorable gentleman (Mr. Hayne) labored to reconstruct.

His argument consists of two propositions, and an inference. His propositions are-1. That the Constitution is a compact between the States. 2. That a compact between two, with authority reserved to one to interpret its terms, would be a surrender to that one, of all power whatever. 3. Therefore, (such is his inference,) the General Government does not possess the authority to construe its own powers.

Now, sir, who does not see, without the aid of exposition or detection, the utter confusion of ideas, involved in this, so elaborate and systematic argument?

The Constitution, it is said, is a compact between States: the States, then, and the States only, are parties to the compact. How comes the general government itself a party? Upon the honorable gentleman's hypothesis, the general government is the result of the compact, the creatures of the compact, not one of the parties to it. Yet the argument, as the gentleman has now stated it, makes the government itself one of its own creators. It makes it a party to that compact to which it owes its own existence.

For the purpose of erecting the Constitution on the basis of a compact, the gentleman considers the States as parties to that compact; but as soon as his compact is made, then he chooses to consider the general government, which is the offspring of that compact, not its offspring, but one of its parties; and so, being a party, has not the power of judging on the terms of compact. If the whole of the gentleman's main proposition were conceded to him, that is to say-if I admit for the sake of the argument, that the Constitution is a compact between States, the inferences, which he draws from that proposition, are warranted by no just reason. Because, if the Constitution be a compact between States, still, that Constitution, or that compact, has established a government, with certain powers; and whether it be one of those powers, that it shall construe and interpret for itself, the terms of the compact, in doubtful cases, can only be decided by looking to the compact, and inquiring what provisions it contains on this point. Without any inconsistency with natural reason, the government, even thus created, might be trusted with this power of construction. The extent of its powers, therefore, must still be sought for in the instrument itself.

If the old confederation had contained a clause, declaring that resolutions of the Congress should be the supreme law of the land, any State law or Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, and that a committee of Congress, or any other body created by it, should possess judicial powers, extending to all cases arising under resolutions of Congress, then the power of ultimate decision would have been vested in Congress, under the confederation, although that confederation was a compact between States; and, for this plain reason: that it would have been competent to the States, who alone were parties to the compact, to agree, who should decide, in cases of dispute arising on the construction of the compact.

For the same reason, sir, if I were now to concede to the gentleman his principal propositions, viz: that the Constitution is a compact between States, the question would still be, what provision is made, in this compact, to settle points of disputed construction, or contested power, that shall come into controversy? and this question would still be answered, and conclusively answered, by the Constitution itself. While the gentleman is contending against construction, he himself is setting up the most loose and dangerous construction. The Constitution declares, that the laws of Congress shall be the supreme law of the land.— No construction is necessary here. It declares, also, with equal plainness and precision, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to every case arising under the laws of Congress. This needs no construction. Here is a law, then, which is declared to be supreme; and here is a power established, which is to interpret that law. Now, sir, how has the gentlemen met this? Suppose the Constitution to be a compact, yet here are its terms and how does the gentleman get rid of them? He cannot argue the seal off the bond, nor the words out of the instrument. Here they are what answer does he give to them? None in the world, sir, except, that the effect of this would be to place the States in a condition of inferiority; and because it results, from the very nature of things, there being no superior, that the parties must be their own judges. Thus closely and cogently does the honorable gentleman reason on the words of the Constitution. The gentleman says, if there be such a power of final decision in the general government, he asks for the grant of that power. Well, sir, I show him the grant-I turn him to the very wordsI show him that the laws of Congress are made supreme; and that the judicial power extends, by express words, to the interpretation of these laws. Instead of answering this, he retreats into the general reflection, that it must result from the nature of things,that the States, being the parties, must judge for themselves.

I have admitted, that, if the Constitution were to be considered as the creature of the State Governments, it might be modified, interpreted, or construed, according to their pleasure. But, even in that case, it would be necessary that they should agree. One, alone, could not interpret it conclusively; one, alone, could not

construe it; one alone, could not modify it. Yet the gentleman's doctrine is, that Carolina, alone, may construe and interpret that compact which equally binds all, and gives equal rights to all.

So then, sir, even supposing the Constitution to be a compact between the States, the gentleman's doctrine, nevertheless, is not maintainable; because, first, the general government is not a party to that compact, but a Government established by it, and vested by it with the powers of trying and deciding doubtful questions; and, secondly, because, if the Constitution be regarded as a compact, not one State only, but all the States, are parties to that compact, and one can have no right to fix upon it her own peculiar construction.

So much, sir, for the argument, even if the premises of the gentleman were granted, or could be proved. But, sir, the gentleman has failed to maintain his leading proposition. He has not shown, it cannot be shown, that the Constitution is a compact between State governments. The Constitution itself, in its very front, refutes that proposition: it declares that it is ordained and established by the People of the United States. So far from saying that it is established by the governments of the several States, it does not even say that it is established by the People of the several States: but it pronounces that it is established by the People of the United States, in the aggregate. The gentleman says, it must mean no more than that the People of the several States, taken collectively, constitute the People of the United States; be it so, but it is in this, their collective capacity, it is as all the People of the United States, that they establish the Constitution. So they declare; and words cannot be plainer than the words used.

When the gentleman says, the Constitution is a compact between the States, he uses language exactly applicable to the old confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The confederation was, in strictness, a compact; the States, as States, were parties to it. We had no other general government. But that was found insufficient, and inadequate to the public exigencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a general government, which should stand on a new basis-not a confederacy, not a league, not a compact between States, but a Constitution: a popular government, founded in popular election, directly responsible to the people themselves, and divided into branches, with prescribed limits of power, and prescribed duties. They ordained such a government: they gave it the name of a Constitution, and therein they established a distribution of powers between this, their general government, and their several State governments. When they shall become dissatisfied with this distribution, they can alter it. Their own power over their own instrument remains. But until they shall alter it, it must stand as their will, and is equally binding on the general government and on the States.

INDEX.

ADAMS, JOHN Vice President, page 17.

his Speech when sworn into office, 17, 18.
in favor of Navy, 89, 95.

elected President in 1797, 91.

his policy and measures similar to Washington, 91.
his praise of Washington, 92.

in his presidency, difficulties with France, 93, 105.
his efforts to maintain peace with France, 94.

his missions to France, 96, 98.

his policy towards France in 1798, 98, 103, 105.
approved by Congress, 108, 113.

his last annual address to Congress, 114.

his administration closed prosperously, 114, 115.

his death noticed, 331.

ADAMS, JOHN Q. chosen President, 305.

elected by House of Representatives, 305.

his superior talents and experience as a statesman, 305.

his political views, 305, 306.

in favor of a liberal construction of Constitution, 306, 307, 312, 313, 358.

differed in some respects from Mr. Monroe as to State rights, 306.
unjust prejudices against, 306.

his appointments judicious and impartial, 306.

his praise of President Monroe, 306.

his fidelity and magnanimious policy, 307.

prosperous state of the Union, at his election, 308, 309.

his negotiations with Great Britain, 308,

his views of the South American republics, 316, 318, 346.
Message relating to Georgia and Indians, 338.

opposition to it, 347.

his opinion on the Tariff, 356, 357.

AGRICULTURE, interests of, stated by Mr. Monroe, 247.

ALABAMA, State of admitted, 263.

ALGIERS and other Barbary powers, 122, 124, 127, 132, 135, 137. 232.
ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS, 102.

ALIENS too easily admitted citizens, 139.

AMERICAN SYSTEM, 389, 340.

AMENDMENTS to Constitution, 26, 27, 269.
proposed, 322.

BANK OF UNITED STATES established, 36.

expires and not removed, 178.

proposed in 1814, and approved by two Houses of Congress, 222.
disapproved by Mr Madison, 222, 223.

incorporated in 1816, 233.

provisions and period of, 234.

useful to regulate the currency, 235.

President Jackson opposed to, 378, 394.

bill to renew, negatived by him, 389.
examination of, 261.

reported to be correct and safe, 261, 410.

President Jackson early opposed to, 378, 389.

not injurious, but useful, 378, 379, 394.

McLane, Secretary of Treasury, in favor of, 394.
opinion in favor of, in Philadelphia, 395.

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