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ministration and its friends, and afterwards arrested and tried, on a charge of cowardice and treason. Others, without justifying his conduct on that occasion, believed there was some apology for him, in the inefficient preparation which had been made, to enable him to defend his position.

Another invasion of Canada was made in October, by the United States troops, a great portion of which were the militia of New York. They were under the immediate command of Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, of that State, and numbered over two thousand. He crossed the river opposite to Queenstown, on the Canada side, and immediately attacked and took possession of the town, but not without a vigorous resistance, and many of his troops. killed and wounded. A large regular British force, which was in the vicinity, promptly marched to Queenstown, and a severe battle ensued. The United States troops at Queenstown were not supported by those on the eastern side of the river, as was expected, and although General Rensselaer passed over and urged their crossing the river. These were mostly militia, and they refused to proceed to Queenstown, as directed. The British were more numerous than those from the United States, who had crossed the river; and, under the command of brave and skilful officers, they overpowered the latter. A great slaughter was made of the United States' troops, and many officers were killed or wounded, and about four hundred taken prisoners.

A third invasion of Canada was projected soon after this defeat, but was not carried into execution, except that a small detachment passed over to the Canada side, and, attacking a fort near the river, returned in a few hours. The preparations deemed necessary for the invasion occupied much time, and it became too late in the season to commence offensive operations with any hope of success. It was believed necessary to make the invasion, if at all, with six thousand men; and though the troops then in service in that quarter amounted to eight thousand or more, many were debilitated by sickness. And probably the reverses which had already occurred, induced the commanding officer to refrain from another attack, without a more powerful army. Proclamations were issued, however, of a boasting and threatening character, not much to the credit of the writers, either on the score of wisdom or bravery. But it ought to be recollected, that it was not supposed by the administration, that any very great opposition would be made by the Canadians, and that the United States'

army was not sufficiently provided to ensure success in the invasion of that country. In truth, the army, and its officers, were more formidable in this paper warfare, than in efficient action. The troops were ordered into winter quarters in different places; and thus, the land campaign of 1812 was brought to a close, without giving much annoyance to the British, or procuring much glory to those who planned or engaged in it. A belief had been entertained by the friends of the administration, that Canada would readily submit to the United States, and that a small military force would soon subdue the British provinces. How this enterprise, even if successful, was to establish the maritime rights of the United States, did not fully appear: and it became evident, that the people generally did not justify the invasion of the enemy's territory, when they had been often assured that the war was entirely in defence of individual or national rights.

The naval arm of the United States proved more efficient and more useful. Compared to that of Great Britain, indeed, the American navy was quite insignificant, and altogether inadequate to contend with the naval power of that nation. Yet it was repeatedly successful in contests with single British ships of war of equal and even of larger size. The American naval commanders exhibited equal enterprise and courage; and had the navy been cherished and augmented for the previous ten years, as many judicious statesmen proposed, it would have been far more efficient than it was. By the provident enterprise, and the prompt action of the few public armed vessels then in service, much property was saved to the United States, and the British were led to acknowledge the great skill and bravery of Americans on the ocean, where that nation had long borne undisputed sway.

The administration now became convinced of the vast importance of a navy; and, from this period, was in favor of its increase. At the session of Congress in March, 1812, and a short time before the declaration of war against Great Britain, it was ordered that the few frigates then belonging to the United States, should be repaired; and three others, then on the stocks, should be completed. Three hundred thousand dollars were voted for these purposes. But, in December following-after several successful naval enterprises, which not only displayed the bravery of the officers and seamen, but rendered essential service to the nation-further and more liberal appropriations were made for the augmentation of the navy. Two millions and a half dollars were devoted to this object, and the President

was authorized to build four ships of the line, of seventyfour guns each; six large frigates, of forty-four guns; and six sloops of war, of twenty guns. He had power given him also to purchase or procure other sloops of war, and smaller vessels, for the public service; and the further sum of two hundred thousand dollars was appropriated for that purpose. Though the war was opposed by a large portion of the people at first, and as the repeal of the British orders in council, soon after followed, and the disasters and defeats suffered by the army on the northwest borders, yet the additional expenses incurred for increasing the navy, were almost universally approved. The measure indicated a disposition to defend the maritime rights of the nation, which the policy for some years previously pursued, seemed to sacrifice or abandon. It had been often said, by a portion of the people, that, unless it was in the policy of the administration from 1806 to 1812, to retire from the ocean, and to relinquish all commercial pursuits, it would be essential to prepare a respectable naval force. The people in the Atlantic States were decided and earnest in favor of a navy; and the neglect of the federal government, during the period just mentioned, to increase, or to keep it in its former state even, served to destroy all confidence in the wisdom of the dominant party. The regard manifested by the administration for giving strength to the navy, at this time, therefore, gave much satisfaction to the people, and saved the federal rulers from a total loss of confidence in the majority. Their conduct in this respect, did not indeed, make many converts to the war policy, but a hope was thereby raised, that the commercial and maritime rights of the nation were not disregarded nor undervalued. The Congress met on the first Monday of November, 1812, as had been provided by a law passed in July previous, when the former session was closed. The message of the President to the federal legislature, in compliance with a provision in the Constitution, "that he should give Congress information, from time to time, of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he might judge necessary and expedient," will best disclose the opinions and views of the administration at this very critical period, and describe the condition of the United States, as to public and national affairs.

The message states, "that, as a measure of precaution and forecaste, a large force was placed at Detroit, before the declaration of war, with a view to its security; and, in the event of war, to such operations in Upper Canada, as would

prevent the influence of the British [officers or agents] over the savages, obtain command of the lake, on which Upper Canada borders, and maintain co-operating relations with such forces as might be employed against other parts" [of the British Provinces.] The unfortunate result of General Hull's invasion of Upper Canada, and the fall of Detroit are then noticed. Complaint is then made of the employment of the savage tribes, by the British general, in attacks on the troops and inhabitants of the United States.

The protection of the northwestern frontiers, it is added, had been given to General Harrison, "who had the entire confidence of his fellow-soldiers and fellow-citizens, in that part of the country." The message refers to the attack made on Queenstown under General Van Rensselaer, in October; and it is said, "that the attack was conducted with. distinguished gallantry." The President says, the object had been "to gain command of the lakes; and that a naval force would be provided there superior to that of the British." The refusal of the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut to call out the militia and place them under the command of an officer of the regular army, was thus noticed in the message; "if the authority [of the federal government] to call the militia into service and command for the public defence, can be thus frustrated, in a state of war, and of course, under apprehensions of invasion preceding war, we are not one nation for the purpose most of all requiring it; and the public safety may have no other resource than in those large and permanent military establishments, which are forbidden by the principles of our free government, and against the necessity of which the militia were intended to be a constitutional bulwark."

"On the coasts and on the ocean, the war has been as successful, as circumstances connected with its early stages could promise. Our public ships and private cruisers, by their activity, and where there was occasion, by their intrepidity, have made the enemy sensible of the difference between a reciprocity of captures, and the long confinement of them to their side. Our trade, with some exceptions, has safely reached our ports, having been much favored and protected by our public armed vessels.

"Anxious to abridge the evils from which a state of war cannot be exempt, I lost no time, after it was declared, in conveying to the British government the terms on which its progress might be arrested, without waiting the delays of a formal and final pacification; and the Envoy at Lon

don was authorized to agree to an Armistice founded upon them. These terms required, that the orders in council should be repealed as they affected the United States, without a revival of blockades violating acknowledged rules: that there should be an immediate discharge of American seamen from British ships, and a stop put to impressments from American ships in future; with an understanding that an exclusion of the seamen of each nation from the ships of the other should be stipulated; and that the Armistice should be improved into a definitive and comprehensive adjustment of depending controversies.

"Although a repeal of the orders in council, susceptible of explanation meeting the views of this government, had taken place before this pacific advance, was communicated to that of Great Britain, the proposition was declined, from an avowed repugnance to suspend the practice of impressments during the Armistice; and without any intimation that the arrangement proposed respecting seamen would be accepted. Whether the subsequent communications from this government, affording an occcasion for reconsidering the subject, on the part of Great Britain, will be viewed in a more favorable light, remains to be known. It would be unwise to relax our measures, on a presumption of such a result.

"Our affairs with France retain the posture which they held at my last communications to Congress. Notwithstanding the authorized expectation of an early and favorable issue to the discussions on foot, these have been procrastinated to the latest dates. The only occurrence meriting attention is the promulgation of a French decree, purporting to be a definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decree. This proceeding, although made the ground of the repeal of the British orders, is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections.

"With a view to that vigorous prosecution of the war, to which our national faculties are adequate, the attention of Congress will still be particularly drawn to the insufficiency of existing provisions for filling up the military establishment. A revision of the militia laws, for the purpose of rendering them more systematic, and better adapting them to the emergences of the war, is at this time particularly desirable."

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* It is stated in the message, that the receipts into the treasury, for the year ending in September, were sixteen and a half millions of dollars-that three millions of the principal of the public debt had been paid; but six millions had been received on loans; and that eleven millions had been actually received on loans, at different times.

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