with a design to exceed the powers given by the Constitution, in its strong measures; and as aiming unduly to restrict and lessen the authority of a State. By claiming a right to command and control the militia, without the approbation or consent of the State authority, as was done in 1812, the opposite doctrine was assumed to be correct; and the practical result would be a concentration of the whole power and force of all the States in the hands of the President and his agents, despite the dissent and remonstrance of the State authorities. The Constitution did not give an unqualified or unlimited authority over the militia to the federal government, but confined it to particular exigences; and unless such occasions presented, the federal executive possessed no just authority to command or employ them. If the President, and his subordinate officers, had a constitutional right to call out and employ the militia, as asserted, they might require their services, and keep them under control, when and as long as they might order, under the pretence, that an invasion might take place at some future day, even in six or twelve months; and that it was necessary to be seasonably prepared to act for the defence. of the country. The doctrine was so evidently liable to abuses and an arbitrary exercise of power, as well as incompatible with the constitutional rights of the militia, that many political friends of the administration repudiated it by open and explicit declarations.

In several States, where the militia were not called into the field, when war was first declared, and their services first required, the legislatures afterwards authorized the Governors to order them out, in the event of invasion, or of imminent danger thereof: and the militia were actually and readily employed, at subsequent periods of the war, when the territory of the United States was invaded, or the appearance of the enemy on the coasts, or near the borders, indicated an intended attack.*

When it was known, that the British orders in council, so justly complained of, and which furnished one of the

*On application of the people near the northeast bounds of Maine, then part of Massachusetts, the Governor ordered several companies of militia to march to that frontier for defence. They apprehended an attack from the British in New Brunswick; and satisfied the Governor they had sufficient reason to fear invasion at that time. He promptly ordered a military force for their protection, though he had declined to call out the militia of the State, when the war was first declared. He gave the federal executive notice of this measure, and declared his readiness to place the men under command of an officer of the United States for the purposes of defence.

principal reasons for the declaration of war against that nation, were withdrawn, and cessation of hostilities or an armistice proposed, the people of the United States became more dissatisfied, and generally expressed a strong desire for renewed negotiations and for peace. The views and sentiments of a great portion, if not of the majority of the citizens, were probably justly expressed in the resolutions, referring to the war and the causes or pretences for it, adopted by a very large meeting in the city of New York, on the 19th of August, 1812; and given in the note below.*

* "Resolved, that the legitimate objects of government is the public good, to promote which its powers ought to be exercised: That a free people have a right to form an opinion of the conduct of those entrusted with authority, and to express that opinion: That our national government is an association of the States, for their joint and several advantage: That exercising the powers of that association, to the great and manifest injury of its members, is a breach of trust: That to adopt rules of proceeding, by which the people are deprived of the power of expressing their sentiments through their representatives, is a violation of the first principles of representative government: That the prosperity of the State is principally derived from agriculture and commerce: That the interests of these two great sources of national wealth and power are inseparable; wherefore, the war, lately declared, being destructive to the one, cannot but impair the other: That war, one of the greatest calamities which afflict mankind, is, when waged without just cause, an insult to the divine Majesty: That, if undertaken, however just the cause, without probability of success, is an act of extreme imprudence: That where the injury which must result is great and manifest, while the object to be secured is of trivial comparative importance, the interest of a nation ought not to be hazarded; still less for the gratification of personal partialities or resentments: That the war, lately declared by a slender majority of Congress, is unwise: That the circumstances, under which it was declared, were unfavorable: That the consequences, to which it leads, are alarming: That it is unwise, because if unsuccessful, the objects for which it is waged, whatever they may be, will probably be abandoned: [They were abandoned or waived:] That the more important those objects are, the more unwise must be a war which rashly puts them to the hazard: That if it be intended to establish national rights, it ought to have been considered, that those rights, though violated, could not, while claimed, be considered as abandoned; whereas, if at the end of an unsuccessful war, the nation should relinquish them for the sake of peace, they will be annihilated; or, at least, will depend on the issue of another bloody contest: That it would have been difficult to select a moment more unfavorable for a measure so portentous; the United States unprepared, the treasury empty, articles of primary importance omitted to be procured in season, and not now to be purchased, much of the funds of our mercantile citizens in the hands of those now by Congress made our enemies, property to a large amount afloat on every sea, the revenue impaired by imprudent commercial restrictions, and now by the war destroyed; the nation against whom the war is declared, completely armed and possessed of ample means to protect herself and to annoy us, her fleet mistress of the ocean, and in a capacity to lay waste many of our maritime cities and towns: That a comparison of the condition, in which the two nations stood at the time of that declaration, and in which they now stand, is alone sufficient to show that in making it, our rulers were not possessed of, or did not exercise, a sound political discretion: That a defensive war is to be

It was the largest assembly of respectable citizens ever witnessed in that place; and was attended by the most distinguished and experienced patriots of that city and vicinity; among whom were John Jay, who had been a member of the first continental Congress, in September, 1774, chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, secretary of foreign affairs in the time of the old Congress, Governor of the State of New York, and envoy extraordinary to the court of England, in 1794, appointed by Washington; Rufus King, who was an early member of the old Congress, a delegate in the Convention for forming the federal Constitution, a Senator in Congress afterwards for several years, and then minister to Great Britain; Governeur Morris, also one of the delegates in the Convention which formed the federal Constitution, an envoy to the court of France, and late a Senator in Congress; Egbert Benson, Judge of the District court of the United States, and many years before, a member of Congress; Matthew Clarkson and Richard Varick, distinguished patriots of the Revolution, and eminent for their public services and moral worth. The resolutions were prepared by these individuals.

sustained by every effort and under the pressure of every calamity, but previous to the commencement of offensive war, common sense would have dictated to men of an ordinary capacity, to restore the revenue, to replenish the treasury, permit our citizens to bring home the wealth which in the course of a lucrative commerce they have scattered abroad; fill the military arsenals and magazines; and above all, build and equip a respectable navy: That a calm review of the conduct which has been pursued, and which is so utterly irreconcilable to the maxims of common prudence, so little commended by any facts which have been exhibited to public view, and so fatal to the dearest interests of this country, leaves no room to doubt of the alarming consequences to which it leads: That we are irresistibly drawn to the conclusion, that the American people will, under the name and form of an alliance, be submitted to the will and power of the French Emperor: That in this view of the subject, the question of peace or war, involves all that is dear and valuable to men on this side the grave.' We are, therefore, under the dire necessity of declaring, that we have no confidence in the men who have brought us to this perilous condition. We do not, because we cannot, examine the causes of that management, the mischievous effects of which we so deeply feel and so seriously apprehend; but called upon by an imperious sense of duty, we declare our sentiments, and we entreat our fellow citizens to declare theirs. We implore them to lay aside party distinctions, to banish party feelings, and to unite. In union is force, in force safety. If it shall appear that the majority is in favor of war, be it so; we must submit. If, as we fully believe, a great majority is desirous of peace, let the fact be known: and to this end we propose, that representatives be chosen in the several counties of this State, discreet men and friends of peace, to correspond or confer with each other, and co-operate with the friends of peace in other States, in devising and pursuing such constitutional measures as may secure our liberties and independence, and preserve our Union, which are endangered by the present war."

This was a period of great anxiety and of uncommon excitement. There was not only an apprehension of extensive calamity, the natural consequence of war, an accumulation of the public debt, loss of property, detriment to commerce, and sacrifice of human life; but a fear of undue military authority, of the exercise of arbitrary power, under the plea of necessity, of a resort to unjust and oppressive acts to oblige the people to support the war; and most of all, a close connection, or alliance, with the French government, then a most alarming and despotic power, though professing to be friendly to republican States; the nation being then entirely subject to the will of one man, whose ambition was unbounded, and whose want of moral principle was such, as that no reliance could be placed on his promises or his justice. It was believed to be the natural consequence of a war with England, especially as it was waged, with the approbation, if not by the dictation, of the Emperor, and was likely to operate in furtherance of his views of universal empire.

The spirit and language of the warm friends of the administration, soon after war was declared, served also to alarm the fears of the people, and to induce the more intelligent to ponder on the policy and movements of the administration. It was openly declared, by the advocates for war, "that there could no longer be endured, any expressions of disapprobation of the measures of Congress or of the federal executive-that the time for discussion was past, and all must now unite in support of the war, in person, or by contributions." In some instances, direct threats were uttered towards such as spoke against the policy of war measures; and acts of violence were committed, by mobs, on peaceable citizens, for daring to speak or write against the war. The streets of Baltimore were moistened with the blood of some of her most worthy and patriotic citizens, who exercised the rights of freemen, by discussing the measures of the administration. In other places, individuals were threatened with violence, unless they would contribute to funds for carrying on the war, by making loans to the government, which had incurred great expenses without any means to meet them.

The general character of the individual, then President of the United States, was such as would have led to the opinion, that he would not hastily give his consent to war. He had none of the peculiar attributes of a military hero, and had never been a soldier. He was esteemed as a philosopher, or a statesman in a republic, when war is not to

be supposed to occur, unless in extreme cases for defence. And many anxiously interrogated, whether there was not some strange infatuation prevailing in the federal councils; or whether the measure of an offensive war could be accounted for on the supposition of unreasonable prejudices and antipathies towards Great Britain, and of equally unreasonable partialities for France. For sometime, it appeared, that the reign of terror had commenced; and that similar scenes of violence were to be witnessed, as had been in revolutionary France; but there was too much intelligence and love of order, and too great a love of rational liberty, indeed, to allow such a state of things long to exist in the United States; and the tone and conduct of the inconsiderate friends of the administration soon became more prudent and proper. The war had its course, under the direction of the federal government, to which it exclusively belonged to continue it, or to make peace. Many assisted no farther than the laws required, and continued to express a desire that it might soon be brought to an end. The number, who were dissatisfied with the war, and who wished for its termination, constantly increased; and this was, probably, one consideration with the federal administration for giving instructions, in 1814, to its ministers then in Europe, to enter into fresh negotiations for peace.

The first military effort after the war began, was attended with defeat and disgrace. A large force was then at Detroit, and were soon ordered to invade the neighboring British province of Upper Canada, but they were not sufficiently provided with munitions of war to authorize such an expedition. It was, indeed, supposed that most of the Canadians would submit without resistance, but this proved to be a great mistake. The American troops, under General Hull, passed over the lake, and effected a landing on the Canada side, without opposition. They, however, did not meet with friends to welcome or assist them, as they had hoped; and some regular British troops in that province, whose commander had early intelligence of the war, were promptly marched to defend that part of the country where the Americans had proceeded. The cannon of the latter was found to be in almost a useless state, and General Hull returned to Detroit without capturing any important post, or acquiring any military honors. The British general in that quarter, who appears to have been a character of decision and energy, soon made an attack on Detroit, and the American commander surrendered to him that important post. He was highly censured by the ad