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days of discipline and urging, a majority voted in favor of it. It was the opinion of a great portion of the United States, that injury had been received from both France and England; equally from the former as from the latter; but to make war on both would be unwise; and that it was not necessary, to the maintenance of the nation's rights to make war on either. The administration was in favor of a different course; and chose war with Great Britain rather than with France. A few months delay of this decision, so disastrous in its effects, might have prevented the sad alternative; for the British Orders in Council were repealed in June, soon after an authentic assurance was given that the French decrees had been revoked. It was afterwards made evident, also, that some of the French state papers, then recently received, were not laid before Congress, when the measure of war was under discussion; and these so exceptionable and insolent, that, had they been communicated at the time, the majority of the national legislature would not have consented to the declaration of hostilities against England.

The declaration of war was preceded by an Act of Congress, of the fourth of April, imposing an embargo for ninety days; which, with other Acts passed by the federal government, at the time, indicated its ultimate object, though the opinion was still expressed by many of the citizens, that such an extreme measure would not be adopted. For, in addition to the fact, that the nation was not prepared to engage in and prosecute a war with efficiency against so formidable a naval power as England, the necessity of such a measure did not appear, from considerations either of national rights or interests. Neither the liberty nor the territory of the United States was directly attacked; and the injuries received were rather incidental than designed to operate unfavorably on the commerce of the United States. Nor was it perceived, that a war, if prosecuted with ability and energy, would procure the recognition of principles and claims advanced by the American government, in the declaration of hostilities. Events soon proved the correctness of these opinions, expressed at the commencement of the war, as well as before a formal declaration was made. For peace was earnestly sought and made by the American administration, within three years after it was declared, without obtaining the admission of Great Britain, of the doctrines first asserted and insisted on, as indispensable to a future amicable treaty or compromise.

There was also something surprising and unaccountable in the declaration of war, by the American government, at the time it was made; as no very adequate means had been prepared for such a crisis. The people were thus left, to indulge in suspicions and apprehensions, that causes unrevealed and unknown to the nation, had an influence in producing this unexpected result. The only explanation to be given, and the conjecture best supported by circumstances, then recently developed, was that a desire to preserve the friendship of the French government had an undue influence in the alternative chosen by the political party then in power. That the declaration of war was hasty and improvident, was generally acknowledged afterwards; and the effect was a more full and prevalent opinion against the policy of war; and a resolution, in the reflecting part of the people, to give greater influence to the benevolent and pacific principles of Christianity.

It was not probably the design or purpose of the administration to oblige the British government, by the declaration of war, or by any naval force it could employ, to yield the points so long in dispute between the two nations. The American navy was comparatively small; and the policy. for ten years, had been to diminish, rather than to increase it. No large ships of war had been built, during that period, although efforts had been made by the minority for that purpose. A number of gunboats had indeed been prepared, but they were designed merely for the defence of the bays and harbors of the country. Nor had such provision been made for the augmentation of the regular troops in the service of the United States, as the crisis, brought on by the administration itself, required, though some increase was ordered; and resort was therefore early had to the aid of the militia for defence and safety. In April, 1812, one hundred thousand were ordered to be detached and equipped, in all the States of the Union, to be apportioned according to the population of each State. The detachment was made in several States; but it was in the expectation that they would be employed only in case of invasion, or imminent danger of invasion, and for defence in times of great exigency, when the regular troops could not protect the places invaded. But it soon became manifest, that the militia were to be chiefly depended on, and must, therefore, be employed in a similar manner with regular troops; and even be called forth to assist in invading and conquering the neighboring territory of Great Britain. Large bodies of troops, and of the militia, were ordered to the northwest

ern borders of the United States, where no other object could possibly be in view, than to take possession of and subdue a portion of the territory, by military force. For no invasion of the United States was then threatened by the Canadian provinces; and a proclamation was issued by one of the American generals on that border, evidently intended to induce the people of Canada to submit to, and become connected with, the American federal government.

That more adequate and efficient measures for the defence of the country were not provided, before war was declared, is proof that no invasion was then expected or feared. Great Britain had made no preparation for such an enterprise, nor threatened it; but, on the other hand, seemed desirous of maintaining amicable relations with the United States; though unwilling to yield to the demands repeatedly made, for a relinquishment of the doctrine of blockade, of impressment of seamen who were natural subjects of England, or of interdicting to neutrals the trade with her enemy in war, not permitted in a time of peace. On these points, the British government was tenacious and determined; and was ready to encounter the hostile movements of the United States, in addition to the attacks of European powers, rather than agree to the demands made of them; leading, as they believed, to their own subjugation and

ruin.

The neglect of previous and seasonable preparation for war, was the occasion of extravagant expenditures afterwards to place the nation in a sufficiently formidable attitude, either for defence, if invaded, or for an attack on the British provinces, as was early projected. Men and provisions were wanted for the extreme western military post at Detroit, in the vicinity of Upper Canada; there not being an adequate force even for defence, much less for invading that territory, which was ordered. The regular army filled up but slowly, compared to the instant exigency and call; but few volunteer companies were raised; and though the militia were detached in several of the States, there was a reluctance generally in calling them into the field, until invasion should take place, or immediately threaten.

A disposition, on the part of the British government to remain in friendship with the United States, was manifested about the time the American Congress declared war

* A law was passed in June, twelve days after the declaration of war, authorizing the issue of treasury notes, to the amount of five millions of dollars; and at the following session of Congress, it was found necessary to issue ten millions more.

against that nation, by repealing the orders in council, so injurious to neutral commerce, and the revocation of which had been often demanded by the federal executive. On satisfactory evidence, that the French edicts of a similar character were actually revoked, the British administration caused its orders to be withdrawn, June 22d; and the intelligence of this repeal reached Washington the last of July. An armistice was also proposed by the British, but it was not accepted. For although it is very probable war would not have been declared by Congress, had the British Orders in Council been withdrawn, and the fact known in the United States before a formal declaration was made; these orders were not the only or chief reason given for resorting to that alternative. The principal cause of the war was stated to be the impressment of seamen, by the British commanders, from the vessels of the United States; and as there was no engagement made by the British ministry on the subject, the armistice was not accepted, nor did the American government cease hostilities which had already commenced; and it was again explicitly announced, that until an adjustment was made on the subject of impressments, essentially agreeable to the views of the federal administration, the war would be prosecuted.

A very interesting question arose at this period, involving a great Constitutional principle, as to the extent of the power of the federal executive over the militia; whether they were under his uncontrolled and merely discretionary direction; or whether the authority of the general government to employ and command them was limited, and only to be exercised in certain specified exigences. The language of the Constitution, on this subject, is as follows: "Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." And when the President directed the general officers of the United States army, to call on the governors of the respective States for the militia, to be put under the command of those officers, in any case they might require, some of the governors declined so to call them forth and place them under command of an officer of the regular army; but, at the same time declaring, that when there should be an actual invasion, or immediate danger of invasion, the militia would be ordered out to repel it, and to defend the coast invaded; and be placed under the command of an officer in the service of the general government.

The principal reasons given for declining to call out the

militia and place them under the command of officers of the regular national army, were, that it was inconsistent with the rights of the militia, as citizens, to dispose of them in this manner, and was converting them into a body of standing troops against their will; and that the Constitution evidently required their being called into public military service by authority of the federal government to repel invasion, unexpectedly arising, and no regular troops prepared for the defence of the country: the power over the militia, the citizen soldiers of a State, being vested entirely in the governor thereof; except in the emergencies particularly stated in the Constitution. The argument of the federal administration, on the other hand, for claiming authority to call out the militia, as was done, at an early period, was, at least, plausible; and some believed, sufficiently valid, to justify the call, and to charge the governors of the States who refused to order out the militia, with a gross and dangerous neglect of public duty.

It was observed, that, as war had been declared, the whole country was exposed to attacks from Great Britain; and that, both for defensive and offensive measures, the whole force of the United States should be subject to the control and direction of the federal executive, in such time and manner as he might judge necessary or proper.

This is a most important subject; and, as in 1812, there is still a difference of opinion, respecting the authority of the federal government over the militia. The doctrine asserted at that period, by the friends of the administration, goes to destroy all State authority over the militia in time of war; and to justify the employment of them by the general government, in the same manner with regular troops; and thus power would be allowed an ambitious President to destroy the liberties of the people. And the extreme of the opposite construction, which would leave it to the governor of each State when, and where, to order out the militia, might often produce disastrous results.

The opinion expressed by the men then in power in the federal government, was quite different from that which they had advocated a few years before, when they were in the minority. They had insisted on a rigid construction of the Constitution, and opposed all exercise of power in Congress and in the President, not plainly authorized by that instrument; and contended strenuously for the right of authority in the State governments to act in all cases, not expressly granted to the general government. And the former administration and its friends had been charged

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