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Great Britain by the American government. The terms of reparation for the affair of the Chesapeake, formerly tendered by the British Envoy in 1809, were, however, accepted in November, 1811; which were a disavowal of the attack by the British government; a restoration of the men taken from that vessel; and compensation to the families or relatives of those killed or wounded at the time of the attack.

Several important measures were adopted or proposed at the session of Congress, which began in December, 1810, and continued to the third of March, 1811; which serve to indicate the views and policy of the administration of that period. The act relating to commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, which had been sometime in force, was modified in part, but in such manner as to afford no advantages to merchants; and rather to embarrass and injure the trade with England. For certain parts of the former act had been repealed, so as to induce mercantile enterprise to British ports; but now they were revived, and the goods imported from Great Britain made liable to seizure; and bonds were required of those who imported them, to await a legal decision.

Louisiana was made a separate and distinct State, with the privileges of other States in the Union; but great opposition was made to the measure, on the ground of unconstitutionality, as it was not a part of the original territory of the United States. It was included in the tract of country purchased of France in 1803. And it was contended, that, according to the true meaning and intent of the Constitution, new States were to be formed, only by a division of one of the original thirteen States; or within the territory ceded to the United States, by the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783. But a large majority of Congress was in favor of the admission of Louisiana as one of the United States.

During this session, the question was agitated in Congress, of the propriety and expediency of taking possession of West Florida, by an armed force; on the plea that it was included in the territory of Louisiana, which had been purchased of France. Without authority of Congress, the President had ordered troops to march from the territory of Mississippi into Florida, and to take possession of the country in the name of the United States. And this order of the Executive was given, on the supposition that Florida was part of the territory which had been purchased. The Spanish authorities refused to surrender it, when demanded

by the general of the United States army, which invaded it; and it was so doubtful, whether the claim to the territory asserted by the administration was just and valid, that Congress did not see fit to urge it at the point of the bayonet; and the troops were soon withdrawn by orders of the federal Executive.

The act of incorporation of the United States Bank, which was passed in 1791, was now about to expire; and a proposition was made to renew it. The importance of continuing the Bank, for the benefit of the public finances, and for individual enterprise, and for the monetary intercourse between distant parts of the Union, was strongly urged, but without success. There was a small majority in the national legislature, at that time, opposed to the institution. The Senate was equally divided on the question; seventeen members being in favor of a renewal of the charter, and seventeen against it; and the President of the Senate also gave his voice in opposition to it.

Further efforts were made by the American administration to conciliate the favor, or to prevent the hostile measures of the French Emperor. And another Envoy was deputed to the court of France, in 1811, with instructions and powers to form a treaty, particularly relating to the interests and pursuits of commerce. He was received with courtesy ; and intimations were repeatedly given by members of the French cabinet, that it was desirous of settling a commercial convention. But the Emperor was deeply engaged in plans of extending his power through continental Europe; and a part of his system was to exclude British goods and manufacturers, to produce all possible injury to his formidable enemy; in accomplishing which, he believed, the commerce of the United States must be restricted, or be wholly under his control. The Envoy of the United States proposed, that as they had lost the trade to Great Britain, free intercourse should be had with the continent of Europe; but after a long time for considering the proposition, it was rejected as interfering too much with the plans and policy of the Emperor. And all this was borne by the American administration with patience, and almost without complaint.

There is but one consideration, which presents itself, consistently with patriotic and impartial views in the administration, from 1801 to 1812; and that is a belief in the two Presidents for that period, that the conduct of Great Britain was alike injurious and unjust; and that the designs of her statesmen were directly hostile to the prosperity of the United States. And that the Emperor of France, with

a few occasional and light trespasses on American commerce, and even these committed in defence of the great cause of human rights and civil liberty, should be considered the real friend of the United States; and his conduct therefore be endured as the wholesome discipline of a political friend. This supposition was advanced as an opology for the measures adopted by the government of the United States. But with this admission, the wisdom of the political course, pursued at that time, seems not to have been fully demonstrated by the events which followed. As was said, by a distinguished member of the Senate, from the State of Connecticut, "the path for the administration to pursue was as plain as a turnpike-the two belligerent nations should have been treated with strict impartiality-an embargo laid for a short and limited period; permission to merchants to arm their vessels; and such measures of defence, both on the land and on the ocean, as the state of the country afforded, and as would, in a great measure, prove efficient for the purposes of commercial protection; and the manifestation of a proper spirit to maintain the rights of the nation." The system of gunboats merely for the harbors and coasts of the United States, was declared by him, and in this opinion a great portion of the citizens in the Atlantic States agreed with him, to be but an apology for, if not designed to cast ridicule on, a proper naval force. And it was the belief of a large and respectable minority in the country, that greater efforts should have been made to defend and maintain the national rights on the ocean, instead of a voluntary abandonment, or suspension of them, on account of the ambitious projects or capricious despotism of any foreign power.

This protracted period of commercial interruptions and restrictions was attended, as might have been anticipated, by a great reduction in the trade and revenue of the United States. The exports were much reduced in 1808, 1809, and 1810; and the imports suffered corresponding depression; so that it became necessary to resort to loans, to meet the demands on the public treasury. A system had long been in operation, even from the third year of the federal government, and under the provident administration of the first President, to reduce the principal of the national debt: and a large sum was appropriated by law, to be annually applied to that object. In May, 1810, a law was passed, authorising a loan, equal to the amount of the public debt, which was reimbursable that year. And thus, though the annual reduction of the public debt took place, nominally, a large amount was actually borrowed, to maintain the credit of the United States.

The American minister long remained at the court of France; expostulating with its ministers, for unfriendly and injurious acts towards the United States; and importuning for justice, and for some proofs of really amicable intentions in favor of the American government. But no direct and satisfactory answer was given to these repeated applications of the American Envoy. After several months of delay on the subject, the Emperor was pleased to decree, "that so long as the British orders in council were unrepealed, and the principles of the treaty of Utrecht (1713) with respect to neutrals, were in operation, his edicts of Berlin and Milan must remain in force, as to those nations which should suffer their flag to be denationalized." This was at once decisive as to the policy and views of the Emperor, and as to the designed inoperativeness of the alleged repeal of those decrees, as stated and promised in August, 1810. And when the British government was urged a second time to withdraw their orders in council, on the plea by the American minister, that the French edicts were repealed, they declared, "that whenever those edicts were absolutely and unconditionally repealed by an authentic act of the French government, publicly promulgated, their orders would be revoked." In April, 1812, the British ministers issued a declaration, or state paper, in which they gave a concise statement of events which preceded their orders of council, and mentioned the terms for their revocation. In this official document it was again declared, that, if at any time hereafter, the Berlin and Milan decrees, shall by an authentic act of the French government, publicly promulgated, be expressly and unconditionally repealed, then, and from thenceforth, the order in council of January, 1807, and of April, 1809, shall, without any further order be, and the same are wholly and absolutely revoked." Hence it appears, that the British government did not, in April, 1812, consider the French edicts repealed. Nor could there be any just complaint against England for requiring proof of the actual repeal of the French decrees; though there was good reason to object to her orders, so injurious to neutrals, and especially to the United States.

Afterwards, when in the month of May, 1812, the decree of the French government of April, preceding, was communicated to the British court by the American minister, the repeal of the Orders in Council followed, in June. But before the intelligence of this repeal reached the United States, war had been declared by Congress against Great Britain, and the door to reconciliation was unhappily closed.

For, probably, there would not have been a resort to war, had there been no deception and no prevarication in the case by the government of France; there being evidence abundantly sufficient to show, that the British government would have readily repealed its obnoxious orders of council on direct and full assurance that the decrees of the Emperor, dated at Berlin and Milan, were actually revoked.

The reasons publicly given for the declaration of war with England were, in substance, as follows:-The impressment of American seamen by the commanders of British ships of war; their doctrine and system of blockade; and the adoption and continuance of the orders in council of that government; which operated extensively to the interruption and injury of the American commerce. The two latter, it was said, were not to be tolerated by civilized communities, being founded not in right or justice, but in force; and that the former was utterly inconsistent with the honor and attributes of an independent nation. Το which was added, a long and unsatisfied demand for remuneration on account of depredations, committed by the subjects of that government, on the lawful commerce of the United States.

War with England had evidently been contemplated by the American administration for some time previously to its formal declaration. No patriotic citizen of the United States justified the conduct of the British government, in all respects. Some of its orders and measures were injurious in their effects, and arbitrary and unjust in their character; but these did not render a war necessary. It was also apparent, when all the facts were known, that the cabinet gave a too high coloring to British acts of aggression; and endeavored to keep out of sight, or to cast a shade on the more arbitrary measures of the French gov

ernment.

The people generally did not approve of the war, though they acquiesced in the measure when thus legally adopted. And some of the leading friends of the administration were known to be opposed to it. The measure was adopted in the House of Representatives by a small majority; but did not pass the Senate till fourteen days, after the question was first submitted to that body, though pressed by several members. At first it was evident that the majority was against war; and a proposition was made on which the Senate was equally divided, at the first vote, for granting reprisals against the commerce of Great Britain, by public or private ships of the United States; but after several

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