its rejection. This charge was reiterated by him, after it had been denied by the American Secretary; and however he might be satisfied, that other terms were substituted for those imposed on the British Envoy, and with the full perception of the American administration, it was deemed highly improper in him to make and repeat the insinuation. The President may be supposed to have perceived, that the terms of the Convention of April, 1809, were a departure from the directions given to the British Envoy, who agreed to it, and yet not to have known that such were all or the only instructions he had received. It was not for the American administration to ascertain the full extent of the authority of the Envoy, but to make the most favorable treaty to which he would give his assent. This was a difficulty to be adjusted between the British government and its public agent. And while that government claimed the right to reject it, without subjecting itself to the charge of wishing to produce a war between the two countries; the President of the United States did not render himself liable to insult or censure for forming a Convention the most favorable to be made with the British Envoy. The correspondence with the new minister from England was maintained for some weeks, but each party considered itself harshly treated, and uncourteous language was used by each; and the President, after several letters passed between them, directed the Secretary of State to receive no further communication. The offensive expressions contained in these notes were rather of a personal nature, or on account of supposed insinuations against the honor of the administration; the merits of the controversy between the two governments were not discussed.

By the abrupt termination of this attempt at negotiation, and the failure of several former efforts for that purpose as the rejection of the treaty signed by the American Envoys in London, in 1807; the declining to treat with the British minister, deputed to offer reparation for the affair of the Chesapeake; the non-acceptance, by Great Britain, of a Convention made in 1809-the prospect of maintaining friendly relations with England was greatly obscured, and war appeared almost certain and inevitable; except that neither nation was disposed to adopt such an alternative; and both, probably, believed its interests would suffer by it.

The principles advanced by the British government, however founded in former precedent, or necessary to the prosperity of that country, were such as an independent,

powerful and neutral nation could not fully admit. The British insisted on the right to their native subjects, and to search for and seize them, if found in the merchant vessels of neutrals; to prohibit to a neutral nation the colonial trade, in time of war, which it was not allowed to use or profit by, in peace: thus preventing the trade, in American vessels, from the colonies of France or Spain to the ports in the parent country, which, in time of peace, those nations had respectively monopolized. To these claims, the government of the United States was not disposed to yield; but offered to repeal the act closing their harbors and ports against the British ships of war; and to suspend the nonintercourse system as to that nation, while they should be in force against France, so long as it continued its obnoxious and injurious decrees. The subject of impressments also presented great difficulties. But the claims and propositions of the American government were such, that the British ministry could not be justly censured for not admitting them.

The British minister left Washington immediately on receiving notice that no further communications would be received from him, November, 1809;* and took up his residence in New York: and the President, by his Envoy in London, requested his recall. This was accordingly done, in March following; but without any censure expressed, as to the conduct of the Envoy, or the offer of any apology to the American government for the insult which it was alleged he had given. Nor did the court of England deem it necessary, or expedient, for some time, to appoint another minister to the United States. It was not disposed to declare war, nor to abandon its claims, however strongly opposed by the American administration, of a right to take its own subjects from merchant vessels, to enforce its doctrine relating to blockades, and to prevent the trade by neutrals. between the colonies and their parent country in Europe, in war, as well as in times of peace. The non-intercourse and non-importation acts of the United States, operated in some measure, to restrict the trade of Great Britain; but this inconvenience was far less than to have consented to the demands of the American government, while the French decrees remained in force.

* On the 13th of November, he published a circular, in which he reiterated the assertion, that the President should have known his predecessor had exceeded his authority, and insinuated that duplicity and prevarication were chargeable against the administration. This act was generally considered highly indecorous, and excited the indignation of the people in all parts of the Union.

The American Envoy to Great Britain was continued, though not without some hesitation, and a disposition to recall him; the British Premier having often expressed his intention of appointing another minister to the United States, during the summer of 1810: but early in 1811, he was directed to leave the court of England, and return to America. He had, however, after the departure of the British Envoy, near the close of 1809, been instructed to continue or renew negotiations with the government of Great Britain, "relating to wrongs committed on the high seas, or other waters," and "for establishing the principles of navigation and commerce between the two nations." But his efforts, under these instructions, proved altogether unavailing.

The French and British decrees, so injurious to the commerce of the United States, and by the American government believed to be violations of the rights of neutral nations, being still in force, after repeated remonstrances against them, and various attempts to procure their repeal by negotiation, Congress passed a law, in March, 1809, interdicting all commercial intercourse between the United States and those countries. The act, however, was limited to the end of the next session of Congress; and the law, imposing an embargo, passed in December, 1807, it was also enacted, should be repealed at the same time.

Pursuing this policy, and in connection with the act of March, of 1809, the President was authorized, by another law of Congress, passed in May, 1810, "in case either Great Britain or France should, before the first of March following, revoke her edicts, or so modify them, that they would cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," to declare the fact by proclamation; and that, on the omission of the other nation to revoke, or so modify her edicts, the act interdicting commercial intercourse between the United States, and France and England, passed in February, 1809, should continue in force as to such nation." The act vesting such authority in the President, was soon after made known to the court of France; and the French minister for foreign affairs immediately addressed a note to the envoy of the United States, then in Paris, dated August, 1810; in which he stated, "that the Berlin and Milan decrees, issued by the Emperor," (which had justly given great offence to the American government and people,) 66 were revoked, and would cease to have effect after the first of November following."

But the contents of this note of the French minister were not sufficiently intelligible or satisfactory, to meet the

approbation of the people of the United States generally; and yet the administration gave a more favorable construction to the document; and in November, immediately after the note was received at Washington, the President issued a proclamation, declaring the restrictions imposed by the act of Congress of May, 1810, were removed or repealed with regard to France.

In his note, giving notice that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, the French minister of foreign affairs was pleased to observe, "that his government had adopted this measure, because the Congress of the United States had retraced its steps, and had engaged to oppose the belligerent (England) which refused to acknowledge the rights of neutrals." The following language was somewhat equivocal, and served as an apology afterwards for the French government, in not fulfilling the promise, which it was understood to have given. "It being understood (or on condition) that the English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have wished to establish; or that the United States shall cause their rights to be respected by the English."

Trusting to the sincerity of this declaration, and believing in the pacific spirit of the French government towards the United States, the President issued a proclamation the first of November, declaring that the French decrees were in fact revoked, and that the non-intercourse law would be revived and in force as to Great Britain, unless her orders in council should be revoked in three months from that date. The wisdom of this measure was questioned by the political opponents of the administration; because the decree, said to have been adopted, was not published in extenso, with its date, and was to have effect at a future day; and that on certain conditions, of which the American government could not guarantee the performance, without declaring war against England, if she did not also revoke the orders in council-which were as injurious to France as to the United States. Nor was there any engagement, at the time, on the part of the French government to provide indemnity for its extensive depredations on American commerce, committed under its several former edicts; notwithstanding the declaration of the President, that the restoration of property so seized, must follow the repeal. Subsequent events served to prove, that the Emperor of France did not intend to revoke his decrees, in fact, unless Great Britain should also withdraw her orders affecting neutral commerce, or the United States should declare war against that nation. In

deed, after the first of November, American vessels and their cargoes were seized and held for sequestration, in order to ensure future measures by the government of the United States, agreeable to the policy and wishes of the Emperor. And several months later, March 1811, he declared, "that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were the fundamental laws of his empire." A new Envoy from France, who arrived about this time, gave official notice also to the federal administration, that no remuneration would be made for the property sequestered.

In the meantime, the President urged on the British government a revocation of the orders in council, against which, he and his predecessor had repeatedly remonstrated as injurious and unjust; and in this application, he assumed that the French edicts were repealed. And yet, on the arrival of the French Envoy, there was no official or direct notice made by him to the President, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were really revoked; and the Secretary of State, in an address, soon after published by him, expressed his full belief, that they were not withdrawn, and no assurance given when they would cease to operate. In March, 1811, however, in this state of uncertainty, as to the past acts or future policy of France, Congress declared its approbation of the measure of the President adopted by his proclamation, and passed a non-intercourse act against Great Britain.

The British ministry were not so credulous, and insisted, that the decrees of the Emperor were not actually repealed; and that the proclamation of the President and the subsequent law of Congress, interdicting all commercial intercourse with that nation, was partial and unjust. And thus the unfriendly feelings, which dictated complaints both from the government of the United States and England, against each other, were continued and increased. The British government was tenacious of the policy it had adopted, relating to neutrals; and pleaded, that its interests rendered it peculiarly necessary to be pursued at that time. There had then been no ambassador from England near the federal government, for some time. The American minister-Pinckney-retired from the British court, early in 1811; but an Envoy was soon after appointed to the United States, with instructions to renew the offer of reparation for the attack on the frigate Chesapeake; and to make other explanations, with a view to prevent the calamities of war, which was then apprehended would take place. Nothing very favorable resulted from this embassy; though the British minister remained at Washington till the declaration of war against