INDEX.

ADMIRALTY. See Collision; Information, 2; Jurisdiction, 20,

tice, 12, 15.

1. Vessels are liable in admiralty for marine torts committed by them
through the negligence of a pilot in charge, and compulsorily taken
on board. The China, 53.

2. By its law, all maritime claims upon the vessel extend to the proceeds
arising from its sale. The Siren, 152.

8. Where, in case of collision, with loss, there is reasonable doubt as to
which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the one on
which it has fallen. The Grace Girdler, 196.

4. The rule of navigation which requires that a vessel coming up behind
another, and on the same course with her, shall keep out of the way,
presupposes that the other vessel keeps her course, and it is not to be
applied irrespective of the circumstances which may render a depar-
ture from it necessary to avoid immediate danger. Ib.

AGENT.

1. Where an instrument payable at a bank is lodged with the bank for
collection, the bank becomes the agent of the payee to receive pay-
ment. Ward v.
Smith, 447.

2. Where not lodged with the bank, whatever the bank receives from the
maker to apply upon the instrument, it receives as his agent. Ib.

3. Without special authority, an agent can only receive payment of the
debt due his principal in the legal currency of the country, or in bills
which pass as money at their par value by the common consent. Ib.

ALABAMA.

Her statute of 7th October, 1864, under which contracts of affreightment
are authorized to be enforced in rem through the courts of the State,
by proceedings, the same in form as those used in courts of admiralty
of the United States, is unconstitutional. The Belfast, 624.

ARBITRAMENT AND AWARD.

An act of Congress referring a claim against the government to an officer
of one of the executive departments, to examine and adjust, does not,
even though the claimant and government act under the statute, and
the account is examined and adjusted, make the case one of "arbi-
trament and award." Gordon v. United States, 188.

ASSIGNMENT. See Equity, 8.

ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. See Judicial Officers, Mandamus, 1.

1. Cannot be disbarred for misbehavior in his office of an attorney gen-
erally, upon the return of a rule issued against him for contempt of
court, and without opportunity of defence to the first-named charge.
Ex parte Bradley, 364.

2. However, formal allegations, making specific charges of malpractice,
are not essential as a foundation for proceedings against attorneys.
What is requisite is, that, when not taken for matters occurring in
open court, in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to
the attorney of the charges made, and opportunity afforded him for
explanation and defence. The manner in which the proceeding shall
be conducted, so that it be without oppression or injustice, is a matter
of judicial regulation. Randall v. Brigham, 523.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL. See Informer.

AUTHORITY.

1. Where the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are equally
divided in opinion, the judgment of affirmance, which is the judgment
rendered in such a case, is as conclusive as if rendered upon the con-
currence of all the judges. Durant v. Essex Company, 107; and see
Appendix, 753.

2. The law about municipal bonds, as adjudged in Gelpcke v. The City of
Dubuque (1 Wallace, 176-223), is not open for re-examination. Lee
County v. Rogers, 181.

BANK BILLS. See Tender.

BILL OF EXCEPTION. See Practice, 1, 2, 10.

Should only present the rulings of the court upon some matter of law, and
contain only so much of the testimony, or such a statement of the
proofs made cr offered, as may be necessary to explain the bearing
of the rulings upon the issue involved. Lincoln v. Claflin, 132.

BILL QUIA TIMET. See Equity, 1.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE. See Texas, 2.

The matter of, when drawn by officers of the government, examined; and
the law decided to be, that as under existing laws there can be no
lawful occasion for an officer to accept drafts on behalf of the govern-
ment, such acceptances cannot bind it, though there may be occasions
for drawing or paying drafts which may bind the government. The
Floyd Acceptances, 666.

BLOCKADE. See Public Law, 2.

CALIFORNIA.

A grant of land in, purporting to have been made by Governor Pio Pico,
on the 2d of May, 1846, and insufficient on the archive papers, decided
not to be helped by papers produced by the claimant; these being
found by the court, upon the evidence in the case, not genuine, but
fabricated on an afterthought, from fragments of papers left unfin-
ished by Pio Pico. Roland v. United States, 743.

CANCELLATION OF PATENT. See Practice, 18.

CAUSA PROXIMA VEL REMOTA. See Inspection, 3; Insurance, 1.

CHARTER-PARTY.

1. The stipulation of, to take a cargo of lawful merchandise, implies that
the articles composing the cargo shall be in such condition, and be put
up in such form, that they can be stowed and carried without one part
damaging the other. Boyd v. Moses, 316.

2. The master of a ship may, therefore, refuse to take goods offered for
shipment, if in his honest judgment they are in such condition or of
such character, that they cannot be carried without injury to the rest
of the cargo, without violating a charter-party containing the condi-
tion mentioned. Ib.

3. A letter from the charterer to the master, making agreement to hold
the ship harmless for a shipment of goods of such a character, held to
be a modification of the terms of the charter-party, and valid between
charterer and owner.
Ib.

CITIZENSHIP. See Naturalization.

COLLECTORS.

Prior to the act of June 12th, 1858, providing compensation not exceed-
ing one quarter of one per cent. to them, acting as disbursing agents
of the United States in certain cases, they could not, if receiving a
general maximum compensation, under the act of March 24, 1831
(? 4), and also a special maximum of $400, under the act of May 7th,
1822 ( 18), recover for disbursements made for building a custom-
house and marine hospital at the port where they were collectors.
United States v. Shoemaker, 338.

COLLISION.

1. The meaning of the terms, "meeting end on," and "meeting nearly
end on," as used within the 11th Article of the Act of Congress of
April 29, 1864, fixing "Rules and Regulations for Preventing Col-
lisions on Water," considered. And, two sailing vessels pursuing, in
the night time, lines which, if followed, it was probable, would bring
them into collision, considered, when but two or three miles apart, as
"meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision"
within the meaning of the article above referred to; their rate of
speed having been, at the time, six miles an hour each, and their rate
of approximation, therefore, a mile in each five minutes. The Nich-
ols, 656.

2. Vessels are liable for tortious collisions, committed by them at sea,
through the negligence of a licensed pilot, compulsorily taken by
them on board. The China, 53.

COLUMBIA. See District of.

COMPULSION. See Duress.

Under a State pilot law, which enacted that all vessels "shall take a
licensed pilot, or, in case of refusal to take such pilot, shall pay pi-

COMPULSION (continued).

lotage as if one had been employed," and that any person not licensed
as a pilot, who should attempt to pilot a vessel as aforesaid, should be
"deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, be punished
by a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment not exceeding sixty
days," and that all persons employing any one to act as a pilot not
holding a license, should "forfeit and pay the sum of $100:" Held,
that vessels were compelled to take a pilot. The China, 53.

1. A grant of land, "upon the express understanding and condition" that
a certain institute of learning then incorporated "shall be perma-
nently located upon said lands," between the date of the deed and the
same day in the succeeding year, is a grant upon condition. Mead v.
Ballard, 290.

2. The condition is fulfilled when the trustees pass a resolution locating
the building on the land, with the intention that it should be the per-
manent place of conducting the business of the corporation. And
this, notwithstanding that the building erected in pursuance of the
resolution was afterwards destroyed by fire, and the institute subse-
quently erected on another piece of land. Ib.

CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION.

I. BETWEEN FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS.

1. The statutes of a State limiting the jurisdiction of suits against coun-
ties to Circuit Courts held within such counties can have no applica-
tion to courts of the National government. Cowles v. Mercer County,
118; Payne v. Hook, 425.

II. BETWEEN CONGRESS AND STATE LEGISLATURES.

2. Certificates of indebtedness issued by the United States to creditors of
the government, for supplies furnished to it in carrying on the war to
suppress the late rebellion, and by which the government promised to
pay the sums of money specified in them, with interest, at a time
named, are beyond the taxing power of the States. The Banks v. The
Mayor, 16.

3. So are notes issued by the United States under the Loan and Currency
Acts of 1862 and 1863, intended to circulate as money, and actually
making, with the National bank notes, the ordinary circulating me-
dium of the country. Bank v. Supervisors, 26.

4. State legislatures have no authority to create maritime liens; nor can
they confer jurisdiction upon a State court, to enforce such a lien by
a suit or proceeding in rem, as practised in admiralty courts. The
Belfast, 624.

5. The equity jurisdiction and remedies conferred by the Constitution and
statutes of the United States cannot be limited or restrained by State
legislation, and are uniform throughout the different States of the
Union. Payne v. Hook, 425.

CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION (continued).

III. BETWEEN STATE LEGISLATURES.

6. A State has no power to tax the interest of bonds (secured in this case
by mortgage) given by a railroad corporation, and binding every part
of the road, when the road lies partially in another State;-one road
incorporated by the two States. Railroad Company v. Jackson, 262.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Attorney at Law, 1; Conflict of Juris-
diction; Internal Revenue, 3; Ships and Shipping, 3.

1. The "full faith and credit" required by the Federal Constitution to be
given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State, is
not given in one State to the judicial proceedings of another, when
these last (proceedings in rem) do not operate to bar a further suit in
the second State as fully as they would do in the first. Green v. Van
Buskirk, 139.

2. The nature of "a State," within the various meanings of the Consti-
tution considered; and the meaning of the word as applied to one of
the United States, settled. Texas v. White, 700.

3. The 5th and 6th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
(relating to criminal prosecutions), were designed exclusively as re-
strictions upon Federal power. Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 321.
4. A statute of a State releasing "whatever interest" in certain real
estate may
"rightfully" belong to it, is not a law impairing the obli-
gation of a contract in a case where an agent of the State, having by
contract with it acquired an interest in half the lot, undertakes to sell
and conveys the whole of it. Mulligan v. Corbins, 487.
5. The repeal, pending an appeal provided for by it, of an act of Congress
enacting that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over
final decisions of the Circuit Courts, in certain cases, is not an exer- -
cise of judicial power by the legislature, no matter whether the repeal
takes effect before or after argument of the appeal. It negatives the
jurisdiction. Ex parte McCardle, 506.

CONTRACT. See Constitutional Law, 4; Inspection, 2, 3; Insurance, 2;
Public Policy.

1. A government contract, not very clear in its terms, interpreted against
the interests of the government, it having been suggested by one
officer of the government, signed by another officer in behalf of the
government, without its being signed by the contractor on the other
side, and the interpretation which this court thus, and upon what it
deemed a reasonable construction of the language of the amendment,
gave to the amendment, having been that which the officer who sug-
gested it had acted upon as the right one. Garrison v. United States,

688.

2. The designation of a bank as the place of payment of a bond, imports
a stipulation that its holder will have it at the bank when due to re-
ceive payment, and that the obligor will produce there the funds to
pay it.
Ward v. Smith, 447.

3. If the obligor is at the bank, at the maturity of the bond, with the