department and its bureaus, the post office department, and each of the other departments of the government; and also out of the land office, patent office, pension office, Indian bureau, and the bureaus in the war and navy departments. In such modes our code of national common law is growing annually; though upon national subjects only; and it can never be rightfully extended to municipal subjects.

SEC. 11. CHECKS AND BALANCES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. LARGE MAJORITIES NECESSARY TO CARRY IT ON.

Government and laws being necessary to society, the powers of legislation and of administering a government must necessarily be either in the hands of the majority, or a minority; for it is impossible for all to agree. In almost every country of Europe, the minority govern, and the majority are subject to their rule; but the fundamental principle of our democratic federal republic is, that the majority shall rule. In all the state governments, and in the city and local governments organized under them, a bare majority rule, for the time being, with no restraint except the laws of the land. But in the federal government it is far otherwise. That government is organized with numerous checks and balances for the protection of state rights and powers, and the rights of minorities, from the selfish ambition and tyranny of majorities.

Before any measure can become a law, it must command the assent and concurrence, first of a majority of the people represented in the lower house of congress; secondly of a majority of the states, represented in the senate; and lastly, the approval of the president of the United States. Those checks are so great, and the local interests and sectional jealousies of our immense country are so numerous, that in practice, it requires the concurrence of the representatives of from three-fifths to two-thirds of the people, to pass any law. So great has been the attachment to the Union and the federal governmeut, that there has never been any difficulty under any administration, to command sufficient majorities to pass revenue and appropriation bills necessary to carry on the government; but it has often been very difficult to obtain the requisite majorities, and the approval of the president, to other classes of appropriations, and in favor of new measures, and espe

cially measures which tend to promote the interests of only a por tion, or section of the Union.

The leading rebels in the great rebellion have pretended that the election by the republicans, of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency, endangered the rights of the slaveholding states. But the pretence was a false one, set up to alarm the people of the south and unite them in the rebellion-for the reason that if all those states had remained in the Union, and their senators and representatives had continued in their seats in congress, the opponents to the republicans would have had a majority in both houses of congress, and could have controlled the federal legislation, and effectually prevented the passage of any measures prejudicial to the interests of the southern states. If those states had remained in the Union, their senators and representatives could and would have prevented the passage of the bills to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and to prohibit it in the territories of the United States; and the administration of president Lincoln would have pased away quietly, withont making any impression whatever upon the institution of slavery.

With the single exception of the imperfect machinery for the election of president and vice-president, the constitution of the United States is the most perfect instrument of the kind ever formed by man.

SEC. 12. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ARE NECESSARILY JUDGES OF THE EXTENT OF THEIR OWN POWERS.

In our system of government the sovereignty of the several states being divided between the national and state governments, there are two co-ordinate sovereignties in each state, each complete within its sphere, but limited as to the subjects to which it applies. The two co-ordinate sovereignties are not however entirely equal in contemplation of law, as independent nations are. If they were so, it would be impossible to avoid conflict. On the contrary, in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the national government and laws take precedence and priority over the state government and laws, and the national government being made by the constitution the sole arbiter between the states, it must, from the necessity of the case, judge of the extent of its own powers,

and of the mode and propriety of their exercise.

Hence the federal government and laws are superior to the state governments and laws, and in case of concurrent jurisdiction or conflict, the former must prevail over the latter; but in theory, each is supreme within its exclusive sphere, and both should move on harmoniously together.

Each operates directly upon both persons and property, and neither can operate directly upon the other. So far as regards the levy and collection of internal and direct taxes and excises, organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, calling them into the service for certain purposes, and governing them, and the administration of justice in certain classes of civil cases, the powers of the national and state governments operate upon the same persons and subjects matter, and are concurrent. In all such cases, where the two governments have concurrent jurisdiction, the national government has the priority and precedence whenever it is necessary or expedient to exercise the power for national purposes; and the legislative and executive branches of the national government are, and must be, from the nature of the case, the sole judges of the necessity and propriety of its exercise, and the sole judges of all questions of national policy; and the legislative branch alone, including the president, must necessarily be the judges of the extent of the powers of the federal government-subject to the revolutionary right of resistance by the people of states, in case of palpable and dangerous usurpations of power, which threaten the overthrow of state rights.

It is impossible for two governments to have concurrent jurisdiction over the same persons and subject matter, with entire equality of right and power, without more or less conflict and confusion, which must occasionally lead to violence and war. All the independent nations of the earth have co-ordinate jurisdiction over the high seas, and having no common arbiter to settle their difficulties, and no modes of settling them but diplomacy and war, each nation must, from the necessity of the case, judge of its own rights and powers, subject to the perils of war, if they commit flagrant outrages upon the rights of others. The want of a common arbiter between nations having equal rights and powers, frequently and unavoidably leads to war; and yet the want is of such a nature that it is impossible to Supply it.

One of the principal objects of government is to settle difficulties and obviate conflicts between the different peoples, cities, countries, districts, provinces, or states, subject to its jurisdiction. The government of every civilized country takes jurisdiction of, and settles by legislation, judicial and executive action, all questions and controversies arising between itself and its citizens and inhabitants; and between the different peoples, countries, states, provinces, and districts, over which it extends. In our system of government, each state has exclusive power and jurisdiction to act upon and settle, all questions and controversies between itself and its people, between individual citizens or inhabitants thereof, and between the several counties, cities, villages, and corporations therein; while the con#titution confers on the courts of the United States power and jurisdiction, to adjudicate upon and determine all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; all cases of admiralty and maratime jurisdiction; all controversies to which the United States shall be a party; all controversies, (including questions of boundary), between two or more states; and all controversies between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. [See ante. pages 52 and 53.]

Every national government must, from the necessity of the case, be the ultimate judge of the extent of its own powers, of the propriety of their exercise, and of their modes of exercise; subject only to the checks of public opinion, and to the revolutionary rights of the people, in cases of misrule, usurpation, or oppression. That rule applies as much to the government of the United States, as to any other government. It is substantially provided for by the 9th and 13th of the articles of confederation, adopted in March, 1781, (ante. pages 25 and 29); and also by the 18th subdivision of section 8, article I, (ante. page 48), and section 2, of Article III, of the constitution of the United States, (ante. pages 52 and 53.) No government could exist very long without such a power, to avoid as well as to settle controversies, and to provide for its wants and exigencies.

Such a power is as reasonable as it is necessary. Our federal government is the representative of the nation; the representative of all

the states in the Union; and it is charged with the duty of protecting the national rights of the people of all the states, and of settling all the controversies between two or more states, between citizens of different states, and between every state and the citizens thereof, and foreign states, and the citizens and subjects thereof.

Congress and the president representing the whole nation, exercising the legislative and executive powers thereof, must have the sole right to judge of the extent of their powers, and the mode, propriety, and necessity of their exercise; otherwise a single state, or the people of even the fraction of a state, might deny the validity of any act of the government, and effectually nullify it; whereby a fraction of the Union would exercise more power than the government of the whole Union. Such are the absurdities of the doctrines of nullification and secession.

Such a mode of interpreting the constitution of the United States, and the powers of the federal government, as the nullifiers and secessionists have acted upon, would deprive the several states of any common arbiter as between each other, for the settlement of controversies; and by depriving them of that essential power, which is, or should be, inherent in every government, it would expose the states to the same dangers of conflicts and wars between each other, and also between each border state and foreign powers, that are unavoidable between independent nations.

As the only checks to the power of each nation to keep it within the laws of nations and prevent it from enchroaching upon the rights of other independent nations, are the public opinion of the civilized world, and the dangers of war; so the only ultimate checks to the usurpations of the federal government, and the oppressions of a state or section of the Union, or the people therof, consist of public opinion, a resort to the ballot-box, and the revolutionary right of the people. But the ultimate right of revolution and rebellion should be resorted to only in extreme cases, after long continued usurpations and oppressions, which the elective franchise, after a faithful trial, shall have proved insufficient to remedy.

The constitution of the United States formed a Union—not a mere league. It formed a Union intended to be perpetual, to the maintenance of which the faith of all the states was bound.

It