of existence. His principle above all is the "Ego," the self. Subject and object, knowledge and will, are all activities of the self. The Ego exists only in its activities (cf. Aristotle's "Idea"), but all things are but phases of its own activity (cf. Brahmanism), even the part of consciousness it distinguishes from itself is so distinguished by its own activity. His "Ground of the Whole Theory of Science" is an attempt to conceive of our world of consciousness as the development of such an Ego. Schelling was a disciple of Fichte, but he began at an early age to apply Fichte's point of view to the world of nature. Fichte had tried to account for the facts of consciousness as the development of the Ego. Schelling tried to account for all nature as the development of unconscious nature toward spirit. When Schelling began to think of subject and object-all things, in fact-as developed from an indeterminate, neutral nature, as the poles from the indifferent point of a magnet, Hegel (1770-1831), who had worked with him thus far, broke away and traced a conception of the world as the development of spirit. Hegel forced modern times to rewrite the history of philosophy, aesthetics, and civilization. Curiously enough, his ideas led to conservatism in politics and social science, because if the universe is the development of spirit, is not each stage a necessary one? Schopenhauer (1788-1860) fought with a pen dipped in the scorn of pessimism against the extravagances of the idealistic philosophy and argued to substitute in place of Kant's thing-in-itself, the idea of the Will in nature. The philosophy of Comte (1798-1857) was a still further reaction against the idealistic philosophy, and in fact against the philosophical state of mind altogether. Comte believed that the first stage in thought is theological, the second philosophical, and the last scientific, or "positive." He believed in the reign of positive law, not only in the natural sciences, but in the field of civilization, and began the development of a new science of society. The stream of philosophy at the beginning of the second third of the century had turned toward materialism and was soon to be well-nigh absorbed in the question of evolution. of existence. His principle above all is the "Ego," the self. Subject and object, knowledge and will, are all activities of the self. The Ego exists only in its activities (cf. Aristotle's "Idea"), but all things are but phases of its own activity (cf. Brahmanism), even the part of consciousness it distinguishes from itself is so distinguished by its own activity. His "Ground of the Whole Theory of Science" is an attempt to conceive of our world of consciousness as the development of such an Ego. Schelling was a disciple of Fichte, but he began at an early age to apply Fichte's point of view to the world of nature. Fichte had tried to account for the facts of consciousness as the development of the Ego. Schelling tried to account for all nature as the development of unconscious nature toward spirit. When Schelling began to think of subject and object-all things, in fact-as developed from an indeterminate, neutral nature, as the poles from the indifferent point of a magnet, Hegel (1770-1831), who had worked with him thus far, broke away and traced a conception of the world as the development of spirit. Hegel forced modern times to rewrite the history of philosophy, aesthetics, and civilization. Curiously enough, his ideas led to conservatism in politics and social science, because if the universe is the development of spirit, is not each stage a necessary one? Schopenhauer (1788-1860) fought with a pen dipped in the scorn of pessimism against the extravagances of the idealistic philosophy and argued to substitute in place of Kant's thing-in-itself, the idea of the Will in nature. The philosophy of Comte (1798-1857) was a still further reaction against the idealistic philosophy, and in fact against the philosophical state of mind altogether. Comte believed that the first stage in thought is theological, the second philosophical, and the last scientific, or “positive." He believed in the reign of positive law, not only in the natural sciences, but in the field of civilization, and began the development of a new science of society. The stream of philosophy at the beginning of the second third of the century had turned toward materialism and was soon to be well-nigh absorbed in the question of evolution. FICHTE age JOHANNE GOTTLIEB FICHTE was born in Upper Lusatia, Germany, May 19, 1762. He was educated in the lower schools under the patronof Baron von Miltitz. Later he studied theology at Jena and Leipzig, supporting himself mostly by private tutoring (1780 to 1787). In 1790 his Critique of All Revelation was published, and as his name and preface had been accidentally omitted it was at once ascribed to Kant. When Kant corrected the mistake, but praised the work, Fichte's reputation was made. In 1793 Fichte succeeded Reinhold at Jena and was immediately successful. He took much interest in politics and attempted to justify the French Revolution (1793). In 1794 he completed his Science of Knowledge, in which he attempted to demonstrate Kant's system of philosophy by an analysis of consciousness. He tried to unfold froin his conception of the Ego the a priori conditions of all knowledge. He was attacked in 1798 for speaking of the moral order of the world as equivalent to the idea of God, and about the same time Kant declared that the Science of Knowledge was not an exposition of the Kantian system. Fichte was forced to take refuge in Berlin. In 1808 he told his pupils that it was time for action, not for philosophy, and led them in the uprising of Germany against Napoleon. His Addresses to the German Nation at this time had an immense effect in arousing Germany. He died of a hospital fever January 27, 1814. In philosophy Fichte starts from the system of Kant that we can know only phenomena, that the laws of phenomena are furnished by the mind (cause and effect, etc.), that things in themselves may be free from these laws, that the soul is a thing in itself, and hence cannot be known, and in regard to its will may be free. Fichte refuses to see how, if cause and effect is merely a mental form, this category would make us suspect the existence of things in themselves that are not mental, and at once takes the high ground that all experience is the product of consciousness itself-that the Ego finds its experience in reflecting on its own acts. His Science of Knowledge is an attempt to conceive of the universe as a system of one's own reason. The outline given below was drawn up by him for the use of his students. OUTLINES OF THE DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE I. THE Doctrine of Knowledge, apart from all special and definite knowing, proceeds immediately upon Knowledge itself, in the essential unity in which it recognizes Knowledge as existing; and it raises this question in the first place: How this Knowledge can come into being, and what it is in its inward and essential Nature? The following must be apparent: There is but One who exists absolutely by and through himself,-namely, God; and God is not the mere dead conception to which we have thus given utterance, but he is in himself pure Life. He can neither change nor determine himself in aught within himself, nor become any other Being; for his Being contains within it all his Being and all possible Being, and neither within him nor out of him can any new Being arise. If, therefore, Knowledge must be, and yet be not God himself, then, since there is nothing but God, it can only be God out of himself,-God's Being out of his Being,-his Manifestation, in which he dwells wholly as he is in himself, while within himself he also still remains wholly such as he is. But such a Manifestation is a picture or Schema. If there be such a Manifestation-and this can only become evident through its immediate being, seeing that it is immediate-it can only be because God is; and, so surely as God is, it cannot but be. It is, however, by no means to be conceived of as a work of God, effected by some particular act, whereby a change is wrought in himself; but it is to be conceived of as an immediate consequence of his Being. It is absolutely, according to the Form of his Being, just as he himself is absolutely; although it is not he himself, but his Manifestation. Again: Out of God there can be nothing whatever but this ;-no Being that is essentially independent, for that he alone is;-only his Manifestation can there be out of him, and thus a Being out of God signifies merely his Manifestation;-the two expressions mean precisely the same thing. II. Further-Since it cannot be overlooked by the Doctrine of Knowl |
