merce, or having concealed the same in unmarked packages for the purpose of such shipment, in evasion or violation of the Act, without alleging delivery to a carrier, was insufficient.

§ 268a. Constitutionality of Statute.-This statute has been held constitutional by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Rupert vs. U. S., 181 Federal, 88, and in the same case it was determined that an indictment which averred that quail which were killed in the open season and which were delivered to a carrier for transportation from Oklahoma into another State "with intent and for the purpose of being shipped and transported out of Oklahoma" need not allege the months in which the quail were killed. The Congress of the United States has the constitutional right to prevent the shipment in interstate commerce of game when such shipments would be in violation of the laws of the state in which such game was killed. Rupert vs. U. S., 181 Federal, 87. Quail or game belong to the State or rather the people collectively thereof and are subject to the local laws as to killing, and the times therefor, and the shipment. Geer vs. Ct., 161 U. S., 519; Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S., 133; Rupert vs. U. S., 181 Federal, 87; U. S. vs. Shauver, 214 Federal, 154. Act of March 4, 1913, as to migratory birds held unconstitutional, U. S. vs. McCullagh, 221 Federal, 288.

§ 269. Marking of Packages.-Section 243 of the new Code was taken from the same Act of May 25, 1900, and is as follows:

"Sec. 243. All packages containing the dead bodies, or the plumage, or parts thereof, of game animals, or game or other wild birds, when shipped in interstate or foreign commerce shall be plainly and clearly marked, so that the name and address of the shipper, and the nature of the contents may be readily ascertained on an inspection of the outside of such package."

§ 270. Penalty for Violation of Preceding Sections. -Section 244 of the new Code reads as follows:

"Sec. 244. For each evasion or violation of any provision of the three sections last preceding, the shipper shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars; the consignee knowingly receiving such articles so shipped and transported in

violation of said sections shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars; and the carrier knowingly carrying or transporting the same in violation of said sections shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars."

§ 271. Depositing Obscene Books, Etc., with Common Carrier.-Section 245 of the new Code is in the following words:

"Sec. 245. Whoever shall bring or cause to be brought into the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, from any foreign country, or shall therein knowingly deposit or cause to be deposited with any express company or other common carrier, for carriage from one State, Terrítory, or District of the United States, or place non-contiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to any other State, Territory, or District of the United States, or place non-contiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any place in or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States through a foreign country to any place in or subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any place in or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to a foreign country, any obscene, lewd, or lascivious, or any filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character, or any drug, medicine, article, or thing designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception, or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral use, or any written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of how, or of whom, or by what means, any of the hereinbefore mentioned articles, matters, or things may be obtained or made; or whoever shall knowingly take or cause to be taken from such express company or other common carrier any matter or thing the depositing of which for carriage is herein made unlawful, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

This section, it will be noticed, relates not to the use of the Post-office establishment in the transmission of things therein denounced, but to the use of a person or common carrier, or express company.

The meat of the statute is substantially the same as Section 211 of the new Code, which relates to obscene matter, etc., as being non-mailable, and which is denounced in Section 211 of the new Code, heretofore treated.

§ 271a. The Statute is Constitutional.-The power of Congress to regulate the transportation or sending of matter or things or persons from one State to another, whether

by a Federal utility or otherwise, is beyond dispute. Lottery Cases 188 U. S., 321; Hoke vs. U. S., 227, U. S., 308; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U. S., 137; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., 557; Coe vs. Errol, 116 U. S., 517.

A demurrer to an indictment under the foregoing section challenging the constitutionality of the statute was overruled in Clark vs. U. S., 211 Federal, 916. In the Clark case it was also determined that when the indictment did not limit the charge to particular passages or parts of a book, the defendants were entitled to have the whole book introduced in evidence and considered by the jury under proper instructions from the Court.

§ 2716.

Anti-Pass Law.-The Act of June 29, 1906, contains the following provision:

"No common carrier, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall after January 1, 1907, directly or indirectly, issue or give any inter-state free ticket, free pass, or free transportation for passengers, except to its employees and their families, its officers, agents, surgeons, physicians, and attorneys-at-law; to ministers of religion, traveling secretaries of railroad, Young Men's Christian Association, inmates of hospitals and charitable and eleemosynary institutions, and persons exclusively engaged in charitable and eleemosynary work; to indigent, destitute and homeless persons, and to such persons when transferred by charitable societies or hospitals, and the necessary agents employed in such transfer; to inmates of the National homes or State homes for disabled volunteer soldiers, and of soldiers and sailors homes, including those about to enter and those returning home after discharge, and boards of managers of such homes; to necessary care-takers of live stock, poultry and fruit; to employees on sleeping cars, express cars, and to linemen of telegraphic and telephone companies; to railway mail service employees, post-office inspectors, customs inspectors and immigrant inspectors; to newsboys on trains, baggage agents, witnesses attending any legal investigation in which the common carrier is interested, persons injured in wrecks, and physicians and nurses attending such persons: Provided, that this provision shall not be construed to prohibit the interchange of passes for the officers, agents and employees of common carriers and their families; nor to prohibit any common carrier from carrying passengers free with the object of providing relief in cases of general epidemic, pestilence or other calamitous visitation: Provided, further, that the term employees as used in this paragraph shall include furloughed, pensioned and superannuated employees, persons

who have become disabled or infirm in the service of any such common carrier, and the remains of a person killed in the employment of a carrier, and ex-employees traveling for the purpose of entering the service of any such common carrier; and the term families as used in this paragraph shall include the families of those persons named in this proviso, also the families of persons killed while in the service of any such common carrier. Any common carrier violating this provision shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for such offense, on conviction, shall pay to the United States a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $2,000, and any person other than the persons excepted in this provision, who uses any such interstate free ticket, free pass, or free transportation, shall be subject to a like penalty.'

35th Statute at Large, 60 page 256, 1909, Supplement Federal Statutes, Annotated.

Manifestly, the provision applies to only such common carriers as are included in the said Act.

It is not thought that the Section would justify the prosecution of one who stole tickets or passes or other transportation from a common carrier, and used the same, for the reason that the word Such, in the latter portion of the Act, evidently refers to the free ticket, free pass, or free transportation issued or given directly or indirectly by a common carrier.

The Act does apply to one, who, having in his possession an interstate free ticket or pass issued by a railroad company, sells it to another, knowing that he is not the person named therein and is not entitled to ride thereon, with the intent that he shall use it. U. S. vs. Martin, 176 Federal, 110.

§ 271c. Theft of Goods in Interstate Commerce.The Act of February 13, 1913, Chapter 50, 37th Statute at Large, 670, page 203, 1914, Federal Statutes, Annotated, provides as follows:

"That whoever shall unlawfully break the seal of any railroad car containing interstate or foreign shipments of freight or express, or shall enter in such car, with intent, in either case, to commit larceny therein; or whoever shall steal or unlawfully take, carry away or conceal, or by fraud or deception obtain from any railroad car, station house, platform, depot, steam boat, vessel or wharf, with intent to convert to his own use, any goods or chattels, moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment

of freight or express, or shall buy or receive or have in his possession any such goods or chattels, knowing the same to have been stolen; or whoever shall steal or shall unlawfully take, carry away, or by fraud or deception obtain, with intent to convert to his own use, any baggage which shall have come into the possession of any common carrier for transportation from one State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, to another State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to a foreign country, or from a foreign country to any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, or shall break into, steal, take, carry away, or conceal any of the contents of such baggage, or shall buy, receive, or have in his possession any such baggage, or any article therefrom of whatsoever nature, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, and prosecutions therefor may be instituted in any District wherein the crime shall have been committed. The carrying or transporting of any such freight, express, baggage, goods or chattels from one State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, into another State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall constitute a separate offense, and subject the offender to the penalties above described for unlawful taking, and the prosecutions therefor may be instituted in any District into which said freight, express, baggage, goods or chattels shall have been removed, or into which they shall have been brought by such offender."

The next section provides that nothing contained in the above section shall impair the jurisdiction of the Courts of the several States, and also provides that a judgment of conviction or acquittal in a State Court shall be a bar to prosecution therefor in the United States Courts. This Statute marks an outer limit of the jurisdiction of the Federal Government over interstate commerce, and the Courts, in enforcing the same, should apply all of the rigid rules of strict construction that have been formulated in criminal cases. As a matter of fact, thefts committed from interstate shipments are, as a rule, small offenses, which should be cognizable solely in the State Courts. There can, however, be no question as to the constitutionality of this section, and while it is a useful statute, in many ways it is also a farreach of the Federal Government.

§ 271d. Cotton Future Contracts.-The Act of August 18, 1914, provides that it shall be known as the United States Cotton Futures Act. In the second Section thereof