than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

This is an entirely new section. In the 1909 Supplement of the Federal Statutes annotated, it is said in speaking of this section, that,

"This section is new. As originally drafted, it was designed to reach officers making false acknowledgments in contracts, etc., with the Post-office Department, that department having strongly recommended such a section, in order to put a stop to abuses which frequently occurred with respect to mail and other contracts. The Committee on Revision of Laws approved the recommendation, and broadened the section so as to punish false acknowledgments with respect to any contract made with or on behalf of the Government."

This statute would seem to answer the cases cited under Section 29, which held that a false certificate of a notary was not punishable.

§ 176. Officer.

Falsely Pretending to be a United States Section 32 of the new Code, in the following words: "Whoever, with intent to defraud either the United States or any person, shall falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States, or any department, or any officer of the Government thereof, and shall take upon himself to act as such, or shall in such pretended character demand or obtain from any person or from the United States, or any department, or any officer of the Government thereof, any money, paper, document, or other valuable thing, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both,"

contains a general statute, which was originally a special statute against one falsely representing himself to be a Revenue Officer, as set out in old Section 5448. This section was amended in the 23 Statute at Large, page 11, Chapter 26, First Supplement 425, and passes into the new Code as shown above.

In the case of the United States vs. Ballard, 118 Federal, 757, District Judge Phillips, in passing upon an indictment drawn under the above mentioned amendment, held that this statute covered the obtaining of some valuable thing by means of the fraudulent standing or credit secured by hold

ing one's self out as such an officer, and that a month's lodging is a valuable thing within the meaning of the law.

The opinion sets out the indictment that was being passed upon, which charges that the defendant pretended to be a Deputy United States Marshal, and in such pretended character, did demand and obtain from Julia Eggeling a thing of value, to wit, lodging of the value of twenty dollars. A second count therein pleads the same fact in a different manner. While the indictment is in general terms, the Court, in passing thereon, upon objection, held that the offense was statutory, and a bill sufficiently describes the same, which follows the language of the statute and describes in addition thereto the act that was done to constitute the offense.

Judge Adams, in United States vs. Taylor, 108 Federal, held that the section created two offenses, the first of which included as an essential element, the use of such assumed position to extort money or property by wrongfully asserting a pretended claim of the United States, and the second comprehending the extortion of money not under the guise of asserting a claim due the United States, but including the holding out of the offender as an officer for the purpose of giving him such credit as will entitle him to successfully demand money from another for his private use, with intent to defraud, and, therefore, an indictment charging that the defendant feloniously, with the intent to defraud H., did falsely assume and pretend to be an officer acting under the authority of the United States Treasury Department, and did then and there feloniously, and with intent to defraud said H., take upon himself to act as such officer, and as a part of the same sentence including the charge, “and did then and there in such assumed and pretended character as such officer, demand and receive the sum of ten dollars," was demurrable for duplicity. Judge Simonton, in charging the jury under this statute, told them that it was necessary to find that the defendant assumed to be the officer mentioned in the indictment; that such assumption was false; that he made such false assumption with the intent to defraud; and that he carried out such intent. That was in the case of United States vs. Curtain, 43 Federal, 433, which was an indictment growing out of one pretending to be a Postoffice Inspector, and in such pretended capacity, visited a postmaster, and charged him with an illegal sale of stamps,

which illegal sale the postmaster admitted; whereupon, the imposter received one hundred fifty dollars from the postmaster, giving him a receipt in full for the stamps illegally used, and signing it as Post-office Inspector. The same judge in United States vs. Bradford, 53 Federal, 542, charged the jury to find the defendant not guilty upon the following state of facts: A Postal Clerk was in his postal car, assorting his mail, and he discovered Bradford concealed in a corner of the car. He sprang and seized him by the collar. The defendant at once said, "I am Bradford, and in the service." The Postal Clerk denied that he was in the service, and Bradford then said, "I have been discharged, but am trying to steal a ride to Florence." The facts not showing that Bradford claimed at the time to be an employee of the United States, he was not guilty of a violation of this section.

In United States vs. Farnham, 127 Federal, 478, District Judge McPherson set aside a conviction, and discharged the defendant, in a case under this statute, which showed the following facts: The defendant, while stopping at the prosecutor's hotel as a guest, falsely represented himself to the prosecutor as a Secret Service operative in the employ of the Government, and exhibited to the prosecutor a metal badge, inscribed, "Secret Service, U. S." Ten months thereafter, the defendant returned, and represented himself as a traveling salesman, spending several days at the hotel. Prosecutor believed defendant to be a Free Mason, and took special care of him during sickness on that account, after which the defendant presented a check which he alleged had been signed by his employer in payment of his salary, and obtained seventy dollars thereon from prosecutor. The check was drawn on a bank which did not exist; was returned unpaid, and the prosecutor declared that he cashed the check because he continued to believe that the defendant was a Secret Service operative.

In discharging the defendant, the Court held that the facts were not sufficient to sustain a conviction for pretending to be an employee of the United States, and as such, knowingly and feloniously obtaining from another a sum of money,

etc.

§ 176a. Intent to Defraud, Etc.-The intent to defraud is an essential element of Section 32, hence one would

not be guilty under it who induces another to purchase certain books through representations that the seller was an employee acting under the authority of the United States, if the purchaser was not defrauded but had received just what he bargained for. U. S. vs. Rush, 196 Federal, 580. There must really be an officer such as is personated and one who sells a book as an U. S. officer by representing that the money therefor goes into U. S. Treasury is not guilty under this section. U. S. vs. Barnow, 221 Federal, 140.

$177. False Personation of Holder of Public Stocks. -Section 33 of the new Code, which re-enacts old Section 5435, is in the following words:

"Sec. 33. Whoever shall falsely personate any true and lawful holder of any share or sum in the public stocks or debt of the United States, or any person entitled to any annuity, dividend, pension, prize money, wages, or other debt due from the United States, and, under color of such false personation, shall transfer or endeavor to transfer such public stock or any part thereof, or shall receive or endeavor to receive the money of such true and lawful holder thereof, or the money of any person really entitled to receive such annuity, dividend, pension, prize money, wages, or other debt, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years."

§ 178. False Demand or Fraudulent Power of Attorney. Old Section 5436 is displaced by the new Code in Section 34, as follows:

"Sec. 34. Whoever shall knowingly or fraudulently demand or endeavor to obtain any share or sum in the public stocks of the United States, or to have any part thereof transferred, assigned, sold, or conveyed, or to have any annuity, dividend, pension, prize money, wages, or other debt due from the United States, or any part thereof, received, or paid by virtue of any false, forged, or counterfeited power of attorney, authority, or instrument, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years."

§ 179. Making or Presenting False Claims.-Section 5438 of the old statutes is replaced by Section 35 of the new Code, in the following words:

"Sec. 35. Whoever shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval

service of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department, or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or whoever, for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, shall make or use, or cause to be made or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry; or whoever shall enter into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claim; or whoever, having charge, possession, custody, or control of any money or other public property used or to be used in the military or naval service, with intent to defraud the United States, or wilfully to conceal such money or other property, shall deliver or cause to be delivered, to any other person having authority to receive the same, any amount of such money or other property less than that for which he received a certificate or took a receipt; or whoever, being authorized to make or deliver any certificate, voucher, receipt, or other paper certifying the receipt of arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing, or other property so used or to be used, shall make or deliver the same to any other person without full knowledge of the truth of the facts stated therein, and with intent to defraud the United States, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. And whoever shall knowingly purchase or receive in pledge for any obligation or indebtedness from any soldier, officer, sailor, or other person called into or employed in the military or naval service, any arms, equipments, ammunition, clothes, military stores, or other public property, whether furnished to the soldier, sailor, officer, or other person under a clothing allowance or otherwise, such soldier, sailor, officer, or other person not having the lawful right to pledge or sell the same, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, and imprisoned not more than two years."

This section contains several offenses, and sets out two different punishments. It is necessary, in alleging an offense under the first portion of the section that there be an averment that the false claim, etc., was made for the purpose of being presented; in other words, a false claim that was not made for such a purpose is not inhibited by the statute. In prosecutions under this portion of the statute, it is not necessary to set out the name of the officer or person to whom